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ABSTRACT
This thesis exam ines the state form ation process in Panjab and the qualitative change in the 
hegem ony o f  elites from M uslim s to non M uslim s in the first h a lf o f  the nineteenth century. The 
w ork argues that after the em ergence o f  the Sikh faith in the fifteenth century there appeared on 
the social fabric o f  elites tw o distinct categories M uslim  and the non M uslim . T he em ergence and 
expansion  o f  the Sikh relig ious ethos and the political am bitions o f  its leadership influenced the 
political scenario in Panjab under the M ughal rulers. It is the argum ent here that even though  
M uslim  and Sikh relig ious leaderships engaged w ith each other, the conversion  o f  Panjabis both 
from Hindu and M uslim  backgrounds to Sikhism  began to create problem s for the M uslim  elites  
in Panjab. T he relig ious group o f  M uslim s existed with that o f  the Sikh and the Hindus but at the 
tim e o f  political tensions, clear a llegian ces w ere form ed betw een the tw o groups, especia lly  at the 
m om ents w hen the call o f  J eh a d  (a religious call to war for the fo llow ers o f  Islam ) w as given  by 
the M uslim  elites. The v ision  o f  a state not controlled by the M uslim  elites, w ho w ere M ughals 
or A fghans, becam e fundam ental for the new  non M uslim  elites o f  the Panjab. The particular 
case studies o f  M ultan, Kashm ir and Peshawar, exam ine the process o f  change from the M uslim  
elites to the non M uslim  elites. It is postulated in the work that though the id eo logy  o f  Islam  as 
the com m on factor becam e instrumental in the align ing together o f  m any tribal elites, it could not 
sustain the alliance against the non M uslim s, in the region beyond the river Indus, due to various 
inter rivalries betw een  different M uslim  groups. The thesis exam ines the reasons behind the 
sustenance o f  the state under Ranjit Singh and the p olicies adopted by him w hich  gave him the 
right to establish his legitim ate dom ination over his m ajority M uslim  subjects. T his aspect o f  
deriving legitim acy from M uslim  subjects by Ranjit Singh has been exam ined in five  different 
areas o f  governance, nam ely relig ious p olicy , ju stice , army, agrarian p o licy  and the form ation o f  
new  M uslim  elites.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The present study of -  ‘State Formation and the establishment of non Muslim hegemony 
in the Post-Mughal Nineteenth Century Panjab (1780-1839)’ - has been undertaken in the 
specific context of a state carved by Ranjit Singh out of the failing Mughal Empire while 
engaging with both elitist as well as common sections of the Muslim population of the 
Panjab. The thesis will argue that there was a qualitative shift in hegemony from the 
Muslims to the non Muslims among the elites, from the middle of the eighteenth century 
till the time of the state formation by Ranjit Singh in the Punjab. The thesis also explores 
the emergence of Sikh ‘space’, from the time of the advent of the Sikh Gurus which is 
one of the crucial factors leading to the emergence of the non Islamic paradigm in the 
political and social fabric of the Punjab. By ‘space’ it is meant the symbolic realm 
inhabited by an ideology (religious) manifested in the belief systems, way of life and the 
art and architecture of its believers. It is only when the ideology takes roots in the minds 
of the believers that it is able to transform the believers from inside out, affecting in the 
process the physical space also which the believers inhabit. The terms Muslim and non 
Muslim are used to denote both religious as well as political categories. This work will 
demonstrate how certain historical incidents, such as the death of Guru Aijan, the fifth 
master of the Sikhs in Lahore, or the beheading of Guru Tegh Bahadur, the ninth Sikh 
master in Delhi or the rise of Banda Singh in Panjab, or the rallying of Muslims under 
Ahmad Shah Abdali against the Sikhs, or the call of Jehad by Syed Ahmad Bareilly
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against Ranjit Singh’s rule, led to political repurcussions at the macro level which 
eventually had a bearing on the evolution of society and state formation in the Panjab.
Indu Banga has argued that shrewd as Ranjit Singh was, he could well understand that the 
Sikhs constituted a small minority in the total population of Panjab and therefore it was 
necessary for him to appease other communities of the region, particularly the landed, the 
aristocracy and the religious classes, and thus maintain a working balance of opposing 
interests and forces. In describing this as an ideology of consolidation Banga further adds 
that, “as a matter of fact, the Sikh rulers derived stability from the equilibrium of various 
opposites in the Panjabi society and there was logic in nurturing these opposing elements 
through conscious state action”.1
Most of the recent research has covered the origin, rise and the final triumph of Ranjit 
Singh. This research through its thesis, “State Formation and the establishment of non 
Muslim hegemony in Post-Mughal Nineteenth Century Panjab (1780-1839)”, however, 
intends to examine the processes involved in the emergence and sustenance of Ranjit 
Singh’s state in the context of the participation and non-participation of the Muslims in 
the Panjab.
1 Presidential address delivered by Professor Indu Banga at the Panjab History Conference held at Patiala 
on 28th March 1980. Indu Banga, a distinguished historian, is the author o f  many important works on 
Panjab history.
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The questions, to which answers have been sought are: how did the relatively new 
religion of Sikhism emerge in the Panjab, and what was the manner by which the new 
Sikh religious leadership engaged with the political and religious Muslim leadership?; 
how did the Sikhs take control of the polity of a Muslim dominated Panjab?; what was 
the nature of the developments preceding the annexation of Lahore by Ranjit Singh and 
his launching himself as the ruler of the Panjab?; what were the factors determining the 
boundaries of Panjab state under Ranjit Singh (territorial and political)?; to what extent 
did the formation of the state under Ranjit Singh lead to the weakening and destruction of 
earlier social structures and cause simplification, standardization and centralization of the 
state?; how did the formation of state under Ranjit Singh lead to a historical 
transformation of the Muslim society in Panjab? Also explored will be questions about 
the social implications of this transformation: what revolutions and religious uprisings 
arose amongst one set of people against the other? How did the power distribution in the 
society change?
The work has focused in particular on the questions of identity regarding context related 
issues and changes among the Muslims. What was the hierarchy of identities, that is 
religious, caste based and regional, which affected the political control of a region? How 
did the other identities such as those of language, caste or race compete with the religious 
identity? Which sections of society conceived and projected themselves as Muslims? 
Above all, what kind of spatial and temporal boundaries did they establish to create pan 
local communities, and how exactly were these defined, perceived and activated?
11
There were different overlapping subgroups which were within the larger Muslim group; 
this work will explore their dynamics in relation to Ranjit Singh. What became the basis 
for collective mobilizations in favour of the state? Did the Muslims, individually or 
collectively, possess any recognized rights to judge and oppose the ruler on moral or on 
religious grounds? What were, in fact, the status and power of the official representatives 
of institutional religion? Were there any tensions within the Muslim community? What 
was the character, nature and influence of the Sufis and what were the transformations 
which occurred within Sufism in due course of time? What were the character and range 
of relationships between Muslims and other religious groups, and the forms in which they 
influenced each other?
1.1 Historical Background
In order to put this thesis in its historical context, this introductory chapter will give a 
brief overview of the social and political events that unfolded in the Panjab between the 
fifteenth and nineteenth century. All of these events will be elaborated in later chapters 
when it comes to discussing and demonstrating the qualitative shift from the Muslim 
hegemony to the non Muslim hegemony.
The two most important developments of the fifteenth century for the current project 
were the emergence of the Mughals at the political front and the emergence of Sikhism at 
the religious front in the Panjab. Sikhism emerged against the backdrop of the Sufi and 
Bhakti movements with the birth of Guru Nanak (1469-1538) who was born on April 15,
12
1469, in a khatri (the caste group mainly involved in military and some in trade) family 
of Talwandi Rae Bhoey, approximately forty miles south west from Lahore. His father 
was a Patvari (land official working for the Government) or a village accountant to the 
Bhatti landlord named Rai Bular. Nanak was educated both by a Brahmin (person of a 
priestly class), and a Maulvi (religious representative of Islam in Masjid). He went on to 
raise a family and worked in the granary of Daulat Khan Lodhi, of Sultanpur Lodhi. 
However, he never relinquished his interest in the spiritual world. One morning while 
taking bath in the river Baeen, he seems to have attained enlightenment. Once 
enlightened he engaged with the society by reciting his compositions, accompanied by a 
Muslim named Mardana. A large number of Panjabi peasants, mostly Jats, gathered 
around him. His followers began to be called Sikhs, derived from the Sanskrit word 
'Shishya'^ a student. He travelled as far as Mecca to the west, Tibet to the north, Assam 
to the East and Ceylon to the south.
At the political front, Zahir-ud-din Mohammed Babar (ruled from 1526-1530), a Chagtai 
Turkish ruler attacked Ibrahim Lodhi who was ruling over Panjab then, several times,
2 Teja Singh and Ganda Singh, A Short History o f  the Sikhs Vol. I (1469-1765). (Patiala: Punjabi 
University, 1999) 2-3. Nanak founded and travelled across to many parts o f the world, to new communities 
and regions where different faiths other than Hindus lived and prospered. He made followers wherever he 
travelled. Bhai Gurdas Var. Varan Bhai Gurcias (Punjabi), I 45, Amritsar, 1976 Bhai Gurdas was a 
contemporary o f third, fourth, fifth and sixth gurus. Also refer, Qazi Nur Mohammed, Jangnama. Ed. 
Ganda Singh. (Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1939) 159; Jangnama. is an eyewitness account in Persian verse 
o f  Alnnad Shah Durrani’s seventh invasion o f  India (1764-1765). It is the only detailed account o f  the 
seventh invasion o f Panjab by Ahmad Shah Durrani. The author wrote this work at the instance o f Mir 
Nasir Khan, the then ruler o f  Kalat, who joined Ahmad Shah Durrani in this religious war against the Sikhs. 
This source explicitly describes mobilization o f the Afghans, battles with the Sikhs and the recognition o f  
the Sikh leader like Ala Singh o f  Patiala by Ahmad Shah. The work was published by the Sikh Historical 
Research Department, Khalsa College, Amritsar, in 1939. Also see, Charles Herbert Payne, Short History 
o f  the Sikhs (London: Thomas Nelson, 1915. Punjab: Department o f  Languages, 1970)25.
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from his capital Kabul. In 1526, after defeating Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi at Panipat, Babar 
occupied Delhi. While returning to the Panjab from Baghdad during one of his odysseys, 
Nanak witnessed the attack on the town of Sayyidpur and the killing of its inhabitants by 
Babar’s army, in the year 1521.4 He criticised the Rajputs (Hindu Kshatriya Caste) for 
adopting the Muslim mannerisms, eating Muslim style of meat, and wearing a blue dress 
in order to please the ruling class. Guru Nanak even commented about the language 
which people had adopted, forgetting their own mother tongue. These facts had a 
sociological and political dimension which will be elaborated upon later in the thesis. 
Babar, after bequeathing to his successors a distinguished lineage, stretching back to the 
central Asian conqueror Changez Khan, died in the year 1530. He was succeeded by 
Humayun (1530-1556), his son, as the governor of Panjab. The engagement of Guru 
Nanak with Babar will be elaborated upon in the thesis and put in its historical context to 
understand the emergence of the Sikh hegemony in the Panjab.
Humayun, successor of Babar, lost control of his possession of the Panjab and also the 
control over Central Asia to his brother Kamran in 1531.3 This was not all, as Humayun 
also encountered more trouble when he engaged in a struggle to control the east of the 
Panjab from the Afghans. The Mughals and the Afghans met at Chunar, Chusa in 1539 
and at Kanauj in 1540, when Humayun was finally defeated by Afghan Sher Shah. He
3 John F Richards, The New Cambridge History o f  India: The Mughal Empire (1993. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 7-8.
4 Babur, Emperor o f Hindustan, Babur1 namah/ Memoirs o f  Zehir-ed-Din Muhammed Babur. Emperor o f  
Hindustan. Trans. John Leyden and William Erskine, Vol. 2. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921) 149.
3 Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times o f  Humayun (1955. Mumbai: Orient Longmans, 1956) 44-45.
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remained in exile for fifteen years and took refuge with Shah Tahmasp, the Safavid ruler 
in Iran, who helped Humayun in regaining Delhi.6 He died in 1556 leaving the Mughal 
rule in the hands of Akbar (1556-1605). Under Akbar’s rule, the Mughal Empire 
extended its political domination from Delhi to Lahore and Multan in the Panjab by 
defeating Islam Shah Sur’s minister and general Hemu and later Prince Sikandar. He 
conducted the affairs of his state from Fatehpur Sikri (from 1571-1585) and Agra. 
However, in the year 1585, he made the city of Lahore the Mughal capital. He was able 
to control the Afghan tribes from there and also was able to annex Kashmir and Sind, the 
two remaining kingdoms not fully incorporated into the empire until then.8 He developed 
the mansabdari system to run the affairs of his state, whereby selected members of the 
nobility were enlisted who dedicated their life and property to Akbar, in compensation for 
which they received state honours and awards.9 He adopted a liberal religious policy and 
aligned with the Chisti Sufis rather than the Naqshbandis, even though the Naqshbandis 
were from Central Asia, from where the Mughals came. His relationship with the Sikh 
leadership will be elaborated upon in the thesis and it will be shown how his liberal 
policy towards the Sikhs created a favourable environment for the Sikhs to rise socially 
and economically in the Panjab. Akbar died in 1605 after giving many victories to the 
Mughal dynasty, and was succeeded by Nur-ud-din Jehangir (1605-1627) in the year 
1605.
6 Richards 10-12.
7 Richards 29-30.
8 Richards 49.
9 Richards 59-65.
15
By the 1590s Akbar had established his suzerainty over most of the Rajput rulers whose 
modest mountain valley kingdoms cordoned the Himalayan foothills from Kashmir to the 
border of BengaL Continuing with the expansionist policy of Akbar, Jehangir, after 
subjugating the Afghans in the west, clashed with the Ahoms, in the east. He even 
subdued the Raja (King) of Kangra, and in 1619, Jehangir travelled to celebrate his 
victory by erecting a mosque in the courtyard of the Kangra fort in the north. Towards the 
south Jehangir resumed military operations against Ahmadnagar, and in 1616, the 
Mughal prince Parwiz commanded a reinforced army that occupied the city. Agra was 
made the imperial capital. He devoted much of his time to making many buildings and 
gardens, especially in Kashmir. His religious policy was intolerant towards different 
faiths during the early years of his ascendancy. It was during his rule that Guru Aijan, the 
fifth Sikh master, was tortured to death in Lahore which was lauded by the Naqshbandi 
order of the Sufis. The relationship between Sufis such as the Naqshbandi order and the 
non Muslims will be discussed in the thesis. As time passed, Jehangir moved away from 
the orthodox leanings. He did not support the Naqshbandi leader Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi. 
His meetings with Gosain Jadrup, a non Muslim leader, have been well recorded by the 
court painters. He, unlike his father Akbar, displayed his reverence for the Chisti saint 
Muin-al-din Chisti. In 1614, he visited the tomb at Ajmer and distributed lavish gifts to 
the devotees and descendants of the Sheikh.10 Due to the influence of the Chisti order, 
who were close to the Sikh Gurus, Jehangir came in touch with the Sikh master Guru 
Hargobind. This relationship and its implications will be elaborated upon in the thesis.
10 Richards 98.
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Jehangir died on October 28, 1627 during his return journey to Lahore from Kashmir and 
the Mughal throne was taken over by Shahjahan (1628-1658).
Shahjahan ruled the Mughal Empire from Agra for nearly two decades, until he moved 
the capital to his new city of Shahjahanabad, at Delhi. He continued expanding the 
empire. The most important aspect of his policy was his intent to take over the land of his 
forefathers, Samarkand and Bukhara. However, these campaigns which lasted for nearly 
a year from 1646 to 1647 and resulted only in partial Mughal domination, were 
unsuccessful and at no time did the Mughal forces, which represented the Mughal 
Chagtais, threaten the Uzbeks and Turkomen. Similarly a failed attempt was made to 
capture Qandhar from the Safavids in 1653." The successful expeditions were the 
subjugation of Golconda in 1635 and the Garhwal hill state and the Ahoms in the year 
1638. His campaigns stretched the Mughal Empire from Sind in the far northwest to 
Sylhet on the Brahmaputra in the east and from Baikh in the north to the southern 
boundary of the Deccan provinces. One of the most important policy changes 
Shahjahan brought into the polity of the Mughal state was the introduction of the 
orthodox Muslim leaders such as the Naqshbandi Sufi order into prominence to revive 
the Sumii Muslims in India. The cumulative effect of this change which was departing 
from the policies practiced by his father and grandfather was the imposing of Sharia
11 Richards 133-135.
12 Richards 136-137.
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provisions against the construction or repairs of temples such as in the city of Benaras.lj 
Shahjahan will always be remembered by historians, for his contribution of the Taj 
Mahal, a mausoleum made in the memory of his wife Mumtaz Mahal, who died in 1631. 
He also got built the city of Shahjahanabad in Delhi. He died in 1666, leaving the Mughal 
Empire in a political crisis, in which his sons Dara Shuja, Aurangzeb and Murad fought 
with each other to gain the ascendancy to the Mughal throne.
After defeating his brothers in the war of succession, Aurangzeb (1658-1689) took over
the Mughal throne in the year 1658.14 He continued with the expansionist policy adopted
by his forefathers in the east and the northwest. Towards the east, it took two years from
1661 to 1663, for the Mughal forces to make the Ahom ruler agree to become a Mughal
vassal. In addition to Assam, important success was scored in the coastal region of
Bengal. Towards the northwest, control of Kabul and the north-western border regions
was of great strategic concern for the Mughals. In 1667, a Yusufzai chief rebelled which
was followed by declaration of independence by the Afridi chief in 1672. In response to
these aggressions, Aurangzeb led the imperial army and suppressed the rebellion. He
returned to Delhi in the year 1675 after instating Amir Khan as the new governor of
Kabul.15 Towards the south he was successful in expanding in Bijapur, Golconda and the
Maratha kingdom. Aurangzeb’s rule brought a significant change in the religious policy
of the state. His goals for the empire were completely consistent with his own ardent
13 Richards 121-122.
H Richards 165.
15 Richards 170-171.
18
piety as a follower of the Hanafi School. He moved away from many un-Islamic 
practices, such as the practice begun by Akbar of appearing on a balcony at sunrise for all 
who wished to have his darshan (Visual sight of a monarch or an idol of a God or 
Goddess) from him.16 His religious policies had an impact on the state polity in Panjab. 
During his reign the ninth Sikh master, Guru Tegh Bahadur, was sentenced to death in 
Delhi. This earned him the bitter hatred of thousands of Jats and Khatris of Panjab. The 
social and political ramifications of the death of Guru Tegh Bahadur will be examined in 
this work. Aurangzeb died in the year 1707, fighting to expand his kingdom in the 
Deccan.17
In the intervening time, in Panjab, religious successions different from the political 
Mughal successions were taking place. Guru Nanak was succeeded by nine living Gurus. 
The last seat of Guruship was given to Guru Granth, which until now is considered to be 
the holy book of the Sikhs. Succession was determined not by the then prevailing law of 
inheritance but by merit in order to present to the Sikhs of Nanak the teacher who could 
carry the spiritual legacy forward.18 Guru Angad (1504-1552), who succeeded Guru 
Nanak, was a son of a petty trader, Pheru, from the village of Matte De Sarai, in the 
present district of Firozpur of Indian Panjab. lie  continued and spread the practice of 
langar (community kitchen). He developed the script of Gurmukhi (the most common
16 Richards 171-174.
17 Richards 177-178.
18 For a detailed comment on the law o f  inheritance adopted by the Sikh Gurus, please refer: Teja Singh and 
Ganda Singh, A Short History o f  the Sikhs Vol. I (1469-1765). (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1999) 16: 
footnote 3.
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script used for writing the Punjabi language), and recorded the writings of Guru Nanak
and added his to the collection.19 He nominated Guru Amar Das (1479-1574) who came
from a Vasihnavite background to succeed him as the Guru. Guru Amar Das rejected the
path of asceticism and stressed to his followers to believe in one God and one Word. He
constructed a Baoli in Goindwal, which led to the place becoming an important centre for
the Sikhs. Even Akbar visited the Guru at Goindwal. Guru Amar Das made valuable
contributions to the society in Panjab, by asking his disciples to prohibit the practise of
Sati and do away with the observance of purdah by women.20 He was instrumental in
giving the Sikhs a structure to adhere to. He developed 22 Manjis or 22 provinces, each
headed by a spiritual Sikh. He also developed the Sikh method for ceremonies like
21marriage, birth and death. The Guru encouraged his followers to take active interest in 
commerce related activities too. Macauliffe points out that Gango, a Khatri of Bassi tribe,
came to Guru Amar Das to ask what he should do to save himself. The Guru suggested to
22  * * him to open a bank. Guru Amar Das was succeeded by his son-in-law from the Sodhi
clan, Guru Ram Das (1534-1581). Guru Ram Das shifted his base from Goindwal to
Tung and laid the foundation for the city of Amritsar, then known as Chak Ramdas. He
was instrumental in encouraging the Sikhs to do business. He encouraged Sikhs to take
19 Teja Singh and Ganda Singh 17.
20 Max Arthur Macauliffe, The Sikh Religion: its gurus, sacred writings and authors. Vol. 2, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1909) 61-62.
21 Horace Arthur Rose, A Glossary o f  Castes and Tribes o f the Panjab and NWFP o f India. 3 vols. (Lahore: 
1919. Patiala: 1970) 719. Teja Singh and Ganda Singh 19-23.
22 Macauliffe, Vol. 2, 275.
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up businesses such as horse trading, banking, embroidery, and carpentry.2'* His son Guru 
Aijan (1563-1606) became the next Guru. He continued the work of completing the tank 
at Ramdaspur and later, in 1589, laid the foundation of the central temple now known as 
the Golden Temple. He founded the important towns of Taran Tarn in 1590 and 
Kartarpur in 1594. The most important contribution of his was the compilation of the 
Granth. The Granth included selections from the writings of the fifteen Hindu and 
Muslim saints such as Kabir, Farid, Namdev, Ravidas, Bhikhan etc. Five at least, such as 
Farid, Bhikhan, Satta, Balvand and Mardana were Muslims. The Mughal emperor Akbar 
also visited the Guru at Goindwal and heard some passages from the Granth.24 
However, it was Jehangir who, soon after taking over the Mughal throne, embarked upon 
policies to crush any movement which could be a threat to Islam.
Guru Arjan was arrested and tortured to death in May 1606 at Lahore.25 The reasons and 
its ramifications have been examined in the thesis. He was succeeded by his eleven year 
old son Guru Hargobind (1595-1644). His taking of arms had been encouraged by his 
father who had placed him in the hands of Bhai Budha, who trained him in the art of 
soldiery. He wore two swords and gave an identity of a Saint and a Soldier to the Sikhs. 
His main contribution was the inculcating of the martial ethos among the Sikhs. He
23 Teja Singh and Ganda Singh 24.
24 Akbar is said to have seen the Adi Granth at Batala after its completion in 1604. Please refer: Macauliffe, 
Vol. 3, 81; According to Akbarnama and Khulasat ut Tawarikh, the Guru and the emperor Akbar met at 
Goindwal. Please refer: Abul Fazl, Akbarnama (Lucknow: Nawal Kishore Press, 1883) 514 and Sujan Rai 
Bhandari, Khulasat ut Tawarikh. Ed. Ranjit Singh Gill. (Patiala: Panjabi University, 1971) 425. Khulasat ut 
Tawarikh was written by Sujan Rai Bhandari in 1676 AD. The author by profession was a munshi in 
Aurangzeb’s court.
23 Teja Singh and Ganda Singh 26-35.
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erected a small fort at Lohgarh. He established the Akal Takhat, locating it opposite to 
the building of ‘Harmandir and strengthened the control over the Sikh historical places 
associated with the earlier Gums, by visiting most of them. He also travelled as far north 
as Kashmir and converted many into Sikhism. He was also instrumental in establishing 
temples and mosques, such as the one in Kapurthala. The Mughal emperor, Jehangir 
befriended the Guru and also went hunting with him.26 With Shahjahan taking over the 
Mughal throne in 1627, after the death of Jehangir, there came about a shift in political 
innuendos towards non Muslim groups from a more open approach to a somewhat 
hardened and polarised view of them. During this period the Sikh army, led by Guru 
Hargobind (the sixth Guru), engaged with the Mughal army four times and won each 
time. These victories were significant milestones towards the emergence of the Sikh 
hegemony in Panjab, as will be demonstrated in the thesis. Guru Hargobind died in 1644 
to be succeeded by Guru Har Rai (1 630-1661) who was his grandson. Guru Har Rai was 
a soldier and kept a strong force of 2200 horsemen ready to be employed whenever 
necessary. He was a friend of Dara Shikoh, son of Shahjahan, who was a ‘favourite’ for 
the succession to the throne. The Guru appointed knowledgeable men such as Bhagat 
Bhagwan, to preach Sikhism out of Panjab. He also made responsible the families of 
Kaithal and Bagrian to spread the word of Sikhism in the region between Jammu and the 
Sutlej. Many families such as the families of Patiala, Nabha, and ancestors of Budh 
Singh, an ancestor of Maharaja Ranjit Singh received blessings of royalty from the
26 It is also said that Guru Hargobind took to service o f Jehangir. This fact has been claimed by Gokul 
Chand Narang, Horace Arthur Rose, and Indubhushan Banerjee, but the primary sources, as will be shown 
in chapter 2, depict a different reality.
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Guru.27 The Guru died after serving for seventeen years at Kiratpur, in the Panjab, on 
October 6, 1661. His son, Guru Harkishan (1656-1664) succeeded him at the age of five. 
He had a short life span, most of which he spent in Delhi. He was succeeded by Guru 
Tegh Bahadur (1621-1675), his grandfather who was in Bakala, in the Panjab. He also 
like earlier Gurus established a town, Anandpur. He travelled as far as Agra, Allahabad, 
Benaras, Sasaram, Gaya, Patna, Dacca and Assam. He preached fearlessness to his Sikhs. 
He was arrested by the orders of the emperor and executed in Delhi on the eleventh of 
November 1675. This incident and its significance will be examined m the thesis, and it 
will be demonstrated that this incident was an important watershed leading to the decline 
of Muslim hegemony in the Panjab. The last living Guru of the Sikhs, Guru Gobind 
Singh (1666-1708), was nine years old when his father was beheaded in Delhi. He 
established the town of Paonta in the foothills of Himalayas on the banks of the river 
Jamna. He was a scholar of Persian language, which he learnt from a Muslim teacher, Pir 
Mohammed. He fought battles with the hill kings of Nahan, and returned to Anandpur, 
the town established by his father, and built four forts- Anandgarh, Lohgarh, Keshgarh 
and Fatehgarh. His most important contribution was the formation of the Khalsa (the 
name given by the Guru to all his baptized disciples) on March 30th> in the year 1699. 
This event contributed immensely to the construction of the religious ethos with a clear
27 Giani Gian Singh. Twarikh Gur Khalsa. (Patiala: Department o f Languages, 1970) 258. The first three 
parts o f  this monumental work ran into several editions in Urdu as well as in Punjabi. These were last 
published in two volumes in Punjabi by The Languages Department, Punjab, Patiala in 1970. Giani Gian 
Singh was a poet and historian who belonged to the Dullat Jat family. He claimed his descent from the 
brother o f  Bhai Mani Singh Shahid, Nagahia Singh. He wrote many distinguished works such as: Panth 
Prakash. Tawarikh Guru Khalsa. Shamsher Khalsa and Rai Khalsa. Also Refer: Bhai Kahan Singh. 
Encyclopaedia o f Sikh Literature. 4 Vols. (Patiala: Department o f  Languages, 1931) 2451; Karam Singh, 
Maharaja Ala Singh. (Tarn Taran: Khalsa Parcharak Vidyala, 1818) 51-52; Macauliffe, Vol 3, (1909. New  
Delhi: 1963) 203; Umdat ut Tawarikh, a Persian work, was authored by Sohan Lai Suri, who was the 
official chronicler o f  Lahore court during Ranjit Singh’s time. Sohan Lai Suri, Umdat ut Tawarikh. Vol. II. 
(Lahore: Arya Press, 1885-89) 3.
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hierarchy to adapt to after the era of the living Gurus. This event is elaborated upon in the 
thesis and its implications for the Sikhs and Panjab have been examined. The subedar 
(Viceroy) of Sarhind attacked Anandpur, where a severe battle took place. The Guru had 
to leave the Anandpur fort and finally rested at Damdama, near the town of Bhatinda. 
Guru Gobind Singh supported Bahadur Shah who invited the Guru to Agra and presented 
him with a rich dress, a jewelled scarf worth sixty thousand rupees.28 The Guru died on 
October 7th in the year 1708 bringing to an end the living spiritual leadership of the Sikhs 
bequeathing the Guruship to the holy book, Guru Granth Sahib.
The hold of the Mughal Empire in the Panjab slowly disintegrated after the death of 
Aurangzeb in the year 1707. The next year, Guru Gobind Singh died, but he had 
instructed an ascetic follower from Rajouri in Kashmir named Madho Das, who later 
became famous as Banda Singh Bahadur to carry on the struggle against the rule of the 
Mughal state. Banda Bahadur fought battles from 1708- 1716 until he was captured alive 
and taken to Delhi, where he was tortured to death under the orders of the then ruler 
Farukhsiyar. After the death of Banda Singh Bahadur, the Sikh movement never got 
contained by the Mughals. Even the provincial Governors of the Mughals started defying 
the authority of the Delhi Emperor. While the hill vassalages began withholding tributes, 
the Amils and the Jagirdars (officials holding land) began resisting transfer and 
obligation of power. The weak centre at Delhi encouraged the Persian ruler, Nadir Shah, 
and later the Afghan ruler Ahmed Shah Abdali, to invade Panjab many times over.
28 Teja Siugh and Ganda Singh 74-76
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In the midst of the political successions and incursions in Panjab, the Sikh movement 
emerged into prominence in the 18th century. The Sikhs faced attacks by both Nadir Shah 
and Ahmed Shah Abdali by organizing themselves in the form of mis Is headed by 
misldars (leader of the misl). These misls also began taking over the territorial control of 
places in Panjab from the Mughals as will be elaborated upon in the thesis. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, Sukarchakia misl under the leadership of Ranjit Singh neutralized 
other contenders among the Sikh misls. Ranjit Singh expanded his political control by 
forming alliances of two sorts with other misls. He did this firstly by marrying with the 
daughters of chiefs of Sikh misls such as the Kanhaya and the Nakai misls and secondly 
by demonstrating vows of friendship with misl chiefs such as Fateh Singh Ahluwalia of 
the Ahluwalia misl. These alliances helped Ranjit Singh to dominate the political ground 
in the Panjab. He slowly expanded his state after taking over Lahore on the 7th of July 
1799. He soon made the Jammu chief submit in 1800, along with the chiefs of Gujrat, 
Mirowal, Narowal, Akalgarh, Nurpur and Chiniot. To legitimize his rule in the eyes of 
Panjabis, he assumed the title of Sarkar in the year 1801. By 1807, Ranjit Singh began 
taking over the political rights of Muslim chiefs such as the Afghan brothers of Kasur to 
whom he gave a jctgir (the assigned land) at Mamdot. Similarly, Jhang was occupied in 
1807, and the same year Bahawalpur and Akhnoor also submitted to Ranjit Singh. By 
extending this process to many other Muslim elites of Panjab he was able to create his 
hegemony over Muslim elites who had been in power for many generations and formed 
new Muslim elites as his governing elites. This process of change from the Muslims to 
the non Muslims will be examined in the thesis. The year 1809 was favourable for Ranjit 
Singh because not only did the Afghan ruler lose his throne leading to anarchy in Kabul,
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but also, he signed a treaty of friendship, known as the treaty of Amritsar, with the 
British, which established the river Sutlej as the eastern border. With no threat from the 
east, Ranjit Singh expanded in the west and north soon after the treaty was signed and he 
took over the fort of Kangra in the same year. He also occupied Gujrat, Khushab, 
Sahiwal, Jammu and Wazirabad, within a year.
Most of Ranjit Singh’s military expeditions were directed towards the conquering of 
Multan, Peshawar and Kashmir. These areas were under the direct or indirect control of 
the Afghan ruler Fateh Khan. It took seven expeditions for Ranjit Singh to finally take 
over Multan in 1818. Soon after the conquest of Multan, the Lahore forces were able to 
conquer Kashmir in 1819. However, it was not until 1834 that direct control was 
established over the region of Peshawar. There was a Jehad waged against the Lahore 
government led by Syed Ahmad Bareilly, from the year 1827 to 1831. Ranjit Singh died 
on 27th June 1839, in Lahore due to prolonged illness. This thesis will look for answers to 
the questions such as even though there were many efforts to build a rhetoric both 
religious and political by the Muslim elites against Ranjit Singh, why were these religious 
Jehads unsuccessful and why was Ranjit Singh able to establish non Muslim hegemony 
in Panjab after many centuries of Muslim elites domination.
In the process of state formation Ranjit Singh expanded his empire from the Sutlej in the 
east to the Khyber in the west, from Leh in the north to Multan in the south. He gave 
internal autonomy to the states he annexed or conquered and did not try to obliterate the 
cultural pluralism existing in his state. The vassalages at the periphery had dual
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suzerainty. Ranjit Singh created his own Rajas like those of Jammu, Kangra and Chamba. 
He continuously checked and closely guarded through his military officers, the authority 
of his administrators. Ranjit Singh himself used to travel widely and listened to the 
complaints of his officials. Both Muslim and non Muslim religious leadership received 
favours from him. This thesis will show that significant integration took place between 
the state and the social categories like the ruling class, regional grantees, intermediaries 
and the peasantry, all of whom could interact with the ruler within a well defined 
context. He replaced Afghan and Mughal ruling class to a considerable degree. His state 
brought in the hegemony of the Jats and the Khatris as will be demonstrated in the thesis. 
Jats were landowners and Khatris were involved in all other types of works. Sikh and 
Hindu Adaltis (officials of the judicial department) did not replace the Muslim Qazis, but 
began working along with them in judicial matters. It appears that the significance of 
non-Muslims increased with the expansion of the kingdom of Lahore. Ranjit Singh saw 
to it that those who had been cultivating land for a long time were generally treated like 
the owners of the land. This led to the tilting of balance in favour of the working rural 
population irrespective of their social and religious affiliations, although, as will be 
demonstrated the major benefactors of this policy were the Muslims. It will be 
demonstrated that Ranjit Singh realized the importance of the Infantry in his army only 
after his soldiers came into conflict with the British soldiers in Amritsar. It took him long 
to strengthen his Infantry and he got his army trained by the French Generals namely 
Jean Francois Allard and Jean Baptiste Ventura on the European model, which meant that 
his soldiers began having regular hierarchy, cash salaries, training and drill, well defined 
messing and supply system. Till the time of his death Ranjit Singh he had an army of
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80,000 men, 300 field guns and 100 garrison guns. The thesis will demonstrate that these 
policies allowed him to gain legitimacy from the majority Muslim population to govern 
Panjab, as the Muslim community were the main beneficiaries of his policy. In lieu of his 
gaining legitimacy to govern, he positioned non Muslims at the top level of the polity in 
the Panjab.
1.2 Muslim and Non-Muslim Categories
The question vital to this research is whether the categories Muslim and non Muslim 
were meaningful or not? Were they relevant to the issue of appointment and power? 
Which sections of society conceived and projected themselves as Muslims? This section 
attempts to examine the social fabric of Punjab and explore the causes, effects, formation, 
alignments and emergence of various groups, which influenced Punjab’s polity then.
Since long Panjab had been the route of entry into India. It witnessed a number of 
invasions from mainly Turks, Mughals, Persians and Afghans. These invaders were 
invariably Muslim which led to an uninterrupted rule of the Muslim rulers and the 
establishment of dominant Muslim elites in Panjab beginning from the invasion of Sind, 
by Mohammed Bin Qasim in the year 712-713, up to the eighteenth century. With the 
ever expanding influence of the Sufis, a significant number of non Muslims got converted 
into Islam in Panjab. Ranjit Singh’s state which spread from Sutlej in the east to 
Suleiman mountain ranges in the west and Sind in the south to the higher mountain 
ranges of Tibet in the north covered approximately an area of 100, 436 square miles and
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had a population of approximately 53,50,000, and was composed of many races and 
religions.29 The classification of the population of this region, as claimed by Mofti 
Aliuddin’s work Ebratnameh written in 1854, could be broadly divided into the Hindus 
(including the Sikhs) and the Muslims.30 The earliest known population figures of Panjab 
collected by methodical means and available to the historians are based on the census of 
the population of the Panjab territories taken on the 1st of January 1855.31 The 
methodology adopted consisted of counting all those persons who might sleep in any 
house of every city, town, village and hamlet and detached tenement bearing a known 
name during the night intervening between the 31st December 1854 and the 1st January 
1855.j2 Many military and civil officials were engaged for completing the task 
successfully. In addition, in many areas the Muslim Mullahs and the Sikh Gnmthees 
were asked to assist in the enumeration.JJ For these reasons it can be suggested that this 
census was conducted carefully. This census demonstrated that the population of the 
Panjab could be classified either as the Hindus and the Muslims on religious basis or as 
agricultural and non agricultural based on the nature of occupations. According to it,
29 For detailed, district wise accounts o f population figures, please see: Carmichael Smyth. A History o f the 
Reigning Family o f Lahore: with some account o f  the Jummoo rajahs, the Seik soldiers and their sirdars. 
(Calcutta: W Thaker & Co., 1847) Appendix, xxix-xxx; Pandit Debi Prasad. Twarikh e Gulshan e Paniab. 
(Lucknow: Nawal Kishore Press, 1872) 162.
30 Mofti Aliuddin. Ebratnameh. Ed. Mohammed Baqir, Vol. 1. (1854. Lahore: The Punjabi Adabi Academy, 
1961) 349; Ebratnameh. a Persian work by Mofti Aliuddin o f Lahore, was completed on 131,1 September 
1854. This work deals with the history and social life o f Panjab. In 1961, Mohammed Baqir edited it and it 
was published in two volumes in Lahore: Also see: Henry Steinbach. The Puniaub: Being a Brief Account 
o f the Country o f  the Sikhs. (Patiala: Language Department, 1970) 75.
31 The decision to conduct this census was taken at the instance o f  the Chief Commissioner in the year 1854 
after the successful completion o f  the census in the North Western Provinces on the 1st o f January 1853. R 
Temple, Report on the Census taken on the 1st January 1855 o f the population o f the Paniab Territories, 
(Calcutta: 1856)4.
32 Temple 4.
33 Temple 5.
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there were 5,352,874 Hindus to 7,364,974 Muslims. The report on the census mentions 
that such a preponderance of Muslims over the Hindus was probably not to be found in 
any other province of India. The report claims that the dominance of the Hindus was in 
the eastern and central districts, that is, in the cis and trans-Sutlej states and the Lahore 
divisions, that is, it was from the river Jamna to the river Chenab. But from river Chenab 
to the trans Sutlej frontier, and in the north western and southern divisions that is in the 
Jhelum, Multan, Leia and Peshawar division, the population was majorly Muslims.34 It 
can be suggested that Islam was the dominant religion of Panjab in the beginning of the 
year 1855. Therefore one can make an educated guess that a substantial number of 
Panjab’s population especially the parts under Ranjit Singh’s territory, were Muslim. 
However there is no quantitative data available before 1855 to corroborate this. Also, it 
can be concluded that there were at least three categories in which the society could be 
divided into as early as 1855, and those were Muslims, Hindus and the Sikhs. Most 
importantly, the Hindus and the Sikhs were clubbed together under one category even 
during those times.
1.2.1 —  The M uslims
But, who were the Muslims under Ranjit Singh’s Panjab? It appears that the Panjabi 
Muslim society in Ranjit Singh’s kingdom could be broadly divided into Sunnis, Shias,
34 Temple 22.
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Ismailis and others/"5 Among the Muslim population, as claimed by J M Wikely, Jats, 
Rajputs, Gujars, Sheikhs, Koreshis, Mughals and Sayyids constituted the major part of 
the Muslim population/6 The point worth noticing is that these groups were important 
land owner classes which controlled the agrarian economy. Another classification of the 
Muslim population provided by Titus Murray distinguishes between the large numbers of 
Muslims who emerged in the country who were converted Muslims, and the others who 
were immigrant Muslims.37 The process of conversion of the Hindus to Muslims38 was a 
slow process, which was mainly due to the Sufis and their shrines spread all over the 
Panjab. Richard Eaton has shown in his work on the shrine of Baba Farid that many 
tribes, such as the Jats were slowly influenced by the shrine and took to Islam in the 
thirteenth century. He has also demonstrated that many clans such as the Bhattis, Chinna, 
Dhudhi, Dogar, Gondal, Hans, JoTya, Khokhar, Sial, Tiwana, Wattu, Kharral and Arains
j:> lsmaili Khojas are converts from Hinduism, as is clearly indicated by the fact that many o f their family 
divisions bear the same name as those o f the Aroras and Khatris. Ram Das. Punjab Government. Gazetteer 
of the Jhang District 0 8 8 3 -8 4 ). (Lahore: Arya Press, 1884) 69.
j6 Most o f the Gazetteers have described the configuration o f  the population. J M Wikeley has categorised 
the Panjabi Muslims into four categories: Rajputs, Jats, Gujars and Foreign tribes, who claim to be neither 
o f the above: Arabs, Turks, Khatar, Ghebas, and Kassars. Ghakars claim Persian origin. Please refer: J M 
Wikeley, Panjabi Musulmans. (Delhi: Manohar Press, 1991) 1.
37 Titus Murray Thurston, Islam in India and Pakistan: a religious history o f  Islam in India and Pakistan 
(1930. Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1990) 36.
38 Richard Maxwell Eaton, in his work Essays on Islam and Indian History, establishes the fact that the 
Sufis composed folk literature (for instance, chukki nama, chcirkha nama and lun-nama) rather than 
mystical literature, for non elite non Muslims, which was instrumental in the spread o f Islam. Please refer: 
Richard M Eaton, “Sufi Folk Literature and the Expansion o f Indian Islam”, Essays on Islam and Indian 
History. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000) 191. Also, as shown by Eaton in the case o f Deccan, 
the Islamic acculturation was a slow process. Also refer Eaton, Essays on Islam 199.
39 Eaton points to the fact that the spiritual power o f the Sufi was believed to adhere after his lifetime to his 
tomb-site, shrines, which were patronized by the Indo-Muslim rulers in South Asia. Also, since these 
shrines were present in South Asia and not in the distant lands o f Central Asia or West Asia, they had a 
claim to legitimately belong to the Indian sub continent. Please refer: Richard M Eaton, “Temple 
Desecration and Indo-Muslim States”, Essays on Islam and Indian History (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2000) 101.
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were converted by Baba Farid 40 The losing of political power to Ranjit Singh by Sials, 
Tiwanas and Awans will be discussed further in the thesis. Most of these clans were 
agriculturists. Out of the clans of Khokhar, Kambohs, Kharrals, Gujars and Mahtams, a 
significant number were Muslims. In the regions of Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan 
and Bhawalpur, the Muslims were composed of Sadozai, Badozai, Laghari, Ghorcharni, 
Lund, Lagharis and the Khosa tribes. These tribes and their subjugation by Ranjit Singh 
will be discussed in chapter four. There were also many menial and artisan classes which 
have been well documented by different gazetteers writing in the nineteenth century. Of 
these classes important were Chuhras and Musallis, Dhobis and Kusars etc.
1.2.2 — The Non Muslims
The non Muslims were composed of the Sikhs, those who followed the teachings of the 
Sikh masters, of which the main composition was that of Jats, Khatris, Brahmins41 and 
Labanas.42 According to the Lahore District Gazetteer, Sikhs were broadly classified as 
Nanakpanthis and Guru Gobindis. The noticable distinction mentioned is that the Gobindi 
Sikhs wear long hair, avoid tobacco, and have the title of Singh. They also carry about 
their person five marks beginning with the letter K, namely, kes or unshorn hair; the 
kachh or short drawers; the kara or iron bangle; the khanda or steel dagger; and the
40 Richard M Eaton, India’s Islamic Traditions 711-1750 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003) 272.
41 The Sikh Brahmins are mainly from the Sarswat background. Please refer: Punjab Government. 
Gazetteer o f  the Hazara District (1883-84). (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press) 75.
42 Labanas chief occupation is rope-making. For details, please refer: Ram Das. Punjab Government. 
Gazetteer o f the Muzaffargarh District (1883-84). (Lahore: Arya Press) 71.
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kanga or comb; on the other hand all the Sikhs are followers of Nanak, and in a sense 
Nanakpanthi. Other than that, in the religious observances, the Gobindi Sikh hardly 
differed from the Nanakpanthi, they both go to the dhrcimshala at least twice a month and 
hear the Granth.43
The other important non Muslim groups in Panjab were the Hindus, from different caste 
backgrounds such as the Brahmins, Rajputs, Kirars44, and the Dogras of Jammu, and the 
Sikhs and the Christians, The Aroras and the Khatris who were not following Sikh ideals, 
worship the images of some of their numerous deities in thakurdwaras, Krishna being 
one of the important impersonations of God. Their holy scriptures were read by a person 
who mostly belonged to the Brahmin caste.45 They were commonly known as Kirars,
« * ■* * 45without regards to their caste. They worshipped Krishna incarnations. In some districts 
such as Hazara, the principle classes of Hindus in the district were Brahmans and Khatris. 
There were few Aroras in the towns of Haripur and Tarbela; and a few Labanas, Sonars 
and Bhatias. Of the Sikhs the majority lived in the Dhund and Karral hills and were 
converted Brahmans and Khatris and the great majority of them were cultivators.47
43 Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Lahore District (1893-94) 88-89.
44 The Kirars group o f the Hindus also style themselves as Aroras. They control the money lending and 
banking business. For details, please refer: Ram Das, Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f  the Muzaffargarh 
District 0883 -84 ) (Lahore: Arya Press) 70.
415 Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Lahore District (1893-94) 89-90.
46 Ram Das, Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f  the Muzaffargarh District ( 1883-84) (Lahore: Arya Press) 
61, 70.
47 Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Hazara District (T883-84) (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette 
Press) 75.
It is worth mentioning that even while the census of 1893 was being taken, it was 
discovered that the strict Hindus, Sikhs and Jains held many beliefs in common. The 
Hindu Jats and the Sikhs went to the dhciramshala (place to rest, primarily created for a 
religious purpose) and heard the granth read to them at least twice. The instructions given 
to the supervising staff in the 1891 census defined the true Sikh as one who wore long 
hair and abstained from tobacco, thereby restricting the term to the followers of Guru 
Gobind, one would think. Others were classified as Hindu by religion, and Sikh or 
Nanakpanthi or whatever they liked to return by sect. The rule, however, does not appear 
to have been clearly understood or carefully followed in this district, for we find that of 
the 86,630 males recorded as Sikhs by religion, 37,244 were classed as Nanakpanthis or 
as worshippers of Nanak by sect and only 36,458 as Guru Gobindis leaving nearly 13,000 
as unclassified. There is no data which demonstrates such type of linkages of various 
religious groups of Hindus, Sikhs or Jains with the Muslims.
The third group of the non Muslims was composed of Christians. Most prominent among 
that were those of the European military officers. They were, after Muslims, Hindus and 
Sikhs, the fourth largest group in Punjab, as is demonstrated by the gazetters,
1,2.3 —  The Categories
Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus co-existed either due to their intent, interdependency or due 
to their engagements in the syncretic zones, such as the Sufi shrines in the Panjab. 
Socially, for instance, as mentioned in the Gazetteer of Multan, there was little
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antagonism between the Muslim and the Hindu and people from both religions often 
visited the same fairs and honoured the same shrines.48 However, as will be examined 
and demonstrated in the thesis, when the political boundaries were being drawn, there 
came into being two distinct categories, one of the Muslim and the other of the non 
Muslim. The Muslim political-religious nexus,49 under the Mughal rulers, could not 
accept the expansion of any non Muslim ideology. The coordinates of division between 
the Muslims and non Muslims crystallised further with the strengthening of the Sikh 
movement’s support among the landed class such as the Jats, and also amongst the 
trading community such as the Khatris as early as the fifteenth century. Since then, till 
the rise of Ranjit Singh as the ruler of northwest Panjab in the early nineteenth century, 
the struggle to control Panjab led to the exploitation of religious ideologies many times 
over, thus deepening the gulf between the two categories. The Hindus and the Sikhs 
aligned together probably also because the Sikh masters came from Hindu backgrounds 
and many of those who got converted into Sikhism began to have mixed families. There 
are very few instances of Muslims converting into Sikhs as compared to the Hindus, as 
has been explored while researching this thesis. It is however important to mention, and 
it has been discussed in detail in this work, that some Muslim groups such as the Chisti 
Sufi order clearly demonstrated their intent to coexist with the non Muslim population. 
However, the attack on the Sikhs and their institutions by the Muslim political-religious 
nexus dominated the feeling of the divide among the Muslims and the non Muslims,
48 E D Maclagan, Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f  the Multan District (1901-02) Revised edition (Lahore: 
Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1902) 117.
49 The religious ideology o f  the politically dominant group did generally attract allegiance from the fellow 
religious groups and members which probably led to the emergence o f a political-religious nexus.
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Another issue which led to the solidification of the religious divide among the Muslims 
and the non Muslim in Panjab was the issue of conversion into Sikhism. It will be 
demonstrated in this work that to curb those from converting, the Mughal emperors such 
as Shahjahan adopted a policy where no other religious denomination was allowed to 
preach its faith. Adopting similar policies, Aurangzeb put many Brahmins into jail on 
refusing to convert to Islam, and it was the ninth master Guru Tegh Bahadur who came to 
Delhi and sacrificed his life to save the Brahmins from getting converted into Islam. 
These aspects and their ramifications will be further elaborated in the thesis. The tenth 
Sikh master Guru Gobind Singh, by bringing new identity markers of the five ‘k’s: kara 
(iron bracelet), kacha (specially designed underwear), kesh (uncut hair), kangha (wooden 
comb) and kirpan (strapped sword), clearly strengthened the non Muslim identity among 
the new group. The new identity markers led the Muslim political groups to define their 
identity markers as well. For instance, all Hindus were asked to shave their beards and 
Muslims were not allowed to have long beards, as will be demonstrated in this work. This 
enabled them to be distinguished from the Sikhs. By the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, after the death of Aurangzeb, it appears that the instrument of Jehad was used 
against the Sikhs more frequently by the Muslim elites. The religious cry of Jehad by the 
Muslim political religious nexus increased the polarization between the Muslims and the 
non Muslims. On the one hand the call for Jehad brought all the sections of Muslims 
under a single banner and on the other the Hindus and Sikhs realization of being different 
from the Muslims was reinforced and they came together to oppose the religious cry of 
the Muslims. The facet of Jehad will be further examined in this work. Similarly, for the 
non Muslims, the ambition to end the Muslim political religious nexus, whose primary
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objective was eradication of the emerging non Muslim power, led them to solidify their 
primary identity of being non Muslim.
In social life, the Multan Gazetteer claims that the Muslim approach to religion was free 
from the semi idolatrous practices and superstitions as prevalent more in its eastern 
developments in the country.50 The rituals of the Muslims and the non Muslims such as 
that of burial of the dead in case of Muslims and burning of the dead in the case of the 
Sikhs and Hindus perhaps also had its implications. There were instances when these 
rituals were used to desecrate one community by another, as will be shown in the thesis. 
In evidence provided by the Dera Ghazi Khan Gazetteer, the boundaries between the non 
Muslims and the Muslims were defined, as one discovers that the Hindus were only 
allowed to ride donkeys and not horses. They were forbidden to wear turbans. The 
Hindus gained their social rights under the rule of the Sikhs.31 In matters of Justice the 
Hindus and the Sikhs fell under one category and the Muslims under separate categories. 
Also for instance in disputes related with property, the arbitrators would according to the 
respective faiths consult the Muslim Sharia or the Hindu shastras 51 These categories 
played a vital role in the formation of the dominant group to rule in the Panjab. This
30 E D Maclagan, Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Multan District (1901-02). Revised edition (Lahore: 
Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1902) 117.
31 Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Dera Ghazi Khan District (1893-97). Revised edition (Lahore: 
Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1898) 75.
52 T Jows, Selections from the Records o f Government o f  India (Foreign Department). Report on the 
Administration o f  the Paniab for the year 1849-1850 and 1850-1851. (Calcutta: Calcutta Gazette Office, 
1853) 10.
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aspect will be discussed in the thesis as the non Muslim category moved to gain political 
power under the Sikhs.
The representation of distinct categories of non Muslims and Muslims can also be seen 
with the changing of the names of some cities occupied by the Sikhs. The Sikh rulers 
changed the names of the conquered cities and gave them names from the Sikh context. 
For instance, in the struggle to take control of the Gujranwala territories, the Sukarchakia 
misl of Ranjit Singh’s family came in confrontation with the Chatha chiefs. The Chatha 
chief Ghulam Mohammed was killed and the Sukarchakia misl led by Maha Singh, father 
of Ranjit Singh, took over the territories of the Chathas. To mark the overthrow of the 
Muslim chiefs and the triumph of the Sikhs, the names of Rasulpur and AHpur were 
changed to Ramnagar and Akalgarhf3 However, as mentioned in the Gujranwala 
Gazetteer, the old names were religiously adhered to by every Muslim in this part of 
Doab (tract of land lying between two confluent rivers) and the heroic resistance of 
Ghulam Mohammed and his treacherous end were celebrated in many a local ballad by 
the Muslims.54 This trend to change names of cities was not pursued by Ranjit Singh as 
he enforced his position as the ruler of Panjab.
53 ‘Rasul’ and ‘A li’ are both used for the Prophet Mohammed while ‘AkaV and ‘Rani5 are used in the 
context o f  ‘Immortal god’ as used by the Sikhs for God and Guru ‘Ram’ Das, the fourth master o f  the 
Sikhs.
34 Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f  the Gujranwala District (1893-94) (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette 
Press, 1895) 24.
By the time Ranjit Singh came to power, there were many instances when the Muslim 
political and religious elites had been ruled by the non Muslim elites, predominantly the 
Sikhs. It will be argued in the thesis that Ranjit Singh throughout his rule did not give the 
total reins of his state in the hands of the Muslims. Rather, as will be shown in the thesis, 
he always kept the non Muslims at the top of the political ladder. He engaged with the 
caste and clan identities and was able to control the Muslim religious majority, and 
displace the Muslim political elites in his state formation process. It can be suggested 
that even though there were many areas where all the communities in Punjab engaged 
with each other, primarily the Muslims existed as a separate group from the Hindus and 
the Sikhs who existed in congruence amongst themselves and gained politically together 
to become dominant partners in the state formation process by Ranjit Singh.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
Works of many theorists have been useful in understanding the stratification of power in 
the socio-political context of Panjab. Max Weber’s work Economy and Society was 
helpful in understanding the formation of legitimate order and domination. The term 
‘legitimacy’, has thus been used in the thesis as defined by Weber in his theory of 
‘legitimate’ domination. According to Weber, ‘Legitimacy to rule’ is the extent to which 
the officials, groups and individuals actively acknowledge the validity of a ruler in an 
established order and the right of a ruler to issue commands. Accompanying each 
established order are beliefs about the ‘legitimacy’ of a given system of domination. 
Every system of domination is based on some corresponding belief of people in the 
legitimacy and right of the ruler to issue commands and rule over individuals. Weber
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used the term ‘legitimate domination’ to refer to the right of the ruler to govern his 
subjects. He points to the two central elements to any system of dominance; 1) the 
perception that authority is legitimate for those who are subject to it and 2) the 
development of an administrative staff to act as a barrier between the leader and the 
people.55 Weber’s understanding on status groups and classes, explains the role of 
property classes, commercial classes, social classes in society.56 Weber’s discussion 011 
the roles of the propertied class and commercial class is important when we look at the 
initial growth of Sikhism and its earliest adherents, including the Gurus who came from 
these classes of society. One can appreciate the predominance of the Jat community 
within the Sikhs which was a major factor in Panjabi politics of that time.
Making use of Max Weber’s analysis of domination and authority, Italian theorists 
Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca used the term ‘Elite’ for the ruling class. Pareto 
wrote, ‘the history of man is the history of the continuous replacement of certain elites: as 
one ascends, another declines’.57 The political domination of a few over the many has 
been a key consideration in the concept and in the understanding of elites, and also, in the 
given context, the state formation process by Ranjit Singh and change in hegemony from 
the Muslim to non Muslim elites. There are different categories within the elite, and it is 
assumed that the political factor offers leverage to all members of the elite group and they
”  Max Weber, “The Types o f  Legitimate Domination”, Economy and Society: An Outline o f  Interpretive 
Sociology. Eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (London: University o f California Press, 1978).
56 Weber, “Status Groups and Classes”, Economy and Society 302-307.
57 John Scott, Stratification and Power: Structures o f  Class. Status and Command. (1996. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2004) 139.
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in turn can also influence politics. Hence members of the elite group are said to belong to 
the ruling class. An elite position does not necessarily carry with itself the element of 
superiority effectively. But the elite are superior to the majority in a given field. The 
superiority of status more often than not enables the elite to influence others. Finally, 
different elites constitute respective hierarchies in different arenas. This is a relative 
phenomenon and can be judged in terms of high and low level elites. In the examples of 
the Sikhs and Hindu groups this thesis will show that Sikhs rose to an elite level in every 
aspect of state formation including the military and administration.
For this research, the theories on elites propounded by Pareto and Mosca have been 
useful and helped in the understanding of the state formation process with regards to the 
Muslim elites. To elaborate on the term ‘elite’, it may be said that the specification of 
being part of an elite group is relative: one might be considered as a part of the elite 
group in a particular area of expertise yet in another area one might not be so rated 
among the masses. In addition, with changes in a given value system, the idea of elite 
varies. For instance, in a religious group of one order a priest may be considered to be an 
elite while among other religious orders or among the atheists he would not be considered 
so.
The elites have been further classified into ‘Political Elite5 and the ‘Governing Elite5 by 
these sociologists. Mosca, in an effort to have a realistic approach to politics, wrote that 
in constituted societies in which something called a government exists, one finds that all 
authority is exercised in the name of the entire people, or sovereign or aristocracy, but
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besides that fact, the 'political elite’, those who hold and exercise the public power, will 
always be a minority and below them are those who never in real sense participate in
* * c ogovernment but merely submit to it; these are known as the ruled. This understanding of 
governing elites was especially useful in the classification of different levels of elites, and 
hence helped the analysis of both position and participation of Muslims in the state 
formation under Ranjit Singh.
Pareto following a mathematical approach defines member of an elite group as one who
secures the highest scores in a specific field; by specifying the degree of individual
endowment one may be said to belong to a lower stratum or a higher stratum. He further
classifies elites as governing and non-governing.39 He defines governing elites as those
occupants of top positions who directly or indirectly play some or considerable part in the
government. He further adds that those who are part of the governing elite are involved in
some way or another in the government of the state. Pareto is cognizant of the
coincidence of economic and political power and discusses the primacy of the political
elite or the ruling elite. Similarly, Mosca explains that the elite consists of an organized
minority which rules over the unorganised majority. However, he goes beyond Pareto
who concentrated on the psychological attributes in the emergence and dominance of
elite persons and argues that the study of the dynamics of social forces is equally
important. T B Bottomore maintains that the minority which rules over the majority
38 James H Meisel, The Myth o f  the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the “elite” (Michigan: Univeristy o f  
Michigan, 1958) 32-33.
59 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology. Ed. Arthur Livingstone, (New  
York: Dover, 1963) 1423,
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consists of those who occupy the post of political command. The ruling minority he 
further contends is replaceable. Pareto applied this ‘circulation of elites’ to functional, 
mainly occupational groups, which have a high status in the society.60 For H D Laswell, 
political elites are as distinct from other types of elite as they comprise the power holders 
of a body politic but he adds that the power positions include both leadership positions 
and social formations from which the leaders emerge and to which accountability is 
referred to during a given period of rule.61 Raymond Aron holds a pluralistic view of 
elites. He examines the relationship between the intellectual elite and the power 
structure.62 C Wright Mills holds that power elite, a tiny and oligarchic group, are the 
main driving force for society. The power elite are composed of closely knit military, 
economic and political forces.
The usage of the word ‘hegemony’ has been in a context of the meaning as mentioned in 
the Merriam-Webster dictionary. It means “preponderant influence or authority over 
others’ domination”.63 The thesis will explore as to how the groups such as the Jats and 
the Khatris acquired power from the enemies by garnering support from the groups such 
as the Shias, mercantile classes, Sufis, Hindus, which actively or passively assisted them 
before the formation of the state of Panjab,
60 T B Bottomore, Elites and Society (Middlesex: Penguin Publications, 1968) 7-23.
61 Harold Dwight Lasswell, The Comparative Studies o f  Elites (Stanford: Hoover Institute, Series B, Elites, 
No. 1, 1952).
62 Raymond Aron, “Social Structure and the Ruling Class”, Part I, British Journal o f Sociology 1(1) (1950).
63 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hegemony
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Terms such as legitimacy, elites and hegemony have been used in a specific context as 
mentioned in this section in this research. Various chapters use these terms quite often 
and have also used the theoretical understanding associated with these terms.
1.4 Historiography
The people of Indian sub-continent as a whole today exhibit a keen interest in history. To 
the uneducated man it has come down in folklore, stories, mythologies and anecdotes. In 
addition, there is no dearth of professional historians. The works produced by Jadunath 
Sarkar, G.S. Sardesai, G.H. Ojha, Tara Chand, Mohammad Habib and R.C. Majumdar 
apart, the continuous assiduity demonstrated by hundreds of other writers of history in 
modern times is evidence enough of the fact that Indians are keenly concerned with its 
history and culture.
Most of the works on the decline of the Mughal Empire and the rise of the successor 
states has always been of interest to historians. But most of the works deal with the 
emergence of the Sikh ideology and later the rise of the state, but fail to examine the 
processes involved in the context of majority Muslim population.
In this context of the Mughal decline, the influence of Tapan Raychauduri and Irfan 
Habib, who have been referred by scholars as Marxist historians, have been of great 
value. They have insisted that the Mughal state was a tightly run state. According to 
Tapan Raychaudari, the reason for the collapse of the Mughal state, for instance, was,
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‘the uncomplicated desire of a small ruling class for more and more material resources’ 
which explains the Mughal state’s action. In the case of the Mughals he asserts, ‘their 
economism was simple, straightforward and almost palpable...there was no containing it 
until it collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions’.64 The focal point is the 
structure of the Mughal state as developed under Akbar (1556-1605). This system is 
termed as the Mughal ‘agrarian system’ (when what is really meant is only the ‘fiscal 
system’), especially in the work of Irfan Habib.
Jadunath Sarkar shows in his work the rise of Sikh, Maratha and Jat states as a reaction to 
the anti Hindu religious policy of Aurangzeb. Historians such as Irfan Habib considered 
the economic oppression of the Jats, Sikhs and the Marathas by the Mughals to be the 
cause of ‘agrarian revolts’. According to Habib, Panjab remained for the latter part of the 
eighteenth century a battleground between the Afghans and the Sikhs, who were 
primarily, composed of ‘sweepers, tanners, the castes of banjaras (a Nomadic tribe of 
India), and lowly and wretched people’.65 Further more the peasant and plebeian 
character of the soldiery and even the leadership, combined with deep rooted religious 
zeal, delayed transformation of the Sikh polity into a conventional state. Zamindarf 
aspirations however became important with time and social egalitarism could not prevent
64 Raychaudhuri, Tapan and Irfan Habib, eds. ‘The State and the Economy: The Mughal Empire’, The 
Cambridge economic history o f India. V o l.l, C.1200-C. 1750. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982) 172.
63 Muhammed Hadi Kamwar Khan, Tazkirat us-Salatin Chaghta: a Mughul chronicle o f post-Aurangzeb 
period. 1707-1724. Ed, Muzaffar Alam (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1980) 32.
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the rise of Kapur Singh, a Sikh leader, into becoming ‘Nawab’ Kapur Singh.66 He further 
maintains that ultimately, in the nineteenth century under Ranjit Singh, the rule was 
apparently a continuance of Mughal administration with strong Rajput symbolism and 
even rites.67 He characterizes the Sikh states among states which were formed by 
opponents of the Mughal power.68 According to Athar Ali, Irfan Habib’s brief which 
considers the decline of the Mughal Empire in the first half of the eighteenth century to 
result in the breaking of social and political fabric, enabling the British conquest to take 
place, represents a summary of conventional thinking.69 Jadunath Sarkar mentions anti 
Hindu religious policy of Aurangzeb as the causal factor for the rise of the newly formed 
states but misses elaborating and substantiating his argument with regards to Panjab’s 
polity from the primary sources, especially those written in Panjabi, Braj and Persian 
languages. Irfan Habib has based his argument on the fact that those from the neglected 
classes took to the battlegrounds on the side of the Sikhs during the struggle against the 
Afghans. However, he fails to notice that it was not only a struggle by these classes but 
had a broader cognitive linkage with various other groups in Panjab, including those from 
upper classes such as the Brahmins in Poonch region, and the Brar Jats in the Panjab. In 
the specific context of the rise of the Sikhs, Irfan Habib seems to witness the eighteenth 
century in isolation and completely misses out on the various factors by which the
56 J. S Grewal, The New Cambridge History o f India: The Sikhs o f the Paniab. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990) 89.
67 Irfan Habib, “The Eighteenth Century in Indian Economic History”, The Eighteenth Century in Indian 
History: Evolution or Revolution? Ed. P J Marshall (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003) 108.
68 Habib, “The Eighteenth Century in Indian Economic History”, The Eighteenth Century in Indian History 
105.
69 Athar Ali, “Recent Theories o f  Eighteenth-Century India”, The Eighteenth Century in Indian History: 
Evolution or Revolution? Ed. P J Marshall (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003) 91.
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eighteenth century gave the Sikhs an influential military, economic and political position 
in Panjab's polity. This work will show as to how and why these different groups came 
together under one banner of the Sikhs to establish their hegemony in Panjab. He also 
ignores that Ranjit Singh’s rule, though based on the Mughal methods of administration, 
was distinct in its composition of its ruling elites of non Muslims, after nearly seven 
centuries of Muslim elite domination in the higher echelons of Panjab, as will be shown 
in this thesis.
A number of scholars in recent years such as C A Bayly, Muzaffar Alam, Andre Wink, 
through their research, emphasize other factors and the regional aspect for motivation of 
the rise of new states, thus departing from earlier conventional views. C A Bayly’s work, 
Rulers, Townsmen, and Bazars: North Indian Society in the Age o f  British Expansion, 
1770 to 1870, rejects the general argument of 'decline’ and misgovernment at the local 
level and demonstrates how indigenous forces such as those of various castes, money 
lenders and merchants established local communities strengthening their hold over the 
state polity, during the fall of the Mughal Empire. He further argues, that the British had 
to further compromise with these communities, hence, in 1757 (battle of Plassey) or 1764 
(battle of Buxar) it was not a break rather a continuity which ought to be determined. In 
his other work The New Cambridge History o f  India, Indian Society and the making o f  
the British Empire, Bayly considers the states formed by the Marathas, the Sikhs and the 
Jats as ‘warrior states’. He argues that the elements of continuity and change in these 
newly formed states are quite difficult to distinguish from the earlier Mughal practices. 
However, he adds that the rise of these warrior states did reflect popular movements of
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peasant insurgency directed in parts against the Indo-Muslim aristocracy.70 He states that 
the Sikh leaders were from humble origins such as the Jat peasants, and they took their 
sense of identity from military brotherhood of the Khalsa (founded in 1699). Bayly 
argues that the Mughal king was recognised by the new rulers such as the Marathas and 
the Sikhs. He elaborates that the new Sikh rulers patronised the Muslim holy men; they 
established police officers and juriconsults modelled on the Mughals and also used 
Mughal methods of revenue collections.71 C A Bayly, by codifying the formation of 
Khalsa as ‘military or warrior brotherhood’ through his work, demonstrates a lack of 
social and political understanding of the historical context in which the emergence of the 
Sikh faith took place. This thesis will try to cover this gap. Also, he has termed newly 
formed states of the Jats, the Sikhs and the Marathas as ‘warrior states’, the style which is 
also followed by Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, in their work 011 modern South Asia, 
without elaborating what he means by this term. This research will demonstrate that the 
formation of Khalsa was not only about giving military perspective to the Sikh 
movement, as it was done much earlier during the time of the sixth Guru Hargobind, but 
was about public declaration of the formation of a hierarchical system to be followed 
among the Sikhs, which was an important step towards the formation of a separate 
identity and establishment of the Sikh hegemony in Panjab. In addition, C A Bayly look 
no notice of the fact that the Sikhs by the eighteenth century had a class of traders and 
many towns and cities such as Amritsar were established where the Sikh traditions and its 
symbology was a dominant feature. This aspect will be further elaborated in the thesis.
70 Christopher Alan Bayly, The N ew  Cambridge History o f  India: Indian Society and the making o f the 
British Empire (1988. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 21.
71 Bayly, Indian Society 22, 42.
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Muzaffar A lam’s work on the First half of the eighteenth century Awadh and Panjab has 
used detailed local evidence from Awadh and missed doing the same in the case of 
Panjab. Andre Wink’s work, which shows how the establishment and consolidation of 
Maratha sovereignty took place over the large part of the Mughal domains, demonstrates 
that the Marathas themselves gave the impression that they were to be the servants of the 
empire, until signs of different nature emerged, when Peshwa Baji Rao I demanded 
Hindu cities such as the Prayag, Benaras, Gaya and Mathura from the Emperor in 1736. 
This argument clearly distinguishes the rise of the Sikhs from the Marathas, as for the 
Sikhs, as will be demonstrated in the thesis, the Mughal emperor did not exist as a 
‘universal emperor’ as it did for the Marathas.72 Athar Ali remains Mughal centric and 
misses examining the growth of the Sikh polity in Panjab which perhaps could be 
considered to be parallel to the rise of the Mughals. Similarly, John F Richards who has 
argued that the Mughal state represented a ‘realm of public order’ analogous to our own 
conception of the modem state, has only briefly touched upon the Sikhs in his work. 
Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal consider the decline of the Mughals as a result of the 
agrarian based revolts by the above mentioned groups and the intent of the local Mughal 
governors to gain autonomy.70 Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal argue that states such as 
the Marathas and the Sikhs used non Muslim symbolism and claimed to protect sacred 
places and cattle. Their distinctiveness did not owe primarily to religion but to policies of 
military fiscalism that they adopted. This point is elaborated by the example of Mahadji
72 Andre Wink, Land and Sovereignity in India. Agrarian Society and Politics under the Eighteenth Century 
Maratha Svaraiva (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 40, 48.
73 Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy (1997. London: 
Routledge, 2006) 38,
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Scindia’s army in their work, which had the same number of Muslims as Hindus in 
1780.74 These authors have put the Sikh case along with the Marathas without analysing 
the primary data available about the Sikhs such as the Khalsa Durbar Records, which 
clearly prove that the Sikhs were in a majority in Ranjit Singh’s army unlike the Maratha 
army. Another work on the Mughal decline by Andrea Hintze75 refers to aspects of Sikh 
history. However, she completely misses out using the primary sources for her work. The 
work of Harnik Deol on the religion and nationalism with regards to Panjab, also adopts 
an interpretive analysis of the secondary sources. The work also briefly touches upon the 
state formation process by Ranjit Singh.76 The work by Mridu Rai77’ Hindu Rulers, 
Muslim Subjects, focuses on the issue of Islam in the context of the histoiy of Kashmir. 
She has briefly touched upon the rise of Gulab Singh from ‘Raja’ to a ‘Maharaja’ but 
does not put it in the context of the emergence of non Muslim hegemony in Kashmir. 
Most importantly, she has based her point on secondary sources such as the work of C A 
Bayly, Indian Society and the Making o f the British Empire. These works do not fill the 
gap with regards to qualitative change in hegemony from the Muslims to the non 
Muslims, specifically in Panjab’s context. These works are plebeian centric, and forget 
that there were other factors such as the religious ideology of Sikhism which had a 
significant role in engaging with the elites from various backgrounds. This research will 
show that the Sikh leadership by engaging with the elites of Panjab were able to establish
7,1 Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia 42.
75 Andrea Hintze, The Mughal Empire and Its Decline (Hampshire.UK: Variorum, 1997).
76 Harnik Deol, The Religion and Nationalism in India: the Case o f Paniab (London: Routledge, 2000) 64- 
65.
77 Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam. Rights and the History o f  Kashmir (London: Hurst, 
2004).
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their hegemony, in both political and religious spheres. Also, even if there was Rajput 
symbolism existing among the Sikhs, as mentioned by Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal in 
their work Modern South Asian History, it was not the predominant symbolism adopted 
by the Sikhs.
Research publications on ‘Muslim communities’ in South Asia by scholars such as I H
Qureshi,78 and Richard Eaton79 also fail to fill the gap. One finds that most of the works
* soare generally 011 the Mughal period like that researched by Athar Ali or the British 
period such as by Peter Hardy.81 The period in between is however, missed by these 
researchers or they fail to use sources in Persian, Panjabi and Braj languages associated 
with Panjab history.
Panjab historians such as Ganda Singh, Teja Singh, G C Narang, N K Sinha, Hari Ram 
Gupta, Fauja Singh, Bhagat Singh, J S Grewal, Indu Banga, Prithipal Singh Kapur and 
Jean Marie Lafont, whose works touch on various aspects of Panjab history miss dealing 
with the process of change from the Muslim to the non Muslim hegemony. Most of these 
works are within the general framework of political narratives, and give enhanced
78 Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Muslim Community o f  the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent 610-1947 (Delhi: 
Renaissance Publishing House, 1998).
79 Eaton, Essays on Islam and Indian History. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
80 Muhammad Athar Ali, Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb (Delh: Oxford University Press, 1997); Also 
see by the same author, Mughal India: Studies in Polity. Ideas, Society and Culture (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2006).
81 Peter Hardy, The Muslims o f British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
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significance to Sikh Mughal conflicts, failing to analyse and seek reasons leading to the 
occurrence of those events in those times, thus leaving much scope for research about the 
concerned period with regards to the process of state formation. For instance, in the 
voluminous works on Sikhism by Hari Ram Gupta,82 especially the one devoted to Ranjit 
Singh’s rule, the author does not mention the state formation process with reference to 
the Muslim population. Not only that, following a narrative style, he ignores the interplay 
of a range of factors involved in the power struggle between the non Muslims and the
thMuslims to gain control over Panjab. Dr. Gupta’s predecessor, for the 18 century Sikh 
history, was N.K.Sinha,83 He enforces Cunningham’s84 characterizations of Sikh polity as 
“theocratic confederate feudalism”. Like Cunningham, he considers the contribution of 
Guru Gobind Singh to the Sikh ethos as a significant reason assisting to the rise of the 
Sikh power. Various writers have provided present scholars with some interesting 
accounts which give insight into the relationship between the Muslims and the non 
Muslims. For instance, according to Lepel Griffin, the main idea of Sikhism was the 
destruction of Islam and it was unlawful to salute Muslims, to associate with them, or to 
make peace with them on any terms.83 According to G C Narang, ‘the whole Hindu 
nation felt that in Ranjit Singh the sun of Hindu glory had once more risen on the
82 Had Ram Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. V: The Sikh lion o f Lahore (Maharaja Ranjit Singh. 1799- 
1839) (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1991).
83 Narendra Krishna Sinha, Rise o f the Sikh Power (1936. Calcutta: A Mukherjee & Co. Ltd., 1973).
84 Joseph Davey Cunningham, A History o f  the Sikhs from the origin o f  the nation to the battles o f Sutlej 
(London: John Murray, 1853. Delhi: S. Chand & Company, 1966) 94.
83 Lepel Griffin, Ranjit Singh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905) 114.
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political horizon of India.86 Some writers have credited Panjabi culture and the spirit of 
nationalism for the success of Ranjit Singh’s rule. For instance, Fauja Singh gives credit 
to Panjabi culture that led to the emergence of a special bond between various 
communities in Panjab.87 Whereas Khushwant Singh states that the sovereign state under
88 89Ranjit Singh was a triumph of Panjabi nationalism, Dr. Fauja Singh’s work Some 
Aspects o f  State and Society under Ranjit Singh, deals with the political and economic 
history of the Panjab from the rise of Sukarchakias to the end of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. 
He discusses the political ideas of the Sikh leadership before the advent of Ranjit Singh, 
the economic policies and its impacts with regards to agriculture, the field of industry and 
trade, elements of continuity and change in society, diplomacy and politics under Ranjit 
Singh. Though his work has endeavoured to cover society it has not been able to 
encompass the aspect of the involvement of the Muslim community in Ranjit Singh’s 
state formation process. A novel advance in Panjab’s research is evident in Dr. Indu 
Banga’s90 study of agrarian relations in Panjab encompassing the vassals and the chiefs, 
jagirdars, dharmarth (religious grant), grantees and landlords. The political and 
institutional changes in land tenures have also been studied in some details. However, it 
does not give the basis of Muslim losses or gains. The focus of the book being on
86 Gokul Chand Narang, Transformation o f Sikhism (Lahore: New Book Society, 1946) 293.
87 Fauja Singh, Some Aspects o f  State and Society under Ranjit Singh (New Delhi: Master Publishers, 
1982) 69.
88 Khushwant Singh, Ranjit Singh. Maharaja o f the Paniab (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962) 8.
89 Fauja Singh, State and Society under Ranjit Singh.
90 Indu Banga, Agrarian System o f the Sikhs: late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Delhi: Manohar, 
1978).
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continuity and change in the agrarian system, process of state formation with regards to 
the majority Muslim population has not been attempted. Another work which carved its 
niche in the important works of Sikh historiography is the work by Harjot Oberoi.91 He 
has argued that the categories of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims remain problematic. In 
addition, religious traditions have rarely been placed at the centre o f social analysis of the 
history of modern India. Though he touches pre-British Panjab, his work’s mainly deals 
with the late nineteenth century and with a certain group among the Sikhs, and about their 
identity in the context of Hindus. His work does not deal with the Muslims in depth in the 
pre British Punjab.
The Maharaja Ranjit Singh \s First Death Centenary Memorial Volume edited By Teja 
Singh and Ganda Singh is a collection of articles. It has contributions on Ranjit Singh 
from many renowned historians. But yet again, the book never confronts the processes of 
change in Muslim ruling elites of Panjab. During the recent bicentenary celebrations of 
Ranjit Singh’s coronation (1801-2001), many publications came out. Among them most
92significant were by Dr. Prithipal Singh Kapur and Dharam Singh and by Jean Marie 
Lafont.9j While the former is a collection of articles which covers a wide spectrum of 
Ranjit Singh’s life, the latter is a well researched book which looks at the French military
91 Harjot Oberoi, The Construction o f religious Boundaries: Culture. Identity and diversity in the Sikh 
Tradition. (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1994).
92 Prithipal Singh Kapur & Dharam Singh, eds., Maharaja Ranjit Singh: Commemoration Volume on the 
Bicentenary o f  his Coronation. 1801-2001. (Patiala: Panjabi University, 2001).
93 Jean Marie Lafont, Maharaja Ranjit Singh: The French Connection, ed. Prithipal Singh Kapur (Amritsar: 
GuruNanak Dev University, 2001).
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men in the service of Ranjit Singh. Another scholar, Bikramjit Hasrat94 has approached 
the Panjab’s society in relation to the social and the economic conditions. However, his 
work has left much scope for an integrated study within the framework of Muslim social 
structure and social mobility. Also, none of the works have explained the process of state 
formation and hegemonic change from the Muslims to the non Muslims it brought in the 
Panjab. This work has tried to cover this gap in the history of the Panjab.
The individual papers presented at various conferences take up aspects like ruling class, 
landed classes, business classes and social mobility. However these works are of a 
suggestive nature towards research rather than being the results of detailed research in 
themselves, specifically when they touch concerns associated with society and then fail 
significantly to analyse the religious pressure groups infecting and effecting state polity 
in the nineteenth century Panjab. However, these tentative discussions have in fact set the 
stage for research for the period of Ranjit Singh’s rule in terms of social change.
It can thus be suggested that there is no study till now which examines the processes 
involved in the state formation with regards to Muslims, both ruling elites and the 
Muslim population in general. To fill this gap, an attempt has been made through this 
research to emphasize that there was a hegemonic shift from the Muslims to the non 
Muslims in Panjab in due course of time, by revisiting various primary sources in 
different languages, such as Persian, Braj, Panjabi and English languages written from
94 Bikramjit Hasrat, Life and Times o f  Ranjit Singh-A saga o f benevolent despotism (Hoshiarpur: 
Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute Book Agency, 1977).
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the seventeenth century to the twentieth century. This research will like to position itself 
among the historical works associated with the Mughal state failure in the South Asian 
context and hopes to make a significant contribution towards regional historiography on 
the Panjab.
1.5 Sources
At this stage the significance of some of the materials used in this study may be pointed 
out. The specificity of some of the sources relates to their ‘newness’ in the sense that 
these materials have not been used by historians to construct a comprehensive social and 
political history of Panjab with regards to the change in hegemony from the Muslims to 
the non Muslims in Panjab, if they have been used by them at all. Primarily four 
different types of sources, each with different set of problems, were located and used for 
the construction of this thesis. Firstly were the Sikh accounts, both religious and 
historical, which are primarily found in Panjabi and Braj languages. Some of these 
accounts were composed and written as early as the later half o f the fifteenth century, the 
time period of Guru Nanak, the first Sikh master of the Sikhs. Adi Granth, which was 
compiled by the fifth Sikh master, has the writings of Guru Nanak, which have been used 
to understand the political situation at the time of the advent of the Mughals under the 
leadership of Babar. The thesis will demonstrate through these sources that there is a 
symbolism indicating towards two distinct groups, those of Muslims, under the 
leadership of the Turks and the other comprising non Muslims under the leadership of the 
Rajputs, even as early as the fifteenth century. Most of the other sources referred to for 
constructing the thesis were written by the authors from non Muslim backgrounds in the
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eighteenth century. Kesar Singh Chibber, a Brahmin, who wrote Bansavalinama Dasan 
Patshahian Ka, in Panjabi verse in the year 1769, Sarup Das Bhalla, a Khatri, who wrote 
Mehma Prakash in the Gurmukhi script, in the year 1776, Santokh Singh, son of cloth 
printers, who wrote Sri Gar Pratap Suraj Granth in Braj language, in the year 1835-1843 
and Giani Gian Singh, a Jat who wrote Panth Prakash, a versified history of the Sikhs in 
Braj language in the year 1880, were important authors who belonged to this genre. One 
common factor linking all these authors except Santokh Singh was that they all claimed 
their descent from important Sikh historical personalities. For instance, Kesar Singh’s 
grandfather, Dharam Chand was in charge of the treasury of Guru Gobind Singh, and 
father of Dharam Chand, Dargah Mall had been a Diwan (a high official) of Guru Tegh 
Bahadur. Similarly while Sarup Das Bhalla claimed his descent from the family of Guru 
Amar Das, the third master of the Sikhs, Giani Gian Singh claimed his descent from 
Nagahia Singh, brother of Bhai Mani Singh Shahid.93 Though these sources provide 
evidence in abundance to construct this thesis, one had to be careful in reading between 
the lines, because the style adopted by these authors is many times hyperbolic, and often 
seems to glorify the Sikhs and deride the Mughals. While examining these sources, it was 
also kept in mind that these writings, as claimed by some of the authors, were written to 
gain state patronage either from the Sikh leaders or later from the British government. 
Therefore, these authors built their image by elevating the position of their caste or
Mani Singh Shahid was baptised by Guru Gobind Singh and stayed with Mata Sundari and Mata Sahib 
Kaur in Delhi. He wrote the Adi Granth dictated by Guru Gobind Singh at Damdama Sahib. After Guru 
Gobind Singh’s demise, he tried to organise the festival o f lights, Diwali, at the Harmandir, the Golden 
Temple. A pre-agreed amount was to be paid to the Moghul authorities by the Sikhs in order to organise the 
festivities. However, due to an unfriendly strict posture adopted by the Mughal authorities, the festivities 
were unsuccessful, thereby affecting the amount envisaged by the Sikhs. Consequently, the amount due 
towards the Moghul authorities was not fulfilled, which led to the death sentence o f  Bhai Mani Singh at 
Lahore. Please refer: Bhai Kalin Singh Nabha, Gurshabad Ratnakar Mahan Kosh (Delhi: National Book 
Shop, 1999)950-951.
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family by Unking themselves with the Sikh Gurus or historical personalities. Many 
aspects may be factually wrong, or period wise wrongly placed, but what needs to be 
analysed is what the author of that period thought important to represent in his writings 
and his perception of various communities. The use of the Panjabi and Braj languages by 
these authors indicate that these authors had a specific audience in mind, and probably 
those were the Panjabi elites who knew both Gurmukhi script and Braj language, which 
was literary Hindi of that time. By incorporating these sources in this research and 
linking them with the other Mughal sources, many new aspects of Panjab’s society and 
polity have been deciphered which has further helped a great deal in understanding how 
the change in hegemony came about in the Panjab from the Muslim elites to the non 
Muslim elites.
To construct this thesis, many sources written by both the Muslims and the non Muslims, 
associated with the Panjab, in Persian language such as chronicles, durbar records, 
tazkirahs (biographical memoirs) and general histories of Panjab, have been used. These 
sources have been crucial for the understanding of the polity of Panjab especially during 
the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century. The authors of these 
sources primarily wrote to seek patronage or were asked to write by British officials. For 
instance, Qazi Nur Mohammed, the author of Jangnama, wrote at the instance of Ahmad 
Shah Abdali, Sohan Lai Suri, the author of Umdat ut Tawarikh, and Diwan Amarnath, the 
author of Zafarnameh e Ranjit Singh, both wrote at the instance o f Ranjit Singh. Mofti 
Aliuddin, the author of Ebratnameh, wrote an account of the Sikhs at the instance of the 
British. This thesis will demonstrate through their writings the bias the authors of one
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community had for the other community that is, Muslim versus non Muslim and vice 
versa, as also show clearly the existence of two groups, Muslims and non Muslims during 
as early as the eighteenth century.
A very important source which was made use of to construct this thesis, though not in its 
entirety due to its sheer scale and problems of accessibility was the Khalsa Durbar 
Records. Preserved inside Panjab State Archives in Chandigarh, these records, which run 
into 300,000 folios covering a period from 1811 to 1849 of Ranjit Singh’s reign, are a 
mine of information written often in the shikasta style and mostly in the mm shikasta 
style. It is difficult to decipher these records; hence they have mostly remained neglected 
in the historical writings on the Panjab. However an effort has been made to use them as 
much as possible for this research. Another important source in Persian language is the 
Panjab’s Akhbarats (Newspapers), which have also been examined, and provide political 
and social information about Panjab.
Caution had to be exercised while making use of these Persian sources. Some of the 
authors of these sources had certain definite advantages due to being present at those 
crucial junctures of the history of Panjab. For instance, the author of Dabistan e Mazahib, 
being a contemporary of Guru Hargobind and Guru Har Rai, the sixth and the seventh 
master of the Sikhs, met with the Sikh masters in Kiratpur in the seventeenth century. 
Similarly, the authors Sohan Lai Suri and Diwan Amarnath were amongst the courtiers of 
Ranjit Singh in the early half of the nineteenth century, and hence they were witness to, 
or close to, those who were witness to the functioning of the court of Lahore’s
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proceedings. But these close connections also meant that these texts were written with a 
bias in favour of the Lahore court, hence any claims by these authors were cross 
examined from Persian as well as other sources such as the British and European 
accounts. These sources have provided interesting evidence vindicating the contention of 
the thesis that there was a qualitative change in hegemony from the Muslim to the non 
Muslim in the Panjab.
The third set of sources used to construct this work, are by the British and the Europeans, 
who were working either in military or civil capacity for the East India Company or were 
travelling through Panjab. The employees of the East India Company belonged mainly to 
the Ludhiana Agency (exceptions such as George Forster from the Madras Agency were 
also there) and wrote either due to the official requirement or due to their personal 
interest in the history of the region. Since most of these accounts were published in 
London, it may be suggested that these authors may also be seeking recognition among 
the elites in England. These accounts which are generally written in a narrative style have 
based their work on various types of sources. Some authors such as John Malcolm and 
Henry Prinsep have based their work on the local histories while others such as H M 
Lawrence have based their work on the information provided by their servants. However, 
some officials such as James Browne and Captain William Osborne, were in direct touch 
with the Sikhs and their leadership, hence have helped in understanding about the 
relationship between different communities in the court and in general in the eighteenth 
century Panjab. Henry Prinsep5s account Origin o f  the Sikh Power in the Punjab and 
Political Life o f  Muharaja Rnnjeet Singh, illustrates that the Sikh movement was the
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movement of the Jat peasantry. He also mentions, probably for the first time by any non 
Indian author, the existence of the Sikh misls. According to him, “the misls were 
confederacies of equals, under chiefs of their own selection” .96 Joseph Davey 
Cunningham lays stress on the fact that the establishment of the rule of Ranjit Singh was 
the fulfilment of the vision of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh. Shahmat Ali and 
Mohan Lai were Indians working for the East India Company who had their education in 
Anglo-Oriental government Colleges in India. Their works have provided an insight into 
the administration, revenue, and the army of Ranjit Singh and also topographical 
description of the towns and forts such as Wazirabad, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Jhelum, 
Rohtas and Rawalpindi in the journey enroute to Peshawar.
Lepel Griffin’s biographical work on the Panjab chiefs has been used to understand the 
history of ‘families of note1 in the Panjab. Lepel Griffin was a high ranking civilian 
officer, who took upon himself to write about the elite families of the Panjab. His other 
works Rajas o f  the Panjab, Law o f Inheritance to Chief ship as observed by the Sikhs 
before the Annexation o f the Panjab (Lahore, 1869), Sikhism and the Sikhs (Great 
Religions of the World: New York, 1901), and Maharaja Ranjit Singh (Asiatic Quarterly, 
London), have all been of use while writing this thesis. The shortcoming of his work 
seems to be the lack of content regarding Ranjit Singh’s rule. However, the work on the 
chief families of Panjab, have been especially valuable in comprehending the internecine 
struggles between various clans and the interplaying of each group against the other by
96 Henry Thoby Prinsep, Origin o f  the Sikh Power in the Punjab and Political Life o f Muha-raia Runieet 
Singh with an account o f the present condition, religion, laws and customs o f the Sikhs. (Calcutta: G.H. 
Huttman, 1834. Patiala: Language Department, 1970) 23.
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the Sikhs to gain and establish their control over the Panjab and the region beyond the 
Indus River.
The accounts by travellers both English and European, who probably could be considered 
as independent of any influence, have been useful indeed for the construction of this 
work. Most importantly, authors such as Charles Masson, 97 Martin Honigberger,98 
William Moorcraft" and Baron Charles Hugel100 have shed light on the political power of 
the Sikhs beyond the river Indus. The account by Charles Masson has made available the 
political situation in Afghanistan during Syed Ahmad Bareilly’s Jehad, and also about 
the joint Sikh-Afghanistan campaign.
It was important to keep in mind that although these authors spent significant parts of 
their lives in India, they were exposed to only filtered information from men in their 
service. It is common to discover that some of these accounts exhibit arrogance, 
cynicism and intolerance towards the local political, social and religious beliefs and 
customs prevalent in the Panjab. However, these accounts do also express certain aspects
97 Charles Masson, Narratives o f  Various Journeys in Beluchistan, Afghanistan and the Paniab. 3 Vols. 
(London: Richard Bentley, 1842).
98 John Martin Honigberger, Thirty-five years in the East : adventures, discoveries, experiments, and 
historical sketches, relating to the Punjab and Cashmere, in connection with medicine, botany, pharmacy, 
etc.. together with an original materia medica. and a medical vocabulary, in four European and five eastern 
languages (London: H Bailliere, 1852).
99 William Moorcroft and George Trebeck, Travels in the Himalayan Provinces o f  Hindustan and the 
Paniab. in Ladak and Kashmir, in Peshawar. Kabul. Kunduz and Bokhara from 1819 to 1825 (London: 
John Murray, 1841. Patiala: Languages Department, 1970).
100 Charles Von Hugel, Travels in Cashmere and the Paniab: containing a particular account o f  the 
government and character o f  the Sikhs. Trans. Thomas Best Jervis (London: John Petherman, 1845).
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of Panjab’s society and polity which have been useful in understanding the change in the 
hegemony from the Muslim to the non Muslims.
With the emergence of the British in the plains of the Panjab vast masses of records on 
the later history of the Sikhs, particularly from the rise of Ranjit Singh to the fall of the 
kingdom of Panjab (1799-1849) such as the records of the Delhi residency and the 
Ludhiana agency (1804-1840), letters from Fort William to the secret committee, private 
papers, the Bengal Secret and Political Consultations (1800-1834), were written, which 
have been fully made use of to understand the socio-politico scenario of Panjab. Some of 
these records such as of the Ludhiana agency provide important information about the 
relationship of Ranjit Singh with northern Muslim dominated areas. Many authors such 
as Henry Prinsep and Joseph Davey Cunningham made use of these records for writing 
their work as well. The records such as census reports, gazetteers and agrarian reports, 
associated with the latter half of the nineteenth century have been valuable towards the 
construction of this research. These reports move away from the narrative style of 
writings by local writers, and towards analysis, which has helped to understand socio­
political scenario in the nineteenth century Ranjit Singh’s Panjab. While making use of 
these records caution was adopted as these records often demonstrate superiority over the 
customs and beliefs of the local people. These records and reports, have given an inside 
view of the structure of society which indeed has been very helpful in the deciphering of 
the jigsaw of shifts in power from one religious group to another, leading to the 
establishment of the non Muslim hegemony in the Muslim dominated Panjab.
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1.6 Thesis Structure
In order to explore, extend, analyse the processes involved in the establishment of non 
Muslim hegemony the thesis has been divided into six chapters. The Chapters two to five 
will be the main chapters. Chapter one and Chapter six will be the Introduction and 
Conclusion chapter respectively. Chapter 2 explores the emergence of Sikh Space and 
Contesting Religious Identities, mainly covering the period from 1469 to 1707. The 
chapter will begin by exploring into the reasons which led to the rise of Sikhism in 
Panjab and its ramifications with regards to the Muslim population which led to a 
favourable context for the rise of Ranjit Singh. Chapter 3 investigates the processes 
which led to the emergence of the Sikh Hegemony and its Legitimacy over the Muslim 
Elites in eighteenth century Panjab. It will be argued in this chapter that the Sikhs, by 
taking on the role of defenders of the land and economy of people of the Panjab, created 
the first ever social contract between themselves and the Muslims thus positioning 
themselves in the command position in the Panjab. Another aspect which is dealt in this 
chapter is the increase in the incidents of Jehad against the Sikhs in the Panjab. The 
chapter also elaborates on the emergence of the political situation in which more Sikhs 
replaced the Muslim elites, both the Afghans and the Mughals, from the command 
position in the Panjab in the eighteenth century, which made it favourable for Ranjit 
Singh to establish non Muslim hegemony in the Panjab. Chapter 4 examines the process 
of change: from the Muslim elites to the non Muslim elites in the nineteenth century 
Panjab. This chapter will demonstrate the qualitative change witnessed from the Muslim 
elites such as the Tiwanas, Sials and the Awans, to the non Muslim elites such as, Hari 
Singh Nalwa (Sikh), Sawan Mala (Hindu Khatri), Avitabile (Italian) or Gulab Singh
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(Dogra), under Ranjit Singh, during the process of state formation. Another important 
aspect that will be dealt within this chapter is Ranjit Singh’s use of inter rivalries between 
different Muslim elites to his favour. These inter rivalries between different groups also 
became an important factor for the Muslims to not to unite under one banner of Syed 
Ahmad’s Jehad as will be demonstrated in this chapter. Chapter 5 explores the process 
of state formation and the issue of Legitimacy among the Muslim Subjects. This chapter 
will examine the reasons which led to the sustenance of power by the non Muslims under 
Ranjit Singh with regards to the Muslim subjects. The issues of legitimacy from the 
various factions of Muslims and the state policies which benefited the larger Muslim 
populace have been examined in this chapter. This chapter will also examine the 
methodology adopted to control Muslim population beyond the river Indus and also deals 
with the aspect of formation of new Muslim Elites. Chapter 6  is the conclusion, which 
will examine some of the themes already discussed, vis-a-vis creation of Sikh space, 
struggle for Sikh hegemony in the eighteenth century, establishment of the non Muslim 
hegemony, and the relationship with the Muslim population that led to the sustenance of 
Ranjit Singh’s rule. This chapter also seeks to demonstrate the relationship the religious 
ideologies of Muslims and non Muslims had with Panjab’s state polity and its 
implications both at the regional as well as at the subcontinent level. The pervasiveness 
and success of such ideological postulations are revealed by pointing to various religious 
and political currents in the Panjab which led to the emergence of the non Muslim 
hegemony in Panjab.
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1.7 Notes on Transliteration
The system of transliteration in the thesis follows that used by the Encyclopaedia of 
Sikhism, edited by Harbans Singh.
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Chapter 2
Em ergence of Sikh Space and Contesting Religious Identities
This chapter will broadly look into the how and why of the foundation for Ranjit Singh’s 
kingdom. It will examine the period from the fifteenth century till the eighteenth century. 
This was the period when on one hand, the Mughals were in the process of gaining 
political hold over Panjab and beyond, and on the other a religious ideology, Sikhism, 
was capturing the imaginations of a large part of the population of Panjab. The 
engagements between the two leaderships, the Sikhs and the Muslim elites, both political 
and religious, are of particular concern in this chapter. The endeavour is to look for an 
answer to the question: What issues arose due to the emergence of a new leadership on 
the canvas of Panjab? The issue of conversion into the new faith appears to be a 
contentious issue of those times: How did the Muslim religious and political leadership 
react to this new phenomenon in Panjab? In order to present explanations to the above 
mentioned concerns, this chapter is divided into three broad sections: firstly, the 
emergence of the Sikh religious power; secondly the Muslim elites and the Sikh 
leadership, and in its subsections, is further analyzed the position of the Muslims vis-a- 
vis the Sikh religious leadership, the political Muslim elites and the Sikh leadership; and 
thirdly, the issue of conversions and the contesting identities between the Muslims and 
the Sikhs.
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2.1 Emergence of the Sikh Religious Power
This section will examine the process by which Sikhism was able to create its space1 
between the existing two spaces, namely, the Hindu space (which predominantly 
included followers of Vaislinavism and Shaivism2* and the Muslim space3 in the 
northwest Indian subcontinent. The prime concern will be to study the thought processes 
of the Sikh leaders, leading to the emergence of the Sikh spiritual apparatus in Panjab. An 
effort will be made to analyse the creation of macro social structures such as Gurudwara 
(Sikh religious place) and Langar and their influence on the Muslim political and 
religious elites. The other dimension to this section will be looking at the interplay of 
power, which led to the emergence of Sikhs as a dominant group in Panjab.
Guru Nanak, born in 1469 AD, created a new space, based on the foundation of dialogue 
and tolerance in Panjab’s society.4 It did not take his ideas long to capture the 
imagination of the people in Panjab, especially among the Jat peasantry. He began to be
1 The word ‘space’ implies the symbolic realm which a religion inhabits which does not always coincide 
with a physical realm.
2 J S Grewal is a well-known historian. He has been the Vice Chancellor o f  Guru Nanak Dev University, 
Amritsar and was also Director, Indian Institute o f Advanced Studies, Shimla in India He mentions that 
what is now known as ‘Hinduism’ was represented by Shaiva, Vaishnavas and Shakta belief and practices: 
J S Grewal, The New Cambridge History o f  India: The Sikhs o f  the Paniab (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990)23.
3 J S Grewal, Cambridge History 4-5, 12-13, 19. J S Grewal states that the middle class in the Muslim 
community was not confined to the religious or racial luminaries. There were scholars, soldiers, clerks, 
traders, shopkeepers, physicians, scientists and men o f letters. The Muslim community did not only consist 
o f  nobility and middle class, there were also artisans and craftsmen, masons, blacksmiths, dyers, water 
carriers and the like.
For a discussion on Panjabi society please refer: J S Grewal, Cambridge History, 19-27.
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considered a saint and a patriarch by the people of Panjab .3 His teachings reflect a 
historical process that one discovers through his writings. A witness to the rise of Babar -  
the founder of the Mughal dynasty -  he strongly criticized the invasions from the west, 
especially the sacking of Sayyidpur. 6 On this occasion he uttered hymns, which he calls 
‘hymns of blood’.
God took Khurasan under His wing, and exposed India to the terrorism o f  Babar
The creator takes no blame to Himself; it was Death disguised as a Mughal that made war on us.
When there was such slaughter, such groaning, didst Thou not feel pain? Creator, Thou belongest to all.
If a powerful party beat another powerful party, it is no matter for anger;
But if a ravenous lion fall upon a herd o f cows, then the master o f the herd should show his manliness.7
He also condemned the fighting caste of the Hindus, the Kshatriyas for being so 
complacent at the time of defending their country. He was a strong advocate of the ideal 
of freedom to practise one’s faith. He denounced the Rajputs for losing their identity,
5 Syad Mohammed Latif, The History o f the Paniab (Calcutta: Calcutta Central Press company, 1891) 245. 
At the instance o f the British, the first-ever history o f  Panjab was authored by the learned Muslim historian, 
Syed Mohammed Latif. He was a revenue official, he could not have ignored his obligation to the East 
India Company. He was appointed as the Extra Assistant Commissioner, and later in 1892 and 1897, was 
granted the titles o f Khan Bahadur, and Shams-id- Ulema respectively for his services. His other valuable 
contributions are the history o f  Lahore and Multan and the third is the comprehensive study o f  the history 
o f  Panjab.
6 According to The Memoirs o f  Babar. those inhabitants o f  Sayyidpur who resisted were put to the sword 
and all their property plundered. Also, their wives and children were carried into captivity. Please refer: 
Babur, Emperor o f Hindustan. Babuf namah/ Memoirs o f  Zehir-ed-Din Muhammed Babur. Emperor o f  
Hindustan. Trans. John Leyden and William Erskine. Vol. 2. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921) 149.
7 “Rag Asa”, Please refer: Max Arthur Macauliffe, The Sikh Religion: its gurus, sacred writings and 
authors. Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909) 112-115.
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culture and tradition to that of the foreigners -  the Muslim elites -  who were the new 
hegemonic group in Panjab. 8
Guru Nanak chose not to express his rhetoric in the Persian or the Sanskrit languages, the 
media of communication for the Muslim and the non -  Muslim elites, but in Panjabi, the 
language of the land, 9 It was a key departure from the dominance of Persian, Braj and 
Sanskrit in the high echelons (The language aided in the formation of the Panjabi 
consciousness that was later nurtured by Ranjit Singh in Lahore in the eighteenth 
century). His follower Guru Angad, who further developed it by formalizing its script, 
continued this tradition. This script came to be known as Gurmukhi, 10 the script from the 
Guru’s mouth. Development of the Panjabi language was an important step towards the 
formation of a ‘new identity’. It demarcated a geographical boundary for the 
dissemination of the new ideology. Also, it encouraged the hegemony of those who were 
well versed in the Panjabi language. By introducing simple new customs, accessible to
8 These verses occur in the compositions o f Guru Nanak reffered to as Babarvani, that is, utterances 
regarding Babar in the Adi Granth. the holy book o f  the Sikhs: Guru Arjun, Adi Granth (compiled in 1604) 
191,360,471-472, 663,723.
9 Seir ul Mutakharin or View o f  the Modern Times -  is a history o f India. It was written in Persian 
language by Seid Gholam Hossein Khan, an Indian nobleman o f  high rank, in 1786 AD. Please refer: Seid- 
Gholam-Hossein-Khan, Seir ul Mutakharin, Vol. I (Calcutta: R. Cambray & Co., 1902-3) 83. Also see: 
Dabistan e Mazahib: a 17th century work, in Persian language which is a unique study o f  different religions 
o f  its time and includes a subsection about the Sikhs (Nanakpanthis). Mobad Kai Khusru Isfandayaar (the 
work is related with the name Mohsin Fani, but now it is clear that it was by Mobad; for a detailed 
discussion on this work, please refer: Muhammad Athar Ali, Journal o f the Asiatic Society Third Series, 
Vol. 9, Part 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Mobad Kai Khusru Isfandayaar, Dabistan e 
Mazahib, Vol. 1 (Tehran: Tahuri, 1983) 206. Also refer: Sri Guru Panth Prakash which is a history o f Sikhs 
in Panjabi verse. The author, who belonged to the Nirmala sect o f  the Sikhs, wrote this book in 1880 AD. 
Giani Gian Singh, Sri Guru Panth Prakash (Patiala: Languages Department, 1970) 80.
10 Kanhaya Lai, Trans. Jit Singh Seetal, Tarikli e Paniab. (Patiala: Punjabi University Publication Bureau, 
1987) 13. Tarikh e Paniab is a work in Urdu language by Kanhaya Lai, who belonged to the Kciyasth 
community. He wrote this work in 1875 AD. He was working for Sir Henry Davis, the Governor o f Panjab.
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the general public. Gum Nanak expressed himself in support of the suppressed women11
and distressed people belonging to low castes. 12 Guru Amar Das, the third master, by
disapproving the tradition of Sati altogether, further strengthened his efforts to uplift
women. 13 Uberoi states that, these lowborn but demographically significant social groups
appropriated and wielded a religious ideology not just for the pragmatic purpose of
mobility but also for launching their versions of society, morality and notions of justice . 14
The establishment and sustenance of the macro social structures such as
Gunidwaras/Dhammshalasb and Langar16 created physical spaces for the sangat, the
community to interact. 17 Further, by instructing the followers to celebrate their social
occasions in the Gurudwaras and to give dasvandh (one tenth of their earnings), to the
institution of the Guru, a distinctive socio-economic model was created under the Gurus.
A community grew up around Guru Nanak and the appointment of a successor, along
18with Gum Nanak’s ideals and institutions, significantly supported the Sikh ideology. 
These institutions seem to have helped the Sikhs to develop a particular type of psyche
11 Guru Arjun 412.
12 Gum Arjun 83, 142, 352, 359, 1330.
13 Latif 2 5 1.
14 JP Singh Uberoi, Religion, Civil Society and the State: A study o f Sikhism (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1999)94-95.
13 The word ‘Gurudwara’ occurs many a time in Guru Nanak’s hymns such as in Adi Granth, 351, 730, 
930, 933 and 1015. For a reading on the importance o f  the Gurudwaras, the abode o f  the Guru, please refer: 
“Hymns by Guru Amar Das, the third master”, Guru Arjun 26-27.
16 Guru Angad’s wife took special interest in langar, the community kitchen in Goindwal. Guru Arjun 966- 
967.
17 Guru Arjun 26, 28-30.
18 J S Grewal, Historical Perspectives on Sikh Identity (Patiala: Panjabi University, 1997) 2-3.
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and a socio cultural ethos. Further, it could be suggested that these developments created 
the base for a new moral order that denounced the hegemony of any group over 
themselves, especially of the Muslim ruling elites.
Another advance towards the creation of the Sikh space was the establishment and 
growth of townships, such as Kartarpur, Kliadur Sahib, Tarn Taran, Goindwal, Chak Ram 
Das, Amritsar, Kiratpur, Anandpur, Paonta and Nanded by the Gurus. The towns began 
to serve as the centres of Sikh culture as cities like Lahore and Multan and towns like 
Tulamba, Ajodhan, Jalandhar, Sultanpur, Sarhind, Thanesar, Panipat, Samana and 
Namaul served as the centres for Muslim culture. 19 However, it is possible, that there 
would have been mohallas (neighbourhoods) of other religious groups such as Muslims 
within the Sikh townships as there is no evidence which indicates that they were excluded 
from inhabiting these centres. Also, these centres, especially cities like Amritsar, became 
important business centres of Panjab. Guru Arjan, the fifth master, designed the city in 
such a way that it could accommodate many markets. Giani Gian Singh mentions that 
people hailing from fifty two caste groups of Patti, Kasur and Kalanaur were invited to 
settle there through Bhai Lalo, Grander Bhan, Roop Rani, Guria, Gurdas and Udhain
on oi ooetc. Khatris established markets in Amritsar. It will be appropriate to imply that
19 Grewal, Historical Perspectives 13.
20 Twarikh Guru Khalsa is a voluminous prose work from the origin o f the Sikhs to the time when they lost 
Panjab to the British. The author Giani Gian Singh (1822-1921) claimed descent from the martyr Bhai 
Mani Singh, who was a contemporary o f  Guru Gobind Singh. Giani Gian Singh, Twarikh Guru Khalsa 
(Patiala: Languages Department, 1970) 344; from the same author, please refer: Twarikh e Amritsar 
(Patiala: Languages Department, 1970) 7. For a detailed account on the city o f  Amritsar and the Golden 
Temple, consult: Madanjit Kaur, The Golden Temple: past and present (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev 
University Press, 1983) 11-12; Also refer: Sri Gur Pratap Surai Granth. which is a historical narrative o f
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these developments brought prosperity among the Sikhs, which further would have 
perhaps acted as a catalyst towards the building of relationships with the Muslim ruling 
elites of Panjab.
A sacred ‘centre’ and a ‘book’ for the new community were the central steps undertaken 
by the Sikh leadership subsequently.23 Guru Aijan, the fifth master, chose the city of 
Amritsar for the sacred centre, the Harmandir. 24 Guru Arjan laid the foundation stone in 
the presence25 of Mian Mir, 26 a Sufi of Lahore. He asked his followers to get the best
great significance written by Santokh Singh in the Braj language, in 1835-43. It was edited and published 
by Bhai Vir Singh who brought out a 14 volume annotated edition o f this classic work: Santokh Singh, Sri 
Gur Pratap Surai Granth, Vol. 6 (Amritsar: Khalsa Samachar, 1961-1964) 1859.
21 In the early days, Sikhism had found a large following among the Khatri caste group, a flourishing ‘urban 
based mercantile community’ which also engaged in ‘administration, clerical employment, and industry’. 
Please refer: William Hewat Mcleod, The Evolution o f the Sikh Community: Five Essays (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976) 10.
22 According to Kesar Singh Chhibber, an important market, called Guru ka Bazaar, sprang up in Amritsar. 
Bansavalinama Dasan Patshahian Ka is a poeticised account in Panjabi language o f  the lives o f  the Gurus 
by Kesar Singh Chhibber, who came from a family o f Diwans o f the Gurus. As he records himself, he 
wrote the Bansavalinama in a Dharamshala in Jammu and completed it in 1769 AD. The version used for 
this research is edited by Piara Singh Padam and published later in Amritsar in the year 1996. Kesar Singh 
Chibber, Bansavalinama Dasan Patshahian Ka, Ed, Piara Singh Padam (Amritsar, 1996) 40. Also, refer 
Mehma Prakash, a versified account in Gurmukhi script written around 1776 AD by Sarup Das Bhalla, who 
belonged to the family o f  the third Master, Guru Amar Das. It has been published by the Language 
Department, Patiala, in two volumes in the year 1971. Please refer: Sarup Das Bhalla, Mehma Prakash 
(Patiala: Languages Department, 1970) 293. Also see: Santokh Singh 1806-1807.
23 J S Grewal calls it Guru Granth and Guru Panth, For the discussion on Guru Granth and Guru Panth, 
please see: J S Grewal, Sikh Ideology. Polity and Social Order (Delhi: Manohar, 1996) 133.
24 Isfandayaar 207, Gian Singh 108-109, Bhalla 320.
25 According to Sikh traditional sources such as Sri Gur Prakash Surai Granth, the foundation stone o f  the 
Harmandir was laid by Guru Arjun himself. Writers such as Macauliffe and even historians such as Teja 
Singh and Ganda Singh have accepted this version. Please refer: Santokh Singh 1856; Teja Singh, Ganda 
Singh 28; and Macauliffe, Vol. 3, 10. However, accounts like Joseph Davey Cunningham’s and the 
pamphlets o f the shrine’s authority have persistently laid stress on the fact that Mian Mir o f  Lahore laid the 
foundation stone o f  the shrine. All the European accounts endorse this fact as well. Also, Satbir Singh, in 
Partakh Hari. Jivni Guru Arjan Dev ji, mentions that Mian Mir did lay the foundation stone o f  Harmandir 
Sahib, based on the Persian works o f nineteenth century such as Umdat ut Tawarikh, Khalsanama and
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bricks for the project. Many followers from far and near joined to lend support, and those 
who could not make it, sent money. The architecture of the shrine by itself was distinct 
Four doors were made in four directions symbolically welcoming people of all castes 
from all directions.27 The compilation of the Granth in the year 1604 AD was another 
landmark. 28 The Sikhs, by then, had a living leader and a written word, which could be 
copied and carried to new places like the Gurudwaras established in Panjab then. 
Altogether, it seems that a new environment with a new language for all those who knew 
bani (verses from the Holy book of the Sikhs, Guru Granth) would have become the 
ultimate paradigm.
Tawarikh e Paniab. Please refer: Satbir Singh, Partakh Hari, Jivni Guru Arian Dev ii Jalandhar: 1991; 
Sohan Lai Suri, Umdat ut Tawarikh, Vol. 1 (Lahore: Arya Press, 1885) 28-29; Bakht Mai, Khalsanama, 
MS 1810-14 (Patiala: Punjabi University); and Ghulam Muhiyuddin Bute Shah, Tawarikh e Paniab MS, 
(Patiala: Punjabi University) 139. Giani Gian Singh’s Twarikh Guru Khalsa in Urdu also mentions that 
Mian Mir was asked to lay the first brick. Please refer: Giani Gian Singh, Twarikh Guru Khalsa, Urdu, Vol. 
1 (1896) 96. Madanjit Kaur argues in her work that this fact is not supported by earlier sources; not even 
by Persian chronicles including biographies o f  Mian Mir (she doesn’t mention evidence to support her 
point). She has argued on the basis o f  the first recorded reference to the fact that Mian Mir did not lay the 
first brick, as mentioned in The Paniab Notes and Queries (1849-1884), typed copy, 141 (Sikh Reference 
Library, Amritsar. The library suffered severe damage during June o f  the year 1984 in the Bluestar 
operation by Indian Army on Golden Temple). The contributor o f the entry was E Nicholl, who was a 
Secretary Municipal Committee, Amritsar. However, there is evidence to prove that Mian Mir had close 
links with Guru Arjun, and since the foundation o f  an important centre was being laid in Amritsar, which is 
35 kms from Lahore, there is every possibility o f Mian Mir being invited and present at the time o f  the 
event, even if he did not lay the foundation stone.
26 To read more about Mian Mir, please refer: Satbir Singh, Gurbhari Jivni Guru Har Gobindji (Patiala: 
Publication Bureau, 1988) 48; Also Satbir Singh, Puratan Itihasak Jivnian (Jalandhar: 1969) 59-67; Also 
Encyclopaedia o f Sikhism, ed. Harbans Singh, Vol. 3 (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1998) 82.
27 Santokh Singh, 1855-1857; Lai 23; Gian Singh 108-110; Also, Bhagat Singh, Gurbilas Patshahi Chevin. 
ed. Gurmukh Singh. (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1997) 157-158.
28 Santokh Singh 2134; Lai 23-24; and Gian Singh 110.
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The event of martyrdom of Guru Aijan at Lahore was a turning point for the Sikh 
movement.29 Guru Arjan asked his son Hargobind to ascend to the Sikh leadership fully 
armed.30 The new development not only gave legitimacy to the right of defending oneself 
with arms but also established it as an integral part of the Sikh ethos. Latif, writing in the 
late nineteenth century states that Guru Hargobind was an antithesis of Guru Nanak; for
31example, he ate flesh and organised his followers on military lines. This argument can 
only be acknowledged to the extent that the Sikhs were in the process of discovering 
solutions to the encountered issues and hence, the change in the approach of leadership 
camiot be considered as an antithesis to Guru Nanak’s ideology. Nevertheless, it seems 
that this step of endorsing armed struggle to defend oneself was an important step in the 
creation of the Sikh space and later, in the formation of a Sikh state by the end of the 
eighteenth century under Ranjit Singh.
The ‘Institution of Preaching’ was created at an early stage by the Sikh Gurus 
themselves. The pioneering step for building this institution was taken up by Guru Amar 
Das, the third master, who created a well-knit religious system and set up twenty-two 
mcrnjis (preaching districts). Each was placed under a pious Sikh, and even women were 
put in control of manjisd1 The job of these Sikh leaders was to preach from the religious 
texts and also to collect the dasvandh (one-tenth share of earnings) and send it to the
29 Gian Singh 26.
30 Santokh Singh, Vol. 7, 234.
31 Latif 255.
32 Lai 17.
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Guru. The other important task of the leaders was to popularise the new ceremonies of 
birth, marriage and death. Guru Har Rai, the seventh master, established three spiritual 
seats, known as bakhshishs, to preach and to spread the message from bani. The first was 
that of Bhagwan Gir, renamed Bhagat Bhagwan, who established missionary centres in 
eastern India. The second was that of Sangatia, renamed Bhai Pheru, who preached in 
Rajasthan and southern Panjab. Guru Har Rai also sent Bhai Gonda to Kabul, j3 Bhai 
Natha to Dhaka and Bhai Jodh to Multan to preach. The Bagrian family and the family of 
Kaithal preached in the Malwa region. He blessed the boy Phul, who was the founding 
father of the royal families of Patiala, Nabha and Jind .34 All the Gurus undertook 
prolonged journeys to spread the message of Sikhism. Guru Tegh Bahadur, the ninth 
master, went as far as Assam. This journey undertaken by him was the longest after Guru 
Nanak’s. He also went as far as Dhaka, Chittagong, Sondip Island and Sylhet.35
Arnold Toynbee considers that Sikhism alone could offer an effective and creative 
response to the challenge of Islam ,36 The Sikh response differed from the Maratha and 
the Jat uprisings, because it explicitly had religious context towards which they looked 
for justifications unlike the Marathas who did not assert their independence from the
33 Sarup Das Bhalla 581-584.
34 Encyclopaedia o f  Sikhism, ed. Harbans Singh, Vol. 3 (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1998) 261.
35 Lai 40.
36 For more details on Sikhism by Toynbee, please refer: Arnold Joseph Toynbee, A Study o f  History. Vol. 
8, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) 475-476.
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Indo-Muslim authority and political culture until Shivaji’s coronation/ 7 People found an 
objective and a creative response to the challenges of the times in Guru Nanak’s faith. 
Followers of the faith were encouraged by the Gums to become traders. The Gurus 
contributed with ideas and support to agriculturists by encouraging the making of step- 
wells in their regions.38 The first four Gurus were farmers or village grocers, and their 
followers were petty peasants and tiny traders. Guru Aijan, the fifth master, encouraged 
his followers to take to trade and commerce, and especially to become horse dealers, as 
suggested by Guru Ram Das earlier to the Sikhs. Buying horses in central Asia and 
selling them in India made them rich, adventurous, fearless and free from caste 
prejudices.39 Satish Chandra stressing on the importance of horses in the context of the 
influence of the Central Asian institutions on Rajputs which brought change in the 
importance of cavalry more than the infantry, claims that a horse had become a status 
symbol in Rajput society as early as twelfth century, so much so that it was the common 
cause of conflict among them .40 This argument can be extended to the rise in the status of 
the Sikhs as well. The control over horse trading would have contributed immensely in 
making a niche in the most lucrative business in the region and also would have helped 
the Sikhs gain economically. Economic prosperity amongst the Sikhs also encouraged a
37 John F Richards, The New Cambridge History o f  India: The Mughal Empire (1993. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 213.
38 Latif 251; Also refer: Andre Wink, Land and Sovereignity in India. Agrarian Society and Politics under 
the Eighteenth Century Maratha Svaraiva (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 40, 48.
39 Hari Ram Gupta, History o f the Sikhs, Vol. 1: The Sikh Gurus (1469-1708 AD) (New Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal Publishers, 1984) 133. Works such as by R S Tripathi have shown that the region between 
north India and the Suleiman mountains was famous for the breeding o f  horses. Please refer: Rama Shankar 
Tripathi, History o f  Kanauj (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1989) 244.
40 Satish Chandra, Essays on Medieval Indian History (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003) 29.
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number of Jats and Khatris to endorse and connect with the Sikh ideals. While accounting 
for the Jat influx in the panth (religious tradition), McLeod proposes that the Jats 
followed the Khatris as the latter were their teachers and secondly, social mobility and 
respect accorded in the egalitarian message of Sikhism also attracted economically 
resurgent, but socially stigmatised Jats, towards the panth.41 Habib clearly mentions the 
Jat peasantry’s oppression by the Mughal Empire and its ruling classes. Thus, he is not 
content with only the cultural pattern, but treats the Jats as oppressed peasants coming 
into Sikhism and opposing the Mughal Empire militantly.42 McLeod dwells greatly on 
the nature of the Jat community while mentioning the economic reason casually. 
“Whatever the reason”, Sikhism turned into a “reflection of the Jat cultural patterns”- 
thus McLeod occludes the possibility of striking a structural link between the Sikh 
doctrine and its social constituency.43 Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth master, created the 
institution of the Khalsa-those who are pure, in front of a huge gathering in Anandpur in 
1699 AD. He further structured the Sikh followers by giving them a dress code and an 
image, which let loose the power of the ‘sangaP-the community, by accepting its
41 Mcleod quotes Irfan Habib in this context however Habib’s emphasis is not on the cultural patterns but 
on the egalitarian notion o f pastoral tribes who had recently turned to settled agrarian practices. They found 
an echo in the Sikh message. As against the mere account o f Jat cultural patterns driving Sikhism to 
militancy. William Hewat Mcleod, The evolution o f the Sikh Community: five essays (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1975) 11-13.
42 Irfan Habib. “Jats o f  Panjab and Sind” Punjab Past and Present: Essays in Honour o f  Dr. Ganda Singh. 
2nd ed. Eds. Harbans Singh and Norman Gerald Barrier (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1996) 100. Ganda 
Singh (1900 -  1987), was a celebrated Panjab historian who, by his sustained and pioneering work in the 
field o f  historic research, initiated new trends in Sikh historiography.
43 William R Pinch, in this context, also mentions the de-emphasising o f the political context by Mcleod on 
the question o f  militarisation o f the Panth. See William R Pinch, Peasants and Monks in British India. 
(Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 1996) 172.
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superiority over him as well.44 The "baptised group’ were a model of Guru Gobind 
Singh’s concept of 'Sant Sipahi\4:> It seems that the Sikh sacred power by this time had 
emerged as a ‘significant group’ and had tried to embrace all aspects of society and its 
constituents.
2.2 The Muslim Elites46 and the Sikh Leadership
The interactions of the Sikh leadership with both the religious and the political Muslim 
elites will be the main area of focus for this section. These exchanges established new 
dynamics, bonds and animosities between the two groups both in the political as well as 
the spiritual spheres. Sikhs were accepted and were offered a hand of alliance by Muslim 
elites; however on other occasions, under the influence of the Muslim radical groups, 
they were brutally assaulted and killed. The closeness between the Sufis and the Sikh 
leadership will also be looked into in this section. The influence of friendship between 
the Muslims and the Sikh leadership will be looked at in the following subsection
2.2.1 — Muslim Religious Elites and the Sikh Leadership
It can be said that the Muslim religious elites and the Sikh leadership had a close contact 
with each other. Giani Gian Singh mentions that the Muslim faqirs (Sufis) such as 
Bilawal, Sheikh Mohammed Tahri, Mohammed Mukim Shah, and Khwajah Bihari had
44 Bhalla 818-824.
43 The idea is popularly known as the ‘iSant Sipahi ’ or Saint Soldier.
46 For a discussion on who are the Elites, please refer Introduction 40-42,
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close ties with the Sikh Gurus, as they came to Guru Amar Das after he took over as the 
third master.47 The association was further strengthened between Guru Arjan and Mian 
Mir48 when the famine broke out in Lahore. The Guru reached there and established 
langar, the community kitchen. This gave employment and food to a number of needy 
people. The Sikhs were even asked to send their tenth share of earnings to Lahore. Mian 
Mir also visited Gum Arjan’s dev a frequently. This friendship led to an invitation by 
Guru Arjan to Mian Mir during the laying of the foundation stone of Harmandir Sahib in 
Amritsar 49 Mian Mir was perturbed at the way the Guru was treated by the Mughals.50 
At the time when orders were passed by Jehangir to execute Guru Aijan and confiscate 
his property, it was Mian Mir who got the latter order deferred . 31 In another instance, 
when Guru Hargobind, the sixth master, was in the Gwalior jail on charges of not paying 
the fine imposed on his father, Mian Mir and Nurjahan, the wife of Jehangir, were helpful 
in facilitating his release.32
The friendship of the Sikh leadership and the tolerant members of the Muslim ruling 
elites like Dara Shikoh continued. Giani Gian Singh states that once when Dara Shikoh 
got sick, Guru Har Rai, the seventh master of the Sikhs, helped him get cured by sending
47 Giani Gian Singh, Twarikh Guru Khalsa. Vol. 1 (Patiala: Languages Department, 1970) 330.
48 Satbir Singh, Gur Bhari Jivni (Patiala: Publication Press, 1998) 48.
49 For a discussion on this issue please refer footnote number 25.
30 Also see: Horace Arthur Rose, A Glossary o f  Castes and Tribes o f  the Panjab and NWFP of India. Vol. 1 
(Lahore: 1919. Patiala: Language Department, 1970)683.
31 Trilochan Singh, Guru Teeh Bahadur (Delhi: Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee, 1967) 37.
32 Chibber; Also see: Gian Singh 127.
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herbs.5J Also, the Guru came to his aid during his struggle for ascendancy to the Mughal 
throne. 54 Another example of friendship was when Guru Tegh Bahadur, the ninth master, 
was on his way through Bahadurgarh, near Patiala; the Nawab (a high title for Muslims), 
Saif Ali Khan, invited him over to his fort. Guru Tegh Bahadur went to his fort to 
discover a Gurudwara constructed within the fort by the Nawab for him . 55 After his stay 
for six months in Bahadurgarh, the Guru went to Samana.56 Twarikh e Panjab mentions 
that he was a guest of the Muslims of ‘Maril’ community. By that time, the Mughal 
informers reached Samana to arrest Guru Tegh Bahadur. However, the informers had to 
face stiff resistance from Marils along with the Sayyids of Samana who were successful 
in protecting the Guru. 57
Pir Budhu Shah, whose real name was Badr-ud-din, was an admirer of Guru Gobind 
Singh, the tenth master. He was born in a prosperous Sayyid family of Sadhaura, near 
Ambala. On his recommendation, the Guru engaged five hundred Pathan soldiers under 
the command of four leaders -  Kale Khan, Bhikhan Khan, Nijabat Khan and Hayat 
Khan. 58 At the time when the combined forces of the hill chiefs led by Raja Fateh Shah of
33 Gian Singh 150.
34 Sujan Rai Bhandari, Khulasat ut Tawarikh Ed. Ranjit Singh Gill, (Patiala: Panjabi University, 1971) 527.
55 Santokh Singh, Vol. 10, 4339, 4346-4347.
36 Samana is a historic town 30 km southwest o f Patiala, in the present day Indian Panjab.
57 Lat 41.
38 Gian Singh 796; Also refer: J S Grewal and Satjit Singh Bal, Guru Gobind Singh: A Biographical study,
(Chandigarh: Panjab University, 1967) 73.
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Srinagar (in Garhwal) attacked Gum Gobind Singh, in the year 1688 at Bhangani, 59 all 
the Pathans, with the exception of Kale Khan, deserted the Guru and joined the hill 
chiefs. As soon as Pir Budhu Shah came to know about this disloyalty, he rushed to the 
battlefield with seven hundred of his followers including his brother and four sons. Many 
of his disciples as well as two of his sons Ashraf and Mohammed Shah and his brother 
Bhure Shah died in the battlefield.60 Guru Gobind Singh offered rich presents to the Pir, 
who declined and only accepted a small kirpan, turban and comb with the Guru’s hair.61 
Fearing the growing power of Guru Gobind Singh, the Rajput hill chiefs complained 
about Guru Gobind Singh and Pir Budhu Shah to the Mughal authorities. The faujdar 
(person reponsible for protecting some territory) of Sarhind under whose jurisdiction the 
pargana (former administrative unit of the Indian Subcontinent) of Sadhaura then fell 
directed the local official, Usman Khan, to chastise the Pir. The latter marched on 
Sadhaura, arrested Budhu Shah and had him executed on 21st March 1704.62
2.2.2 — M uslim Political Elites and the Sikh Leadership
The first information about Nanak’s interaction with the Muslim rulers of the times, as 
provided by Latif, is when the kardars (administrators) of the then Delhi emperor, 
Ibrahim Lodhi, informed him that a faqir whose tenets were different from the Quran and
39 The battle site, Bhangani is 25 kms from the city o f Paonta (in the present state o f Himachal Pradesh), 
which is 60 kms from Dehradun (in the present state o f  Uttranchal) in India.
60 Kartar Singh, Life o f  Guru Gobind Singh (Ludhiana: Lahore Book Shop, 1951) 83.
61 Lai 45.
62 Encyclopaedia o f Sikhism, ed. Harbans Singh, Vol. 1 (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1992) 410.
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the Vedas was openly preaching to the people. By imperial order, Guru Nanak was 
brought to the emperor who met him, and after hearing his ideas on religion ordered him 
to be kept in close confinement. He was kept in the prison for seven months.63 During 
Babar’s rule, Guru Nanak and Mardana, along with a number of Guru’s followers, were 
apprehended and brought before the emperor. Babar enjoyed his conversation with Guru 
Nanak. However, there is no evidence in Babarnama about this meeting. This was 
probably because Guru Nanak was not a man of note at that time . 64 By examining the 
writings of Guru Nanak, which figure in the Adi Granth, the holy book of the Sikhs, the 
treatment meted out to the Sikhs by the Mughal invaders in 1521 AD becomes clear. 
Guru Nanak was on his way back after visiting the Muslim countries, when at Sayyidpur 
(presently Eminabad), he strongly condemned the violence meted out to the Muslim 
ladies there. Also, he criticised the ruling elites vehemently. 65
After the defeat by Sher Shah, on May 17th 1540, at Kanauj, Humayun made his way to 
Lahore and learnt of the ways of the “wonder-working priest” that could restore to him 
his kingdom . 66 This priest was Guru Angad, the second master. When Humayun went to 
meet this priest, he had to wait for sometime, which annoyed him to the extent that his 
hand went for the sword. At that very moment, Guru Angad said that you wish to attack
63 Latif 245.
64 Latif 249.
65 Guru Arjun 722, 903, 1191.
66 Macauliffe, Vol. 2, 19-20.
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men who are lost in devotion while you did not use your sword when you should have 
used it.67 This moved Humayun who, without delay, realised his mistake.
Interaction of Guru Amar Das, the third master, with the political power took place when 
Marwah, the Sarpanch (head of the village council) of a village, from whose father the 
Guru had bought land for developing the township of Goindwal, complained to the 
governor of Lahore.68 He connived with the Brahmins, the Jogis (a term for a male 
practitioner of various forms of the path of Yoga) and the Sadhus (Ascetics), as they also 
disliked the liberal beliefs of Guru Amar Das. The Nawab, Jaffar Beg decided to pay a 
visit to Goindwal himself. He was impressed by what he saw and dismissed the 
complaint. In a similar instance, the Brahmins complained to Akbar about the age-old 
traditions of Hindus being broken. 69 Akbar sent his parwana and asked for 
representation. Mehma Prakash describes this incident: ‘The Brahmins, the Khatris and 
the Muslims went together to the king to make a complaint. They said that the Guru does 
not chant Gayatri mantra and asks people to meditate on Waheguru. He has rejected 
sntras and smritis and established his own cult” . 70 Bhai Jetha, who later succeeded him as 
the Guru, was sent as a representative to the court. He explained and defended the Sikh 
ethos in the Mughal court. Akbar was satisfied and declared that Marwah and his 
associates be turned out of the court. 71 This recognition from the court would have given
67 Santokh Singh 1349-53; Also refer: Lai 13; Gian Singh 81.
68 Bhalla 133.
69 Santokh Singh 1506-07.
70 Santokh Singh 1507-08; Also see: Bhalla 138-140.
71 Bhalla 141.
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a thrust to the activities of the Sikhs. Under the rule of Akbar, Sikh relations with the 
Mughals remained cordial. Akbar met Guru Amar Das in 1560 AD at Goindwal and had 
food in the community kitchen with ordinary men .72 He offered to give a grant of land 
for langar, to which the Guru declined. On learning that Ram Das, who was the son- in-
73law of the Guru, was looking for land, Akbar granted the same to his wife Bibi Bhani. 
The Gazetteer of Amritsar points out that, in 1577 AD, the Gum obtained a grant of the 
site, together with five hundred bighas (a unit of measurement of land), from the emperor 
Akbar on payment of rupees seven hundred Akbari to the zamindar of Tung who owned 
the land. 74 There he dug a tank to which he gave the name of Amritsar. In response to the 
complaint against the Guru by Chandu and Prithia, 75 Emperor Akbar asked about the 
Granth and ordered to see it. Baba Budha and Bhai Gurdas went to Akbar, who offered 
fifty one gold coins. He also gave dresses of honour to Baba Budha and Bhai Gurdas. 
Later, the emperor visited the Guru on his way to Delhi from Lahore. 76 Amritsar became 
the spiritual and economic centre. As mentioned earlier, the construction of the spiritual 
centre of the Sikhs, Harmandir, created mass dynamics in those times involving people of
72 Santokh Singh, Vol. 5, 1555.
?J Gurbilas Patshahi Chevin is a versified biography o f Guru Hargobind in Braj language but is written in 
Gunmikhi script. The colophon mentions 1718 AD as the year o f  completion o f  this book. The Languages 
Department o f  Panjabi University published this manuscript in 1970. The poet claims to have versified the 
biographical details o f the Guru’s life as narrated to him by his literary mentor, Dharam Singh, who 
happened to be present at Nanaksar, where Bhai Mani Singh, scholar and martyr, on the request o f a devout 
Sikh named Bhagat Singh, recounted in successive sittings the memorable events relating to the Guru 
Hargobind’s life: Bhagat Singh, Gurbilas Patshahi Chevin. Ed. Dr. Gurmukh Singh (Patiala: Panjabi 
University, 1997) 44: Also see: Santokh Singh, Vol. 5, 1680.
74 Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f  the Amritsar District (1883-84) 61.
73 Chandu was a Diwcrn in the Lahore government and Prithia was the eldest brother o f  Guru Arjan. Both 
had personal animosities with the Guru.
76 Macauliffe, Vol. 3, 82-84.
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all castes from far and near in a common cause. Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh by Sujan Rai 
Bhandari has mentioned that Akbar went to meet Guru Arjan on November 24th 1598. At 
this time, Guru Arjan requested Akbar to reduce taxes because the value of grains had
* 77reduced after the Royal army left the region. Akbar reduced the taxes by l /6 th at the 
instance of Guru Arjan, though Latif is of the view that Akbar reduced the taxes at the 
instance of Guru Ram Das .78 This may be incorrect, as the view of Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh 
seems to be more appropriate due to its author’s proximity to the Mughal court.
In the post Akbar scenario, during Jehangir’s reign, there was an increase in intolerance 
towards the Sikh leadership. As claimed by Tuzuk Jehangiri, Jehangir had formed his 
opinions about Guru Arjan. According to the Tuzuk;
In G obindw al, w hich  is on the river Biyah (B eas), there w as a Hindu named Arjun, in the 
garments o f  sainthood and sanctity, so much so that he had captivated m any o f  the sim ple- 
hearted o f  the Hindus, and even  the ignorant and foolish  follow ers o f  Islam, by his w ays and 
manners, and they had loudly sounded the drum o f  his holiness. T hey called  him G uru  and 
from all sides stupid people crow ded to worship and m anifest com plete faith in him. For 
three or four generations (o f  spiritual successors) they had kept this shop warm. M any tim es 
it had occurred to me to put a stop to this vain affair or to bring him into the assem bly o f  
people o f  Islam .79
In Panjab, the Naqshbandi Sufis had become influential in the Mughal court and were 
influencing political elites against other religious denominations, though Jehangir was not 
under their influence. Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, the leader of the Naqshbandis, born in
77 Sujan Rai Bhandari, Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh, ed. Ranjit Singh Gill, (Patiala: Panjabi University) 436-437.
78 Latif 253.
79 Nuruddin Jahangir, Tuzuk e Jahangiri. Trans. Alexander Rogers, ed. Henry Beveridge, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. 
(Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1968) 72.
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1563, used to call himself Mujdad Alefsani (the protector of Islam) . 80 Mohammed Mujib, 
in his work The Indian Muslims, has written about the Naqshbandi leaders and their 
hatred for the Hindus. 81 According to R S Sharma, with the accession of Jehangir, 
‘orthodoxy had shown resilience and had recovered some lost ground’. " The other issue 
which probably incited Jehangir against the Sikh leadership was the close relation of 
Prince Khusru with Guru Arjan. After the death of Akbar in 1605 AD, Khusru contested 
for the Mughal throne against Jehangir. During this struggle to the throne, Prince Khusru 
was able to escape from the Agra fort and reach Panjab, where he met Guru Arjan in Tam
• « * 83Taran. The Guru warmly received him by applying a saffron mark on his forehead. The
84Dabistan e Mazahib mentions that the Guru offered prayer for the Prince. There were 
also other reasons why Mughal leadership developed animosity with the Sikh leadership. 
Chandu Shah, who was the finance minister at Lahore, wanted his daughter to be married 
to Hargobind, the son of Guru Arjan. But the proposal was not accepted. Chandu took it 
as his personal insult, and instigated Jehangir against Guru Arjan . 83 Latif , writing his 
work in nineteenth century, states that Guru Aijan assumed 'dictatorship', and adds that 
he was the first one to lay aside the rosary and the garb of a faqir, and dressed himself in 
costly attire and converted the saintly gaddi (the seat) of his pious predecessors into a
80 Nuruddin Jahangir, “Tarikh e Salim Shahi”, The History o f India as told by its own Historians -  The 
Mohammedan Period. Henry Miers Elliot and George Rowley Dowson, Vol. 6, (London: Trtibner, 1867- 
1877) 272.
81 Mohammad Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967) 244.
82 Ram Sharma, The Religious Policy o f  the Mughal Emperors (Calcutta:, 1940) 40.
83 Jehangir calls it ‘Qashqa’; Jahangir, Tuzuk e Jahangiri 72-73.
84 Isfandayaar 207.
85 Santokh Singh, Vol. 6, 2134, 2257; Lai 25.
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princely rostrum. He adds that Guru Arjan kept fine horses and elephants, and lived in 
splendour. 86 C H Payne says that Aijan Dev had realized that it was crucial to have
0 7
weapons to sustain freedom. This action was bound to have its effects. Guru Aijan was
88asked to come to Lahore where he died from torture in Lahore in 1606.
Some of the spiritual Muslim leadership much-praised this event and considered it as a 
success of the Islamic forces. For instance, Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi of the Naqshbandi 
order of Sufis expressed his utmost delight at Guru Aijan being tortured to death. In a 
letter written to Sheikh Farid Bukhari, then entitled Murtaza Khan, the governor of 
Panjab, he said, “The execution at this time of the cursed kafir of Goindwal.. .with 
whatever motive.. .is an act of the highest grace for the followers of Islam. Hindus should 
be treated as dogs. Jazia should be imposed upon them and cow slaughter should be 
allowed in open” .89 For the Sikhs, this incident became an important reference point to 
refer to and get inspired from both socially and politically, thus strengthening the belief 
among those, such as Jats, who did not intend to adhere to the Mughal hegemony.
86 Latif 253.
87 Charles Herbert Payne, A Short History o f  the Sikhs (London: Thomas Nelson, 1915. Punjab: 
Department o f  Languages, 1970) 31-32.
ss Tuzuk e Jahangiri states that Jehangir ordered for the execution o f  Guru Aijan, ‘that he should be put to 
death’; Jahangir, Tuzuk e Jahangiri. 73; J S Grewal argues in The Cambridge History o f India: The Sikhs o f  
the Paniab, that Guru Arjan’s capital penalty was commuted to heavy fine which the Guru refused to pay; 
See: J S Grewal, The Cambridge History o f India: The Sikhs o f the Paniab (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990) 64. Also see: Bhagat Singh, 243; HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. 1, 152.
89 Maktubat e Imam Rabanni. I, Part 111, letter no 193. Quoted by Ganda Singh in: The Paniab past and 
present: Sources on the life and teachings o f  Guru Nanak (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1969) 94, 95. For 
more discussion on Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, please refer: Mujeeb.
Guru Arjan had foreseen and Guru Hargobind had also envisaged that it would no longer 
be possible to protect the Sikh community and its organisation without the aids of arms 
and the way in which he proceeded to secure this end speaks a good deal for his sagacity 
and his shrewd political sense.90 Before his death Guru Aijan asked his disciples to go to 
his son Hargobind and ask him to ascend the throne fully armed, maintain his army to the 
best of his ability and treat the Sikhs with utmost courtesy. 91 The construction of the Akal 
Takhat by Guru Hargobind, constructed right opposite the holy shrine of Harmandir, had 
been another litigious matter for the Mughal authority.92 Another development had been 
the emergence of the institution of the Guru as a military alternative to the Mughals. The 
Guru himself was maintaining seven hundred horses, three hundred foot soldiers and six 
topchis, thus becoming the first organised army of the Sikhs, and had built a fort, named 
Lohgarh, near Amritsar.93 The Guru had employed Pathan soldiers like Painda Khan, 
who had left the Mughal forces.94 Jehangir asked Guru Hargobind to pay the fine, which 
had been levied on his father Guru Arjan. On denial of the above order, Guru Hargobind 
was put in the Gwalior jail.9^  There were immediate efforts for the Guru’s release.
90 Indubhusan Banerjee, Evolution o f  the Khalsa. 2nd ed. Vol. 2, (Calcutta: A Mukherjee and Co., 1962) 32.
91 Macauliffe, Vol. Ill, 99.
92 Bhagat Singh, Gurbilas 247; John Clark Archer, The Sikhs in Relation to Hindus. Moslems, Christians 
and Ahmadiwas: A Study in Comparative Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1946) 174. 
Khazan Singh argues that Akal Bunga (synonym o f Akal Takhat) was a temporal seat, which led to a 
situation where the Sikhs did not look towards Delhi or Lahore for justice. Khazan Singh, History and 
Philosophy o f  the Sikh Religion, Vol. 1 (Lahore: Nawal Kishore Press, 1914) 127.
93 Isfandayaar 208.
94 Bhalla 470; Santokh Singh, Vol. 7, 2633.
95 Isfandayaar 207; Latif argues that Guru Hargobind was arrested due to misappropriation o f funds (Latif 
255). However, this seems to be incorrect as it is contradicted by the fact available to us by contemporary
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Bansavalinama states that when Guru Hargobind was put in the Gwalior jail, Mian Mir 
suggested to Nurjahan for his release, which led to the freeing of Guru from the Gwalior 
fort.96 The Sikhs celebrated the release of Guru Hargobind in Panjab.97 Guru Hargobind 
had an audience with Jehangir and was able to convince him against Chandu Shah, the 
dew an. Chandu was handed over to the Guru and later brutally executed by the Sikhs in 
Amritsar.98 Later, when Jehangir passed through Amritsar on his way to Lahore, Guru 
Hargobind asked his followers that whatever Jehangir and his forces like they should be 
given without any charge and the cost of this sale will be taken care of by the Guru.99 
Jehangir also went to the Harmandir.100 This proves that the Sikh leadership had 
reasonably large amounts of resources and were keen to gain goodwill for the Sikhs in 
the court of Jehangir. This led to their recognition by the then political power, leading to 
a rise in their position. It shows that Jehangir did perceive the Sikhs not only as a 
religious community but also a community with political significance.
The cordial relationship the Sikh leaders enjoyed with Jehangir did not continue with his 
son, Shahjahan. The Sikhs fought five battles against the Mughal forces during the reign 
of Shahjahan. These battles, namely, the battle of Amritsar (1628 AD), the battle of
evidence from Dabistan e Mazahib. which stresses on the role o f Chandu, the finance minister o f  the 
Governor o f Lahore.
96 Chibber 83.
97 Bhalla 432.
98 Bhalla 424; Also see: Bhagat Singh, Gurbilas 272; Gian Singh 120-131.
99 Satbir Singh, Gurbhari 59.
100 Gian Singh 131.
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Hargobindpur (1630 AD), the battles of Lara and Gurusar (December 1634 AD), and the 
battle of Kartarpur (1635 AD), were fought between the Sikh forces and the Mughal 
army.101 These battles were instrumental in raising the self-esteem of the Panjabi society 
because the Sikh forces were able to defeat the Mughal Army in these battles.102 The 
battle of Amritsar was the first military encounter between the Mughals and the Sikhs and 
victory would have had its implications on the morale of the armies. It can be argued that 
these battles were instrumental in creating a more militant form of Sikh identity which 
would culminate in the establishment of the Khalsa identity. It can also be suggested that 
military victories which the Sikhs had in these battles were significant because a 
sophisticated and powerful state formation such as that of the Mughals was defeated by a 
group who were not yet a state formation and did not have state instruments. Guru 
Hargobind died in 1645, by which time the institution of the Guru had become a force to 
reckon with in the Panjab. The esteem in which the Sikhs, especially from the two 
important caste backgrounds of Rajputs and Jats, considered him may be judged by the 
fact that a great many of them volunteered to burn themselves on his funeral pyre. Two of 
his followers, one a Rajput and the other a Jat, jumped into his funeral pyre.103
Guru Har Rai, who succeeded, made Kiratpur as his base. As mentioned earlier, Dara 
Shikoh had cordial relations with the Guru.104 As soon as Aurangzeb ascended the throne,
101 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs, Vol. 1, 166-171.
102 Latif 256.
103 Latif 257.
104 Please refer Page 21, 79; Also see: Bhalla 596-597.
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he sent for Guru Har Rai, who had supported Dara Shikoh. The Guru sent his brother 
Ram Rai to Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb became fond of Ram Rai so much that he gave him 
land in the foothills of Himalayas, the place that later came to be known as Dehradun.105 
After Guru Har Rai, the young Guru Harkishan was also asked to come to Delhi.106 
Rajput Raja Jai Singh, who was influential in the court of Aurangzeb, took upon himself 
to take care of the young master.107 The young Guru died in Delhi before meeting the 
emperor,108 Guru Tegh Bahadur succeeded him. During that period Aurangzeb was 
pursuing radical policies. Mohammed Saqi Musta-id-Khan in Maasir e Alamgiri says that 
in April 1669 AD, the director of faith issued orders to the governors of all the provinces 
to destroy with the willing hand, the schools and temples of the non Muslims.109
105 Bhalla 604-618.
106 Bhalla 635, Gian Singh 153.
107 Bhalla 636-640; Gian Singh 154.
108 According to Mehma Prakash, he died due to small pox, while Sri Guru Panth Prakash says that he died 
due to Haiza, dysentery. Also, Mehma Prakash (640-644) mentions about the Guru’s meeting with 
Aurangzeb, while Sri Guru Panth Prakash (156) states that he died before meeting the emperor. There is no 
mention o f this meeting in the Mughal sources, such as Maasir e Alamgiri, and Khulasat ut Tawarikh. 
Please refer: Mohammed Saqi Mustaid Khan, Maasir e Alamgiri : a history o f  the Emperor Aurangzeb. 
Trans. Darshan Singh Awara, Ed. Fauja Singh (Patiala: Panjabi University, 1977). However, Guru 
Harkishan stayed in Raja Jai Singh’s house (Gian Singh 154) in Delhi - a big Sikh Gurudwara, Bangla 
Sahib, near Connaught Place in Delhi stands there in the memory o f  his stay. As mentioned by both the 
works, a number o f  Sikhs came to visit the Guru. Raja Jai Singh, a Rajput, who was a follower o f the Guru 
was also an important courtier o f Aurangzeb. It can thus be suggested that the news o f  the Guru’s presence 
in Delhi would have been significant news in the court as well. In light o f the evidences available, it will be 
appropriate to say that the meeting was not recorded in important sources related with the Mughal history, 
hence it did not take place. However, the desire o f  the Guru to meet the emperor and vice versa is 
established as suggested by the available evidence.
109 Maasir e Alamgiri by Mohammed Saqi Mustaid Khan is an important work in the Persian language 
about Aurangzeb’s rule, written immediately after the death o f  the emperor in 1707 AD. The author was a 
mcmsabdar o f Aurangzeb. It was translated from Persian to English by Jadunath Sarkar, and later was 
translated into Urdu language by Maulvi Mohammed Fida Ali Taalib. The translation to the Punjabi 
language was done at the instance o f  Panjabi University, Patiala: Mohammed Saqi Mustaid Khan, Maasir e 
Alamgiri : A history o f  the Emperor Aurangzeb. Trans. Darshan Singh Awara, Ed. Fauja Singh (Patiala: 
Panjabi University, 1977) 68; Also see: Elliot and Dowson, Vol. VII, 183-184.
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Jadunath Sarkar mentions about the resistance offered by the Jats against this policy of 
suppression. Five thousand Jats got killed and 7000 were taken as prisoners.110 
Aurangzeb, whose efforts were directed at converting people to Islam, even urged the 
Sikh Gurus to embrace Islam, as stated by Latif.111 At the instance of the plea of some 
Kashmiri pandits, and to uphold the ideal of religious freedom, Guru Tegh Bahadur 
offered himself to the Mughal authority. He was brought to Delhi and killed in public in 
Chandni Chowk, but he did not convert to Islam.112 Sikh Gurudwaras were destroyed and
113the masands of the Sikhs were expelled from the cities. With time, however, the 
relationship of Guru Gobind Singh, the last of the ten Masters, with the Mughal elites, 
improved due to the tolerant policies adopted by Bahadur Shah. He gave Guru Gobind 
Singh the robe of honour and a shamshir,UA which according to popular history traditions 
belonged to Hazrat Ali. Guru Gobind Singh travelled with Bahadur Shah to central India. 
While in Nanded, Guru Gobind Singh was attacked by a Pathan soldier. Bahadur Shah 
sent doctors for Guru’s supervision but he succumbed to the wounds. According to
110 Jadunath Sarkar, History o f Aurangzeb. 0658-1681) Vol. Ill, (Calcutta: MC Sarkar & Sons, 1916) 334- 
335; Also see: Christopher Alan Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, North Indian Society in the Age o f  
British Expansion, 1770-1870, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 21.
111 Latif 260.
112 Rattan Singh Bhangu, Prachin Panth Prakash. (Amritsar: Wazir Hind Press, 1962) 34-38. Gian Singh 
169, Bhalla 745 and Chibber 120 mention that Hindus were in danger and pleaded in front o f  Guru Tegh 
Bahadur. On the other hand, these works do not mention about the identity o f  those who pleaded to the 
Guru for the sacrifice. However, Sukha Singh’s Gurbilas Patshahi Dasvin mentions that these Hindus were 
from Kashmir. Gurbilas Patshahi Dasvin by Sukha Singh is a poeticised account o f  the life o f  Guru Gobind 
Singh. The poet was born in Anandpur in 1768 and completed the work in 1797 AD. The poetry is in Braj 
language though it is written in the Gunnukhi script. Sukha Singh, the author, used to deliver sermons to 
Sikh congregations at Takhat Sri Harmandir Sahib, Patna. This research has referred to an edition brought 
out by the Languages Department, Patiala, in Devnagri script. Sukha Singh, Gurbilas Patshahi Dasvin Ed. 
Jai Bhagwan Goyai, (Patiala: Languages Department, 1970, 55-56.
113 Sarkar 354.
114 The shamshir is kept with reverence at Takhat Kesgarh Sahib in Anandpur, Panjab. It is displayed 
everyday to the public.
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Mahiraa Prakash he declared that the Granth would now be the spiritual guide for the 
Sikhs.115 These engagements and interactions between the Muslim political elites and the 
Sikh leadership at times gave legitimacy to the new faith in Punjab among the Muslim 
population and at other times were considered to be anti establishment by the ruling elites 
of Punjab. It can be suggested that this process of engagement brought about awareness 
among the non Muslim population of Punjab about the existence of their own space. This 
reaslisation seems to be a significant foundation towards the shift in hegemony from 
Muslims elites to the non Muslim elites.
2.3 Conversions116 and Contesting Identities between the Muslims and the Sikhs
This subsection will try to examine the issue of conversion from Hindus and Muslims 
into Sikhs and vice versa. The prime concern will be to study the contesting identities of 
the Hindus, the Sikhs and the Muslims. The emergence of the Sikh leadership and its 
recognition as a separate body brought about new dynamics in Panjab between the Sikhs
115 Bhalla 892.
116 Studies on Religious Conversions followed two approaches. One set that believes in ‘Brain Washing’ 
theory, and the other which believe in ‘World Saver’ theory; the latter has influenced me because it makes 
the actors in the process o f conversion important. Lofland and Stark’s the ‘World-Saver’ model: The basic 
elements o f the model include three predisposing characteristics (perception o f  long-term tension, strain, 
and so on; possession o f  a religious rhetoric and problem-solving perspective and self-definition as a 
"religious seeker") and four situational factors (reaching a "turning point" when old lines o f action no 
longer work, development o f  affective ties between preconvert and group members, weakening affective 
ties with non group members, intensive interaction with group members). For more discussion please read: 
John Lofland, Doomsday Cult: A Study o f  Conversion. Proselvtization and Maintenance o f  Faith 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966); J Lofland, "Becoming a World-Saver Revisited", Conversion 
Careers, ed. J.T. Richardson (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978) 1-23; J. Lofland and L Norman Skonovd, 
"Conversion Motifs", Journal for the Scientific Study o f Religion 20 (1981) 373-385; J. Lofland and 
Rodney Stark, "Becoming a World-Saver," American Sociological Review 30 (1965) 863-874. Also; Brock 
Kilbourne and James T. Richardson, "Paradigm Conflict, Types o f Conversion, and Conversion Theories," 
Sociological Analysis 50 (1989) 1-21.
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and the Hindus. It seems that the Sikh religion came as an alternative for the Hindus who 
saw it as a matter of rising from a ‘class’ of nobody to that of somebody with ‘status’. 
Being a Sikh brought the new converts ‘honour’.117 While Sikhism came as an alternative 
way of life for the Hindus, for the Muslims it was more because of the recognition of 
Sikh power in those times. This issue became a cause of concern for the political as well 
as the religious Muslim elites.
The conversion into Sikhism became an important issue, which led to conflict situations 
in Panjab. There were various reasons for conversions; some were political, while others 
were ideological. This section will explore conversions and their implications in detail.
Apart from Latif s work, no other source provides evidence about the conversion of 
‘Mardana, Harper of Nanak’. Latif claims, ‘Nanak brought Mardana into his fold’. He 
adds that while on his travels in Afghanistan, he lost his faithful servant Mardana the 
harper, who was originally a Muslim, but who had become a convert to Nanak’s new 
doctrine. He was burnt according to his own wish in Kliulum where he died. He also adds 
that taking with him Sajada, the son of Mardana, Nanak went to Tulamba near Multan. 
Here a notorious thug imprisoned Sajada and Nanak obtained his release and made the
117 Weber argues that groups are more likely to be formed on the basis o f status or status honour than from 
class situation or class. In contrast to classes, status groups are normally groups. They are, however, often 
o f  an amorphous kind. Contrary to the purely economically determined ‘class situation’ we wish to 
designate as status situation  every typical component o f the life o f  men that is determined by a specific, 
positive or negative, social estimation o f  honour. This honour may be connected with any quality shared by 
a plurality, and, o f  course, it can be knit to a class situation: class distinctions are linked in the most varied 
ways with status distinctions. For more discussion on status/honour and social groups please read; Max 
Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline o f  Interpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968) 
932.
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thug a convert to his faith.118 The authenticity of this incident can be debated; however, 
the fact remains that Latif thought the issue of conversion to be significant enough to 
mention in his book. Conversion into ‘Nanak’s fold’, which later became known as 
Sikhism, was indeed a new phenomenon in Panjabi society119 after the arrival of Islam.
The new faith, Sikhism, became available as another option worth considering apart from
Islam and Hinduism. When Giani Pratap Mai heard that a Hindu was converting into
Islam because there was freedom to eat among Muslims, he suggested that if only for this
reason he was considering change of religion then he should become a Sikh.120 Secondly,
the institution of the Guru was crucial for all the followers.121 In that period, the Sikh
leadership adopted practises which gave message of affection and comaraderie. For
instance, Sikhs were encouraged to address each other as brother and sister or by other
122terms signifying importance and intimacy within the members of the community.
Thirdly, when a person became a Sikh convert, the way in which he interpreted life — his 
rhetoric — changed. From the beginning itself, the new language, Panjabi, was introduced
118 Latif 245.
119 For a discussion on the Panjab Society, please refer footnote 3.
120 Satbir Singh, Gurbhari 58.
121 For the discussion on Guru Granth and Guru Panth, please see: J S Grewal, Sikh Ideology, Polity and 
Social Order (Delhi: Manohar, 1996) 133; Also, for more discussion on the city o f Kartarpur as an example 
o f early Sikh community, please refer: HR Gupta, History o f the Sikhs. Vol. 1, 71-72. Also see: Gokul 
Chand Narang, Transformation o f Sikhism (Lahore: New Book Society, 1946, Delhi: New Book Society o f  
India, 1956) 27.
122 Guru Arjun 470, 611-612.
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and followed.12j By formalising the script of the language, the status of the language of 
the masses was raised to that of a language with grammar. Even an illiterate who spoke 
Panjabi could consider himself educated by learning the script in a Gurudwara. The basic 
tenets taught by the Sikh masters i.e. to meditate, work hard and share the income with 
the community, encouraged interactions which helped individuals in adopting a new 
lifestyle different from the one to which they were accustomed.124 The simplification of 
personal ceremonies and the denunciation of the priestly class was another factor, which 
attracted many to the new fold. Probably, this would have had the significant impact on 
the beliefs and practices of the Panjabi people. Since anyone who knew the 6 /'/prayers 
could accomplish any religious ceremony, it gave freedom from the Brahmanical 
captivity and Mullah supremacy.
The other factor was that of ‘Status or Honour’ associated with the Sikh movement. 
Social recognition by others, such as the Mughal emperor or other spiritual leaders 
brought a sense of social honour for a Sikh.123 A low scavenger or leather dresser, the 
lowest of the low in India, left home to join the Sikh fold and in a short time returned to 
his home village with his orders of appointment in hand. All in the village obeyed him.126 
The new social hierarchy created by Sikhism did not have its foundation in the prevalent
123 See earlier discussion on Panjabi language on page 69
124 The idea o f Naam Japo — meditate, Kirat Karo — work hard, Wand Chako — share with community were 
introduced as the primary ethos by Guru Nanak — the First master
123 For example Akbar, Jehangir, Dara Shikoh and Mian Mir had good relations with the Gurus.
126 Hari Ram Gupta, History o f the Sikhs. Vol. II -  Evolution o f  Sikh confederations. (1708-1769 AD). 
(Lahore: 1944. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1978) 11.
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caste system.127 During Banda Singh’s time, tillers became landowners, which had a 
long-term effect in Panjab. To become a Sikh was a matter of status then.
The Sikh movement provided ‘an anti ruling elite identity’ for those who had rebelled or 
thought of rebelling against the tyrant rule. Many conversions took place for the reason of 
‘uprising’. The Gujars of Nanauta, anxious to wipe off old scores with their oppressors, 
enrolled themselves in the ranks of the invading Sikh army and gladly embraced the
opportunity to throw off the yoke of their Muslim rulers. The Gujars styled themselves to
128be the followers of Guru Nanak and called themselves as Nanak prast. On the other 
hand, under the rule of Banda Singh, there were conversions from Muslims, such as that 
of Dindar Khan, a powerful ruler who was renamed Dindar Singh; Mir Naseruddin, the 
news writer of Sarhind became Mir Nasir Singh; Chajju, a Jat of Panjwar near Amritsar, 
was converted to Chajja Singh and a large number of Muslims and Hindus adopted the 
mannerism of the Sikhs.129 Even at the time of the attack on Sarhind, lives of those who 
converted to Sikhism were spared.lj0
127 Panj Piaras, the five beloved ones, created by Guru Gobind Singh were from different castes. Three o f  
them were from low castes, the other two were from Jat and Kshatriya backgrounds. Their names were: 
Bhai Daya Singh, Bhai Dharam Singh, Bhai Himmat Singh, Bhai Muhkam Chand and Bhai Sahib Singh. 
Santokh Singh mentions the episode in detail in his work whereas Sri Gur Sobha, and Bansavalinama do 
not. Rattan Singh Bhangu, in Prachin Panth Prakash, just mentions that five Sikhs volunteered from five 
different castes. For a detailed account o f  formation o f the Khalsa and the Panj Piaras, please refer: Sukha 
Singh 175-176.
128 Ganda Singh, Life o f  Banda Singh Bahadur (Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1935) 65.
129 Ganda Singh, Banda Singh Bahadur 73; Also, Khushwaqt Rai, Tarikh e Sikhkhan (1811), MS. SHR 
1274 (Amritsar: Khalsa College) 49.
130 Ganda Singh, Banda Singh Bahadur 63.
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The Sikh leadership created the tradition of reference martyrs, where individuals who 
were seen to die for the Sikh faith rather than convert to another religion were lauded. 
This process went a long way in establishing the Sikh hegemony over the Muslim ruling 
elites in Panjab. An example of such an event is of Bibi Anup Kaur. Anup Kaur was 
carried away by Sher Mohammed Khan and was buried after she had committed suicide 
to save her honour. Banda Singh marched to Malerkotla ill an effort to rectify history. 
Her grave was dug, and her body exhumed and put to the pyre according to the Sikh last 
rites. This was done to highlight honour and pride in the community. It was also an 
indication of a beginning of new dynamics of the emerging Sikh rule.ljl
Individual conversions1 j2 and mass conversions both had their implications in Panjab’s 
society as these had a direct bearing on the hegemony of the ruling elites. The rule of 
Jehangir saw the rise and fall of fundamental policies against the Sikhs. Shahjahan, 
taking over the reins of the Mughal Empire, saw change of three Governors of Lahore 
and eventually the reappointment of Quliz Khan, who was there at the time of Guru 
Arjan’s killing. He ordered the then recently constructed temples and the Baoli 
constructed by Guru Arjan to be demolished. Shahjahan stated in his policy that no 
Muslim would be permitted to convert. Secondly, no other religious denomination was
131 Inayat All Khan, A description o f Principal Kotla Afghans (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette, 1882) 
14.
132 Like that o f Mardana, refer page 94.
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allowed to do tabligh, the religious propaganda.133 This declaration would have set the 
boundaries between the common Muslims and the Sikhs as it would have discouraged 
them to join the Sikh congregations.
Another issue, of ‘Kolan’, the daughter of Qazi Rustum Khan of Lahore, became a 
contentious issue between the Muslim ruling elites and the Sikh leadership during the 
reign of Shahjahan. She was a follower of Mian Mir, the Sufi master. The Qazi 
disapproved of her interests and inclinations towards Sufi thought. Mian Mir sent Kolan 
to Guru Hargobind for protection from the atrocities done by the Qazi 011 her. Though 
there is no mention of her converting to Sikhism, Wazir Rustum Khan and Chandu 
Shah’s son asked Guru Hargobind to return her to the Qazi but were refused. This 
probably was taken seriously as defying the honour of the ruling elites. This led to the 
eruption of a conflict between the Muslim ruling elites and the Sikh leadership.1^
During the period of Aurangzeb, Latif mentions, a policy was adopted to pursue 
Brahmins to convert. In retrospect they were put into jail in the hope that if these 
Brahmins first embraced the religion of the prophet, the rest of the Hindus would readily 
follow.lj6 Macauliffe points towards another reason as well. Kashmir was close to
133 Ram Sharma, The Religious Policy o f  the Mughal Emperors (London: Oxford University Press, 1940); 
Harbans Kaur Sagoo, Banda Singh Bahadur and Sikh Sovereignty (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 
2001) 35.
134 Bhagat Singh 339; Gian Singh 134.
135 Latif 256.
136 Latif 260,
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Peshawar and Kabul, which were Muslim majority areas; and in case the Kashmiri
* * * 137Hindus offered any resistance, Muslims might declare a religious war on them. As 
mentioned earlier in the previous section, the Kashmiri Pundits approached the Sikh
* 1 0 0
leadership, Guru Tegh Bahadur, the ninth master, who was at that time in Anandpur so 
as to work towards stopping forced conversions in Kashmir. Guru Tegh Bahadur agreed 
to confront the ruling elites and offered himself for the sacrifice. Many Sikhs
accompanied him to Delhi. He was killed in Delhi publicly because of his refusal to
1 « * * accept Islam. It will be appropriate to say that a ‘significant example of opposing
forced conversion into another religion’ was made, which defied the religious supremacy
of Islam in the Mughal centre of Delhi.
In another sort of conversion, Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth master did internal 
conversion among the Sikhs and established the ‘Khalsa’.140 The timing of this event of 
the creation of the Khalsa was vital. In 1695, Aurangzeb had declared that apart from 
Rajputs, no Hindu would be allowed to keep weapons or ride 011 elephants, Arab horses
137 Macauliffe, Vol. IV 369.
138 Bhangu 35-36.
139 Bhangu 38.
140 Gian Singh 230-234; Also refer: Bhalla 825-828 and Bhangu 43-44. For a detailed account o f the 
formation o f  Khalsa, please refer: Sukha Singh 172-176.
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or palanquins.141 Just four years after this order, Guru Gobind Singh created the 
Khalsa,142 publicly defying all the imperial orders.
The establishment of the Khalsa was a landmark in defining an identity, which was 
separate from that of the Hindus and Muslims. The five ‘k’s, that is kara, kanga, kachha, 
kesh and kirpan,H  ^were the symbols of distinction from the other communities and led to 
the creation of a 'pure group’, as the meaning of Khalsa implies. The researcher would 
like to argue that this was an important step at that juncture because it led to the 
formation of the boundaries of ‘the dominant group’, thus setting the ground for Sikh 
ruling elites.144 The Khalsa brought another element into prominence, and that was ‘the 
supremacy of the community’. Guru Gobind Singh himself, with folded hands, asked to 
be baptised by ‘the chosen five’.143 The caste barrier was also broken by this incident, in 
front of a large gathering, as the chosen five were from varied caste backgrounds 
including the low castes.146 It was declared that violent means might be adopted in 
defence at the time of intolerable tyranny, hence giving legitimacy to the taking up of
141 Mustaid Khan 337.
142 Gian Singh 230-234; Also refer: Bhalla 825-828 and Bhangu 43-44.
143 Gian Singh 233.
144 This is vindicated by the fact that Guru Gobind Singh asked Banda Singh Bahadur to obey the Khalsa, 
Please refer: Bhangu 82. This incident had both social and political implications as it defined the 
coordinates o f identity o f  those who were to govern and rule in the coming centuries in Panjab. Moreover, 
the successive events demonstrate that those who rose to power, such as Jassa Singh Ramgarhia, Jassa 
Singh Ahluwalia, Budh Singh, Hari Singh Nalwa and Ranjit Singh in Panjab, adhered to the principles o f  
the Khalsa identity.
143 Bhangu 44.
146 Bhangu 43, Gian Singh 234.
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arms as corroborated in the Zafamameh by Guru Gobind Singh.147 Khalsa was an internal 
exercise by the Guru to create a hierarchical structure within the widespread community 
that already existed then. It was not created against any other community.148
The new identity of the Sikhs, the Khalsa, brought a new impetus especially in the 
context of the physical identity of the ruling elites in Panjab. A new system was 
introduced by which a person was able to gain awards, status and favours by killing and 
bringing Sikh heads adhering to the Khalsa identity. Muzaffar Alam accounts for the 
4 Ices IT as an anti-empire statement of defiance.149 Ganda Singh mentions that during the 
time of Banda Singh Bahadur in the year 1710, Bahadur Shah, fearing that there might be 
disguised Sikhs among the Hindus employed in the imperial offices, asked them to shave 
off their beards. Hindu peshkars and dhvans followed the order and received khillats 
(robes of honour) from the emperor for their obedience and loyal service.130 Firoz Khan 
Mewati was rewarded with the faujdari of Sarhind and a hundred thousand rupees 
(100,000) were remitted to him on the 13th of ramzan for general expenses. He also got 
six dresses of honour. The heads of the Sikhs, which had become prized trophies, were 
hung from the trees on the Grand Trunk road with their hair. In Shahjahanabad, Yaar
1,17 Guru Gobind Singh, Zafarnama Guru Gobind Singh. Trans, and Ed. Padam Piara Singh (Amritsar: 
Singh Brothers, 1998) 49. Guru Gobind Singh wrote a letter in Persian verse to Aurangzeb while he was at 
Dina, a small village in the Faridkot district o f Indian Panjab, in 1706 AD. This work has been included in 
Dasam Granth. compiled by Guru Gobind Singh.
148 For a discussion on Khalsa, consult: J P S Uberoi, “The Five Symbols o f Sikhism”, Sikhism, Guru 
Nanak Quincentenary Celebration Series Ed. Fauja Singh (Patiala: Panjabi University, 1969) 123-138.
149 Alam 149-155.
150 Ganda Singh 128-129.
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Mohammed Qalandar, the Governor, issued a royal order that the beards of all the Hindus 
in the royal camp should be shaved, that it should be known in all the provinces that no 
Muslim should be allowed to have a long beard; and whosoever is found so, his beard 
should be pulled out. In the Imperial camp, army officials went about in markets and 
streets accompanied by a barber and filthy water in dirty basins and shaved off the beards 
of whosoever sported one. Princes and mutasaddis shaved off their beard before coming 
in front of the royal presence.151 It can be said that the radical religious policies led to the 
polarisation of ideologies among the Sikhs and the Muslims. Also, the political and 
religious boundaries between the two communities got firmly established.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter, mainly covering the period from 1469 to 1707, has explored the reasons 
which led to the rise of the ideology of Sikhism and the Sikhs in the Panjab and its 
ramifications with regards to the Muslim population which led to an emergence of a 
favourable context for the rise of Ranjit Singh. The chapter has shown that it was as 
early as the fifteenth century that Guru Nanak denounced the Rajputs for losing their 
identity and tradition to the Muslim invaders. The main focus of the sections has been to 
illustrate the development of the Sikh social macro structures, such as the institution of 
Gurudwara, Langar or community kitchen, the Panjabi language, Amritsar as a Sikh 
religious and cultural centre, emergence of towns such as Kartarpur, Tarn Taran, Kiratpur 
etc in the earlier days o f Sikhism. It has been argued in the chapter that once these social
151 Ganda Singh 172-173.
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structures were established the process of expansion and its engagement with the Muslim 
community, both political and religious, led to the creation of Sikh space in the region 
which later came under the control of Ranjit Singh. Another aspect that has been shown 
is that the division in the society of Panjab emerged due to conversions of few Muslims 
and many Hindus into the fold of Sikhism. All these factors were crucial for the political 
rise of the Sikhs as will be shown in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Em ergence of Sikh H egem ony1 and its Legitimacy over M uslim Elites in the
18th Century Panjab
This chapter will examine the volte-face of hegemonies in Panjab from Muslim to the 
Sikh. By the end of the 18th century, Sikhs became a dominant group in Panjab. This 
period of time was important as it acted as a foundation for the state formation process 
under Ranjit Singh. Led by those who rose from the grass roots level, the Sikhs aspired to 
consolidate Panjab under their control as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
Since the time of Guru Hargobind, it can be argued, the Sikhs began gradually rising to a 
position which would give them political and military dominance or significance in the 
Panjab. The position was significantly augmented by the crucial military victories of 
Banda Singh Bahadur. Banda Singh was chosen by Guru Gobind Singh to be the 
temporal authority of the Sikhs in the first decade of the eighteenth century. He led the 
first offensive by the Sikhs against the Muslim ruling elites in Panjab. An important 
milestone in this process of hegemonic change was the capture of the city of Lahore in 
the mid eighteenth century by the Sikh leaders and later on, the development of
1 For the discussion on “Hegemony”, “Dominant Group” and “Power”, please refer Introduction, 39-40
2 Bhangu 80-81; Dr. Ganda Singh writes that the Guru gave him the title o f  'Bahadur ’ and five ai*rows from 
his own quiver as a ‘pledge’ and ‘token o f victory’. A council o f five ‘P ia ra s\  consisting o f  Bhais Binod 
Singh, Kahan Singh, Baj Singh, Daya Singh and Ran Singh, was appointed to advise him, and some twenty 
other Singhs were told to accompany him. A Nishan Sahib and a Nagar a (a flag and a drum) were 
bestowed upon him as the emblems o f temporal authority: Ganda Singh, Life o f Banda Singh Bahadur 
(Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1935) 24-25. It is important to note that the weakening o f  the Mughal Empire 
was not the primary rationale behind the political or territorial rise in Panjab o f  the Sikhs, (led by Banda 
Singh Bahadur) as was the case with the Marathas and the Jats during the eighteenth century. The religious 
factor along with the sensibility o f retribution seems to have been a strong motivational factor to stand 
against the Muslim elites o f  Panjab.
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administrative apparatus like daftars and administrative offices, similar to that of the 
Mughals, for running the state. It appears that in the eighteenth century the ‘Sikh 
religious base’, established and thriving since the fifteenth century, was determined to 
establish its 'political space'.
This chapter will discuss three aspects which were crucial for the change in hegemony 
from the Muslims to the non Muslims, particularly the Sikhs. The first would be the 
various reasons due to which the Sikhs began to be accepted as protectors of the people 
of Panjab, by the majority of Muslims. Second would be examining the use of the 
instrument of Jehad by the Muslim elites. The third section of the chapter examines the 
process of shift in power from the Muslim elites towards the Sikhs in the eighteenth 
century.
3.1 The idea of Sikhs as Protectors
It appears that the Sikhs carved a niche for themselves in Panjab’s political scenario by 
shielding the rights of those who were being massacred or exploited due to the policies of 
the elites in power. The idea of Sikhs acting as protectors for various communities of 
Panjab became a catalyst in attaining political power by the Sikh leadership later in the 
eighteenth century. By the time Ranjit Singh was to take control of Lahore in 1799 AD, 
the historical context of engagements with Muslim elites and the people of Panjab of 
nearly four centuries gave him legitimacy to govern the majority Muslim population.
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As discussed earlier, in chapter two, by 1707 AD, the spiritual Sikh leadership had 
created a ‘Sikh Space’ in Panjab to which the Sikh warriors could refer. It appears that a 
shocking event, in which the young sons of Guru Gobind Singh were bricked alive by the 
orders of the Nawab of Sarhind,3 became a catalyst for the Sikhs to converge under the 
new temporal leadership of Banda Singh. As soon as he reached Panjab from Nanded in 
southern India, he sent hitkamnamas (set of orders) to all the Sikhs of Panjab reminding 
them about the martyrdom of the young sahibzadas.4 This seems to have led to many 
people of Panjab and around, joining him against the Muslim elites under his flag. For 
instance, Banjcircis joined the Sikh army with rations. Many amongst the Jats, especially 
the Brar Sikhs, rallied around Banda Singh. Many Sikhs from Majha and Doaba gathered 
in great numbers in the hills at Kiratpur, on the other side of the Sutlej, only to be blocked 
by the Nawab of Malerkotla. There were some rebels from the Mughal forces like Ali 
Singh and Mali Singh (they worked for Wazir Khan of Sarhind) and others like 
freebooters who also joined.3
It seems the idea to chastise the ruling elites gave impetus to the Sikh dominance in 
Panjab by beginning the end of the rule of the Muslim ruling elites and formation of a 
new regime under their leadership. Also, chastisement was essentially conceived of as a
3 Sirhind is an ancient town lying along the Grand Trunk Road, midway between cities o f Ludhiana and 
Ambala in the Indian Panjab. Fateh Singh and Zorawar Singh, the two young sons o f Guru Gobind Singh, 
were bricked alive in Sirhind on 12th December 1705, by the orders o f Nawab Wazir Khan o f Sirhind. 
Harbans Singh (1921-), editor-in-chief. Encyclopaedia o f Sikhism, ed. Harbans Singh, Vol. 2 (Patiala: 
Punjabi University, 1996)461,
4 Bhangu 83, Also see: Gian Singh 363-370.
3 Bhangu 87-88; Also see: Ganda Singh 32-34.
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form of retribution or paying back. It was legitimised as administering justice, and it 
brought about respect and honour for the Sikhs. It also appears that the other reason 
might have been deterring potential offenders and the establishment of a reformative 
effect on actual offenders. In the process, it appears that the Sikhs attacked all the 
strongholds of Muslim ruling elites such as Ghuram of the Pathans, Shahabad of the 
Sheikhs and Mustafabad of the Mughals and the Sayyids. The other Muslim strongholds, 
which were attacked, were Batala and Kalanaur. The evidence suggests that the Sikh 
process of retribution began from Sonepat and then Samana, the towns to which the 
executioners of Guru Tegh Bahadur and that of the sons of Guru Gobind Singh, 
belonged.6 The place also offered treasure, which was crucial for the establishment of the 
state. Further, it appears, on the way to Samana, the Amil of Kaithal was also defeated. 
He was reinstated on behalf of the Khalsa forces on the payment of a tribute and a task 
force was designated for the collection of revenue.7 Samana, a town inhabited by the 
Muslim elites and 22 high ranked Amirs and Sayyids, was taken over and the houses of 
the executioners were destroyed.8 After destroying these cities, it seems, the Sikhs went 
on to attack the vicinities of Lahore,9 the capital city of Panjab. The Imperial governor 
Syed Aslam Khan, a Maulvizada (son of a Maulvi) of Kabul who then ruled Lahore as 
the deputy of Prince Muazzuddin, (the eldest son of the emperor Bahadur Shah) hid
6 Daulat Rai, Banda Bahadur. (1901) 24. Syed Jalal-ud-din was the executioner o f  Guru Tegh Bahadur and 
Shashel Begh and Bashel Begh, from Samana, were the executioners o f  the sons o f  Guru Gobind Singh.
7 Bhangu 86-90.
s Ganda Singh 39-40; Raj Pal Singh mentions in his book Banda Bahadur and his Times, that the reason 
Banda Singh Bahadur attacked Samana was to attract support from the Sikhs o f  Central Panjab. Raj Pal 
Singh, Banda Bahadur and his Times (New Delhi: Harman Publishing house, 1998) 17.
9 Ganda Singh 101-102.
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himself inside the city walls. Consequently, Lahore citizens along with the Maulvis took 
upon themselves to defend the city from the Sikhs and they launched together a resistance 
against the Sikhs, which led to the Sikhs retreating.10
It appears that Banda Singh and his men upheld the honour of women, religious men and 
peasants by chastising only those Muslim elites who were involved in acts of tyranny and 
dishonour. For instance, the Sikh forces attacked Qadammuddin of Kasuri, who was 
known to abduct Hindu women by force. In one instance, he had once forcibly carried 
away a Sikh woman from the city of Amritsar. Kasuri, which was under the control of 
Qadammuddin was attacked along with his other strongholds. In another instance, Banda 
Singh also punished Osmana Khan of Sadhaura, who tortured the Muslim saint Syed 
Badruddin Shah (ninth in the succession of Syed Nizamuddin of Siyana) to death, for 
helping Guru Gobind Singh in the battle of Bhangani.11 It appears that in Sadhaura, the 
Hindus were not allowed to burn their dead and the slaughtering of cows was done in 
streets. With the rise of a force which was opposed to the Muslim elites of Panjab, cracks 
began to appear in the peasantry and many peasant groups began supporting Banda Singh 
against the ruling elites. For instance, in Sadhaura, the peasants of the region revolted. 
The Sayyids and the Sheikhs of the town of Sadhaura took shelter in the haveli (a big 
residence) of Syed Badruddin Shah on the presumption that since the martyred Syed was
10 Ganda Singh 102-103.
11 Ganda Singh 47.
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a friend of Guru Gobind Singh the Sikhs might spare their lives. But all were put to 
death. The place even today is known as Qatalgarhi, fortress of death.12
It appears that the Sikh offensive provided an opportunity to those who sought to settle 
their conflicts with the ruling elites. For instance, the tillers of Sadhaura, who were 
continuously exploited by their zamindars, were motivated by Banda Singh to revolt. Ali 
Hamid Khan, the faujdar of Sadhaura, was called upon by the Sikhs to surrender. Instead 
he took off for Delhi, leaving the city unguarded and defenceless, which led to its plunder 
by the Sikhs.13 Also, in another instance, half of the Sarkar (Government) of Saharanpur 
fell into the hands of the Sikhs. The fall of the city was vital because the peerzadas, who 
were killed in the attack, were notorious for their religious fanaticism and the open 
slaughter of cows in the streets of the town.14 There was a general Sikh uprising 
throughout the eastern and the south eastern Panjab except in the city of Lahore, which 
was in control of an Imperial governor and the leading aristocrats. However, the Sikhs 
controlled the whole of Majha, the Riarki and the Kandhi as far as Pathankot.1;>
It appears the Sikhs upheld the principle of religious freedom which led to the emergence 
of a new dimension to the relationship of Muslim space and the new political Sikh space. 
It can be said that this became the first social contract between the Sikh rulers and their
12 Bhangu 90-91. Also see: Ganda Singh 48.
13 Ganda Singh 91.
14 GRC Williams, The Sikhs in the Upper Doab. (Calcutta Review, Vol. LX) 23.
13 Please refer the map.
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Muslim subjects. Also, this reversal of roles gave a new dimension in the post-Aurangzeb 
history. This social contract is best described in the Bhagwati Das Harkara report, 
submitted to the emperor, who has described the religious policy of Banda Singh. In 
April 1711, at Kalanaur, Banda Singh assured the Muslims that they would enjoy full 
religious liberty. They would be allowed to read the Khutba e Namaz but not the Khutba 
e Sikka, the latter being a pronouncement of sovereignty. Proclaiming: “I don’t oppress 
the Muslims”, he recruited 5000 Muslims in his army.16 This event seems to be the first 
time ever since the coming of the Mughals that the Muslim community was being granted 
rights by a non-Muslim ruler in Panjab.
In another instance, after the death of Banda Singh in the year 1716 AD, the Sikhs
1 7formed themselves into groups, known as Mis is. The Sikh mis Is developed the Rakhi 
system,18 which ensured the villagers’ security and safety. It appears that the system 
created a strong economic base, which strengthened the Sikh chiefs and their
16 “Akhbarat e Durbar e Mualla, Jan. 9, 1711 AD”, Trans. Bhagat Singh, The Paniab. Past and Present, Vol. 
XVIU-1I, (October 1984) 1-206. It was by coincidence that at the time o f  Banda Singh’s execution along 
with beheading o f many other Sikhs in February 1716, an embassy o f  the British Governor o f Fort William 
was present at the court o f Mughal emperor Farukhsiyar. The embassy consisted o f John Surman and 
Edward Stephenson. According to them, “It is not a little remarkable with patience they undergo their fate, 
and to the last it has not been found that one apostatized from this new formed religion”. This is the earliest 
known reference by the British. Please refer: “Letter from John Surman and Edward Stephenson to Robert 
Hedges, President and Governor o f Fort William, Bengal”, Dated Delhi, March 10, 1716. C. R. Wilson, 
The Early Annals o f  the English in Bengal. Vol. II, Part II, “The Surman Embassy,” Letter XII (I), 119.
17 The word “w/.s/”, common in Persian language, means a ‘group o f likes or equals or similar’.
ls There is a parallel here with the couth and sardesmukhi, protection-rent imposed by the Marathas. 
However, an important distinction o f  Rakhi o f  the Sikhs and cauth and sardesmukhi o f  the Marathas was 
that the economic and political implications o f  the Rakhi system was influenced by the Sikh community at 
large through the institution o f  Sarbat Khalsa unlike the Marathas whose control was political and 
economic. For details on cauth and sardesmukhi please refer: Andre Wink, Land and Sovereignity in India, 
Agrarian Society and Politics under the Eighteenth Century Maratha Svaraiva (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986) 45, 46, 96.
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principalities. Also, it was the first major sustainable social contract between the people, 
which later led towards the establishment of political rule with the Sikhs in the dominant 
position. According to this system, the ruined peasantry and traders of Panjab were given 
security by the organised army, the Dal Khalsa {Dal Khalsa is the term used to describe 
the militia, which came into being during the turbulent period of the eighteenth century 
and became a formidable force of the Sikhs in the northwestern India).The villagers 
placed themselves under the protection of the Dal Khalsa. Twice a year, the village 
headman collected a sum equal to one-fifth of the government revenue from the 
villagers.19 The zamindars, the traders and the merchants paid rakhi, while kambli was 
collected from the artisans. By the end of the second half of the eighteenth century many 
village clusters came under the Sikh protection. This system appears to have acted as a 
catalyst for the Sikhs to rise to position themselves in Panjab from being small time 
chiefs to administrators and landlords, and finally to becoming rulers. As James Browne 
mentions in his book, "Whenever a Zamindar agreed to pay this tribute to any Sikh chief, 
that chief not only refrained himself from plundering, but also protected the Zamindar 
from pillaging by others; and this protection was, by general consent, held so far sacred, 
that if the Dal Khalsa passed through a zamindari where the safeguards of even the
♦ ♦ ♦ * 90lowest Sikh chief were stationed, it would not plunder them.”
!9 The Rakhi amount was collected in May after the harvest o f Rabi, the spring crop and in October- 
November, after the harvest o f Kharif the autumn crop. Hari Ram Gupta, History o f the Sikhs. Vol II: 
Evolution o f the Sikh Confederacies (1708-17691. (Lahore: 1944. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal 
Publishers, 1978) 127.
20 James Browne, History o f  the Origin and Progress o f the Sikhs (India Tracts!. (London: The East India 
Company Press, 1788) Introduction, vii.
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Simultaneously at different points in the 18th century, different Sikh chiefs undertook 
territorial control of different regions of Panjab. The bands of Sardar Karor Singh and 
Sardar Deep Singh Shaheed moved to the south of the river Sutlej and the Singh Puria 
and Ahluwalia sections went to the area of the river Ghara to protect the population on 
both sides of it. Sardar Jai Singh Kanhaya and Sardar Jassa Singh Ramgarhia took charge 
of the Riarki area. Sardar Charat Singh Sukarchakia and Sardar Hari Singh Bhangi had 
the doaba Rachna between the Ravi and the Chenab. The Nishanwalia and Dallewalia 
Misls were stationed at Amritsar as a back up force and the Naqqi sardars had the Naqqi 
section. The Sikh chiefs raised a number of forts and garhis,mud fortlets21 thus 
expanding their rakhis.
3.2 Muslim led Militarism
This subsection will examine the Muslim led militarism against the Sikhs. The subsection 
will highlight the fact that the instrument of Jehad22 was used by certain classes of the 
Muslim political and religious elites, who had vested political interests in the concept of 
Muslim identity to re garner support from the Muslims of Panjab. A careful examiniation 
of texts has been done to distinguish between the rhetoric of the accounts and the origins 
of, and motivations for, such conflicts, and the reality of at least some of them. It will be
21 Sohan Lai Stiri, Unidat ut Tawarikh, Daftar-III (Parts I-III) Trans.V S Suri, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev 
University, 2002) v.
22 Jehad - (from Ar. JcihJ effort), Holy War. A divine institution o f warfare to extend Islam into darb a 
harb (the non-Islamic territories which are described as the “abode o f struggle” or o f disbelief), or to 
defend Islam from danger. Adult males must participate, if the need arises, but not all o f them, provided 
that a “sufficient number” (farcl al kifaycth) take it up: Cyril Glasse, The Concise Encyclopaedia o f Islam 
(London: Stacey International, 1999) 209-210. For a further discussion on Jehad, please refer: Majid 
Khadduri, War and Peace in the law o f  Islam (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1955) 55-82.
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argued that the Jehad against the Sikhs in Panjab was used at a juncture when the Muslim 
political and religious elites were at their weakest position, that is, when cracks began to 
appear in their dominance over Panjab. Jehad was considered as an option because it was 
thought that the religious sentiment of Muslims in Punjab could be capitalized upon, 
then. It appears to have no connection with the Muslims as a community being under 
threat; rather it was the Muslim elites who were under the threat of losing their power, 
and thus seem to have created a perception that led to the declaration of Jehad to gain the 
support of the larger Muslim population.
It appears that during the time of attack on Sarhind by Banda Singh, Wazir Khan, the 
governor of Sarhind, aligned with four to five noted zamindars and faijdars along with a 
large number of men, and used the instrument of Jehad to defend the town of Sarhind, as 
mentioned by Khafi Khan.2j There seems to be no evidence such as a fatwa, declaration 
by the Mullahs. However, this clearly demonstrates that religious symbology such as 
Jehad was a potent instrument for any form of political or military mobilization 
demonstrating the importance of religious sentiments in political actions taken during 
those times. Wazir Khan lost his life in the following battle with the Sikhs, resulting in 
the fall of the city of Sarhind, an important centre for Muslim elites. After successful 
victories over towns such as Saharanpur, Batala and Kalanaur, the Sikh forces headed for 
Lahore. Due to the weak Imperial governor Sayyed Aslam Khan, who ruled as the deputy 
of Prince Muazz-ud-din, the eldest son of emperor Bahadur Shah in Lahore, the Midlahs
23 Khafi Khan, Muntakhib-ul Lubab, Vol. II (Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society o f  Bengal, 1874) 653, as 
quoted in Ganda Singh 59.
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of the city along with the Muslim elites now took upon themselves to stop this 
aggression.24 According to William Irvine, they planted a green banner known as haidari 
flag near the Idgah mosque and proclaimed Jehad against the Sikhs.25 According to Syed 
Muhammed Qasim many Muslim notables such as - Mohammed Taqi and Musa Beg - 
the son of Kliuda Wardi Khan Agharkhani, sold off their belongings and household 
furniture and applied the proceeds to the mobilization of men and to acquire horses and 
military stores. Many Khojas who were known as lakhi (millionaires) also contributed 
large funds. Other leading Muslims like Haji Syed Ismail, Haji Yaar Beg, Shah Inayat 
and Mullah Pir Mohammed the preacher, though aged and inexperienced, personally 
joined the movement and assembled at the Idgah with numerous followers, among whom 
were also many Hindus. At last when the imperial governor, Syed Aslam Khan, heard 
that he was being vilified and defamed as a coward, he deputed Mir Ata Ullah, a 
gentleman from the east and Muhib Khan Kharal, a zamindar of Faridabad, to join the 
Ghazis (Islamic religious warriors) with a force of live hundred horses and one thousand 
foot soldiers.26
It appears that, while, the Lahore inhabitants were busy organising themselves against the 
Sikh aggression, the Muslim inhabitants of Sarhind and Thanesar and the Peerzadas of
24 Ganda Singh 102.
23 Ganda Singh 102. Also see: William Irvine, Later Mughals, Vol. 1 (Delhi: Oriental Book Reprint 
Corporation, 1971) 103.
26 Ibratnameh, a Persian work, by Syed Mohammed Qasim o f Lahore, is a manuscript that deals with the 
rule o f Delhi after Aurangzeb until the fall o f  Sayyid brothers Abdullah and Hussein Ali. The author was a 
protege o f  Amir ul Umara Hussein Ali, one o f the Sayyid brothers, and therefore was a first hand witness to 
contemporary affairs o f state: Syed Mohammed Qasim, lbratnameh, (Amritsar: Khalsa College) ff  22-24.
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Samana and Sadhaura were approaching Bahadur Shah. Bahadur Shah too wanted to lead 
a Jehad against the Sikhs. However, his minister, Mumin Khan, advised him otherwise; 
rather he found it undignified for the emperor to do so. As a result, Bahadur Shah 
declined to get involved in the idea of Jehad. Nevertheless, he ordered the governor of 
Delhi, Nizamul Mulk Asafudaulah and Wakil i Mutliq to mobilize an army at the earliest. 
He also called upon Khan Duran - the Subedar of Oudh, Mohammed Amin Khan Chin 
Bahadur - the Faujdar of Muradabad, Khan Jahan - the Nazim of Allahabad, and Syed 
Abdullah Khan of Barha to join him in the expedition to Panjab. He himself left Ajmer 
for Panjab 011 27th June 1710 accompanied by Chatar Sal Bundela.27
It appears that Banda Singh’s death and the later policies adopted by the Mughals and the 
Afghans towards the Sikhs, had their impact on the growth and consolidation of the 
Sikhs. There was no mobilization for a Jehad against the Sikhs for a decade. However, it 
seems that during the rule of Ahmad Shah Abdali in Panjab, Timur Shah, his son, 
controlled Panjab from 1757 to 1758 AD, Jahan Khan, a notable in his court, received 
intelligence that the Sikhs were assembling in large numbers at Chak Guru, Amritsar, to 
take a holy bath and to repair the building. It appears that the instrument of Jehad was 
used by the Muslim elites, against the Sikhs by the beating of drums in Lahore and called 
upon every Muslim with horses, irrespective of his being a servant of the state or not, to 
accompany him to the field of battle. On the other hand the Sikhs mobilized themselves 
under the leadership of Baba Deep Singh and marched in gala dresses similar to that of a 
bridegroom with festal ribbons on their wrists and saffron sprinkled 011 their robes. The
27 Ganda Singh 126-127; Also see: Bhangu 120-123.
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battle took place near Amritsar in which Baba Deep Singh was killed. After his victory, 
Jahan Khan destroyed and polluted the places of worship of the Sikhs.28 Bhagat Lachman 
Singh29 mentions about leaders he perceived as fanatic like Tayar Beg and Murtaza Khan 
who participated in the Jehad. The Mughal Sardar (Leader) of Jalandhar, Inayat Ullah, 
the Rajputs of Jerawari and the Rohillas from the Far East brought their contingents. 
Pahar Mai, the great grandson of Todar Mai, placed his treasures at the disposal of the 
leader. The Sikhs had to flee leaving the disappointed Ghazis behind, who spent their 
anger upon the Hindus of Lahore.30
It appears that with the expansion of the political control by the Sikhs over Panjab’s cities 
and towns, instances of call for Jehad by the Muslim ruling elites became more eminent 
and frequent. For instance, in Jalandhar Doab, the Sikhs turned out many petty officials 
in the districts of the Doab and appointed new lehsildars and thanedarsd1 At that time a 
Khalfzai Pathan, Shams Khan of Kasur was ruling as the Faujdar of the Jalandhar Doab. 
Encouraged by their successes, the Sikhs sent a parwana to Shams Khan calling upon 
him to submit to carry out certain reforms and to come out to receive them, bringing with
28 John Malcolm, the author o f  Sketch o f the Sikhs: Their Origin, customs and manners accompanied Lord 
Lake while chasing Jasvant Rao Holkar into the Sutlej-Jamuna divide during 1805 AD and had a first hand 
experience o f  interacting with the Sikhs. John Malcolm, Sketch o f  the Sikhs: Their Origin, customs and 
manners (Chandigarh: Vinay Publications, 1981) 94. Also see: Browne 19.
29 Bhagat Lachman Singh. Sikh Martyrs (Ludhiana: Lahore Book Shop, 1923) 105.
30 Qasim 23.
31 Ganesh Dass Badhera. Char Bagh-i-Paniab. Ed. Kirpal Singh. (1865. Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1965) 
189; the author, Ganesh Dass belonged to a distinguished family o f  Qanungos (Qammgo means "an 
expounder o f law". This designation was used in the Punjab and other provinces o f  India and Pakistan for 
hereditary registrar o f  landed property in a subdivision o f  a district. In Mughal times the most o f these 
offices were held by Khatris), in the Gujarat district o f  Panjab. The work is a history o f  Panjab upto 1849.
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him, the entire treasury he had. It appears that Shams Khan sent the Sikh messengers 
back and declared Jehad against the Sikhs. More than one hundred thousand Julahas and 
artisans came together and joined his forces, demonstrating the scale of resistance 
mobilized against the Sikh forces,32
Evidence suggests that certain Muslim figures felt that Islam in Northern India was 
threatened by the expanding non Muslim power. In reaction, a strong movement emerged 
among the Muslims to retain the whole of northern India under the Muslim rule. For 
example, a Muslim scholar and theologian named Shah Wali Ullah, the son of the sufi 
scholar Abdur Rahim (who flourished during the reign of Aurangzeb) led a movement to 
stop the expansion of non Muslim hegemony in Panjab. His immediate concern was the 
rising tide of the Maratha, the Sikh and the Jat aggression. Najib ud Daullah, who had 
taken control of the Mughal court, could not fulfil the objective of curtailing this 
forcefulness of the non Muslims and hence Shah Wali Ullah wrote a letter to Ahmad 
Shah Abdali, the Afghan, inviting him to come to the rescue of the Muslims because it 
was his duty as the most powerful Muslim monarch in that region. He was successful in 
convincing Abdali to attack.JJ The Jangnama, an eye witness account, mentions that the 
Sikhs had carried their arms as far as Multan and crossed the river Indus as early as 1764 
under the Bhangi misl. Nasir Khan, the ruler of Kalat, referred the matter to the Ulama 
for a fatwa. Mullah Mirza, Qazi Farrukh-ud-Din, Nizamuddin and Mullah Hamid
32 Khafi Khan, Vol. Ill 657 as referred in Ganda Singh 114-115.
33 M Mujeeb has quoted an article on Shah Wali Ullah and Indian Politics in the Eighteenth Century by K 
A Nizami front Islamic Culture. Vol. XXV, in his book -  The Indian Muslims. Please see: M Mujeeb, The 
Indian Muslims (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967) 389.
119
unanimously decreed in favour of the religious war. The matter was then referred to 
Ahmad Shah who wrote to Nasir Khan endorsing the Jehad against the Sikhs. It is quite 
evident from Jangnama that the territorial gains by the Sikhs, who are referred to as 
‘Dogs’ in the text, were seen as an attack on Islam. Abdali in his letter to Nasir Jang asks 
‘How can a Muslim think of going to Mecca while this evil sect is causing havoc?’ Jehad 
on these idolaters is more meritorious than Hajj...34 Evidence suggests that a grand army 
was formed which began its holy war from Lahore. After taking over Lahore, the Ghazis 
attacked Amritsar only to find 30 Sikhs there.35 During their march from Lahore to 
Sarhind, the Ghazis ransacked every village, as the author of Jangnama mentions; there 
was no distinction between ‘dogs’ and ‘non-dogs’.36 It seems that these actions would 
have had an impact 011 the non-Sikh and non-Muslim population of Panjab, and would 
have resulted later in their support for the Sikhs. The futility of pursuing the Sikhs was 
becoming evident to Ahmad Shah Abdali; hence he decided to retreat to Kabul. 
However, he recognised the authority of Ala Singh of Patiala, over the Sarhind region, by 
bestowing a robe of honour-Khillat, a drum- tabl o alam and a banner.37 This fact seems 
to demonstrate that the intentions of religious war against the Sikhs had become weak. 
On his way back to Kabul, the Ghazis met with the Sikh forces. The best warriors from 
both sides faced each other. Ranjit Singh’s grandfather Charat Singh Sukarchakia gets a 
special mention in the text, due to his bravery. The Sikhs retreated back to the jungles
34 Qazi Nur Mohammed, Jangnama. Ed. Ganda Singh, (Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1939) 36-44. For 
introduction about this source, please refer p 12, footnote 2.
33 Qazi Nur 100.
36 Qazi Nur 103-104.
37 Qazi Nur 125-128.
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after inflicting a severe blow on the Ghazis. The mobilization to fight weakened within 
the Ghazis, who thought it best to return to Kabul. Abdali honoured Nasir Khan by 
granting him the territory of Shal.j8 This Jehad was significant in that it was one of the 
last efforts to sustain the Afghan control over Panjab. It furthered the establishment of the 
Sikh hegemony in Panjab.
Though there has been no evidence to find decrees by the mullahs declaring Jehad' there 
is significant evidence, as shown above, by which it can be suggested that the instrument 
of Jehad had become an important tool in the Muslim led Militarism against the Sikhs. 
There is no doubt that it is difficult to conclude from the available sources whether these 
religious calls influenced every Muslim living in the Punjab then. However, it can also 
not be ignored that this instrument, which has many dimensions to it, was used mostly 
when the Muslim elites were closest to losing their political control over the region by the 
non Muslims.
3.3 Shifting swings of Political Power in Panjab
The dynamics of power in Panjab continued to shift from Muslim elites to the non 
Muslim elites. It appears that there were efforts by the Sikhs to take over as much 
territorial/administrative rights in Panjab as possible. It seems that the Sikh endeavour to 
weaken Lahore, the capital of Panjab, which began under the leadership of Banda Singh, 
was eventually successful by 1765, when the first Sikh coins were struck. The expanding
38 Qazi Nur 174.
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power of the Sikhs, which was at its zenith by the end of the eighteenth century, enabled 
them to attack the Mughal capital, Delhi, in 1783.39 This subsection will trace and 
examine these swings in shifting power in Panjab, which in the later half of the century 
brought a qualitative shift in hegemony from the Muslim to the non Muslim in Panjab.
It appears that Banda Singh’s expansionist policies had two fold implications: On the one 
hand, they were able to occupy more territory which meant more revenue. For instance, 
land worth revenue of rupees thirty six hundred thousand fell into the hands of the Sikhs 
at the time of the fall of Mukhlispur in 1710.40 On the other hand they were able to put 
‘new elites’, who were Sikhs, in the political as well as administrative positions of control 
thus defining the new state. For instance, after attacking the Muslim principality of 
Samana, Banda Singh appointed a new faujdci}\ Bhai Fateh Singh. Similarly, a Sikh Amil 
was installed in the small town of Chatt, in Hoshiarpur district. In another instance, Baj 
Singh, his companion from Nanded, was appointed as the Subedar of Sarhind with Ali 
Singh as his Naib. Bhai Fateh Singh was later promoted from faujdar to governor of 
Samana. Suri mentions that Ram Singh, the governor of Thanesar, joined with the Sikh 
leader Binod Singh.41 Important symbolic development also took place, such as a coin 
being struck with the inscription of the Gurus as a mark of the declaration of sovereignty.
39 According to HR Gupta, the Sikhs had established a military post in Sabzi Mandi, in Delhi by 1783. 
Though the main body o f  the Sikh army retired, Baghel Singh, a Sikh general, stayed back to construct 
Gurudwaras at places associated with the Gurus. For more discussion, please see: HR Gupta, History o f  the 
Sikhs. Vol. II, (Lahore: 1944. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1978) 142.
40 However, it is important to note that his rule was predominantly a military occupation with the 
abolishment o f the zamindars; the land was given to the tillers. Please refer Ganda Singh 83-85.
41 Suri, Vol. I, 78; Qasim 21.
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Banda Singh also introduced a new calendar. He also abolished zcimindaru and gave land 
to the tillers.42 It can be said that the examples set, such as the mention of the Gurus on 
the coins and the formation of a new calendar, emphasized the break from the old Mughal 
government and the beginning of a new regime with an ethos of new religious 
fundamentals. Also by taking powers from the zamindars, and distributing the rights over 
the land to the tillers, he not only expanded his base of followers, thus reducing the 
number of those in favour of the Mughal regime, but also, attacked the fundamental 
political and social fabric, which supported the Mughal empire. This possibly was a very, 
if not the most significant, contribution towards an emergence of a new social and 
political order with Sikhs in power in Panjab.
After Bahadur Shah’s death, power kept shifting mainly between the Afghans, the 
Mughals, the Sikhs and the Marathas. In the Mughal court, Jahandar Khan took over the 
reigns of the Mughal power (1712-1713) but could not hold them for long. Farukhsiyar 
emerged (1713-1719) as a strong Mughal ruler whose agenda was to effectively curtail 
the Sikh power. He attacked at the root of the problem by focusing on Banda Singh and 
his Sikhs, and they were brutally killed wherever they were found. Banda Singh was 
arrested and brought to Delhi. This arrest was an important unfinished agenda of Bahadur 
Shah. Farukhsiyar paraded Banda Singh around the tomb of Bahadur Shah43 thus 
accomplishing his unfinished task which began under Bahadur Shah. It seems he
42 Ganda Singh 83-85.
43 Bahadur Shah was buried on 15th May 1712 in the court o f a marble mosque in Mehrauli (near Delhi) 
erected by Aurangzeb, near the shrine o f  Khwajah Qutub ud Din Bakhtiar Kaki.
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legitimised his stature in the eyes of the elites of those times, by accomplishing the 
unfinished task of Bahadur Shah.
After the death of Banda Singh, the Sikhs regrouped and began attacking the Mughal 
establishments. It appears that this armed pressure forced a change in the attitude of the 
Mughal authorities, especially in Panjab, towards the Sikhs. For instance, instead of 
subjugating, the government began appeasing them. In 1733, Zakariya Khan decided to 
confer the title of Nawab on their leader. He asked Subeg Singh, a Sikh government 
contractor, to negotiate for the acceptance of his proposal by the Sikh groups so that the 
Sikhs could develop a liking for the Mughal system. Subeg Singh reached Amritsar, 
where the Sikhs had been allowed to assemble and celebrate Baisakhi after many years of 
exile. Evidence suggests that he offered, on behalf of the government, the title of Nawab 
and a jagir consisting of the parganas of Dipalpur, Kangawal and Jhabal, yielding an 
annual revenue of one thousand rupees and a khillat, the robe of honour, for their leader. 
The implications of the offer were thoroughly discussed in the presence of almost all the 
leaders of the Sikhs viz.: Bhai Mani Singh, Darbara Singh, Kapur Singh, Issar Singh, 
Tharaj Singh, Karan Singh, Bhoga Singh and Garja Singh. It was decided unanimously 
that the ‘Nawabship’ should be conferred upon the much-respected Kapur Singh, who 
was reluctant, but could not go against the unanimous will of the Sikhs (in 1733 AD). 
Consequently, Zakariya Khan conferred upon Sardar Kapur Singh the title of'Nawab'; he 
received a turban, a shawl, a row of pearls, a brocade garment and a sword.44 It appears 
that this event had three fold implications: firstly, the Sikh space was fully recognised by
44 Bhangu 211-213.
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the Muslim political authority, hence there was a swing in the eyes of the rulers towards 
the 'position' of the Sikh leadership. Secondly, the Sikhs got time to regroup themselves 
and lastly since the title of Nawab was not a 'm ansabdariit was nothing but a move to 
reconcile the Sikhs. Probably the Mughal governor also needed peace to regroup in 
Panjab. Thus, it seemed to be a win-win situation for both the parties.
However, it seems that even after getting the title of Nawab, Kapur Singh continued 
organising the Sikhs. Zakariya Khan realised that the Sikh power had not been controlled 
and he began following the policy of persecution.45 In 1735, before the harvest itself, 
Zakariya Khan took thejagir of the Sikhs back and continued his policy of suppression 46
Another instance of governments’ policy of appeasement was when Mir Mannu was 
ordered to face the revolt of Shah Nawaz Khan.47 Shah Nawaz Khan, having received the 
letter of appointment as the Subedar of the province, left for Multan. Shortly afterwards 
at Multan, he gathered 15000 men, horses and foot soldiers. And then he asked for 
permission to meet near his father’s tomb at Lahore. The trick being too apparent, Muin-
4d HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs, Vol. II, (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1978) 55.
46 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. II, 49-50.
47 HR Gupta, History o f the Sikhs. Vol. II, 105: Shahnawaz Khan, the son o f  Zakariya Khan, occupied the 
province in the civil war that followed between him and his brother Yahiya Khan, Meanwhile, Ahmad 
Shah Abdali emerged as a leader o f  the region after the death o f Nadir Shah on 9 lh June 1747. When Abdali 
attacked Panjab, Shahnawaz Khan, instead o f  defending Lahore, fled to Delhi. It was then that Muin ul 
Mulk emerged as a formidable leader who gave a strong blow to the Afghan advancing armies, and Panjab 
was recovered for the Mughals from the Afghans. Muin ul Mulk was given the charge o f  Lahore, as the 
Governor: Azad Bilgrami, Khazaneh Amarih (Lucknow: Nawal Kishore Press, 1900) 97-98.
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zlSun-Mulk or Mir Mamiu sent Diwan Koda Mai and Bakshi Asmat Khan as the head of a 
force to Multan. At this critical juncture, it appears that Diwan Koda Mai advised Mir 
Mannu to enlist Sikhs in his army.49 This seems to be the first instance of the Sikhs 
becoming a part of the Mughal Army in Panjab. Koda Mai took a number of Sikhs into 
his pay to fight against Shah Nawaz Khan. In the following battle, Bhim Singh of the 
Sikh forces decapitated Shah Nawaz Khan resulting in the victory of Koda Mai. Diwan 
Koda Mai was duly admired by Mir Mannu who conferred upon him the title of 
‘Bahadur’ and also appointed him as Governor of Thatta and Multan.50
In 1748, it appears that Mir Mannu was under pressure from Ahmed Shah Abdali, who 
sent him a letter asking for surrender. Mir Mannu readily accepted the proposal and sent 
the Pir Sheikh Abdul Kadir and Alama Maulvi Abdullah to settle the terms of peace. The 
treaty was signed according to which 1.4 million rupees as the annual surplus revenue of
51the four mahals - Sialkot, Pasrur, Gujarat and Aurangabad, were to be paid to Durrani. 
Immediately after Ahmed Shah left Panjab, Mir Mannu himself addressed the task of the 
administrative affairs of Panjab, which involved chastisement of the Sikhs. However, 
due to the non-payment of the annual tribute of 4 mahals, there was a breach of treaty,
48 Diwan Kauda Mat was a Khulasa (Sahajdhari or slow adopting) Sikh, Bhangu 330; George Forster, A 
Journey from Bengal to England through Northern Parts o f India. Kashmir. Afghanistan and Persia and into 
Russia ('1782-1784). 2 vols. (London: R Faulder, 1798. Patiala: Language Department, 1970) 314. Also 
see: Malcolm (London: John Murray, 1812) 91.
49 Bhangu 417; Also HR Gupta, History o f the Sikhs. Vol. II, 105.
50 Bhangu 330-33.
51 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. II, 105.
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which provoked Abdali to attack Panjab for the third time. Mir Mannu prepared himself 
for the battle. He again asked Diwan Koda Mai to recruit Sikhs. The state of suspense 
continued for over a month and half after which, finally, a battle was fought in which the 
Lahore forces pressed the Afghans hard. Following negotiations with Mir Mannu, 
another treaty was signed according to which Panjab and Multan became a part of the 
Afghan empire. Mir Mannu was to continue as the governor of these provinces and 
surplus revenue was to be sent to Abdali. As a consequence of this treaty, the Afghan 
empire extended till Sarhind. The economic condition of the Mughal Empire and 
especially Panjab worsened affecting the peasants severely.52
According to Hari Ram Gupta when Ahmed Shah left Panjab in 1750, Mir Mannu was 
convinced that the Sikhs would not be contented with the jagirs and the allowances. He 
took to the task of chastising the Sikhs.1'3 He encouraged the killing of the Sikhs by 
following policies such as anybody bringing the head of a Sikh was to be rewarded with 
Rupees 10 and whosoever brought a horse of a Sikh could keep the horse.34 It appears 
that consequentially, mass executions of the Sikhs were carried on. Mir Mannu entrusted 
his most capable officers, Sadiq Begh Khan with Adina Begh, to punish the Sikhs in the 
Jalandhar Doab. For instance, In Feb. 1753, when the great concourse of the Sikhs had 
gathered at Makhowal, i.e., Anandpur, to celebrate Diwali, Mir Mannu’s forces fell upon
32 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs, Vol. II, 109-111.
53 Hari Ram Gupta, History o f  Sikhs, Vol. I -  The Sikh Gurus (1469-1708 AD-), (Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal Publishers, 1984) 70.
34 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. II, 104.
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them and killed many. Malcolm argues that Adina Begh had a secret understanding with 
the Sikhs and hence the attack was mild.55 To strike more terror, he ordered his moving 
columns of troops to seize the women and children of the Sikhs. He tortured them and 
forced them to abandon their religion. George Thomas provides us with evidence in 
Military Memoirs o f  George Thomas that the Sikh women also used to pick up arms to 
defend their habitation.56 During the campaign of Mir Mannu, the Hindu peasants were 
also persecuted on many allegations such as supplying food to the Sikh outlaws, giving 
them shelter and avoiding disclosure about their whereabouts.57 Just when Mir Mamiu 
died in 1753, a band of Sikhs hiding in the sugarcane fields attacked Lahore and freed the 
women. These atrocities did not prevent the Sikh struggle from growing as they took 
atrocities stoically, as one finds in Aliuddin’s Ebratnameh:
M annu is our Sickle, We the fo d d e r  f o r  his to  mow,
58The m ore he reaps, the m ore w e grow .
It appears that the objective of taking over Lahore, the seat of power, and the ‘centre’ of 
Panjab, and establishing total hegemony, was being worked towards unceasingly by the 
Sikh leadership. They weakened the Afghans by following guerrilla tactics. In one 
instance, Charat Singh and Jai Singh entered Lahore at the head of 500 Sikhs disguised as 
Muslims, to plunder the rich merchants. Mumin Khan, who was in charge of the city
33 Malcolm 92.
36 William Francklin, Military Memoirs o f  George Thomas. (Calcutta. London: John Stockdale, 1805) 75.
57 Suri, Vol. I 130.
38 AUuddin iii.
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then, punished them.39 In another instance when Abdali attacked the Delhi suburbs in 
1757 the Sikhs attacked his army and relieved him of his booty. Sardar Ala Singh of 
Patiala and some other Sikh chiefs gathered at Sarhind and attacked Prince Timur Shah 
between Ambala and Patiala.60 In response to the Sikh attacks, evidence suggests that 
Timur Shah destroyed Kartarpur, the town important for its Gurudwaras, and set them on 
fire. The Gurudwara Tham Sahib was also burnt to ashes. Cows were slaughtered and 
their blood was put in the Gurudwaras. Abdali ransacked the city of Amritsar and the 
sacred tank was desecrated by filling it with trash and refuse. Charat Singh Sukarchakia, 
grandfather of Ranjit Singh, who had established himself at Gujranwala attacked Abdali 
while he was on his way to Qandhar.61
It appears that, Jahan Khan, who was the commander- in- chief and a Wazir, after being 
unsuccessful in tackling the Sikhs, summoned Adina Begh, belonging to the Arain 
community, to Lahore. It appears that Adina Beg understood the politics of Panjab. Adina 
Beg arrived at an informal understanding with the Sikh leaders, Sodhi Wadbhag Singh 
and Jassa Singh Ahluwalia and declined to obey the summons and withdrew to 
inaccessible recesses of the Shivaliks. The two armies of the Sikhs and the Afghans 
fought with each other at Mahilpur in December 1757. The Sikhs were victorious and 
rushed upon the city of Jalandhar and wrecked it. In retribution, the dead body of Nasir
59 Bhangu 311-312.
60 Jadunath Sarkar, Fall o f the Mughal Empire. Vol. II (Calcutta: MC Sarkar & Sons) 51; for an account o f  
the Sikh-Afghan conflict during Taimur Shah’s rule in Panjab (1757-1758 AD), please see: 46-51.
61 Haqiqat-e-Bina-o-Aruj-e-Firqa-e-Sikhan (Amritsar: Khalsa College) 36.
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Ali, who was responsible for the slaughter at Kartarpur and for burning the Tham Sahib 
Gurudwara, was dragged out of his grave and subjected to indignities. Adina Begh at last 
came to the rescue of the city and paid one hundred thousand rupees to the Sikhs to have 
peace.62
Adina Begh, an important player in Panjab, began negotiating with the Marathas, which 
seems to have led to the introduction of a new player on Panjab’s plains. The Sikhs 
joined this new group comprising of the Marathas and Adina Begh. Jahan Khan, the 
Afghan general, thought it prudent to retreat before the combined advancing forces of the 
Marathas, Adina Begh and the Sikhs. When these forces reached the neighbourhood of 
Lahore, Timur Shah and Jahan Khan fled from Lahore 011 the 18th of April 1758. A day 
later, 011 April 19th, the Marathas and the Sikhs entered the city of Lahore. It seems that 
Timur Shah had left his baggage and even his artillery behind him. The leading Sikh 
Sardars like Charat Singh Sukarchakia, Jassa Singh Ramgarlha, Hari Singh, Lehna Singh, 
Gujar Singh and Jhanda Singh Bhangi took part in this war. In an effort to chastise, the 
Sikhs took the Afghan captives to Amritsar and forced them to clean the sacred tank 
filled up with rubbish by Jahan Khan. Maratha chiefs also paid their respects to the 
temple.6j
62 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. II 138-139.
63 Surjit Singh Gandhi, Sikhs in the Eighteenth Century (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1999) 225-226.
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It appears Adina Beg thought that by repressing the Sikhs he might lead the government 
to entrust the Doab in someone else’s hands for a higher sum, thus depriving him of his 
post. This attitude of his helped the Sikhs to grow stronger and they gradually occupied 
many villages as Jagirs.64 On the other hand, it seems that, in view of the cold conditions 
of Panjab, the Maratha chief Raghunath Rao understood that it would be wise to entrust 
Panjab to Adina Beg, who had an understanding with the Sikhs and a long experience of 
administration. Hence, the viceroyalty of Panjab was given to Adina Beg, on the 
condition that he would pay an annual tribute of 7.5 million rupees to the Marathas.65 It 
appears that Adina Beg intended to weaken the Sikh power and to do so, he mobilized the 
noted Zamindars and the chiefs of Panjab to join him to combat the Sikh menace. 
Consequently the Gakhars, the Janjuas and the Gheba Zamindars of the Sind Sagar Doab, 
Chaudhary Ralimat Khan Waraich in the Chaj Doab, Raja Ranjit Dev of Jammu, 
Chaudhary Pir Mohammed Chatha, Izzat Baksh, Muran Baksh Bhatti and other 
zamindars in the Rachna Doab, Raja Ghumand Chand, Nidhan Singh Randhawa and 
Mirza Mohammed Anwar of Qadian, the Afghans of Kasur and Dhaulpur in the Bari 
Doab, the Afghans of Jalandhar and Alawalpur, Rai Ibrahim of Kapurthala, the Rais of 
Bankala, Dasua, Khardunbala and Phagwara and the Rajputs of Rahon in the Jalandhar 
Doab were persuaded to join him in his campaign.66 But he was not to live long enough 
to see his efforts lead to desired results. Adina Beg, the man who created a balance 
between the Delhi government, Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Sikhs and the Marathas, died in
64 Baklit Mai, Klialsanama MS, SHR 1288 fDaftars I -  IV) (1810-1814). (Patiala: Ganda Singh Collection, 
Punjabi University and Amritsar: Klialsa College) 58-59.
65 Gandhi 240.
65 Gandhi 241.
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1758. According to evidence provided by Sohan Lai and Mofti Aliuddin, in 1760 AD, the 
Sikhs met at Amritsar and passed a Gurmalla by Sarbat Khalsa that Lahore be captured. 
The Sikh sardars, viz.: Jassa Singh Ahluwalia, Jai Singh Kanhaya, Bhai Hari Singh 
Bhangi, Gujjar Singh and Lehna Singh fell upon Lahore in November. Mir Mohammed 
Khan of Lahore had to pay a sum of 30,000 rupees to be freed.67 As the payment was 
made from the revenue of the four Mahals- Pasrur, Aurangabad, Gujarat and Sialkot- 
otherwise payable to the Royal Afghan treasury, Yakub Khan and Azam Khan, the 
Afghans, reported the matter to the Shah. The Shah ordered that the money be realised 
from the leading citizens of Lahore i.e. Shah Ghulam Hussein Pirzada Sirhindi, Mian 
Naqi Mohammed, Mir Nathu Shah, Mir Shahar Yar, Hafiz Qadir Baksh and others 
through whom the payment had been made to the Sikhs.68
It appears that Abdali had been embarrassed due to the expulsion of his son Timur Shah 
from Lahore. He left Qandhar in the beginning of September 1759 to attack the Marathas 
who had receded till Delhi. He appointed Raja Ghumand Chand of Kangra as the 
governor of the Jalandhar Doab. The 1761 Battle of Panipat was fought in which the 
Afghans were victorious. It seems that this battle had consequences for the Sikhs 
struggling to gain power in Panjab, The Sikhs attacked Abdali as soon as he left Lahore
67 Suri Vol. I, 150; Mofti Aliuddin, Ebratnameh, Ed. Mohammed Baqir. Vol. 1 (1854. Lahore: The Punjabi 
Adabi Academy, 1961) 226-227. According to Tarikh e Panjab. the amount o f Rs 30,000 was paid for 
Karah Parshad  (a soft, sweetened food made o f flour or semolina and ghee) to lift the siege by the Sikhs. 
Kanhaya Lai, Tarikh e Panjab Trans. Jit Singh Seetal. (Patiala: Punjabi University Publication Bureau, 
1987) 76.
68 Gandhi 265.
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and freed 2200 Maratha women.69 It appears Abdali dispatched a contingent of his best 
soldiers to chastise the Sikhs. More so on his way back to Afghanistan, Abdali attacked 
Amritsar and blew up the Harmandir. In consequence, Charat Singh Sukarchakia’s forces 
gave a tough resistance to the Afghan army and defeated them. The Sikhs came out to 
punish those who sided with Ahmad Shah Abdali. Also, the Afghans who were captured 
by the Sikh forces were made to clean the Harmandir.70 In another instance, the 
Sukarchakia, Kanhaiya and Ramgarhia misls overran the Jalandhar Doab, the Jamuna 
Gangetic tract and eventually reached Lahore. The Sikhs demanded of Kabuli Mai, the 
governor of Lahore, to surrender all the butchers of the place and to forbid the killing of 
the cows. In response to the Sikh demand, the Governor chopped off the noses and ears 
of two or three butchers with the consent of the leading citizens of Lahore. He also 
agreed to pay a large sum of money as a tribute to them and to keep in Lahore, Tek 
Chand, a vakil (Diplomat) of Sardar Hari Singh Bhangi. This seems to be the beginning 
of the Sikh control over the centre, Lahore.71 By 1764, Charat Singh Sukarchakia, 
accompanied by Gujar Singh Bhangi, put an end to the Afghan domination in the region 
between Indus and Chenab. Likewise in the southwest Panjab, Hari Singh Bhangi and his 
sons Jhanda Singh and Ganda Singh and the Naqqi Sardar Hira Singh brought the 
domination of Muslim elites to an end. Also Jassa Singh Kalal had brought Jalandhar
69 Lai 95.
70 Forster 321.
71 Lai 79.
1 J  J
Doab under his control. From Sarhind and Lahore up to Multan and the Deras, the Sikhs 
had divided the country and appropriated the revenues without anyone’s interference.72
In 1764, it appears that the Sikhs assembled at Amritsar and rebuilt the Harmandir. These 
developments in Panjab encouraged and gave confidence to the other Sikh chiefs to 
attack the Afghan forces. More so, on 22nd October, realising that the victory would be 
incomplete unless they capture Lahore; Jassa Singh Ahluwalia marched towards the 
capital. The provincial governor, Ubeid Khan, shut himself inside the city, but the leading 
citizens of Lahore realized the situation and opened the gates. The Sikhs proclaimed Jassa 
Singh Ahluwalia as Sultan e Qaum, i.e. King of the Community.73 It appears to be a 
landmark development as it was after more than seven centuries that a non-Muslim ruler 
had taken control of the city of Lahore. The Sikhs struck their own coin, which said:
Sikka z a d  d a r  ja h a n  B afaza l e A kal
M ulk e A h m a d  ga rift J a ssa  K a la l
74The coin  struck by the grace o f  God in the country o f  Ahm ad captured by Jassa Kalal.
11 Qazi Nur 160-161.
73 Gandhi 268; It is important to note that Jassa Singh Ahluwalia was called Sultan e Qaum, literally 
translated as ‘King o f  the Community'’ and not ‘Sultan i Lahore’ or ‘Sultan i Panjab \  This distinction 
clearly suggests that although the Sikhs as a community had moved closer to the realisation o f the new 
state, they were not clear about the territorial context o f  their envisaged state. Furthermore, there seems to 
be no evidence o f  Muslim elite participation in the take over o f  the city o f  Lahore, as was there during the 
take over o f  the city by Ranjit Singh in 1799. This will be demonstrated in the following chapter.
74 This coin is not available with any numismatic society or in individual collection, though it Fmds a 
mention in Khazaneh e Amarih. It is a Persian contemporary work completed in about 1763. It gives an 
account o f Durrani’s invasions and Wadda Ghallughara: Azad Bilgrami, Khazaneh e Amarih, (Lucknow: 
Nawal Kishore Press, 1900) 114; Also see: Browne ii and pg 121.
134
It appears that Abdali attacked Panjab for the eighth time in 1766. The Sikhs left the city 
of Lahore and Gujar Singh and Lehna Singh left for Kasur while Sobha Singh, Hira 
Singh and Ajaib Singh made for Pakpattan. It seems this time a deputation of the leading 
citizens of Lahore, both Muslims and non-Muslims, submitted to the Shah that Lehna 
Singh was a good administrator and was unbiased in his rule. Abdali then wrote a letter to 
Lehna Singh with an offer of governorship of Lahore, which was refused. As soon as 
Abdali left Lahore, Lehna Singh, Gujar Singh and Sobha Singh returned to take over the 
administration of Lahore. Ahmad Shah Abdali died in 1772 at Murgha.75 It can be 
suggested that Muslims had already accepted a Sikh ruler in the city of Lahore as their 
ruler and it seems that the Sikh ruler was not keen to get his rule legitimized from the 
Afghan ruler. This seems to be surely an important period when the Sikh hegemony not 
only began getting recognised by the Muslims but also received legitimacy to govern 
from the Lahore citizens and not from Afghan or Mughal rulers.
It appears that the Misls laid a special stress on the construction of the Gurudwaras, the 
basic unit of the Sikh organization. For instance, by 1783, the misls had exerted their 
power till the Mughal centre in Delhi. The Sikh groups attacked and took over Delhi 
under the leadership of Jassa Singh Ahluwalia, Jassa Singh Ramgarhia and Baghel Singh 
Dhaliwal who along with the other chieftains entered the Red Fort. They occupied Diwan 
e Am. The city was essentially surrendered by the Mughal wazir on 11th March 1783. 
This seems to be the first direct attack by the Sikhs on the Mughal centre. Also, the Sikhs, 
who began as a movement under Banda Singh, had reached a position to negotiate with
75 HR Gupta, Vol. II 238-239.
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the Mughal Empire. It appears that the crucial fact is that the Sikh misls were only keen 
to establish their 'Historical space'76 for which they negotiated. Evidence suggests that a 
settlement was arrived between the Dal Khalsa and Shah Alam II. One of the important 
clauses of the settlement was that Bhagel Singh would stay in Delhi for about a year, to 
construct seven Gurudwaras on the sites where important historical events associated 
with the Gurus took place. This historic symbolism gave political and military potency to 
the Sikh power and gave a clear political and military message to the Sikhs in Panjab and 
their rivals of the emerged Sikh hegemony at the Mughal centre, Delhi.
3.4 Conclusion
Ray argues that the attributes of the vitality of the Sikh movement was due to its 
innovative array of institutions and the successful organizational base attended to, by the
* 77  *successive Gurus. It appears that new pilgrimage centres, founding of new towns, 
holding periodic meetings and undertaking extensive tours were the elements of this 
organizational thrust, providing sufficient social autonomy to the panth, coupled with the 
egalitarian message of the Gurus.78 The consistent focus on the productive classes was a 
significant discernible thread, which, to a large extent, ensured its material
76 The phrase ‘Historical Space’ is used in the context o f  recognition o f  all the places associated with the 
Sikh Gurus.
77 Niharranjan Ray, Sikh Gurus and the Sikh Society: A Study in Social Analysis (Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal, 1975) 67-68.
78 The fact is also borne out by Eaton in another context: Richard M Eaton, ‘The Political and Religious 
Authority o f  the Shrine o f  Baba Farid’, Essays on Islam and Indian History. (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2000) 206. He shows how the shrine o f  Baba Farid had become important enough to intervene in the 
circulation and redistribution o f  a great deal o f material wealth in the region.
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independence.79 Conversely, the material and social wealth generated was a major cause 
of the schismatic rivalry becoming an essential site for doctrinal conflicts and thus 
provided the Mughal administration a considerable ally in injecting dissensions within 
the panth.80 The institution of the Khalsa led to the virtual abolition of the corporeal Guru 
and set up the stage for the eighteenth century with its own characteristics. The story until 
now can be summed up as a working out of the twin processes of maintaining doctrinal 
sovereignty in distinction from the medieval Hindu tradition, and simultaneously keeping 
intact its spatial autonomy vis-a-vis the Mughal rule.81 The ethical impulse of the 
doctrinal stance; engagement with history through devising appropriate ideals and 
institutions; and perhaps most significantly, the social composition embracing the petty 
traders, the artisans and the land holding peasants along with other deprived groups, 
provided the distinctive thrust to the structure for the pre-Khalsa phase of the Sikh 
movement,82
The two fold processes of flourishing agriculture and urban trade resulted in the overall 
prosperity of the Panjab province. In a highly differentiated society, the expansion of 
artisan production, urban trade and development and the region’s integration into a wider
79 Surjit Hans, A Reconstruction o f  Sikh History from Sikh Literature (Jalandhar: ABS Publication, 1988) 
141.
80 J S Grewal, Sikh Ideology, Polity and Social Order (Delhi: Manohar, 1996) 40.
81 The Gurus invited artisans and traders to reside at Amritsar, its administration was free o f  Mughal 
interference and the institution o f Akal Takhat had overtly political underpinnings. Grewal, Sikh Ideology, 
128-129.
82 Referring the Guru as Sacha Padshah effectively merges the status o f  the Guru and o f  the ruler 
representing one o f  the several ways in which the institution o f  the Guru soldered religious and political 
division o f  authority. Grewal, Sikh Ideology, p 136.
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market network in the seventeenth century was to the obvious benefit of the upper strata
f 83of the local communities; which enabled them to challenge the Mughal authority. The 
zamindar uprisings in the early eighteenth century were widespread, internally fractious 
and limited in cause, often organised on the lines of caste and community.84 However, the 
urban elite were the sufferers at the hands of the rebels. The desire for political stability 
for the purpose of long distance trade and monetary transactions forced the traders and 
some artisans to side with the Mughals, because economic prosperity had followed the 
political integration of the region.83 Alam argues that the Sikh uprisings during and after 
Banda Singh reflected a deep-rooted resentment between the Mughal state and its 
beneficiaries on one hand and, the various categories of petty zamindars and peasants on 
the other, who were at a non-reconciliatory stage. The Sikhs began to put forward their 
claim to rulership. The efforts were kept alive by devising subsequent institutions in the 
form of the Dal Khalsa, the Gurmatta, the Rakhi system, Sarbat Khalsa etc. Militarily, in 
the mid eighteenth century, the circumstances of foreign invasions by the Durranis helped 
the Sikh chiefs in seizing the opportunity to completely attain the territorial sovereignty.86 
The Sikh movement continued to challenge the Mughal power with its larger reach 
amongst the dispossessed zamindars, the impoverished peasants and the pauperised lower
87urban classes.
83 Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis o f Empire in Mughal North India: Avvadh and the Panjab, 1707-48 (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1986) 304-306.
84 Alam 306.
85 Alam 307.
86 Alam 315.
87 Alam 317.
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With their territorial rule established in most of the Panjab and their hegemony extending 
till Delhi by the end of the eighteenth century, the Sikh Misls were only a step away from 
their kingdom. The Panjabis, including all religious denominations, realized the 
importance of their trade and agricultural interests as supreme. The Muslim ruling elites 
had faced and lost enough battles against the Sikh misls, and were devoid of a strong 
centre. With no alternative but to accept the command of the new regime, they were in a 
conciliatory situation. The tolerant leadership of Sufis in Panjab were the only ones to 
have sustained an emotional relationship with the masses and were favoured by the Sikh 
misls. It would not be wrong to suggest that the only leadership possible to emerge from 
within Panjab could have been from within the Sikhs as the only challenge for any new 
emerging leadership would have been tackling the Sikh misls. Ranjit Singh, from the 
Sukarchakia misl, had some answers to this emerging dynamic and was soon to take over 
Lahore, and establish himself as its new ruler.
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Chapter 4
The Process of Change -  From M uslim Elites to Non M uslim Elites in the 
Nineteenth Century Panjab: Some Case Studies
Ail important city of the Mughal imperial power, Lahore, and its surrounding areas came 
under the sway of the Sikhs in 1770 AD. Ranjit Singh, after taking over Lahore in 
1799AD, expanded the territories in 1818 to Multan, in 1819 to Kashmir and to the trans- 
Indus territories in the 1820s.1 The Persian chronicle, Umdat ut Tawcirikh, of Lahore 
court clearly seemed to define this state formation by Ranjit Singh, when they 
distinguished the new state from the regions either in control of the British, i.e. 
‘Hindustan ’ or in control of the Afghans, i.e. Vilayal? The dominions of the new state, 
formed by Ranjit Singh, hence encompassed diverse ethnic, religious, linguistic and 
economic organisations, and equally diverse political elements ranging from the warlike 
Yusufzais and the Gakhars in the north, the Pathans and the Baluchs in the northwest and 
southwest, the pastoral Labanas, the trading Khatris and the agriculturalist Jats in the 
plains, and the ruling Rajputs in the hills.3
1 JS Grewal mentions that the city o f Lahore was united after three decades o f  it being taken over by Ranjit 
Singh in 1799. Before taking Amritsar in 1805, 20 principalities in the plains had been subjugated. JS 
Grewal, The Sikhs o f  the Panjab (Delhi: 1990) 100-101. Also, for the conquests o f  Ranjit Singh, refer: Indu 
Banga, Agrarian System o f  the Sikhs: late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Delhi: Manohar, 1978) 
22-26.
2 Sohan Lai Suri mentions the British controlled territories as ‘Hindustan1, and Afghan controlled as 
‘Vilayat1, the term Vilayat is used to refer to any Foreign Country. Sohan Lai Suri, Umdat ut Tawarikh, 
Vol. II, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 6, 64, and 104.
3 Indu Banga, Ed. Five Panjabi Centuries, Polity. Economy, Society and Culture, c l 500-1990, Essays for J 
S Grewal. (Delhi: Manohar, 1997); Indu Banga, Formation o f  the Sikh State, 89.
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Various scholars, both Sikh and non Sikh, since the nineteenth century have written about 
the new state formed in the Northwest of India. In the recent past, while celebrating the 
bicentenary of the coronation of Ranjit Singh the world over, in the year 2001, his secular 
rule was emphasised in a volume edited by M K  Gill Among other contributors to Gill’s 
volume, Secular Sovereign Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Harmohinder Singh argues that Ranjit 
Singh created the spirit of Panjabiyat...”4 Another contributor, Prithipal Singh argues 
that: “Ranjit Singh incorporated men from different castes, creed and colour”.5 Kirpal 
Singh has previously argued that Ranjit Singh de-linked religion from politics, by 
stopping the agency of Gurmatla.6 According to Bhagat Singh, he was very considerate 
in dealing with the Muslim chiefs.7 Fauja Singh in his work on state and society argues 
that, “Akbar who was the most liberal of the Mughal emperors and who thought so much 
of expedient considerations did not go as far as Ranjit Singh did. Whereas Ranjit Singh 
gave highest positions, such as Prime Ministership and Foreign Ministership to members 
of other communities, Akbar did not go beyond associating one or two non-Muslim 
ministers with his court which thus predominantly remained Muslim in character and 
composition”.8 N C Baneijee argues that Ranjit Singh built a state which was not part of 
the Khalsa, nor was it a Hindu state. It was a state based on the political loyalty, the
4 Harmohinder Singh, Secular Sovereign (Patiala: Punjabi University, 2001) 23.
5 Maharaja Ranjit Singh Commemorative Volume on Bicentenary o f  his Coronation (1801-2001). Eds. 
Prithipal Singh Kapur and Dharam Singh, (Patiala: Punjabi University, 2001) xiii-xvi.
6 Kirpal Singh, The Historical Study o f  Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s Time (Delhi: National Book Shop, 1994) 
58.
7 Bhagat Singh, Maharaja Ranjit Singh and His Times (Delhi: Sehgal Publishers, 1990) 289.
8 Fauja Singh, Some Aspects o f  State and Society under Ranjit Singh (New Delhi: Master Publishers, 1982) 
77-78.
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goodwill and the cooperation of all classes of his subjects including the Muslims, who a 
generation before his birth, had committed the most horrible barbarities upon the Sikh 
population and had repeatedly desecrated the holy shrines of the Sikhs.9 Contemporary 
European observers and historians have agreed. For example, Thornton serving in the 
Panjab in the 1840s argues that some leading Muslims had reconciled themselves to the 
sway of Ranjit Singh, a Sikh, and he points to several creditable features of the policy 
that the Maharaja followed.10 Jacquemont writes that during Ranjit Singh’s time, “the 
fanaticism of the Sikhs had become extinct and all were equal in the good grace of the 
Sikh monarch”.11
However, all the above mentioned mainly eulogistic works and many others do not deal 
with the aspect of state formation by Ranjit Singh, with regards to the majority Muslim 
population. Rather, most of the scholars have simplified the issue by a stereotypical 
understanding such as in 'Ranjit Singh’s rule religion was de-linked from politics; his 
dealings with the Muslim chiefs were considerate; that he received cooperation from all 
including the Muslims’. The current genre of scholars like M K Gill, Prithipal Singh 
Kapur and Harmohinder Singh, have used terminologies such as ‘secular’ to describe this
9 NC Banerjee, ‘Maharaja Ranjit Singh -  The Man, His Achievements and Ideals’, The Khalsa and the 
Panjab. Studies in Sikh History to the Nineteenth Century. Ed. Himadri Banerjee (Delhi: India History 
Congress, Tullika, 2002) 82.
10 Thomas Henry Thornton, History o f  the Panjab. Vol. II (London: Allen & Co., 1846) 198.
11 Victor Jacquemont, Letters From India: Describing a Journey in the British Dominions o f  India. Tibet, 
Lahore and Cashmere during the years 1828. 1829. 1830. 1831. undertaken by orders o f the French 
Government, Vol. II (London: Edward Churton, 1834) 99-20; Diwan Amarnath, Zafarnamah e Ranjit 
Singh, Ed. Sita Ram Kohli, 18.
142
newly carved state without explaining what they signify by it.12 They have ignored the 
fact that a significant change with regard to Muslims was brought about by him in the 
process of governance and the support extended by the Muslim elites to the young misl 
chief to take over the city of Lahore was more opportunistic than anything else. In this 
chapter these conclusions are contested by examining the trajectory of the process of state 
formation under Ranjit Singh and by showing that in the process under examination,
13major changes occurred where the Muslim ruling elites of Panjab gave way to non 
Muslim elites in the command positions14 and that the social relationships between the 
non Muslim communities and the Muslims were built with the former taking over as the 
dominant partners. It will also be argued that the use of religious polemic against Non 
Muslim domination was unsuccessful due to Ranjit Singh’s use of the interrivalries 
between the various tribes. To do so, this chapter will be divided into four sections 
namely: Establishment of legitimacy over the Centre- Lahore; case studies of Multan,
12 The word ‘Secular’ is often associated with his state. The term secular is frequently linked with the 
concept where the state and religion are separate and work in different areas o f  human activity. That it is 
not the function o f the state to propagate or profess a religious ideology, similarly political power is outside 
the scope o f  the religion’s legitimate objective. It seems that the effort by scholars to link the term ‘Secular’ 
with the state o f Ranjit Singh is erroneous for two reasons. Firstly, none o f  the scholars define what they 
have meant by the term secular and its relevance in Ranjit Singh’s context. Secondly, the scholars 
misinterpret the policies adopted by Ranjit Singh towards his majority Muslim subjects in particular as 
‘secular’. As argued in the fifth chapter the policies were undeniably formulated keeping in mind the 
Muslim majority. However, the fact not to be ignored is that these policies only came into practice after 
establishing firmly, the political superiority o f  Ranjit Singh.
13 Gaetano Mosca, as cited by James Miesel, describes ruling minority as all authority is being 
exercised in the name o f the entire people, or o f an aristocracy, or o f a single sovereign...but besides that 
fact we find unfailingly another; the political elite or rather, those who hold and exercise the public power, 
will always be a minority, and below them we find a numerous class o f  persons who do never, in any real 
sense, participate in government but merely submit to it, these may be called the ruled.”, James Hans 
Meisel, The Myth o f the Ruling Class (Michigan: The University o f Michigan Press, 1958) 32-33. Also 
see: John Scott, Stratification and Power: Structures o f  Class, Status and Command. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2004) 132.
14 ‘Command situations’ in hierarchies o f authority are independent determinants o f life chances, and the 
social strata (such as 'elites’) arise from these command situations. For more discussion on ‘Command 
Situation’, Please refer Introduction 38-43.
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Kashmir and Peshawar;15 religious uprising under Syed Ahmad; and tackling of Muslim 
Tribal Elites.
4.1 Establishing Legitimacy over Lahore
This section will demonstrate that Ranjit Singh established his legitimate rule over the 
city of Lahore with the help of Muslim elites, who supported him because there was no 
other Muslim ruler who could take control of the administration of Lahore at that 
juncture. The process of take over of the city will be examined, and the reasons why 
elites, both Muslims and Non Muslims acknowledged his authority will be looked into.
4.1.1 — Struggle fo r  control over Lahore
The evidence available from all the primary sources indicates three dominant forces 
which were trying to take control of Lahore in the late eighteenth century, namely the 
Afghans under the leadership of Shah Zaman, the Bhangi M isl16 under the combined 
leadership of Sahib Singh, Chait Singh and Mohar Singh, and Ranjit Singh of the
13 Ranjit Singh had divided his state into four provinces 1. Suba e Lahore, 2. Suba e Multan 3. Suba e 
Kashmir, 4. Suba e Peshawar.
16 Bhangi Misl was one o f  the twelve misls or Eighteenth century Principalities. The founder o f the misl 
was Chhajja Singh o f  Panjwar village, near Amritsar, who had converted to Sikhism. He was succeeded by 
Bhuma Singh, a Dhillon jatt o f the village o f  Hung, near Badhni in the present day Moga district. His 
successor Hari Singh was acknowledged the leader o f the Dal Khalsa at its formation in 1748. Under his 
leadership, Bhangi misl’s power increased manyfold and he created an army o f  20,000 youth. The Bhangi 
misl actively participated in the skirmishes with Ahmad Shah Durrani. In 1763, the Bhangi misl sacked the 
Afghan stronghold o f  Kasur. In 1764, Bhangi Misl ravaged Bahawalpur and Multan. Hari Singh was 
succeeded by Jhanda Singh, who further expanded the control o f the Bhangi Misl and took control o f  
Jhang, Kala Bagh and Mankera. He led the Misl to victory and got the famous Zamzama gun from the 
Chathas o f Rasulnagar. Bhangi Misls had become so powerful by the end o f the Eighteenth century that 
they invaded the Lahore city. They were such domineering rulers that the Muhammedan Chaudaris along 
with the Khatris o f  Lahore invited Ranjit Singh to take over the city o f Lahore in 1799. Please refer: 
Encyclopaedia o f Sikhism, ed. Harbans Singh, Vol. 3 (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1997) 99-102.
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Sukarchakia misl. The most significant challenge for these Sikh chiefs seems to have 
been the Afghan ruler Shah Zaman and rightly so for two reasons: his Muslim identity 
and an Afghan background, which could have enabled him to rally troops in the Muslim- 
Afghan elites controlled region of the Panjab. The Sikh chiefs of the Bhangi Misl had 
penetrated Lahore but had not established themselves strongly enough, to defend the city 
from Shah Zaman’s attack which happened on the 1st January 1797. The Afghan ruler’s 
intentions to curb the Sikhs led his forces to march as far into Panjab as the city of 
Amritsar, where the joint army of different Sikh misls forced him to retreat to the Lahore 
fort.17 During his stay in Lahore, Shah Zaman oppressed the people of the city and it 
resulted in a large number of casualties.18 The defeat of the Afghans, as evidence 
suggests, led to the increase in diplomatic activities. The Prime Minister of the Afghan 
ruler, Wafadar Khan, was forced to send his emissary, Neki Singh to Amritsar on 22nd 
December 1798 to negotiate peace with the Sikh misl chiefs.19 This Afghan initiative was 
reciprocated by two Sikh chiefs: Ranjit Singh of the Sukarchakia misl and Sahib Singh of 
the Bhangi misl, by sending vakils to Lahore along with Neki Singh. In a confidential 
meeting with the Afghan agent, Ranjit Singh offered to pay rupees one hundred thousand 
as nazrana to the Shah if Lahore was given in his charge.20 This seems to be the first
17 According to Hari Rani Gupta, Shah Zaman had to withdraw to Peshawar on February 25lh, 1797. Please 
refer: Hari Ram Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. V: The Sikh lion o f Lahore (Maharaja Ranjit Singh, 
1799-18391 (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. 1991) 15.
18 Suri, Vol. 11, Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002, 30.
19 Badhera, the author o f this work, served under the Lahore court as a Qammgo (revenue official) o f  
Gujrat. It was completed in 1855 AD. Ganesh Das Badhera, Charbagh e Panjab, (Amritsar: Khalsa College, 
1965) 140.
20 Ghulam Muhayy-ud-din Bute Shah, Tarikh e Panjab, MS, (1848), Vol. V (Amritsar: Ganda Singh 
Collection, Khalsa College) 22-23; Imperial Records, ‘Political Proceedings’, 25th January, 1799 No. 27; 
HR Gupta, History o f the Sikhs, Vol. V, p 17.
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sign of Ranjit Singh’s political ambitions towards the idea of a take-over of the city of 
Lahore with the help of the Afghans. However, this political understanding could not 
bear fruit as during the same time, at the instance of the Afghan ruler, Nizamuddin of 
Kasur,21 a force had to be sent to deal with and dispose the Nakai misl.22 The misl forces 
were camping near Kasur and were thought to be a threat. To make matters worse, 
unshorn hair of two Sikh chiefs were cut, which enraged Ranjit Singh and he attacked the 
Durrani forces with 1000 horsemen. It seems that political interests were taken over by 
religious concerns. The Bhangi chiefs followed in support of Ranjit Singh. The cutting of 
unshorn hair was taken by the Sikh misl chiefs as a challenge to their religious identity, 
which triggered in them an altogether different response, from those of negotiators to 
those of adversaries, leading to the aforementioned offensive on Lahore. Upon reaching 
the city wall of Lahore, Ranjit Singh challenged Shah Zaman, who was at the Mussaman 
Buij in Lahore fort, to fight.2j This symbology of unshorn hair demonstrates that the 
religious sentiments and identity played a critical role in the politics of those times. More 
so, religion acted as a bonding factor for the political leaders of those times. Further, it 
could be suggested that this religious identity, would be an important aspect of those 
elites in power during the Sikh rule. Thus, it can be suggested there would be a 
qualitative shift in hegemony from Muslim to the Sikhs.
21 Kasur owed allegiance to the Kabul government.
22 Ranjit Singh was married to Datar Kaur o f Nakai misl. Please see; Kapur, ‘Raj Kaur- Sada Kaur’, 
Maharaja Ranjit Singh Commemorative Volume on Bicentenary o f his coronation-1801-2001). Eds. Kapur 
and Dharam Singh, 16
23 Suri, Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 34.
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Contemporary Persian sources written by authors commissioned by the British such as 
Mofti Aliuddin and British sources in English, such as the account compiled by Henry T 
Prinsep, suggest that another opportunity emerged for Ranjit Singh to have a political 
understanding with the Afghan ruler, Shah Zaman, when he had to retreat to Herat later 
in the year 1797 to curb a rebellion. Ranjit Singh intended to get legitimacy from the 
Afghan ruler and to position himself above the other Sikh chiefs and in the eyes of the 
Muslim elites of the region. While crossing the river Jhelum, the Afghan lost his guns in 
the flooded river and reached Peshawar without any. From there he sent a letter under his 
own signature (Dastakhat e Khas) to the Sikh misl chief, Ranjit Singh, asking him to 
retrieve the guns from the river and send them to Peshawar. In reward for which, he 
would be given the subedctri of the province of Lahore.24 The Sikh chief accomplished
• 2.5this task and as promised the Afghan ruler sent a khillat in recognition of his service, 
with a farman (order) permitting him to take over Lahore.26
24 Mofti Aliuddin, Ebratnameh. Ed. Mohammed Baqir. (Lahore: The Punjabi Adabi Academy, 1961) 398; 
Henry Thoby Prinsep, Origin o f  the Sikh Power in the Punjab and Political Life o f Muha-raia Runieet 
Singh with an account o f the present condition, religion, laws and customs o f the Sikhs. (Patiala: 
Languages Department, 1970) 41.
25 Aliuddin 398. The narrative o f Kanhaya Lai agrees with most o f what Aliuddin had to say but according 
to Kanhaya Lai, Shah Zaman lost 10 guns in the river Chenab and not Jhelum. Out o f  the ten, Ranjit Singh 
was sent eight and kept the other two with him self. Kanhaya Lai, Tarikh e Panjab, Trans. Jit Singh Seetal. 
(Patiala: Punjabi University, 1987) 128.
20 This fact was corroborated by John Collins, the British resident at the court o f Daulat Rao Sindhia (1795- 
1803). From Fatehgarh on the river Ganga, he informed the Governor General: “Zaman Shah is 
endeavouring to attach to his interests Ranjit Singh, the usurper o f Lahore, who has lately received a rich 
khillat from the Durrani Prince”. On 11 May, 1800, he again wrote: “Ever since Ranjit Singh obtained the 
khillat from the Shah, he announces himself as the chief o f Lahore on behalf o f  Zaman Shah”. Please refer: 
HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs, Vol. V, 30. Also see, Sicques, Tigers, or Thieves: Eyewitness Accounts o f  
the Sikhs (1606-1809), Eds. Amandeep Singh Madra and Pannjit Singh (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004) 273. However, Umdat ut Tawarikh and Zafamamah e Ranjit Singh are silent about this episode. The 
reason probably could be that the authors o f these accounts were inclined towards Ranjit Singh, and hence 
would have thought it to be unwise to consider recognition from Shah Zaman as important enough to be 
recorded since it could undermine Ranjit Singh’s personality. Shahamat Ali, who was the Persian secretary 
to CM Wade mission to Peshawar, mentions in his account about the guns and that it was the river Jhelum
147
The mention of these facts only in certain sources, seems to indicate that the specially 
commissioned authors of the later narratives, such as Mofti Aliuddin, the author of 
Ebratnameh or the authors under the influence or working for the British, were keen to 
explore the reasons in the regional political context that enabled Ranjit Singh to get the 
right to take over Lahore from the Afghans.
However, on close examination of the available evidence one can suggest that the fact 
that the guns were lost and retrieved could not have been the only reason for Shah Zaman 
to accept Ranjit Singh as the subedar of Lahore. Also, in conjunction to the above- 
mentioned fact, there is no evidence available which implies that Ranjit Singh sent a 
hundred thousand rupees to the Durrani court as nazrana as suggested by him to Neki 
Singh, the emissary of Shah Zaman. But what needs to be noticed is the promptness with 
which Ranjit Singh retrieved and returned those guns. This seems to indicate that Ranjit 
Singh was intent on positioning himself in the eyes of the Afghans and the Muslim 
society at large in a context where he was to be seen as a partner and not an adversary, 
especially while taking over Lahore.27
from which the guns were retrieved, Please see: Shahamat Ali, The Sikhs and the Afghans (Patiala: 
Language Department, 1970) 108-109; N K Sinha argued that “each wanted to make use o f the other to 
serve his own interest and the submissive attitude o f the one and the conciliatory attitude o f  the other must 
be regarded as mere diplomatic camouflage to hide the real objectives for which they were striving” 
Narendra Krishna Sinha, Rani it Singh (Calcutta; A Mukherjee & Co. Ltd., 1960) 11.
27 Prinsep, in his account, writes, “Armed with this authority as an influence over the Muhammedan 
population o f the town, and ... .” Prinsep 41.
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The evidence from Persian sources such as the chronicle Umdat ut Tawarikh and 
Ebratnameh suggests that both the political and the social situation with regards to the 
Muslims at large and to the Muslim elites of Lahore in particular were favourable for 
Ranjit Singh. For instance, Umdat ut Tawarikh claims, Shah Zaman”s departure led to the 
return of the three Bhangi chiefs and their oppression of the people of Lahore. The 
atrocities incurred by them led to the poor citizens asking for help from the Sikh misl 
chief.28 Also, the Lahore elites, Mohammed Ashaq, Mohammed Sabri and Mahar 
Molikam ud din opposed Mangal Singh, the lieutenant of the Bhangi chief Naib Singh. 
They sent their agent Hakim Rai to Ranjit Singh with an assurance that on his arrival in 
Lahore, he would receive support from them.29 Mofti Aliuddin provides noteworthy 
evidence that adds a new dimension worth mentioning. Before the take over of Lahore,
■’j n
the Bhangi chiefs arrested prominent members of an important community, the Arains. 
The city elites invited the Afghan Nawab of Kasur, Nizamuddin, to take over Lahore. He, 
however, expressed his inability to do so. Hence, the only choice left with the Muslim 
majority elites of Lahore was to support Ranjit Singh as their next ruler.
28 Suri, Vol. II, GNDU, Amritsar, 2002 34-35.
29 Suri, Vol. II, 35-36; Also see: Lai 128. It is possible that ‘Hakim Rai’ is the same Lala Hakam Rai, the 
chief physician o f Lahore in Lepel Griffin, The Panjab Chiefs: historical and biographical notices o f  the 
principal families in the Lahore and Rawalpindi divisions o f the Paniab. Ed. Charles Francis Massy, Vol II. 
(Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1890) 235; Amarnath only briefly mentions Mehr 
Muhakummuddin’s help in enabling Ranjit Singh to enter Lahore in his account. Kanhaya Lai states that 
the citizens o f  Lahore, Hakam Rai, Mohammed Ashiq, Mohammed Bakar, Mohammed Tahir, Mufti 
Mohammed Mukarram and some other elites o f  the city wrote a letter, inviting Ranjit Singh to Lahore. 
Please see: Diwan Amarnath, Zafarnamah e Ranjit Singh. Ed. Sita Ram Kohli (Lahore: University o f the 
Panjab, 1928) 8-9.
30 Arains were only next to the Jats in, and lie thickest near, Lahore. They are landed class settled mostly 
along either o f the banks o f  the river Ravi at the upper half o f its course through the district, and hold great 
influence in the region. There are very few Hindu and Sikh Arains. Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f  the 
Lahore District (1893-941. 105.
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Ebralnameh gives an insight into the planning done by Ranjit: Singh before taking over. 
The planning indicates that Ranjit Singh wanted to confirm support from the Muslim 
elites before he attacked Lahore. For instance, he deputed Qazi Abdur Rahman of 
Rasulnagar to go to Lahore and meet secretly the notable men of the city, such as Mian 
Mohammed Ashiq, Mian Jan Mohammed of Laverian, Mehar Mohkamuddin of 
Nawankot, Abid Khan Attariwala, Mohammed Azim and Hafiz Mohammed of 
Bagbanpura, Mehar Shadi Katarband and Ahmad Khan Bhinder of Lahore. After getting 
assured of support from these men, the Qazi returned to Ranjit Singh.31 During the take 
over, evidence suggests active participation of the Muslim zamindars in enabling Ranjit 
Singh to occupy the city. For instance, Ranjit Singh stopped at Shah Bilawafs tomb, then 
at the Wazir Khan Bagh and the Anarkali tomb, where the Muslim zamindars of the 
region under the leadership of Mehr Muhakkumuddin came forward to accept Ranjit 
Singh as their leader and insisted that he sit on the former Mughal and Afghan throne of 
Lahore the very next dayf2
According to the Persian contemporary sources, it seems that the Sikh and Hindu groups 
supported Ranjit Singh during the take over of Lahore. For instance, Ranjit Singh went to 
Majithia near Batala to discuss the plans with Sada Kaur, his mother-in-law, who also 
happened to be the leader of the Kanhaya Misl. He also met important Hindu and Khalsa
31 Aliuddin 397-398; AUuddin has tried to look into this event with regards to the main actors involved. He 
is the only author who mentions in detail about the secret planning carried out by Ranjit Singh along with 
the citizens o f Lahore before attempting to take over. Also refer: Syad Mohammed Latif, History o f the 
Paniab: from the remotest antiquity to the present time. (Calcutta: Calcutta Central Press company, 1891) 
349-350; and Prinsep 41.
32 Suri, Vol. II, GNDU, Amritsar, 2002, 35-36.
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leaders such as Diwan Dhanpat Rae, Jaimal Singh, Nidhan Singh and Surjan Singh. At 
the time of the attack, Ranjit Singh had a 25,000 strong army composed of Non Muslim 
men predominantly of the Kanhaya and his own Sukarchakia misl. Some of the Bhangi 
loyalists, like Sewa Singh, betrayed their misl, and opened the city gates for Ranjit 
Singh to enter who then positioned his army in the Shalh mosque, and later at the Wazir 
Khan mosque, possibly with the support from the Muslim religious leadership. Bhangi 
chiefs left the city, leading to the looting of Lahore citizens by the victorious troops. 
Later, by means of the beating of the drum, it was declared by Ranjit Singh that complete 
order had been established.34 The fort was taken over on 3 rd Safar 1214 hijri that is, 7th 
July 1799.35
It seems that the primary reasons for inviting Ranjit Singh to Lahore, by the elites of the 
city, was firstly the misrule and atrocities incurred on Lahore citizens by the Bhangi 
chiefs, secondly the weakness of the Kasur nawab’s military strength, thirdly the 
legitimacy derived from the Afghan ruler Shah Zaman, and lastly a quest for long-term 
peace. It seems that the support to the Arain community, the second important agrarian 
community in Lahore region, also could have encouraged support in Ranjit Singh’s
33 Suri, Vol. II GNDU, Amritsar, 2002, 36; According to Tarikh e Paniab. it was Melir Muhakkumuddin 
who was in charge o f  the gate at that time, see: Lai 130.
34 Suri, Vol. II GNDU, Amritsar, 2002, 37; Lai 13.
35 Suri, Vol. II GNDU, Amritsar, 2002, 37; There is a different version provided by Mofti Aliuddin in the 
Ebratnameh. According to the author, Ranjit Singh went to Majithia, where Mohammed Azim Baghban 
joined him to guide him to Lahore. The city was besieged, which threatened the nobility o f the city. The 
nobility agreed to open the city gates for Ranjit Singh’s forces to take over the fort. However, the author 
does not reveal much about the background o f Mohammed Azim Baghban. Perhaps, he could have been 
one o f  the Lahore elites who would have been sent to receive Ranjit Singh. Please see: Aliuddin 399-401.
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favour. Ranjit Singh and his supporters were the landed class and the Arains were 
important landlords in the former Mughal suba of Lahore. This perhaps could be 
considered as a Jat-Arain alliance. Also, the support to an important section of the 
Muslim society within the broader Muslim population served to carve a niche in Ranjit 
Singh’s favour among the Muslim populace of Lahore. It appears that the will and 
participation of the Muslim elites were crucial in the take over of Lahore. Evidence also 
suggests that the Muslim elites accepted the new leadership at their command position. 
However, comments by various authors on the situation show a bias in their interpretation 
towards their own religious affiliations. For instance, the works by the authors Sohan Lai 
Suri and Amarnath do not present the role of the Muslims appropriately, thereby, 
undermining their contribution. On the other hand, Aliuddin mentions the crucial role of 
Mehar Muhakkumuddin, the gatekeeper,36 and also indicates that a Muslim, Mohammed 
Azim Baghban met Ranjit Singh in Majithia and was with him until he entered Lahore. It 
seems there were two different perspectives among the authors of those times, one trying 
to emphasize the role of Muslims and the other trying to bypass it.
4 .1 .2 -  Evading aggression towards Muslim Principalities
When one considers the expeditions carried out by Ranjit Singh after the take over of 
Lahore, one can argue that for nearly two years he did not intend to show aggression 
towards any Muslim principality. However, he tried to establish his hegemony over the 
non Muslim principalities during the time. This probably helped him to create an image
36 According to Sohan Lai Suri, the name o f the gate keeper is Sewa Singh, who, as the name suggests, was 
not a Muslim. Suri Voi II, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002), 36
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of a ruler who was not against Muslims. For instance, he avoided attacking Kasur nawabs 
even though the first opposition against Ranjit Singh soon after his taking over Lahore 
came jointly from the Nawab of Kasur, Nizamuddin, Gulab Singh of the Bhangi misl and 
Jassa Singh of the Ramgarhia misl at the village of Bhasin near Lahore/7 It appears from 
the sources that Sahib Singh Bedi, the direct descendent of the first Sikh master, Guru 
Nanak, supported Ranjit Singh and so did Kesar Singh Sodhi, the direct descendent of the 
last Sikh master, Guru Gobind. They exercised great symbolic power among the Sikhs 
and the Hindus alike. There are instances provided by contemporary accounts, which 
indicate this. During Ranjit Singh’s campaign against Ramnagar, Sahib Singh Gujratia at 
Wadale challenged him. But when Sahib Singh Bedi intervened as a mediator, Ranjit 
Singh, Dal Singh and Sahib Singh Gujratia took off their swords and kept them in front 
of him. After an hour, Sahib Singh Bedi picked the sword of Ranjit Singh and tied it 
around his waist and said that soon all the opposition will end and that Ranjit Singh will 
establish his rule over the region/8
In another instance, during the second expedition, Ranjit Singh with the help of Diwan 
Mohkam Chand arrested Dal Singh, the Sikh ruler of Akalgarh at Ramnagar. From there, 
he attacked Akalgarh only to discover that Dal Singh’s wife had taken a hostile position 
against him. Jodh Singh Wazirabadi, an important Sikh ruler and a supporter of Dal 
Singh, aligned with Sahib Singh Gujratia who was in Gujrat at the time against the new
37 Aliuddin 403; Also see: Suri, Vol. II, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 38.
38 Suri, Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 40.
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ruler of Lahore. Ranjit Singh immediately withdrew to Ramnagar, a town close to 
Wazirabad, to face the joint armies of Jodh Singh and Sahib Singh. However, due to the 
intervention of Sada K.aurj9 and Kesar Singh Sodhi, the descendent of Guru Gobind, the 
armed conflict was avoided. Within a short while Dal Singh died and Ranjit Singh under 
the pretext of offering condolences to the deceased widow took over the fort of Akalgarh. 
He gave two villages to the widow of Dal Singh for her subsistence.40 It thus seems the 
support by important religious leaders of those times had a significant role in helping him 
establish his legitimacy as a leader amongst the warring factions of the Sikhs.
As indicated by the contemporary sources, Ranjit Singh continued expanding towards the 
non Muslim principalities such as the Hindu kingdom of Jammu.41 As stated by 
Amarnath, on the way to Jammu, Mirowal and Narowal were won, and eight thousand 
rupees were collected from their chiefs. The Charal fort was besieged and mass killings 
were ordered for those inside the fort. In the events that followed, the Jammu king came 
to pay his respects to Ranjit Singh with an elephant and twenty thousand rupees. Ranjit 
Singh gave him a robe of honour and the subedari of Lahore.42 It appears that his march 
to Mirowal, Narowal and Charal, to receive nazranas from them, were conscious steps 
towards establishing his hegemony and legitimacy as a ruler of Lahore. He was able to 
inculcate the fear of death among the people of Charal, thus setting an example of his
39 Sada Kaur was the mother-in-law o f Ranjit Singh.
40 Suri, Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002).
41 According to HR Gupta, there were 27 small Hindu states; HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. V 22.
42 Amarnath, 16; According to Latif, it was the Jassarwal fort in which mass killings were ordered; Latif 
352.
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authority by force. This appears to be a measure to establish a political hierarchy, which 
would make the superiority of the ruling elite under Ranjit Singh beyond question. Also, 
the British recognized this new rising power of Lahore then, which is illustrated by the 
fact that they sent their vakil, Munshi Yusuf Ali with gifts 43 This shows that the 
hegemonic shift from the Muslims to the Sikhs, under Ranjit Singh was noticed and 
acknowledged by the powerfiil and organised power of the British in India at that time.
The contemporary evidence from Amarnath’s and Sohan Lai Suri’s works suggests that 
these victories over the Sikh and Hindu independent territories were not only used 
towards celebrations on a grand scale but also to establish legitimacy over the seat of 
Lahore by the Sikh chief. For instance, it was decided that a big gathering was to be held 
where Ranjit Singh would take the title of ‘Maharaja’. The gathering took place on 12th 
April, 1801, in which all the notable persons including mukaddams, nambardars, 
chaudharis (Government officials), came from far and near to congratulate him. In this 
gathering, Ranjit Singh declared that from then onwards he should be addressed as 
‘Sarkar’.44 Waheeduddin writes in his account based on his family archival material that 
Baba Sahib Singh Bedi daubed Ranjit Singh with saffron paste and proclaimed him the 
Maharaja of Panjab.43 Ranjit Singh asked the poets present during that occasion, to come 
up with a couplet in Persian language having the names of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind
43 Suri, Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 45.
44 Amarnath 16
4:5 Fakir Waheeduddin, who is a direct descendant o f  the Fakir family, used his family archives to research 
the book entitled: The Real Ranjit Singh. It is a well written book in a narrative style, which has used the 
primary sources available to the author from his family archives. Fakir Syed Waheeduudin, The Real Rani it 
Singh. (Patiala: Panjabi University, 1981) 56.
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Singh, which could be on the coins of the state. Finally, the the following couplet was 
selected;
Degh o teghfateh misrat bedrang 
Yaft az Nanak Gum Go bind Singh
H ospitality, sword, victory and conquest
46U nfailing  have been received from  Guru Nanak, Guru Gobind Singh
This was the same couplet that could be seen 011 the hukamnamas issued by Banda Singh 
Bahadur, a Sikh leader in 1710, and not for the first time on Ranjit Singh’s coin, as 
Amarnath suggests.47 The Lahore mint was asked to make coins with this couplet on 
them. One hundred thousand rupees were granted to Moti Ram for the repair of the city 
wall and the moat. The fort was repaired and put in a state of defence. It seems that with 
the independent charge of the Lahore government and the title of sarkar, Ranjit Singh 
tried legitimizing his right to demand the revenue from the Muslim chiefs of the ill- 
defined borders of Panjab, which had paid tribute to the Lahore durbar earlier. The events 
were also symbolic of the paradigm shift from Muslim to Sikh hegemony in the state 
formation process in Panjab. As has been shown by Richard Eaton, the Sufis, such as the 
Chistis, played an important role in the proclamation act of a Muslim ruler becoming a 
king. However, the daubing of Ranjit Singh by Sahib Singh Bedi, with saffron paste in 
the act of proclamation of him as the Maharaja, and doing away totally with any 
validating ceremony from the Sufis, seems to be a move away from the act of Mughal
46 Mohinder Singh and Rishi Singh, Maharaja Ranjit Singh (Delhi: UBS Publishers, 2001) 45.
47 Ganda Singh, Hukamnamas (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1999) 193.
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proclamation to the throne. Further, it can be suggested from the overwhelming presence 
of the government officials such as the mukaddams, nambardars and chaudharis, and the 
absence of representatives from the Sufi order, that Ranjit Singh’s intentions were to 
engage the Mughal machinery of state, but totally replace the religious context under 
which the new state would function.
Many decisions were taken concerning the Muslim populace which led to the emergence 
of a partnership between the Muslims and their new rulers. Amarnath has described 
instances, in his contemporary account, which suggests the involvement of the Muslim 
elites. In Ranjit Singh’s durbar, many Muslims were given important portfolios: Qazi 
Nizamuddin was invested with full authority regarding marriage, divorce and matters 
regarding using the royal seal on court papers. The civil cases like mortgages, contracts, 
sales etc were entrusted to Mufti Mohammed Shah’s son, Sadullah Chisti, whereas the 
post of Kohval (Inspector) was given to Imam Baksh Kharsowar. This recognized the 
rights and welfare of individuals and the society generally. Former neighbourhood 
headmen were reappointed in various neighbourhoods or mohallas, thus reintroducing 
neighbourhood system or mohalladari system. According to this system, each locality 
was handed over to an elder of the area. New soldiers were placed on the city gates to 
report any untoward incident. Khalifa Nur ud din, the younger brother of Fakir 
Azizuddin, was nominated as the public physician. During this time, a son was born to 
Ranjit Singh. The occasion was celebrated by distributing expensive doshalas and golden 
karas to every soldier and Karam Singh, his in-charge of affairs, was ordered to make all
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the Brahmins, Hindus and Musalmans contented.48 Qazi Nizamuddin was asked to 
conduct the affairs in the same manner as done during the times of the Mughais. There is 
no evidence available to explain why Muslims such as Qazi Nizamuddin, Sadullah Chisti 
and Imam Kharsowar were given positions rather than those who helped Ranjit Singh 
into Lahore, such as Mian Mohammed Ashiq, Mian Jan Mohammed, Mehr 
Muhakkumuddin, Abid Khan Attariwala, Mohammed Azim and Hafiz Mohammed, but it 
still demonstrates that Ranjit Singh felt it significant to give positions of importance in 
his government to the Muslims.
The fact that the event has no mention in the two accounts of Sohan Lai Suri and Mofti 
Aliuddin creates a doubt about the scale of the event held at the Durbar. Also, evidence 
suggests the absence of reputable men of the region at the event. Perhaps those associated 
with the court could have influenced Amarnath’s account, due to the author’s access to 
the courtiers, and led him to believe about the grand scale of the durbar. This event 
appears to be an exercise envisaged by Ranjit Singh to create his ‘own space’ by giving 
himself a new title of ‘Sarkar’, striking a coin and by re-establishing ‘this space’ through 
the legal system, which was an important step towards establishing his hegemony. 
Ownership of private property was given recognition in the society under his rule. These
48 Sohan lal Suri and Mofti Aliuddin do not describe this event, however Kanhaya Lai mentions it with 
lucidity. According to him, the durbar took place one month after the birth o f  Kharak Singh. Many 
mukaddams, chaudharis and nambardars came to congratulate Ranjit Singh who declared that from then 
onwards he should be called ‘sarkar’ and in writing should be addressed as ‘Maharaja Ranjit Singh 
Bahadur’. At that time he ordered that couplets be written in the Persian language containing the mention 
o f Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh. Amongst those written, one would be selected to be put on the 
coin. The above mentioned couplet was selected which was decided to be on the obverse with ‘Ranjit 
Singh’, along with the city in which it had been manufactured, on reverse. It was called the nanakshahi 
rupee. Very next day, hundred rupees were presented to Ranjit Singh, who gave it to the poor. Lal 137,138.
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administrative orders appear to demonstrate a special consideration for justice. The right 
of giving “ultimate justice”49 rested with himself, which also meant a new distribution of 
the powers of command within the state with him on the top. He made it clear that peace 
among citizens was most important; no person should practice highhandedness or 
oppression of the people. It seems that he emphasized the element of ‘ethics’ by 
introducing these measures and thus tied the Lahore society by ethical laws to the 
supreme political power, the monarch. Also, these events set the parameters of freedom 
for an individual and gave him rights and expected him to perform his duties towards his 
state, thus enabling the emergence of the concept of ‘us’ for those within his idea of state 
and ‘others’ who were not.
4.2 Case Studies: Multan, Kashmir and Peshawar
All the primary sources echo the fact that the beginning of the nineteenth century saw the 
disintegration of the Durrani power, along with the treaty of 1809 with the British which 
secured eastern borders, and gave an opportunity to Ranjit Singh to expand and 
consolidate his empire towards south, north and west of Panjab. Creation and the 
strengthening of the peripheral borders of the state were crucial for the security of Lahore 
— the centre. Multan, Kashmir and Peshawar were under the direct rule of the Muslim 
elites representing the Kabul government. While the Afghan Muslim rulers of Kasur and 
Bahawalpur owed allegiance to Kabul, the Panjabi chiefs, such as Sials and Tiwanas,
49 The Justice system is dealt with in Chapter V in detail.
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acted as vassalages for the Kabul government.^0 An important question to ask here 
would be what happened to the Muslim elites after the take over of these regions? It 
seems that the state formation process required the incorporation and subjugation of both 
Afghan and Panjabi Muslim elites. This section will examine this process and argue that 
soon after the take over of these regions Ranjit Singh brought a significant hegemonic 
change from Muslim elites to the non Muslim elites.
4.2.1  —  The Southern border: Multan
The province of Multan consisted of Multan, Leiah, Khangarh, Dera Ghazi Khan and 
Jhang. This section will argue that the process of the take over of Multan was the most 
significant reason for the Muslim elites of Panjab to lose their control and accept the 
hegemony of the non Muslim elites under Ranjit Singh.
4.2.1 fa) Why Attack Multan?
According to Alexander Burnes, Multan was a large town with a population of about 
60,000 of which two-thirds were Muslims and one-third Hindus.51 Why was Multan 
important for Ranjit Singh? This province had been under the control of the Afghans
50 HR Gupta, History o f the Sikhs. Vol. V 23.
31 Alexander Burnes (1805-1841), was a British traveller, explorer and writer who recorded his 
observations o f  Ranjit Singh’s kingdom. Alexander Burnes, Travels into Bokhara containing the Narrative 
o f the Voyage on the Indus from the Sea to Lahore. Vol. 3 (London: John Murray, 1834) 94; The city was 
predominantly Muslim and Non Muslims were only found in bleak numbers in the city. There were 
practically no indigenous Jat and Rajput Hindus and the Hindus were entirely confined to the non- 
agricultural castes, such as the Brahmans, Aroras and the Bhatias. Please refer: E D Maclagan, Punjab 
Government. Gazetteer o f  the Multan District (1901-02). Revised edition. (Lahore: Civil and Military 
Gazette Press, 1902) 115.
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since 1752 after Ahmad Shah Durrani took it over from the Mughal control. Multan was a 
rich state, watered by the rivers Indus, Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej.52 Hence, its allegiance to 
the Afghan throne also made it a rallying point for all the Afghan principalities, and its 
fall would have been a significant gain for Ranjit Singh. The Nawab of Multan, Muzaffar 
Khan,53 had supported most of the Muslim principalities of Panjab to resist Ranjit Singh’s 
expansionist policy, hence, it was expected that he would receive help from other Afghan 
Muslim principalities at his time of need. For instance, in 1805-1806, Ahmad Khan, the 
Sial chief, had fled to take refuge in Multan, and the Nawab of Kasur, Qutubuddin, had 
thought of joining hands with the Muslim rulers of Multan to overthrow Ranjit Singh.54 
Bhagat Singh argues recently that by conquering Multan, Ranjit Singh could drive a 
wedge between the Muslim states of Bahawalpur and Dera Ghazi Khan, as these Muslim 
states could always plan a common cause against the Lahore durbar.55 According to 
Amarnath’s Persian account, Muzaffar Khan, the Muslim governor of Multan, had 
rebellious plans against the Lahore government.2,6 Multan was strategically located, as it 
was situated on the highway leading to Qandhar and was linked with Delhi through 
Bhatinda. It was also a major trading centre between Hindustan and Central A siaf7 
Hence, it appears that it was economically, strategically and preventively crucial for
52 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. V 105-106.
33 For a detailed account on the family o f  the Nawab o f Multan, please refer: ED Maclagan 158-159.
34 HR Gupta, History o f the Paniab. Vol. V 72.
33 Bhagat Singh, Maharaja Ranjit Singh 66.
36 Amarnath 22-23.
37 Bhagat Singh, Maharaja Ranjit Singh 66.
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Ranjit Singh to extend his rule up to Multan, which led his forces to adopt a strategy of 
repeatedly attacking Multan to drain its resources.
4.2.1(b) Fear o f  Muslim Elites
All the primary Persian sources concur that the first conflict between the forces of Lahore 
and Multan was in 1803. However it was not until 1818 that Ranjit Singh finally took 
over Multan, Why did Ranjit Singh take so long to subdue the Nawab of Multan, 
Muzaffar Khan? For instance, even after the Lahore forces entered the Multan city in 
1803, they retreated after taking a nazrana from the Nawab.58 Aliuddin mentions the 
nazrana to be 50,000 rupees and 10 horses.59 Hari Ram Gupta argues that Ranjit Singh's 
policy was not to kill his powerful enemy at one stroke, but to go on striking at him until 
he became just so much weak as to submit voluntarily or to be defeated easily without 
much loss in men, money or material.60 But, on the contrary, the seven expeditions he 
sent to Multan would have consumed all the above-mentioned resources. Also, according 
to important evidence in the form of news from the chamberlain of the Lahore fort, there 
was another reason for the delay in the taking over of Multan. According to Sher 
Mohammed Khan, the representative of Mir Sohrab Khan of Malpur to Ranjit Singh, the 
reason for not being able to conquer the Multan fort was the friendship between some 
loyalists of the Lahore court, Munshi Devi Das, Hakim Azizuddin Khan, Bhai Gurbaksh
38 Suri, Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 55; Also see: Aliuddin Vol. I 407; Bute Shah, 
Vol. V, 30-31.
59 Aliuddin, Vol. I 407.
60 HR Gupta, History o f the Sikhs, Vol. V 106.
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Singh and several other Sardars, with the Nawab of Multan.61 Possibly, this friendship 
would have led the loyalists to advise Ranjit Singh against taking over of Multan city.
It seems that Ranjit Singh adopted a cautious approach and observed the reactions of 
Shuja ul Mulk, ruler of Kabul and the other Afghan Muslim principalities in the Panjab.
69
In the year 1809, Ranjit Singh signed a treaty with the East India Company, " which 
defined the Sutlej as the eastern border, and also in the same year, the turmoil in 
Afghanistan led Shuja ul Mulk to lose his throne.63 Only after the eastern borders were 
secured the Lahore forces attacked Multan again in 1810. It is evident from the sources 
that the intensity of the attack had increased to the extent that the big Zamzama gun was 
also commissioned to be used to batter down the walls of the fort. Siege was laid on the 
Multan fort,64 which led the Nawab to surrender. Lie agreed to pay a huge amount as war 
indemnity and a nazrana worth 1, 80,000 rupees to the Lahore government.65 After this 
assault it took nearly seven years for Ranjit Singh to concentrate again on Multan. 
Meanwhile, as mentioned by Bute Shah, Akali Phula Singh was sent to realise the arrears 
from Multan in 1816.66 In the same year, to build more pressure, Prince Kharak Singh, 
Diwan Bhawani Das, Diwan Moti Ram and Hari Singh Nalwa along with Fakir
61 News dated 24lh December, 1810, Herbert Leonard Offley Garrett and Gulshan Lal Chopra, Events at the 
Court o f  Ranieet Singh. 1810-1817 (Patiala: Language Department, 1970) 16.
62 S inha 71.
63 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs, Vol V 107; According to Tarikh e Shah Shuja, Ranjit Singh offered to 
help Shah Shuja take over Multan during a meeting in Sahiwal, after his dethronement. Shah Shuja, Tarikh 
e Shah Shuia, MS, (Patiala: Punjabi University) 55-56.
64 Aliuddin Vol. 1 421; Suri, Vol. II 99; Bute Shah, Tarikh e Paniab, Vol. V 74.
63 Amarnath 55. According to Aliuddin, the amount was 100,000 rupees, Aliuddin 421.
66 Bute Shah, Vol. V 140.
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Azizuddin, were sent to negotiate with the Nawab of Multan. The Fakir met the Nawab at 
Multan and realised a sum of rupees 1, 30,000 from him. In 1817, Bhawani Das was sent 
to realise the stipulated nazrana, but according to Amarnath’s account, the mission was 
not successful owing to Bhawani Das accepting a bribe offered by the Nawab of 
Multan.67
The last expedition to Multan, which brought about its annexation, was in 1818. Ranjit 
Singh fully realised the danger of the Muslim elites joining hands in the cause of their 
faith. To win over the Muslims, before undertaking this expedition, he released from his 
custody Ahmad Khan, the Sial chief, retaining Inayat Khan, his eldest son as security. 
Also, as stated by Umdat ut Tawarikh, Ranjit Singh personally supervised the expedition 
along with his close relatives.68 For instance, Prince Kharak Singh was made the 
commander of the expedition.69 The charge of maintaining a free flow of food grains and 
war material was entrusted to Prince Kharak Singh’s mother Rani Datar Kaur, popularly
70known as Mai Nakain. Muzaffar Khan offered two hundred thousand rupees as nazrana 
soon after the fortresses of Khangarh and Muzaffargarh which surrounded the city of 
Multan were besieged.71 In addition it seems that Ranjit Singh offered a jagir and a
67 Amarnath 102; Also refer: William Lewis McGregor, History o f the Sikhs. Vol. I 181 and Vol. II 178 
(London: James Madden, 1846).
68 Suri, Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002)218.
69 Aliuddin Vol. 1 447. It was an extensive operation, in which boats were reserved for the transportation o f  
the war material and the provisions over the fords o f Ravi, Chenab and Jhelum rivers; Suri, Vol. II 213- 
214.
70 Suri, Vol. 11213-214.
71 Amarnath 114.
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personal residence to Muzaffar Khan at the fortress of Kot Shujahabad.72 The Nawab 
agreed to Ranjit Singh’s offer73 and sent his vakils Jamiat Rai, Syed Mohsin Shah, 
Gurbaksh Rai and Amin Klian to negotiate the agreement.74 Bhawani Das, Panjab Singh, 
Qutubuddin Klian, the former Nawab of Kasur, and Chaudhary Qadir Baksh represented 
Ranjit Singh.75 The Nawab also requested the fort of Khangarh for his subsistence. 
However, Sohan Lal Suri mentions that some Afghans rebuked the Nawab for thinking of 
an agreement, which led to the Nawab’s refusal to accept the agreement.76 As the 
situation progressed the Nawab used the instrument of Jehad to garner support from the 
Muslims and died fighting in the following attack,77 which resulted in the annexation of 
Multan by the Lahore forces. From the severity with which the hardline wing of Ranjit 
Singh’s army, comprising of Nihangs (armed Sikh order), attacked the fort of Multan, as 
mentioned by Amarnath in his account, the call of Jehad might have had a reactionary 
effect in Ranjit Singh’s army. The Nihangs, under their leader Sadhu Singh, were 
instrumental in making a breach in the wall of the Multan fort which acted as a catalyst
10
towards the downfall of the Multan fort and in its take over by the Sikhs.
72 Aliuddin, Vol. 1 448; Suri, Vol. II 217.
73 Aliuddin, Vol. 1 448.
74 Suri, Vol. II217; Bute Shah, Vol.V 156.
75 Suri, Vol. II 217.
76 Suri, Vol. II 217.
77 Suri, Vol. II 217; Aliuddin, Vol I 448; Amarnath 115; Badhera 308.
78 Amarnath 115; Aliuddin 448; Badhera 308. Also see; Lepel Griffin, Ranjit Singh (Oxford; Clarendon 
Press, 1905) 186.
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4.2.1(c) The Change from Muslim Elites to non Musm elites in Multan
Soon after the fall of the city of Multan, Ranjit Singh deputed six hundred horsemen for 
the safety of the city; and to run the administration of the city, non Muslim ruling elites, 
such as Sardar Dal Singh Naharena, Sardar Jodli Singh Kalsia and Sardar Deva Singh
70Doabia were appointed. Diwan Sukh Dayal, a Hindu, was appointed as the Governor of
80 *Multan. Sarfraz Khan, and his wounded brother Zulfiqar Klian, were brought to Lahore
with their families and were granted a jagir of rupees thirty thousand and a maintenance
o I
allowance. The Afghan influence in Panjab came to an end breaking the ring of Muslim 
states that surrounded the state of Lahore.
4.2.2 — The Northern border: Kashmir
The political control over Afghanistan kept shifting from Shah Zaman to Shah Mahmud 
to Shah Shuja and yet again to Shah Mahmud. In view of these political developments, 
two Afghan brothers Jahandad Khan and Ata Mohammed Khan who controlled Attock 
and Kashmir respectively for the Kabul government declared themselves independent of 
Kabul. Also, the ruler Shah Shuja after losing power in Kabul escaped along with the 
Begums of Shah Shuja and took refuge at Lahore.82 In addition, Shah Mahmud, soon 
after taking over Kabul decided to take over Kashmir with his Prime Minister Wazir
79 Amarnath 116; Also refer: Suri, Vol. II 221.
80 Amarnath 117; Suri, Vol. II 221.
81 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. V 112.
82 Suri, Vol. 11 119-20, 130; Bute Shah, Vol. V 85.
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Fateh Khan. It can be argued that these turn of political events tilted the swing in favour 
of the Lahore government as the new Afghan Muslim rulers began looking towards 
Ranjit Singh as a power to align with.
4.2.2(a) Conformity o f  an Alliance
The question that arises is: Why did this alliance between the Afghan ruler and Ranjit 
Singh take place and how did it effect the political situation in the region? The evidence 
from Sohan Lal Suri and Amarnath mentions that the Afghan Prime Minister sent Godar 
Mai, a reliable vakil of the Afghans to the Lahore court in 1811. As a result of Godar 
Mai’s visit, a meeting between Ranjit Singh and Fateh Khan took place in 1812 at Rohtas 
where the two rulers agreed for a joint action towards Kashmir.83 One of the reasons in 
favour of the Afghan ruler seems to be the fact that the Lahore government controlled the 
nobility of Jammu, Jhelum and Gujrat and it was through these territories that the 
approach to Kashmir laid. Similarly, Fauja Singh argues that Ranjit Singh joined in the 
expedition to Kashmir to get acquainted with the topography. He also argues that the 
course of events was so rapid that Ranjit Singh could not get enough time to enter into an
OA
alliance with the governor of Kashmir. Bhagat Singh disagrees with Fauja Singh and 
argues that this explanation was not tenable simply because Wazir Fateh Khan had 
approached Ranjit Singh in the December of 1811 proposing a collaborative attack. And
83 Sohan Lal, Vol II, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002)111-112; Amarnath 71; Aliuddin, Vol. I 
431.
84 Fauja Singh 298.
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no meeting took place until 1812 between Fateh Khan and Ranjit Singh. Hence according
oc
to Bhagat Singh, the question remains unanswered.
It seems that the reason in favour for the alliance for Ranjit Singh was his interest in 
receiving cooperation from the Afghan during his conquests of Multan. For instance, he 
accepted to cooperate with an army of twelve thousand on the condition that a
detachment of Afghan soldiers will be given to him at the time of his attack on Multan,
• * $6 and also that there will be a share in the booty and a portion of the territory of Kashmir.
In another development, Wafa Begum, wife of Shah Shuja, approached Ranjit Singh
through Faqir Azizuddin and Diwan Bhawani Das, suggesting that if the Maharaja
arranged the freedom of her husband from Ata Mohammed’s prison in the fort of Kot
87 88Maran, and restored him to her, she would offer the Koh i No or diamond to him. 
Ranjit Singh accepted the offer and asked General Mohkam Chand, who was in 
command of the expedition to Kashmir, to bring Shah Shuja to Lahore, which was 
accomplished successfully.89 According to Amarnath, Ranjit Singh depicted his eagerness 
in sending reinforcements to accomplish this task.90
83 Bhagat Singh, Maharaja Ranjit Singh 79.
86 Garrett and Chopra, 18 April 1813, 61-62; Suri, Vol. II 181.
87 Aliuddin, Vol. I 432; Badhera 154; Suri, Vol. II 137; Amarnath, 71; Bute Shah, Vol. V 85.
88 Suri, Vol. II 137.
89 Amarnath 71; Aliuddin, Vol. I 432.
90 Amarnath 71.
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As mentioned earlier, many Afghan principalities in Panjab had their allegiance with the 
Kabul government, unlike Kashmir, which itself was a vassal turned independent state, of 
the Kabul kingdom. It seems that an alliance with Kabul, along with a clause of receiving 
help during the attack by Lahore forces on Multan, would have encouraged a divide 
among these Muslim principalities; furthermore it would have discouraged polarisation 
among Muslims over religion. Also the alliance allowed Ranjit Singh a chance to possess 
the Koh i Noor diamond,91 as the possession of the diamond offered a unique symbolic 
standing, which no other ruler of the subcontinent could have had.
4.2.2(b) Atlock fort: Increase in the Non Muslim Control
This section will examine the reasons for Ranjit Singh’s taking over of the Attock fort 
and its political repercussions in Panjab. Attock Fort was strategically situated on the 
banks of the river Indus and was under the control of Jahandad Khan, brother of Ata 
Mohammed Khan of Kashmir. Bute Shah, in his account, mentions that after Kashmir fell 
to Wazir Fateh Khan, Jahandad Khan offered to surrender the Attock fort to Ranjit Singh 
on the condition of receiving a subsistence allowance.92 In lieu of the offer, Ranjit Singh 
quickly offered the pargana of Wazirabad as a jagir for Jahandad Khan93 and sent an 
army under the command of Faqir Azizuddin, Sardar Mit Singh Naherna and Diwan
91 The diamond was handed over to Ranjit Singh after many deliberations; Please see Suri, Vol II, 
(Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 143.
92 Bute Shah, Vol. V 88-89.
93 Suri, Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 139-140.
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Bhawani Das, to take charge of the fort.94 He also gave a sum of rupees one hundred 
thousand to occupy the fort.93 It seems that the take over of the fort infuriated Wazir 
Fateh Khan of Kabul who asked Ranjit Singh to vacate the fort after giving the charge of 
Kashmir in the hands of his brother, Azim Khan.96 Ranjit Singh’s refusal led to the 
emergence of a first ever-direct conflict between the Afghans and the Sikhs. The battle 
was fought on the 12th of July, 1813 at Hazro,97 and is known as the battle of Cliuch. The 
Lahore forces were victorious and Fateh Khan moved to Peshawar.98 A non-Muslim, 
Hukam Singh Chimni, was appointed as the Qiladar of the fort of Attock.99
This battle has been considered to be a watershed with regards to the non Muslim 
domination over the Afghans. N K Sinha considers the defeat of the Afghans in the battle 
of Chuch as important an episode in the history of the Sikhs as was the third battle of 
Panipat in the history of the Marathas in the north. Ranjit Singh’s hold over Panjab was 
not yet consolidated and a defeat might have been disastrous.100 It seems that this battle 
as mentioned by Sinha was a vital battle, on which the expansionist policy of Ranjit 
Singh depended. It might have set the stage for the Multan campaign as Multan and the
94 Bute Shah, Vol. V 89.
93 Burnes, Vol. Ill 238.
96 Suri, Vol. II (Amritsar; Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 145.
97 Sinha 48.
98 Badhera 155.
99 Amarnath 74; Badhera 155.
100 Sinha 51.
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other Muslim principalities had been taking support of the Kabul government; hence 
probably, this victory would have boosted the morale of the Lahore army.
4.2.2(c) Kashmir and its control by the non Muslims
Kashmir, in the north east was the last region not under the control of the non Muslims. 
It will be argued that soon after the annexation of Multan in 1818 Ranjit Singh brought a 
change in control of Kashmir from Muslim to non Muslim elites. He ordered his forces to 
march under the leadership of non Muslim leaders such as Sardar Nihal Singh Attariwala, 
Sardar Desa Singh Majithia, Diwan Ram Dayal, Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa and Bhai Ram 
Singh.101 Primarily, one section was under Misar Diwan Chand, Zafar Jang Bahadur and 
Sardar Sham Singh Attariwala and the second contingent was placed under Prince Kharak 
Singh, whereas the third was under Ranjit Singh who stayed at Wazirabad.
Those Muslim elites who did not align with him were dealt with harshly. Ranjit Singh 
had not been able to give his attention to Kashmir due to his preoccupation with the 
Multan campaigns from 1816 to 1819. However it appears from contemporary 
correspondence that Ranjit Singh was in correspondence with the Muslim principalities 
surrounding Kashmir. For instance, news dated 24th July 1813, suggests that a letter from 
Alain Klian, the Raja of Akhnoor, stated that the ruler of Kashmir had written to all the 
Rajas of that region to act in his support, but added that no one had paid any heed to this
101 However, Bhai Ram Singh, as suggested by Amarnath’s account, avoided fighting and suggested to 
Ranjit Singh that the enemies had an upper hand over the Lahore forces o f whom many had been killed and 
it was in the interest o f  the Lahore durbar to recall the forces from Kashmir. He returned to Lahore without 
waiting for a reply from Ranjit Singh. Please see, Amarnath 84.
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I (Prequest. Also, if Ranjit Singh could fund him, then Kashmir could be conquered. “ In 
another instance, Sarbuland Khan of Kundagarh also pledged to support Ranjit Singh 
during an expedition to Kashmir against the Afghan ruler.103 Apart from the lack of unity 
among the Muslim elites, it seems good luck also favoured the Lahore government. Wazir 
Fateh Klian, the leader of the Afghans in the Kashmir campaign was killed and his 
brother Azim Khan went to Kabul leaving Kashmir in the hands of Jabar Klian.
On his march to Kashmir, those Muslim chiefs who refused to obey the Lahore 
government, like Raja Ughar Khan, the chief of Rajauri, were removed, in this case, by 
his brother Rahim Ullah Khan, as the ruler of Rajauri and some were given titles such as 
‘Raja’ to persuade them.104 There was opposition from Zabardast Khan of Poonch against 
the Lahore campaign as well.103 A policy of appeasement was also followed by Ranjit 
Singh towards the Muslim elites who helped in the expedition. The chief of Bhimber, 
Sultan Khan, was released from prison and asked to accompany the expedition, probably 
to direct the Lahore forces to Kashmir through Bhimber because the route through 
Bhimber was the shortest to Kashmir from Lahore. The Afghan province of Kashmir, an
102 Garrett and Chopra, News dated 24tU July 1813, 84.
103 Garrett and Chopra, News dated 24th August 1815, 211.
104 Garrett and Chopra 129.
103 Suri, Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002), 255.
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area of more than twenty thousand square miles and worth more than 2.5 million rupees a 
year, was conquered on 4th of July 1819.106
4.2.2(d) Post Conquest Scenario
Observing the celebrations that followed the take over of Kashmir from the Muslim elites 
as suggested by the sources, it may be argued that this victory was considered to be the 
victory of the non Muslim leadership, especially of the Sikhs. For instance, the victory of 
Kashmir was celebrated in Durbar Sahib, Amritsar, where rich presents were offered. 
There are no instances available of the celebration of this victory in Muslim mosques or 
shrines. Non Muslim elites such as Misar Diwan Chand, Sardar Sham Singh Attariwala, 
and Sardar Jawala Singh Padhania were posted to Baramullah and Srinagar. Diwan Moti 
Ram, a Hindu was appointed the governor of Kashmir.107 Kashmir valley was farmed out 
to a pundit, Bir Dar, for 5,3 million rupees.108 This could perhaps have been the 
beginning of the pundits’ domination in Kashmir in the higher echelons of Kashmiri 
society. Thus, as suggested by evidences available, celebrations and the new appointed 
ruling elites of Kashmir were to be predominantly non Muslims.109 It appears that the 
idea of a new rule without Muslim elites in control was predominant in the minds of
106 Gulshan Lal Chopra, The Panjab as a Sovereign State (Lahore: Uttar Chand Kapur and Sons, 1928. 
Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, 1960) 13-17. Also see Sinha 45-48, 53-55, 59-60 
& 152-53; Khushwant Singh, Ranjit Singh, Maharaja o f the Paniab. 1780-1839 (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1962) 129-31.
107 Amarnath 132; Suri, Vol. I I261; Badhera 311.
108 Amarnath 132.
109 The services o f  Fakir Azizuddin were taken too- he was sent to Kashmir to make a detailed report but 
was not given any political position. Suri Vol II, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 259.
173
Lahore courtiers. Kashmir was the second peripheral boundary after Multan, where after 
some oppositions, the Lahore government chose to establish its hegemony firmly over the 
Muslim elites.
4.2.3 -  Expanding West o f  Indus; Peshawar
Ranjit Singh also expanded his state’s territorial borders west of the Indus. This part will 
examine the reasons which led the shift in the defence axis beyond the river Indus and its 
ramifications with regards to the Muslim elites. This expansion was different from that of 
Multan and Kashmir, because Ranjit Singh did not put non Muslim elites in control 
immediately, rather allowed the Afghans to rule. However, it will be argued in this 
section that Ranjit Singh continued to allow the rule by the Afghans only until he was 
able to establish a non Muslim elite control.
4.2.3(a) Shift in defence axis and its ramifications
Primarily, the shift in the defence axis up to the Suleiman ranges appears to be a strategic 
decision. It seems that Ranjit Singh established a firm control over the territory between 
the Indus and the Suleiman range to check the Afghan tribesno who used to attack the 
Panjab plains. To go beyond this point, as suggested to Ranjit Singh by Captain Wade in
110 Each Afghan tribe had its special locality. For instance, the Yusufzais controlled the northern portion of 
the district, from the Kalapani to the Indus. Hashtnagar is/was held by the Mohammedzais. The Khataks 
held the pargana o f the same name south o f  the river Kabul, together with the lowlands north o f the Kabul 
from Hind on the Indus to Nowshera. For more details on Afghan tribes, please refer: Punjab Government. 
Gazetteer o f the Peshawar District (1897-981 126-128.
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1827, was not in his interest.111 On the same lines Arthur Swinson adds, “anyone falling 
back to the Indus plain is dominated by the Suleiman range”.112 He further adds,
A ltogether as a physical barrier or as the basis for a m ilitary defen ce line, the Indus is 
inadequate and capricious; this is a fact w hich su ccessive rulers o f  northern India have 
had to recognise. The true barrier between Central and southern A sia  lies som e 200  m iles  
to the north w est o f  Indus. This is the Hindukush, a range o f  m ountains running from the 
great barren uplands o f  the Pamirs towards the borders o f  Persia. B etw een  the Hindukush  
and the river Indus lies another chain o f  m ountains, the su fed  koh  and the Suleim an range 
w hich  ends at Sibi at the southern entrance o f  the Bolan P ass.113
Amarnath suggests other reasons too which encouraged the expansion of territorial 
control beyond the river Indus by Lahore forces. For instance, he mentions that a dispute 
between Kamran, the son of Shah Mahmud, and Wazir Fateh Khan resulted in the murder 
of the wazir}14 This perhaps gave an opportunity to the Lahore forces to cross the river 
Indus.115 Sohan Lai Suri’s work also points to the fact that the Afghans had ruined the 
city of Peshawar and its citizens were looking for respite from them through Ranjit 
Singh’s intervention.116
!H Political Proceedings, 31st July, 1837, No. 23.
112 Arthur Swinson, North West Frontier: People and Events. 1839-1947 (London: Hutchinson, 1967) 18.
113 Arthur Swinson 20.
114 Amarnath 119.
113 Suri Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 275.
116 Suri Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 275.
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4.2.3(b) Control o f Peshawar and the non Muslim Elites
After the take over of the city of Peshawar on November the 20lh, 1818, unlike Multan 
and Kashmir, Ranjit Singh appointed Jahandad Khan, an Afghan who was earlier the 
governor of Attock, and a Muslim, as the governor of Peshawar replacing Yar 
Mohammed.117 In addition, with the rise of Ranjit Singh beyond Indus, it can be 
suggested from the evidence that two significant developments had their impact in the 
regional context. Firstly, the Afghan tribes began seeking legitimacy to rule Peshawar 
from him, thus establishing Lahore’s hegemony among the Muslim tribes of Peshawar. 
For instance, even though the former ruler Yar Mohammed again took over control of 
Peshawar soon after Ranjit Singh left,118 Dost Mohammed Khan, one of the Barakzai 
brothers, sent his vakils Diwan Damodar Mai and Hafiz Rooh Ullah Khan to Ranjit Singh 
suggesting that he was interested to serve under the Lahore government, and that he 
would pay one hundred thousand rupees annually to Lahore.119 It appears Ranjit Singh 
allowed Dost Mohammed to function as a tributary chief of Peshawar for Lahore. 
Secondly, the emergence of a new non Afghan power became a problem for some 
Afghans, who wanted to regain its possession. The idea of pitching religious identities of 
Muslim against non Muslim was exploited by the Afghan elites. For instance, as claimed 
by Bute Shah in his account. Azim Khan, the wazir of Kabul, took the lead and marched 
to Peshawar against the Sikhs. Many Maulvis and religious preachers were mobilised to
117 Amarnath, 119; According to Sohan Lai Suri, ‘With the beat o f the drum it was announced that peace 
was to be restored in Peshawar’, Suri, Vol. II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 275.
118 Bute Shah, Vol. V 162.
119 Suri, Vol. II Vol II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 275.276-278.
176
entice Muslims against the Sikhs.120 The battle of Naushera between the Muslims and 
the Sikhs that followed in response to this mobilization of Muslims was considered to be 
a decisive battle. According to Lepel Griffin,121 “It was a critical contest and decided, 
once for all, whether the Sikhs or the Afghans should rule the east of the Khyber, the 
mountains of the North West Frontier”.122 Ranjit Singh made non Muslims lead the army. 
For instance, he despatched a contingent of two thousand horsemen under Prince Sher
i 23Singh and Diwan Kirpa Ram. Another contingent was sent under Hari Singh Nalwa to 
reinforce the Prince. Ranjit Singh himself, commanding Akali Phoola Singh, Desa Singh 
Majithia and Fateh Singh Ahluwalia, led the third contingent.124 According to Ahmad 
Shah Batalia’s depiction of the battle, “The Afghans acted in a most cowardly 
manner. ..out of the fear of the Sikhs, they evacuated the fort of Jahangira in the cover of 
darkness and fled away”.123 The fort of Jahangira was conquered,126 which upset Azim
120 Bute Shah, Vol. V 202.
121 Lepel Griffin produced detailed works on the Panjab Chiefs, Panjab Rajas and the Law o f Inheritance to 
Chiefships. His major contribution is the Panjab Chiefs. During his tenure in the Panjab he developed close 
relations with the chieftains and succesors o f  erstwhile rulers, whom he interviewed for the writing o f his 
work. The accounts provided by him provide scholars with insight into the information about the 
genealogies and histories o f  the rulers o f Panjab and regions beyond river Indus before the British took 
over. Lepel Griffin and Charles Francis Massy, Chiefs and Families o f  Note in the Paniab. 2 Vols. 
(Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette, 1909-1910).
122 Lepel Griffin, Ranjit Singh. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905) 209.
123 Hari Singh Nalwa, a Khatri Sikh general o f Ranjit Singh, who played a significant role in bringing the 
Northwest territories tinder Lahore’s rule, built strong forts all over the country. He built Jamrud in 1836 
right at the Khyber Pass, which became symbolic o f  an end o f aggression from the west by the unruly 
tribes. It seems the Afghan tribes on the west o f  Indus could never reconcile with the new non Muslim 
elites. Eventually, Hari Singh Nalwa lost his life while defending the Jamrud fort.
124 Griffin, Ranjit Singh. 209.
12:1 Ahmad Shah Batalia, Tarikh e Paniab, Appendix to: Suri, Daftar I, 43.
126 Bute Shah Vol. 5 201.
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Khan, who was still stationed at Peshawar. This increased the conflict and a bloody 
battle followed between a twenty thousand strong Lahore army and a twenty five 
thousand strong Afghan army at Naushera between Attock and Peshawar on March 14th,
1 *7 7  *1823. Many leading Non Muslim leaders such as Akali Phoola Singh, Garbha Singh, 
Karam Singh Chahal and Balbahadur, lost their lives. After nearly a year of battle of 
Naushera, Ranjit Singh entered Peshawar ceremoniously on March 17lh, 1824.129 
However, it seems, he was not confident enough to establish his direct rule. When Yar 
Mohammed Khan offered to rule Peshawar on his behalf, with a tribute of one hundred 
and ten thousand rupees annually, Ranjit Singh appointed him as the governor of
i -jrt
Peshawar. Ranjit Singh gave him a robe of honour, an elephant, a fine horse and a
n i
sword as gifts before returning to Lahore. From 1827 until 1831, Lahore’s political 
control in and near the region of Peshawar was immensely influenced by the Muslim 
revivalist leader, Syed Ahmad of Rai Bareilly.132 His activities and their implications will 
be discussed in the following section. In 1831, after Syed Ahmad was killed, Ranjit
127 Foreign Department, Miscellaneous, No 128, 1823; The Battle o f  Naushera is also known as the battle 
o f  Tibbi Tehri.
128 Amarnath 154; Suri, Vol. II 366; Badhera 316; Bute Shah, Vol. V, 201-202; Prinsep (Calcutta: G.H. 
Huttman, 1834) 139.
129 Suri Vol. II, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 366.
130 Amarnath 155; Badhera 316.
131 Amarnath 155.
132 Syed Ahmad Bareilly, formerly known as Mir Ahmad, was a resident o f  Bareilly. In the beginning he 
was in the army o f Amir Khan Rohilla and later became a religious leader with Wahabi doctrines. He 
reached Kabul via Shikarpur and preached his religious ideas and instigated local people against the Sikhs. 
Please refer: Amarnath 175; Badhera 317.
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133Singh thought of establishing his direct rule over Peshawar. He sent an army to 
Peshawar under Prince Nau Nihal Singh, accompanied by General Ventura and Hari 
Singh Nalwa.1,4 Prince Nau Nihal Singh took over from Sultan Mohammed Khan, the 
then ruler who had succeeded Yar Muhammed Khan and became the first Sikh Governor 
of Peshawar.1 J5 This brought Peshawar under the non Muslim occupation.
The control by non Muslims was not welcomed by some Afghan groups who in reaction 
began using religion to unify various Muslim factions. For instance, it appears from 
Kanhaya Lai’s Ranjit Singhnama that Dost Mohammed Khan did not accept the new 
elites; rather he offered to pay the same tribute as paid by the previous governor to Ranjit 
Singh. On being refused, he challenged Ranjit Singh with an army of ghazis. It seems that 
Ranjit Singh took up the challenge.lj6 In a timely diplomatic effort to pacify the Afghan- 
Muslim aggression Ranjit Singh gave jagirs worth three hundred thousand of rupees 
annually, to Sultan Mohammed Khan and Pir Mohammed Khan, brothers of Dost 
Mohammed Khan. When Dost Mohammed called for help from Muslim tribal groups 
from Kunduz, Qandhar, Derajat, Bahawalpur etc while leading a large army towards 
Peshawar, no one responded to his call. Thus increasing the control of Ranjit Singh in the 
region.
133 Bhagat Singh argues that it was due to the fear in the mind o f Ranjit Singh that his governor, Sultan 
Mohammed Khan, might have switched loyalties to the new ruler Dost Mohammed Khan. Refer: Bhagat 
Singh, Maharaja Ranjit Singh 92,
134 Suri Vol. Ill (Part I-III) (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 244.
133 Suri Vol. Ill (Part l-III) (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 244.
136 Kanhaya Lai, Raniitnama (Lahore: Mustafee Press, 1876) 485-486.
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4.2.3(c) Religious Uprising under Sved Ahmad
It appears that before Ranjit Singh could establish his direct rule over the region of 
Peshawar in 1834, the Muslim elites united under one banner against the Lahore court. 
By late 1820s, religious ideology promulgated by Syed Ahmad, a resident of Bareilly, 
who had travelled all the way to Peshawar from Hindustan to wage Jehad, the holy war 
against the Sikhs, involved the Afghan Muslim elites, especially the Yusufzais of the 
Peshawar region.lj7 The movement, which probably was the first Jehad led by a religious 
leader and not a political leader, had its base in the regions of Peshawar and later spread 
to Akora, Attock, Bannu, Panjtar, Hund, Swat and Hazara.
There are a range of primary sources, which have been used for research by scholars to 
understand Syed Ahmad and his movement to the northwest of the river Indus. However, 
it seems for some reasons that modern scholars have not been able to critically examine 
one type of source from another and have particularly completely missed out using Sikh 
sources. For instance, the primary sources in Persian language which were influenced by 
Syed Ahmad,lj8 such as the eye witness account of his life recorded in four volumes 
entitled Waqa e Ahmadi, compiled at the request of the Nawab of Tonk, the work by
lj7 According to Amarnath’s account Zafarnamah e Ranjit Singh, he reached Kabul via Shikarpur and 
preached his religious ideas and incited people o f  the surrounding areas for a crusade against the Sikhs. 
See: Amarnath 175; Lai 297; Also see: Alexander Gardner, The Fall o f  the Sikh Empire. Ed, Baldev Singh 
Baddan (Delhi: National Book Shop, 1999) 117. For a detailed account o f Syed Ahmad and his life, please 
see: Syed Habibul Haq Naqvi, Islamic Resurgent Movements in the Indo- Pak Subcontinent during the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Durban, South Africa: Academia, the Centre for Islamic, Near, and 
Middle Eastern Studies, Planning & Publication: Available from the Dept, o f  Arabic, Urdu, and Persian, 
University o f  Durban-Westville, 1987) 90,
138 For a detailed discussion o f  these sources, please refer: Naqvi 94.
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Maulana Jafar AH Naqwi, a Persian scholar of repute, who participated in the expeditions 
of Syed Ahmad as an official correspondent, and Suada Fi Ahwal al Ghuzzat Wash 
Shuhada, to name a few, have been fully used. However the Persian sources written 
during the Sikh rule under Ranjit Singh, such as Zafarnameh Ranjit Singh and Twarikh e 
Panjab, which mention Syed Bareilly’s Jehad against the Sikhs, have been ignored. Also, 
it seems while most of the scholars have made use of the British sources written about the 
Muslims such as by WW Hunter139 and Masson’s140 travels, they have missed examining 
the other works which were written exclusively about the Sikhs, such as works by Lepel 
Griffin, Mohan Lai Kashmiri, Alexander Gardner, Henry T Prinsep and also by those 
serving Ranjit Singh, such as the writings of Ventura and Claude Auguste Court in the 
French language. By critically examining these sources, answers to questions such as 
what led to the rise of Syed Ahmad are possible. For our purposes, the question of what 
were the ramifications of the Jehad on Muslim elites and non Muslim elites and how did 
Ranjit Singh engage with the Muslim Elites of that region are relevant to our larger 
questions.
All the sources echo the same fact that Syed Ahmad made inroads into the region due to 
the support from the leadership of the Yusufzai tribe. According to James W Spain, in his 
work The Pathan Borderland, “Yusufzais are one of the oldest, most sophisticated of the 
tribes.” He adds that the tribe has perhaps the greatest number of divisions and offshoots
139 William Wilson Hunter, Indian Musuhnans (London: 1871).
140 Charles Masson, Narratives o f various Journeys in Beluchistan. Afghanistan and the Paniab. 3 vols. 
(London: Richard Bentley, 1842).
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and the greatest variety of development. They inhabit both the wild mountains of Dir and 
Swat and the fertile plains of Mardan”.141 Hence their support was crucial. Another tribe 
whose elites supported the Syed was that of the Khataks142. Their land runs along the 
Indus river from above Attock down to about fifteen miles north of Kalabagh. The 
southern portion extends westwards to the mouth of the Kurram valley. The Seno 
Khataks are located in Kohat district; the Akora Khataks in the northern part of 
Mardan.143
What were the reasons which inspired these tribal leaders to support Syed Ahmad in his
ambition to drive out the infidels and establish an Islamic state? The territorial expansion
beyond the river Indus towards Siifed Koh put the Lahore court in the middle of a war of
taking control of Peshawar, between the Afghan tribes of Barakzais and the Yusufzais. It
also led to the spread of Lahore interest in tax collection from Muslim tribal elites,
especially from the two important tribes of Yusufzais and the Khataks.144 We learn from
the report of the regular settlement of Peshawar that these tribes were mostly those who
had lost their territorial rights over their land after generations of rule. For instance, the
Yusufzai Muslims, especially four brothers Yar Mohammed Khan, Sultan Mohammed
141 James W Spain is an American scholar who did his research on the Pathans. He received the Ford 
Foundation Grant to do this research. James William Spain, The Pathan Borderland (The Hague: Mouton 
& Co., 1963)43.
!42 During the battle that led to Ranjit Singh entering Peshawar city in 1823 AD, two Khatak leaders Firoz 
Khan Khatak and Naurooz Khan Khatak died in action. Please refer: Lai 290-291.
143 Lai 55; For more on Khatak tribe, please see: Cuthbert Collin Davies, The Problem o f  the North-West 
Frontier. (1890-1908): with a survey o f policy since 1849. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932) 
67.
144 Ahmad Hasan Dani, Peshawar: Historic City o f  the Frontier. (Peshawar: Khyber Mail Press, 1969) 105.
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Khan, Sayyid Mohammed Khan and Pir Mohammed Khan were in control of the region 
for many years before they were made tributaries by Ranjit Singh. Similarly, Mir Alam 
Khan of Bajaur, Fateh Khan of Panjtar, Painda Khan of Amb, Sayyid Jan, chief of Kuna 
and the leader of Khatak Afghans, had run away after Budh Singh Sandhanwalia, a 
collateral brother of Ranjit Singh, had taken over his territory of Akora, near Attock.
It seems that there were social reasons for the Afghans to harbour feelings of animosity 
against the Sikh domination, aroused for instance by the atrocities of the Sikhs cited by S 
M Ikram, in his work Mauj i Konsar, who mentions that the Sikhs forcibly took 
possession of some Afghan women and later married them.,4:> During taking over of the 
trans-Indus territories, the Sikhs committed great havoc, burning a great part of the city of 
Peshawar and felling numerous gardens to supply themselves with Firewood.146
It seems that Syed Ahmad’s religious ideology acted as a bonding force for these tribal 
chiefs who had lost their control to the ‘infidels’ of Lahore. His name spread among the 
tribesmen and they not only accepted his leadership but also flocked round him. This fact 
is elaborated upon by an eyewitness Claude Auguste Court, the French General of Ranjit 
Singh, who having joined the Lahore army in 1826 documented his experiences with the 
Jehadis on his way to Lahore. According to his accounts as quoted by Jean Marie Lafont, 
two hundred thousand people gathered in support of Syed Ahmad’s Jehad against the 
Sikhs. While on his way to join Ventura, Court was obliged to join the bards of Ghazis,
145 Shaikh Mohammed Ikram, Maui e Kausar (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1958) 584.
146 Amarnath 173-174; Also see: G G Hastings, Report o f the Regular Settlement o f  the Peshawar District 
o f the Paniab (Lahore. 1878)45 ,46 .
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and thus gives a first hand description of the Jehadis. According to Court the Ghazis 
shouted “Death to the infidels”. Most of the fanatics were on foot, equipped with spears 
and javelins, but some had clubs and sticks. He adds that the Ghazis were a strange 
mixture of people of every condition and even women carrying arms were with them. 
Everywhere they were carrying standards and recited quotations from the Koran.147 
Another dimension provided by the settlement report of Peshawar district is with regards 
to the Muslim leadership of Peshawar, who had felt the influence and longing to free 
themselves from their Sikh oppressors. In a particular example, the Khatak chief Najaf 
Khan who had been overthrown by Budh Singh Sandhanwalia, a collateral brother of 
Ranjit Singh from Peshawar, came in support of Jehadis, which resulted in the battle of 
Akora, on 21st December, 1826. In the battle that followed after the Muslim mobilisation 
against the Lahore government, three trusted lieutenants of Syed Ahmad Bareilly, Maulvi 
Abdul Hai, Mohammed Ismail Khan and Baqar Ali of Syed Ahmad, Maulvi Baqar Ali of 
Patna along with the commander of the Jehadis, Allahbakhsh Khan lost their lives.149 It 
can be thus suggested that under the leadership of Syed Ahmad, Muslim religious 
symbolism against the non Muslims, represented by the Lahore government, was at its 
strongest. And, though there seems to be no deep commitment to Syed Ahmad’s mission, 
this unity among the Muslims against the non Muslims provided many Muslim chiefs, 
who had lost both economic and political control due to the Sikhs expansions, with an
147 Jean Marie Lafont, “Private Business and Cultural Activities o f  the French Officers o f  Maharaja Ranjit 
Singh”, 89-91, Journal o f  Sikh Studies. Vol. X, No. 1, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, February 
1983).
148 Hastings 47.
149 HR Gupta, History o f the Sikhs, Vol. V 161.
184
opportunity to unite with other Muslim chiefs under Syed Ahmad's Jehad and break the 
pressure on the non Muslim hegemony.
It appears that the continued defiance against the Sikh rule by Syed Ahmad and his 
followers continued to encourage other Muslim chiefs to join the Jehadis in the hope to 
getting rid of the Sikh hegemony. With more public support from the Muslims, it also led 
to further acceptance of the leadership of Syed Ahmad among them. For instance, Ashraf 
Khan of Zaidah, Fateh Khan of Panjtar and Khadi Khan of Hund joined the Ghazis and 
challenged the Lahore forces again at Hazro. Meanwhile on 111,1 January 1827, the 
Jehadis decided to declare Syed Ahmad as the Imam, The Hindustani Mujahideen 
(muslim strugglers) began to address him as Amir ul Mominin (Leader of the faithful). 
The local people began calling him Sayyid Badshah and his name was mentioned in the 
Friday Khutba.150 In the battle that followed at Hazro, the Sikhs held their position with 
great difficulty. In another battle, the chiefs of Peshawar with an army o f twenty 
thousand strong joined Syed Ahmad. However, Budh Singh, a Sikh general of Ranjit 
Singh, won over the Barakzai chiefs and made them his allies against the Jehadis, This 
alliance led to the emergence of two blocks, one that of the Sikhs along with the 
Barakzais and the other included all the other major tribes of the region, thus breaking 
away from the prevalent Syed Ahmad’s rhetoric of Muslim versus non Muslim conflict. 
Non Muslim generals such as Raja Gulab Singh, Raja Sucheit Singh and Attariwala 
sardars came in support o f Budh Singh Sandhanwalia, In the battle that followed, the
b0 Naqvi, Islamic Resurgent 47: Also see: HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs, Vol. V, 162.
185
Jehadis suffered a serious set- back at Pirpai or Saidu.151 Following which, Syed Ahmad 
impelled the Khaibaris, the tribes living near Khyber Pass against the Barakzais and the 
Sikhs. With his gathered mass support the Ghazis fought battles at Damgala and at 
Shinkiari and Utmanzai with the Sikh army and Barakzai chiefs.152 It appears that these 
battles were not able to do significant damage to Syed Ahmad’s military structure, and 
after the battle of Saidu or Pirpai he expanded his base in the Yusufzai controlled areas. 
For instance, he invited tribal chiefs of Afridis, Mohmands and Khalils who controlled 
the areas of Buner and Swat, to join him in the Jehad against the non Muslim hegemony. 
By then Syed Ahmad began living with Fateh Khan of Panjtar and soon brought the 
whole of the Yusufzai valley under his sway. Even Mir Babu Khan of Sadhum, a town on 
the Kalapani river in Peshawar district, Sarbuland Khan of Tanawal, Habibullah Khan of 
Swat, Sultan Zabardast Khan of Muzaffarabad, Sultan Najaf Khan of Khatur, Khan Abdul 
Ghaffur Khan of Agror, Nasir Khan of Nandhar, and Painda Khan of Amb were subdued.
4.2.3(d) End o f  Jehad: Establishment o f  Heeemonv o f  the non Muslim elites
It appears that even when he seemed successful, Syed Ahmad began losing his control 
over the tribal leadership. Many tribal chiefs began betraying him. For instance, at the 
time of taking over the fort of Attock, Khadi Khan of Hund alerted the Sikh commander, 
Hari Singh Nalwa who with his twenty thousand men attacked Syed Ahmad’s forces and
131 Murray, History o f  the Paniab, (London: William Allen, 1846) Vol. II 85, 88.
132 Hastings 48.
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killed three fourths of the Khalifa’s Ghazis.152 In 1829, Khadi Khan was killed in a battle 
at Hund.154 In another instance, Yusufzai chief Yar Mohammed Khan betrayed Syed 
Ahmad Bareilly as well.155 Amarnath mentions these differences that arose between Syed 
Ahmad and the Yusufzai leadership. According to him Yar Mohammed Khan refused to 
send an army from Peshawar, on which the Syed called him an apostate.156 With an army 
of forty thousand religious ghazis he attacked Peshawar, killed Yar Mohammed157 and 
occupied the town. In response to these new developments, Ranjit Singh appointed Sultan
158Mohammed Khan, the brother of the deceased as the governor of Peshawar. In 
addition, in October 1827, he sent a strong force under the leadership of Prince Kharak 
Singh, Allard and Ventura to fight the Jehadis. The Lahore forces killed six thousand 
followers of the khalifa.159 The Syed expanded in the Hazara region, where tribal chiefs 
Painda Khan of Darband and Amb were his supporters. The Syed forces joined Painda 
Khan and a battle was fought at Phulra, a place that was under the rule of Painda Khan’s 
brother Madad Khan. Two associates of Syed Ahmad, his nephew Syed Ahmad Ali Shah, 
along with Mir Faiz All of Gorakhpur, were killed.160
L:,J Hastings 47.
154 Dani 107.
1:0 Mohammed Ikram 50.
156 Amarnath 181.
157 Bute Shah 279.
158 Aliuddin, Vol. 1,492.
139 Amarnath 181.
160 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs, Vol. V, 164.
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It appears that Syed Ahmad went on to impose stricter Islamic doctrines, which had their 
ramifications. For instance, after subduing the ruler of Peshawar, Sultan Mohammed 
Khan, who was installed by Ranjit Singh, he introduced Shariat law in 1830.161 This 
brought about the closure of wine and liquor shops, drug centres and brothels. Syed 
Mazhar Ali of Sadiqpur (Patna) was appointed chief justice of Peshawar. Ushr Tax (One 
tenth of the proceeds) was imposed and Muslim tax collectors were appointed. Social 
reforms were also introduced to sanctify the corrupt society.162 Some of the Shariat laws 
interfered with the age-old customs of the Afghan tribes, which were contrary to the 
Islamic law and usage. One such was the open sale of their daughters. Syed Ahmad 
ordained that this practice should cease and to assist in its abolition decreed that all 
tribesmen should give their daughters in marriage at an early age without receiving 
money. Pilgrimages to the tombs of saints for making offerings and soliciting favours 
were denounced and prohibited. The tazias of Shias were forbidden. The Afghan tribal 
leaders and their Ulema (Muslim legal scholars) who lived on Ushr (Islamic tax) taxes, 
refused to accept the establishment of a miniature Islamic state of Khilafat in the 
province. They conspired against the Mujahideen and decided to kill all tax collectors in 
mosques when they would come for night prayers.163 The massive execution of tax 
collectors in mosques in one night once again shook the Jehad movement.164 The Afghan 
Ulema not only issued a fatwa  of infidelity (Kufr) against Syed Ahmad but also declared
161 Lai 303.
162 SAA Nadwi, Sirat e Ismail e Shahid (Lucknow: 1977) 135-149; Also see: Mohammed Ikram 28; HR 
Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs, Vol. V, 164-165.
163 Nadwi 318-330.
,64 Nadwi 318-330.
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his execution as obligatory. Pir Mohammed executed the chief justice of Peshawar.163 
The huge army under166 the leadership of Prince Sher Singh and Hari Singh Nalwa, 
Rattan Singh Gharjakia, Partap Singh Attariwala, Jawala Singh Padhania, Sham Singh 
Nihang reinforced General Ventura and Attar Singh Kalianwala when they clashed with 
the Sayyid’s ghazis at Balakot.167 The Lahore forces trapped Syed Ahmad and his 
companions while on their way to migration.168 The Mujahideen were defeated and 
uprooted and Syed Ismail and Maulana Khairuddin were killed along with other 
companions.169 Syed Ahmad was killed on 24 Zil Qada, 1246 (1831).170 Perhaps the rise 
and rule of Syed Ahmad gave a glimpse of a Muslim theocratic state to the Muslims, 
illustrating to them the superceding of their age old customs. This perhaps tilted their 
preference towards Ranjit Singh’s domination, which allowed prevalence of the 
customary laws. The death of S}^ cd Ahmad Bareilly was a landmark achievement for 
Ranjit Singh in his quest to establish non Muslim hegemony in Peshawar and areas 
around the town. He probably now had a case to demonstrate to his Muslim elites and 
subjects his established hegemony and he wasted no time illustrating his intent of non
i6:> Mohammed Ikram 32.
166 Kanhaya Lai mentions that Ranjit Singh planned this attack very carefully. He asked for detailed 
information about Syed Ahmad from Sultan Muhhamed Khan before this attack. Please refer: Lai 306,
167 Amarnath 192-193.
168 Naqvi 434-464.
169 Naqvi 434-464.
170 Amarnath claims that Prince Sher Singh, who was commanding the Lahore army, got the dead body o f  
Syed Ahmad Bareilly produced before him and got his painting prepared and presented it to the Maharaja 
who praised his brave opponent. Please refer: Amarnath 193-194; Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Ulema in 
Politics: a study relating to the political activities o f  the ulema in the South-Asian subcontinent from 1556 
to 1947 (1972. Karachi: Ma’aref, 1974) 175; for an account o f  the Battle at Balakot, please refer: 
Alexender Gardner, Soldier and traveller: memoirs o f  Alexander Gardner, colonel o f  artillery in the service 
o f  Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Ed. Hugh Pearse (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1898) 117-119.
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Muslim hegemony by appointing Prince Nau Nihal Singh as the first non Muslim 
Governor of Peshawar in the year 1834.
4.3 Losing Power: Panjabi Muslim Elites and Tribal Elites
This section will argue that under the state formation process by Ranjit Singh, the 
Muslim elites of Panjab and those in the tribal areas lost their control to the non Muslim 
elites due to the use of internal rivalries among the different factions as an effective foul 
against them by their subjugator. It appears from primary sources such as that of Lepel 
Griffin accounts that the inter tribal rivalries between Panjabi Muslim chiefs - the Awans, 
Sials and the Tiwana Maliks significantly contributed towards the Lahore government’s 
political gain in the plains of Panjab. Here is a very significant excerpt from the report of 
a British settlement officer, Capt. James about Peshawar during the Sikh rule.
But the people o f  this unhappy district did not enjoy peace even during the respites w hich
the withdrawl o f  the Sikhs afforded them; it is hard to say w hether they suffered m ost o f
these terrible but passing invasions, or from  bitter feuds w hich fo llow ed  them, arising out
o f  hostile acts com m itted towards each other either to find favour w ith  the invaders or to
gratify personal feelin gs o f  hatred and revenge; for as is com m on in such a depraved
condition they had no scruple in betraying each other for such purposes and as sp ies and
informers in bringing the Sikh scourge upon their neighbours w ith  a baseness from  w hich
their ancestors w ould  have revolted. O ne o f  the terms on w hich  the Cham kain c h ie f  held
his tenure o f  the Sikhs w as the annual production o f  tw enty Afridi heads and the old  man
relates w ithout a blush the treacherous m ethods he w as som etim es com pelled  to adopt to
171fu lfil the conditions o f  his tenure.
The policy did not change, when in 1834, the Peshawar valley was annexed and brought 
under the direct Sikh administration. Similar attempts were made in other northwest areas
171 Griffin. Ranjit Singh 147.
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to make use of inter tribal rivalries for purposes of checks and balances.172 Many efforts 
to patronise the landed class of these regions were attempted. For instance on 18th August 
1815, a letter was received from the thanedar of Makhanbar saying that some zamindars 
were coming to the Maharaja, and would request him to assure them that they would be 
shown honour and patronage. Also, on 18th September 1815, a note was sent to the 
thanedar of Attock, Nand Singh, asking him to gather the zamindars of Hasan Abdal, 
Sarai Kala and other places and to send them on to the ‘noble sarkark Also in the regions 
of Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan and Bhawalpur, predominantly the Sadozai tribe, 
Badozai tribe, Laghari, Ghorcharni, Lund, Lagharis and the Kliosas lost power to non 
Muslim elites due to inter tribal rivalries. By examining these case studies, the reasons for 
the loss of power by Muslim elites to non Muslim elites will be further established.
4.3.1 -  Case Studies: Tiwanas, Sials and theAwans
It appears that the focal point of aggression for Lahore forces, the town of Multan, was 
used as a pretext to slowly create hegemony over the other Muslim principalities, by 
taking tribute or administrative control or by taking over the political control. For 
instance, the Baluch chief of Sahiwal gave tribute to Ranjit Singh during his second 
expedition to Multan; Dipalpur was taken over in 1807, during Lahore’s army march to 
Multan; Lahore concluded a treaty with the Nawab of Mankera to pay an annual tribute 
of rupees eighty thousand and to supply a number of horses and camels and a contingent 
of troops for service in Multan in case of war. When Ranjit Singh realised that Ahmad
172 Amarnath Chapter XXIII. The instance given here is o f  one zamindar Mohammed Khan o f Galdheri 
offering his services in the fighting for the supression o f the hill rebels.
191
Khan SiaL of Jhang had concluded a secret treaty with Nawab Muzaffar Khan of Multan,
• * • 173he annexed Jhang in 1807 and gave Ahmad Khan a jagir at Mirowal near Amritsar. 
Nawab Muzaffar Khan also used the help of the Nawab of Bahawalpur, who sent his 
envoy, Dhanpat Rai, for negotiations with Ranjit Singh. During the negotiations, it was 
agreed that Muzaffar Khan would pay seventy thousand as nazranaP4.
It appears that the Tiwana chief was engaged in constant hostilities with the Awan chief, 
his neighbour to the north.175 Historically, the Maliks Dadu Khan and Sher Khan (third 
and the fourth Tiwana Maliks) enlarged Mitha Tiwana, which soon became a flourishing 
town where many clans from other parts of the country like Awans from Jhelum, Kurars 
from Mankera, Chahals from the neighbourhood of Lahore and Nuns from the upper 
Chenab, settled. Sher Khan and his brother Alam Sher Khan after taking over the reins of 
the Tiwana clan considerably expanded their territory at the expense of the Awans, 
seizing Warcha and other Awan territories in the foothills. Sher Khan Tiwana, in an effort 
to go independent refused to pay his share of tribute which he had hitherto paid to the 
governors of Dera Ismail Khan. He founded his own centre, Nurpur Tiwana. He even 
betrayed the Sial chief, Inayat Khan, by forcefully taking charge of Mari, a place which 
the Sial chief had won from the Nawab of Multan. Continuing his expansionist policy he 
assembled his clan and not only drove the Sials out of Khai, but also laid siege to Kot 
Langar Khan. In the battle that followed, Inayat Khan Sial defeated Sher Khan Tiwana.
173 Suri, Vol. II 212; Lepel Griffin mentions that Ahmad Khan was given a force by Muzaffar Khan of  
Multan to take over the Jhang fort again from Ranjit Singh. Please see: Griffin and Massy, Vol. II 300.
174 Suri, Vol. II 65.
175 Griffin, The Paniab Chiefs. Vol. II 168.
192
It appears that these inter rivalries among and between different clans brought the 
involvement of Sikh Misl chiefs to act as mediators. For instance, after Sher Khan’s 
death in 1767, his two sons Khan Mohammed Khan and Khan Beg Khan, in a struggle to 
capture the Tiwana territories fought among themselves. In due course, Khan Mohammed 
took over the Tiwana territory and was engaged in constant hostilities with the Nawab of 
Mankera. He also came in conflict with Jaffir Khan, the son of the chief of Khushab. 
Jaffir Khan called Mahan Singh Sukarchakia who helped with a considerable force and 
compelled the Tiwana chief to retire.176 This may be considered to be the first instance 
when the intervention by a Sikh chief took place to resolve a conflict between two 
Muslim chiefs of important clans.
Later, other chiefs such as that of the Sials,177 and also Ranjit Singh, took advantage of 
the conflict between the two brothers. For instance, in 1803, Khan Beg Khan Tiwana, 
jointly with Rajab Khan, the Sial chief, Fateh Khan of Sahiwal and Jaffir Khan of 
Khushab, attacked Khan Mohammed of Tiwana clan. Khan Mohammed Tiwana asked 
for help from Ranjit Singh, who, on the promise of a subsidy of one hundred thousand 
rupees, consented to trap Khan Beg Khan. It was arranged between the confederates that 
when Ranjit Singh marched into the country, Khan Mohammed should take flight, seeing 
which Khan Beg Khan would probably come to pay his respects, believing the Lahore 
chief to be his friend. All happened as planned and Khan Beg Khan Tiwana was caught
176 Griffin, The Paniab Chiefs. Vol. II 168-171.
177 The Sials occupy nearly all the villages on both banks o f the river Ravi. Ahmad Khan Sial was granted a 
ja g ir  by Ranjit Singh. Please see: Maclagan 134-135; Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f  the Jhang District 
(1908). Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1910. 45-46.
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by Ranjit Singh and handed over to his brother by whom he was put to death. Ranjit 
Singh took his share and returned to Lahore in 1804.
It can be said that Ranjit Singh had by 1817 decided to subjugate the Tiwana chief. He 
sent a force under Misr Diwan Chand against Ahmad Yar Khan, the Tiwana chief at 
Nurpur. The fort was taken and Ahmad Yar Khan fled to Jhandewala or Jandiala in the 
Mankera territory. Ahmad Yar Khan returned and regained possession of the country 
soon after the Sikh army had retired leaving a garrison under Jaswant Singh Mokal. But 
he was compelled to fly to Jandiala a second time from where he was forced away by the 
Mankera Nawab who threw Ahmad Yar Khan’s sons into prison. Ahmad Yar Khan 
Tiwana now submitted to the Maharaja who granted him the ilciqcis of Jhawarian worth 
10,000 rupees in jagir  subject to the service of 60 horsemen.
After taking over Multan and Kashmir in 1821, Ranjit Singh marched against Hafiz 
Ahmad Khan, the Nawab of Mankera. It is believed that Mohammed Khan, the former 
Nawab of Mankera, had built a cordon of twelve forts at Haiderabad, Moajghar, 
Fatahpur, Pipal, Darya Khan, Khanpur Jhandewala, Kalor, Dulehwala, Bhakkar, 
Dinganah and Chaubara while to make the central fortress inaccessible he had not 
permitted any wells to be sunk within the cordon. This time the vindictive Tiwana Malik 
Ahmad Yar Khan joined with the Lahore forces against the Nawab of Mankera. Ranjit 
Singh attacked the forts and after a siege of 25 days the Nawab surrendered, but was
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allowed to retain the government of Dera Ismail Khan.178 The assistance rendered by the 
Tiwanas led to a troop of Tiwana horses returning to Lahore in the service of Ranjit 
Singh.
It is important to note that with the passage of time, Ranjit Singh subdued the Tiwana 
chiefs. Tiwana chiefs then served Ranjit Singh in Multan and in many other campaigns. 
Even so, by 1837, the Tiwana chief, Khuda Yar Khan, found himself a person of very 
small importance at Lahore where not one of the Sikh nobles cared a straw for his long 
genealogy or for his hereditary claim to rule over the Shahpur jungles. He was appointed 
011 a thousand rupees a year as a chabnk sawar to Ranjit Singh whose hunting expeditions 
he superintended until his death in 1837. Fateh Khan, son of Khuda Yar Khan continued 
to serve under a non Muslim, khatri Sikh Hari Singh Nalwa - till the latter’s death in 
1837.179 After Hari Singh’s death, Raja Dhyan Singh made him the manager of Mitha 
Tiwana country with the control of salt mines, Warcha and Choha,
4.3.2 — Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ism ail Khan and Bhawalpur
Inter rivalries also had its impact on Multan and its neighbouring principalities such as 
Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan and Bhawalpur which saw the change in political 
control from Muslims to non Muslim. As mentioned earlier, predominantly the Sadozai
178 HR Gupta, History o f  the Sikhs. Vol. V, 74-75.
179 Griffin, The Paniab Chiefs. Vol. II, 170-171.
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tribe, Badozai tribe, Laghari, Ghorcharni, Lund, Lagharis and the Kliosas, controlled 
those areas.
It appears from the sources that Muzaffar Khan, the Nawab of Multan was engaged in 
hostilities with Abdus Samad Khan, who belonged to Badozai tribe. It seems that this 
conflict began in the year 1801, after Shah Zaman lost power in Afghanistan. The 
influence of Fateh Khan Barakzai, the new minister at the Kabul court, obtained the 
nomination of the Badozai chief, Abdus Samad Khan, as the Governor of Multan. 
Following this the formation of two groups took place, one supporting the newly 
appointed governor and the other supporting the old. Muzaffar Khan did not submit to the 
changed Afghan regime and allied with the Bahawalpur chief who sent five thousand 
troops under Jiwan Ram and Din Mohammed Khan to his aid. These, along with Multan 
troops under Ghulam Murtaza, besieged Abdus Samad Khan Badozai in his fort at 
Dinpana. Mir Alam, the governor of Dera Ghazi Khan, joined Muzaffar Khan as well. 
Abdus Samad Khan lost his fort and fled to Lahore for refuge.
It seems Ranjit Singh took advantage of this situation by giving refuge to Badozai chiefs. 
He gave a command of two hundred horsemen to Abdus Samad Khan and sent him to 
watch the frontiers of Bahawalpur along with a jagir in another part of the country. 
However, due to his mismanagement, his property was seized and an allowance of thirty 
two hundred rupees was fixed. Earlier, his brother, Hafiz Sarbuland Khan, who had 
earlier received favours from the Lahore government, was after the capture of Mankera in 
1821, given a jagir of Leiah worth rupees two thousand, which he retained until 1829.
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Diwan Sawan Mai, a Hindu Khatri, placed the chief under the command of ten sowars 
(horse riders) on rupees 1,200 per annum. He accompanied the Governor of Multan under
Ranjit Singh, Sawan Mai, against Gurcharni, Lishari, Laghari and Khosa tribes when they
* * • 180 made their incursion into Dajal and Khanpur. He sent forty sowars to Harappa as well.
181 * 182 183 •The struggle of important tribes of Laghari, Gurcharnis and Khosas to gain power 
over each other made them lose to Ranjit Singh.184 Diwan Sawan Mai supported the 
Lagharis who in support of Chata Khan Gurcharni, took up the quarrel. Bijar Khan, who 
tried to kill Chata Khan Gurcharni, was seized and sent to Multan, and there made over to 
the Lagharis by whom he was slain.185
Diwan Sawan Mai also aligned with the Lund tribe in an expedition against the Bozdar 
tribe. In reward for the services, the Diwan freed the Lunds from the payment of tlrni or
180 Griffin, The Paniab Chiefs. Vol. 2, 320-322.
181 The Laghari tribe inhabits the plain country between the Vador torrent on the north and the Khura 
torrent in the Jantpur tahsil on the south, and also a considerable extent o f  hill country in which was 
situated the station o f  Fort Munro. For more details, refer: Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Dera Ghazi 
Khan District (1893-97). Revised ed. (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1898) 69.
182 The Gurchani tribe borders on the Leghari to the north and on the Drishak to the south. They own the 
Mari and the Dragnal hills, and their boundary extends further into the hills than that o f any other tribe. For 
more details, refer: Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Dera Ghazi Khan District (1893-97) 70.
183 The Khosas occupy the frontier southwards from the Lund territory as far as the Sakhi Sarwar pass, and 
there are also two sections isolated from the main body o f  the tribe but forming part o f its organisation: one 
between the Nutkani and Sori Lund tribes and the other within the limits o f  the Leghari tribes. Punjab 
Government, Gazetteer o f the Dera Ghazi Khan District (1893-97) 68.
184 Khosa territory was taken by Ranjit Singh, they remained in constant conflict with Nawab o f  
Bhawalpur.
183 Griffin, Ranjit Singh 342.
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grazing dues, and restored the arrangements made in the time of the Durranis, according 
to which they paid only half the revenue due to their villages.186
It appears that the Nutkani chief,187 Rind Baluch, allied with the Bahawalpur Nawab, who 
was put in charge of Dera Ghazi Khan by Ranjit Singh. He persuaded the nawab to attack 
the Khosa tribe. When General Ventura took over, the Nutkani delayed in paying the 
nazrana due to him which led the Lahore forces under Prince Kharak Singh to march 
against the tribe. The chief, Asad Khan, fled to Bozdar hills, and remained there for some 
time, while Haji Mohammed Khan, his successor to chieftainship of the tribe, accepted 
the hegemony of Prince Kharak Singh’s army and joined the Lahore forces. The 
agreement, however, broke down, for Haji Mohammed Khan could not undertake to pay 
the heavy annual nazrana demanded from him by the Lahore government. Thus, no one 
was recognised as tumandars of the Nutkani tribe by Ranjit Singh. Asad Khan Nutkani 
was afraid to venture in to the plains, hence he deputed his son Zulfiqar Khan, with a 
nazrana of rupees twenty five thousand to take charge of the terms. He was sent as a 
prisoner to Lahore, but was ultimately released by Ranjit Singh. Asad Khan himself 
shortly afterwards paid a visit to the Sadozai Nawab Sher Mohammed Khan at Dera 
Ismail Khan and while there, was arrested and sent to Lahore. When Diwan Sawan Mai
186 Griffin, Ranjit Singh 370.
187 The Nutkanis are an important tribe who occupy the country watered by the distributary channels from 
the Sangarh lying between the Kasrani country to the north and the country o f the Khosas and the Sori 
Lund to the south. For more details, please refer: Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Dera Ghazi Khan 
District (T893-97! 66.
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became Governor he called him to Multan and granted him an annual allowance of 
rupees four thousand,188
4.4 Conclusion
It appears that in the process of Ranjit Singh’s state formation, the Lahore Muslim elites 
did see themselves as a part of the new emerging state. They collaborated to see through 
the change in governance. Ranjit Singh was quick to capitalise on the breaking up of the 
Afghan empire, and also capitalised on the inter rivalries among different tribal groups. It 
seems the collapsing power structure enabled Ranjit Singh to gain knowledge about these 
group rivalries and eventually annex these states. This led to a process of change in the 
ruling elites in Panjab. It appears that as the empire gradually became strong, the 
Muslims elites steadily lost power. The army of Ranjit Singh, as the Khalsa Durbar 
Records seem to indicate, was predominantly composed of the non Muslims, which in 
turn, had a greater majority of thq ja t  community followed by the khatris,189 It can be said 
that the character of the elites of the Panjab had changed significantly from Muslim elites 
to non Muslim elites. It can be thus suggested that Ranjit Singh’s rule brought about a 
historic change in Panjab. Not only did it redefine geographical boundaries of the state,190 
but it also carried the non Muslims upwards in the social mobility ladder. It was able to 
put a new ruling minority in power, though only at the top level. For the state formation
188 Griffin, Ranjit Singh 385-386.
189 Khalsa Durbar Records. (Chandigarh: Panjab Archives) Financial, Military and Dharmarth records in 
original preserved at the Punjab State Archives.
190 The current border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the same as defined during Ranjit Singh’s time.
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process to succeed, it was crucial for the Sikhs to establish their legitimacy over the 
Muslim population, and this aspect will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
State Formation: The Issue of Legitimacy among M uslim Subjects
Ranjit Singh was aware that for sustaining state polity, it was vital to practice legitimacy 
in governance while ruling over the majority Muslim population. It appears that though 
on the one hand he removed the political elites from power, yet on the other, he devised 
policies to include many Muslims in every sphere of state formation of Panjab.1 This 
chapter will endeavour to address and respond to the question about the concerns of 
Ranjit Singh with regards to the Muslim subjects while formulating state policies. It will 
be argued in this chapter that while making policies Ranjit Singh took cautious decisions 
in order not to cause offence to the Muslims. This led not only to the sustenance and 
expansion of the state under Ranjit Singh but also made the Muslims of Panjab major 
beneficiaries of this state formation process. This process will be examined in five 
distinct areas of governance, namely: religious policy, justice, army, agriculture and the 
formation of new governing Muslim elites.
5.1 Religious Policy towards the Muslims
Various contemporary sources claim that Ranjit Singh adopted a policy which they saw 
as non-sectarian towards his Muslim subjects belonging to the conquered territory. In the
1 J S Grewal has argued that though the new elevations included men from several communities — Sikhs, 
Hindus and Muslims; a vast majority o f  them consisted o f Sikhs (mostly Jats), Khatris and Brahmins drawn 
from the Bist Jalandhar Doab and the upper portions o f the Bari, Rachna, and Chaj Doabs. In the lower 
echelons o f  the ruling class however, the dominance o f  the Sikh jats and Hindu khatris and Brahmins was 
practically offset by the great increase in the number o f  Muslims in the service o f the state. Please see: J S 
Grewal, Sita Ram Memorial Lectures delivered on 6-7 April 1981 at Panjabi University, Patiala.
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process of state formation, Ranjit Singh built his image as a friend and supporter of the 
different groups within the Muslim society. Panjab akhbarats throw light on one 
significant aspect of his religious policy. Ranjit Singh paid great attention to the Muslim 
relics, believed to belong to Prophet Mohammed and his descendants, found during the 
conquest of Multan and other places. These included a pair of shoes of the Prophet, a 
copy of the Holy Quran, and a few religious compositions which Hazrat Ali used to read, 
some of his hair, and teeth and a jubba  (a piece of clothing for the trunk of the body). 
They were all kept in the royal toshakhana (royal treasury) and looked after with great 
care. The Maharaja would not part with them for any monetary considerations and he 
politely refused the offer of rupees 125,000 from Mir Sher Mohammed Khan of Tehara.2
Particularly, in the context of Sufi shrines, he built upon his positive image among the 
Muslim population by strengthening relations with these shrines. The Sufi practice was 
common all over the Panjab but most prevalent in the western Panjab where every single 
person was supposed to have a pir or preceptor who would initiate him into the secrets of 
divine worship and guide him in his spiritual progress. This practice was known as 'piri 
muridi\ No one could inspire confidence and claim to be truthful or straightforward 
unless he had affiliated himself to some pir. Once this was done the mar id (disciple)
2 Panjab Akhbarat, 237/562-3, 240-1/567-8, as quoted by Ganda Singh, The Paniab in 1839-40 (Amritsar: 
Sikh History Society, 1952) 5-6.
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would depend on die Pir for helping him through all his difficulties and having him 
absolved of all his sins. The pir in most cases was a Syed, Koreshi or Khagga2
The Sufi shrines were important centres for the local communities.4 Through these 
shrines, as discussed by Eaton in his work, the message of the Holy Quran was conveyed 
to the local people. These shrines displayed in theatrical style and in microcosm, the 
moral order of the Islamic macrocosm. He adds that such shrines not only possessed 
important economic, political and social ties with the masses that frequented them, their 
objective was fundamentally religious; that is these shrines made Islam accessible to the 
non lettered masses. It was believed that the saint of the Sufi shrine enjoyed a closer 
relationship with God than the common devotee could ever have, and the saint’s baraka 
(spiritual power) to intercede with God on behalf of the devotees outlasted the saint’s 
moral lifetime and adhered to his burial placed Also, at the local level, many fairs were 
held in connection with one shrine or the other, and there were very few shrines of any
3 J M Wikeley, Panjabi Musulmans. (Delhi: Manohar Press, 1991) 28; Also see: E D Maclagan, Punjab 
Government, Gazetteer o f the Multan District (1901-02). Revised ed. (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette 
Press, 1902) 118.
4 Some o f these shrines were considered very holy and all riders had to dismount when passing. It was also 
a matter o f some importance on which hand the shrine should have been left in passing. Failure to do 
observe the proper practice even by Kafirs is said to have entailed in some cases serious consequences 
Please refer Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f the Peshawar District (1897-98) 111: These institutions are 
ornaments to the villages. They have some architectural pretensions and being embossed in trees, were 
often the shady spots in the neighbourhood. They added much to the rustic life and kept alive a spirit o f  
hospitality and piety among the agricultural people, please see: T Jows, Selections from the records o f the 
Government o f  India (Foreign Department No. ID Report on the Administration o f  the Paniab from the year 
1849-1850 and 1850-1855. (Calcutta: Calcutta Gazette office, 1853) 123.
5 Richard Maxwell Eaton, ‘The Political and Religious Authority’, Essays on Islam and Indian history. 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000) 204; Also refer: Aubrey O’Brien, ‘The Mohammedan Saints 
o f  the Western Panjab,’ Journal o f the Royal Anthropoligical Institute 41 (1911) (London: The Royal 
Anthropological Institute) 511.
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importance to which some kind of fair was not attached.6 For instance in the Jhelum 
district there were thirty three fairs held. All the fairs were connected with nearby shrines, 
and the principal features of the mela were the making of offerings to the shrine, and the
n
distribution of food from the shrine or Iangar.
The most important shrines that get a mention in contemporary sources are those of 
Madho Lai Hussein at Lahore, Baba Farid at Pak Pattan8 and the shrine of Abdul Qadir 
Sani of Uch.9 For instance, Umdat ut Tawarikh mentions various religious and seasonal 
festivities with which Ranjit Singh began associating himself. His participation and 
encouragement of the festivities of Basant (the spring season), in the shrine of Madho Lai 
Hussein, an important Sufi shrine in Lahore is mentioned quite often.10 On January I6lh, 
1815, Ranjit Singh along with the Prince spent a quarter of a day at the shrine.11 In
6 The guardians o f  the shrine generally received some small offerings in cash or kind, but in most cases 
they also gave out food, so that they retained little or no net income. In some cases the zamindars who 
owned the land or had influence in the neighbourhood took a contribution either from the people at the fair 
or from the shopkeepers whom they allowed to trade there. Please refer; Maclagan 103.
7 Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f  the Jhelam District (1883-84) 64.
8 The shrine o f Shaikh Farid as Din Ganj I Shakar, lies on the right bank o f  the Panjab’s most southeasterly 
river, the Sutlej, roughly halfway between Firozepur and Bahawalpur. For a detailed account on Baba 
Farid, please refer; Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, The Life and Times o f Shaikh Farid-ud-Din Gani-i-Shakar, 
(Delhi; Idarah-i-Adabiyat-i-Delli, 1973).
9 For a detailed account o f the Sayyids o f  Uch, refer; Gazetteer o f the Jhang District (1908). (Lahore; Civil 
and Military Gazette Press, 1910) 59- 60.
10 The tomb o f  Madho Lai Hussein is situated north o f village Bagbanpura. Madho Lai was a disciple o f  
Hussein who was born in 1539 AD in Lahore. Madho Lai was a brahman boy o f Shahdara, a village across 
the river Ravi. For a detailed description, please see: Narendra Krishna Singh, Sufis o f  India and Pakistan 
and Bangladesh. Vol. Ill, (New Delhi; Kitab Bhawan, 2002) 86-87.
11 Sohan Lai Suri, Umdat ut Tawarikh. Daftar II (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 178.
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another instance, the celebrations of B a s a n t  was described very graphically by Sohan Lai 
Suri,
Ranjit Singh conferred splendid robes o f  honour m ade o f  y e llo w  Pashm ina upon all the 
glorious chieftains, near attendants, M unshis, Daftaris and V akils. Every one o f  them w as 
given  an order to present h im self  at that M ausoleum  at about the third quarter o f  the day, 
dressed in y e llo w  garm ents, like brocade, satin and gold w oven  cloth. After that reliable 
persons w ere appointed to go to Shah A yoob, Shahzada Ibrahim and to other Shahzadas. 
Som e elephants w ere sent out for riding o f  the said Shah and others. A fter that an order 
w as issued to the Com m andants o f  the C am poo e M an ila  (royal cam p) to dress all the 
footm en in y e llo w  garm ents to stand all along the w ay from  D elh i gate to the m ausoleum . 
B ehind the footm en, horsem en o f  the triumphant troops should be stationed in rows just 
opposite to the troops and footm en stood drawn in lines according to the orders o f  the 
Maharaja. At about the third quarter o f  the day the Maharaja cam e out o f  the fort with 
great pomp and sh ow , passed through the D elh i gate and then w ent to the said 
M ausoleum , surveying in the w ay the triumphant troops. There he took  his seat upon a 
gold chair under a w ell-se t canopy, w ith very valuable canopies around it. B esid es there 
w ere variegated carpets and different kinds o f  floorings spread u n d ern eath ...12
These cultural festivities of Basant, associated with the end of cold winter and arrival of 
spring, to be organised in the Sufi shrine of Madho Lai Hussein, not only seem to 
recognise the importance of Sufi Islamic ethos, but also brought various communities 
together under the non Muslim political symbolism represented by Ranjit Singh and his 
courtiers at the shrine.
The other way of engaging with the Sufi shrines was state patronage by means of offering 
khillats, state honours, grantslj and allotment of jagirs to the gaddinashins of these 
shrines. Persian contemporary sources have given instances to elaborate this point with 
regard to the shrine of Baba Farid at Pak Pattan and the shrine of Uch. After the taking
12 Suri, Vol. II, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 487-488; Also see: 388 and 438.
13 For classification o f Grants, please see: Jows 119-123.
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over of Sahiwal, Ranjit Singh gave khillats to the Faqirs of Uch. In another instance 
Ranjit Singh asked Ahmad Khan Sial to pay tribute to the Faqirs of Uch.14 It seems that 
the relationship between the shrine of Pakpattan and the Lahore government was 
strengthened when Diwan Sheikh Mohammed Yar, Sajada Nashin of Pak Pattan, went to 
meet Ranjit Singh. This meeting was followed by Ranjit Singh’s visit to Pak Pattan 
where he fixed a nominal nazrana of rupees nine thousand and granted the robe of honour 
to the Pirzada.15 The descendants of Sheikh Farid at Pakpattan were recognised by Ranjit 
Singh and received fresh grants of revenue free land in addition to their old madad i 
maash.16 It is noteworthy that in the central Panjab there were scattered small Sufi shrines 
associated with Baba Farid. The presence of these shrines showed that a certain tract of 
the Panjab had become identified with Baba Farid’s wilayat, or spiritual kingdom, which 
to his devotees was perceived as having specific geographic boundaries that bordered the 
wilayats of other saints.17 This state patronage given to the Sufi shrine, by the Lahore 
government would have benefited Ranjit Singh. By patronising the Sufi shrine of Baba 
Farid at Pak Pattan, it can be suggested that he increased his influence and authority over
14 Suri 87, 94; Such references o f local revenues being allocated to the Sufi shrine have been as old as the 
time o f  Sultan Mohammed ibn Tughlaq who had bestowed the city o f Ajodhan on the shrine. Please refer: 
Ibn Battuta, Rehla o f  Ibn Batuta (India, Maldive Islands and Ceylon), Trans, and Ed. Mahdi Husain 
(Baroda: The Oriental Institute, 1953) 20.
15 Suri 202-203; The Diwan was the chief patron o f  the Sufi shrine, and the clients were the masses o f the 
murid. Please refer: Eaton, ‘Court o f Man and Court o f  God’, Essays in Islam 227.
16 Foreign/Political Proceedings. 28 June 1854. Nos. 204-205; Prinsep and Lepel Griffin suggest that the 
Muslim Pirzadas suffered a loss. According to Indu Banga, it is a partial view and it is important to note 
that Muslim grantees received the same treatment from the Sikh rulers as the Hindu and Sikh grantees, See: 
Indu Banga, Agrarian System o f the Sikhs: late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Delhi: Manohar, 
1978) 164. Also see: Henry Thoby Prinsep, Origin o f  the Sikh Power in the Punjab and Political Life o f  
Muha-raia Runieet Singh with an account o f the present condition, religion, laws and customs o f the Sikhs. 
(1830. Calcutta: G.H. Huttman, 1834. Patiala: Languages Department, 1970) 166 and Lepel Griffin and 
Charles Massey, Chiefs and Families o f  Note in the Paniab.Vol. I (Lahore: 1909) 306.
17 Sivar al-Arifin 115, as quoted by Eaton, ‘Political and Religious Authority1, Essays on Islam 210.
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the regions of central Panjab, thus increasing the non Muslim legitimacy among Muslims 
of Panjab. This was perhaps similar to when Delhi court patronised the shrine of 
Pakpattan, also to add the shrine patronized the agricultural clans.18
The state grants received by Sufi shrines in Multan,19 Kashmir and Peshawar were 
recognised by Ranjit Singh soon after their take over. For instance, the Shia Gardezi 
Sayyids20 of Multan retained their wealth and influence though some of their lands were
91 * •resumed. In Kashmir, the number of Muslim grantees of all categories ran into
* 4 22thousands, including the famous shrines of Hazratbal and Shah Hamdan. Mohammed
Shah Naqshbandi alone was given five villages.23 In Peshawar, there were one or more 
masjids in every village to each of which was attached a small ma'afi, enjoyed by the 
Imam.24 All old grants enjoyed by the Sayyids, the Ulema, and the Qazis were confirmed 
along with that of the faqirs of Peshawar.23 The Sayyids and the Ulema of Bannu were
18 Eaton, Essays on Islam 218.
19 For a detailed account on the shrines o f Multan, please refer: Maclagan 121-124.
20 For a detailed account o f the Gardezi Sayyids, please refer: Maclagan 153-154.
21 Suri, Vol. 11 270.
22 Mir Ahmad, Dastur al Amal e Kashmir. (MS) ff  184a, 206b, 207b, 208 a-b, 209a, 283a; also ff  326a- 
341a.
23 Baron Charles Von Hugel, Travels in Cashmere and the Paniab: containing a particular account o f the 
government and character o f the Sikhs, Trans. Thomas Best Jervis (London: John Petherman, 1845) 354.
24 Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f  the Peshawar District (4 897-98) 207-208.
23 Suri, Vol. Ill (Part I-III), (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2002) 309.
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also exempt from taxation.26 The shrine of Sakhi Sarwar in Dera Ghazi Khan enjoyed the
* ■ 27equivalent of over forty thousand acres of land in dharmarth.
Among the Muslim groups, it seems Sheikhs and Sayyids28 were patronized by Ranjit
99Singh. They enjoyed grants of revenue free land in all the doabs of the Panjab." 
Everywhere Sayyids and Sheikhs were objects of reverence, whose temporal wants were 
freely attended to.30 Numerous khanqas (buildings designed specifically for gatherings of 
a Sufi brotherhood) received grants from the Sikh ruler.31 The Sheikhs of the khanqas of 
Pir Mitha near Wazirabad enjoyed fifteen different concessions, including revenue free 
lands, daily allowance in cash, dues from the mint, grain from Gujarat, rice from
26 Herbert Benjamin Edwardes, Political diaries o f Lieut. H.B. Edwardes, assistant to the resident at Lahore, 
1847-1849, Series: Panjab Government Records, Vol. 5, (Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1911) 162, 170, 179. 
180, 213-214, 228, 265. Also see: Gazetteer o f Bannn (1883-84), 194 and 196.
27 Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f the Dera Ghazi Khan District (1893-97). Revised ed. (Lahore: Civil 
and Military Gazette Press, 1898)120.
28 For a detailed account o f the Sheikhs and Sayyids, please refer: Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f  the 
Peshawar District (1897-98) 142; Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Lahore District (1893-94) 106; 
Maclagan 153; Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Rawalpindi District (1893-94) Revised ed. (Lahore: 
Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1895) 111-112; Aluf Shah, Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f  the Dera 
Ismail Khan District (1883-84) (Lahore: Arya Press, 1884) 66; the Sayyids are very influential with the 
Muslim population and the tribes o f  the highest rank. The Gakhars and the Janjuas, important Panjabi clans, 
are always ready to give their daughters in marriage to the Sayyids. Please refer: Punjab Government, 
Gazetteer o f  the Rawalpindi District (1893-94) 111.
29 Khalsa Durbar Records, Bundle 5, Vol. XI, 3, 4, 11-15, 35, 101, 335, 353, 357, 387, 399, 421, 449, 527, 
597. Foreign/Political proceedings, 22 November 1850, No 117 A; Also: 7 January 1853, Nos. 231-34.
30 Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Peshawar District (1897-98) 111.
31 Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Peshawar District (1897-98). 371, 455, 485 & 575, See also: 
Foreign/Political Proceedings, 14 November 1851, No. 45; Gazetteer o f Shahpur (1897). 16, 42 and 85; 
Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Rawalpindi District (1893-94) 116-117. Some o f the khanqas to 
receive grants from the Sikh rulers were those o f  mastan Shah, Shah Bahlol, Wazir Shah, Sayyid Mahmud 
Fateh Ali, Pir Adam Sultan, Shah Shams and Sultan Habib.
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Kashmir, and salt from Pind Dadan Khan.j2 The great Sayyids and respectable Sheikhs 
associated with the tomb in the fort of Multan came to present themselves before the 
Maharaja with some sanctioned offerings of crumbs and every one of them was given 
some cash according to his status.33 Ranjit Singh was able to get his authority recognised 
among the Muslims through these elites, and establish non Muslim legitimate domination 
in Panjab.
Evidence from the Persian contemporary sources suggests that Ranjit Singh patronised 
and supported Shia Muslims.34 For instance, on the 20lh August, 1825, Mirza Behun Beg, 
“Kumidan i Topkhcma” (the commandant of gunnery), with some others, approached 
Ranjit Singh and protested on behalf of his Muslim officers, against restriction on the 
procession of tazias (procession taken out by Shia Muslims during the Muharram) on the 
street, in connection with the Muharram festival. He pleaded in favour of the Muslims 
arguing that this tradition of taking out tazias had been present since time immemorial. 
He further said that if Ranjit Singh had any prejudices against the Muslims then he 
should first dismiss Muslim officers working under him. Ranjit Singh asked them to build 
tazias in their own house. Two days later, after Prince Kharak Singh had told Ranjit 
Singh in the open durbar about the discontentment among Muslim soldiers about the ban 
on taking out tazias in the streets, Ranjit Singh ordered the Kotwal of the city to proclaim
32 Khalsa Durbar Records. Bundle 5, Vol. XIII, 615-616.
33 Suri, Vol. II 355.
34 For a detailed account o f Shias and the difference between the Shias and the Sunnis please refer: J M 
Wikeley, Panjabi Musulmans 19; Also see: Maclagan 119.
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that any one wanting to take out a tazia should be allowed to do so.35 In addition, Ranjit 
Singh clad himself in green ornaments and joined the Muslims on the occasion of 
M uharram/6 It appears that he also joined in other festivals of Persian origins which were 
celebrated by the Shias. For instance, he celebrated Nctitrooz (The official New Year for 
Zoroastrians) festival, the first day of the year for the Persians. All the servants were 
offered nazars 011 the occasion.37 This practice broke away from the earlier trend of 
abolishing the celebrations of Iranian New Year or Naurooz festivities, targeted against
* 38the Shias during the period of Aurangzeb.
Similarly, evidence also suggests that Ismaili Khojas were also recognised by him. For 
instance, at the time of the take over of Chiniot by Ranjit Singh from the Bhangi Misl 
chief, Ranjit Singh observed that Mian Sultan, a Khoja, stood firm over the citadel and 
though the Bhangi forces had been defeated outside the town and the Bhangi leader taken 
prisoner, he did not desert his charge or open the gates of the fort except at the order of 
his master. Ranjit Singh was so pleased with the dedication of this Khoja leader that he 
granted him Kalowal and Changranwala.39
35 Suri, Vol. Ill 293-294.
36 Suri, Vol. Ill 152.
37 Suri, Vol. Ill 242.
3S John F Richards, The New Cambridge History o f India: The Mughal Empire (1993. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 173.
39 Gazetteer o f the Jhang District (1908). 69.
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Ranjit Singh intervened in the affairs of Muslim institutions if he saw that Muslim 
religious authority could not rectify a problem associated with their institutions such as a 
mosque. He used his political authority to correct the crisis keeping the interests of the 
larger Muslim population in mind. This signified his desire to uphold the sensibilities of 
his Muslim subjects through his governance. For instance, in Moti Masjid when he 
discovered a discrepancy in financial matters, he appointed bankers to investigate the 
matter.40 In another instance, Sawan Mai took charge of the tomb of Daud Jahaniah and 
got it repaired.41 Another method, adopted for maintaining political stability was by 
encouraging interaction of the various religious groups, such as the interaction between 
the Sikh religious leaders and the Sheikhs and the Sayyids. As a befitting example, Baba 
Sahib Singh Bedi was told to settle in the locality of the Sayyids. It appears from Suri’s 
account that the Sayyids were contented with the good treatment of the said baba42 It 
could be argued that the settling of the Bedis alongside the Sayyids at one level was done 
to encourage religious harmony but at a less esoteric level it was a strategic move, as 
religious harmony would lead to political harmony.
It can be suggested that the religious policy adopted by Ranjit Singh built an image of a 
state tolerant towards its Muslim subjects. It laid importance to the fact that every section,
40 Suri Vol. Ill (Part I-III) 486-487.
41 The shrine o f  Daud Jahaniah is located three miles south o f Muzaffargarh in the village o f Rampur. The 
shrine has a celebrity o f curing leprosy and lepers from all parts o f  Panjab and Kashmir resort to it. The 
shrine is visited by Muslims and Hindus both. Ram Das, Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f the 
Muzaffargarh District (1883-84) (Lahore: Arya Press) 63.
42 Suri Vol. Ill (Part I-III) 97.
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whether it was those following the Sufi order, or those who were Shias were important 
for the state.
5.2 Justice
The judicial policy adopted by Ranjit Singh appears to have been cautiously formulated 
and executed with regards to the interests of the Muslim population. It is important to 
consider what the institution of justice meant for the Muslims in the context of state 
formation. Most of the Muslim population came under the jurisdiction of Muslim law 
under Ranjit Singh’s rule. H. K. Trevaskis, substantiating this point, mentions that 
Muslim law was applicable to the civil cases of the Muslims.43 Even though it is difficult 
to understand the difference between the criminal and civil law. It appears that in the 
system of justice formulated in Panjab, Ranjit Singh put himself at the top of the pyramid 
of justice,44 and began employing Muslim managerial elites in the judicial system, soon 
after the taking over of Lahore. We know from Amarnath’s contemporary account and 
Waheeduddin’s work that one of the first steps taken by Ranjit Singh after he took over 
Lahore was the revival of the system of Qazis and Adaltis followed during the times of 
the Mughals. For instance, Qazi Nizamuddin was invested with full authority regarding 
marriages, divorce and matters regarding the royal seal on court papers. He was asked to 
conduct the affairs in a manner similar to the times of the Mughals. The civil cases like 
mortgages, contracts, sales etc were entrusted to Mufti Mohammed Shah’s son Sadullah
43 Hugh Kennedy Treveski, The Land o f the Five Rivers: An economic History o f  the Panjab from Earliest 
Times to the year o f  Grace 1890 (Oxford University Press: 1928) 289.
44 Ganesh Das Badhera, Char Bagh-i-Paniab, Ed. Kirpal Singh (1865. Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1965) 329.
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Chisti, whereas the post of Kohval or the head of the city police was given to Imam 
Baksh Kharsowar. Former neighbourhood headmen were reappointed in various 
neighbourhoods or mohallas, thus reintroducing neighbourhood system or mohalladari 
system. According to this system, each locality was handed over to an elder of the area.45
It is important to note that Ranjit Singh did not get his appointments approved by any 
other political authority such as the Mughal, Afghan or British or any other. Satish 
Chandra in his work has demonstrated how it was important for the Maratha Baji Rao, to 
get approval for the positions he appointed such as those of Qazis etc, from the Mughal 
emperor 46 This clearly demonstrates the emergence of non Muslim hegemony in Panjab 
in the institution of Justice, which was free of recognition from any Muslim emperor.
Though various secondary works have offered their views on other aspects of the judicial 
system however they have failed to examine the institution of justice with regards to 
Muslims. For instance, J S Grewal mentions briefly in the Cambridge History o f  the 
Sikhs, that Ranjit Singh was the chief source of Justice, though judges (adaltis) were 
appointed all fresh and the court of the qazi and panchayats were kept up in the town and 
villages.47 In another instance he mentions that the jurisprudence was exclusively the 
domain of Hindu scholars, particularly Brahmans. All the other interests were cultivated
4:1 Fakir Syed Waheeduddin, The Real Ranjit Singh (Karachi: Lion Art Press Limited, 1965) 34; and Diwan 
Amarnath, Zafarnamah e Ranjit Singh, Chapter III; Also see: Jows 10.
46 Satish Chandra, Essays on Medieval Indian History (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003) 73.
47 JS Grewal, The New Cambridge History o f  India: The Sikhs o f  the Paniab (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990) 107.
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by Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs alike.48 Bhagat Singh, in his work deals with the issue of 
law and justice, and describes the structure of judicial system, but it fails to relate the 
system and its ramifications with regards to the Muslim population 49 Jagjiwan Walia 
totally misses mentioning the judicial system prevalent under Ranjit Singh with regard to 
the Muslim majority.50 This section will endeavour to examine this aspect in detail.
Some British writers and some British influenced writers have generally criticised Ranjit 
Singh’s method of justice. For example, in the report on the administration of the Panjab, 
T Jows mentions that the system of Justice under Ranjit Singh was rude and simple. Men 
of wealth and influence were deputed to get revenue from the remote corners of the state. 
So long as their remittances to the royal treasury were regular, they might exercise 
plenary authority over life and property.51 The author of History o f  Panjab writes that 
there was no law written or oral and no regular courts of justice.52 According to him,
The civ il governm ent and the power o f  life and death in the provinces were in the hands 
o f  the sa rd a rs , ja g ir d a r s  and renters. The personal character o f  each individual w as the 
standard by w hich ju stice  w as measured. The A d a la t or nom inal court o f  ju stice  w as a 
rich source o f  revenue, a fine being the punishm ent usually awarded. In c iv il cases the 
prisoner w as charged one fourth o f  the am ount at issue and it w as com m on for both 
parties to endeavour to purchase a decision . Under such a system  the poor man had but
48 JS Grewal, The Reign o f  Maharaja Ranjit Singh: Structure o f Power, Economy, and Society (Patiala: 
Panjabi University, 1981) 34.
49 Bhagat Singh, Maharaja Ranjit Singh and His Times (Delhi: Sehgal Publishers, 1990) 208.
50 Jagjiwan Mohan Walia, Parties and Politics at the Sikh Court. 1799-1849 (Delhi: Master Publishers, 
1982).
M Jows 8.
32 History o f the Paniab. 188-189. This book has an anonymous author but it is generally attributed to TH 
Thornton. (1846. Patiala: Language department, 1970).
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little chance, the vagabond th ie f urged to plunder by necessity  lost his nose or ears, but 
the w ealthy robber and dextrous ruffian w ere unm olested.53
Similarly, according to Prinsep, Avitabile acted as a savage among savage men. He 
mercilessly punished people and villages, especially if some harm had been done to a 
Sikh or a Hindu.54 Malcolm called the administration of justice in the country under the 
Sikhs ‘rude’ and the reflection of an imperfect state.55
However, Persian and English language contemporary sources of the period have given a 
more appreciative account of Ranjit Singh’s system of justice. For instance, 
contemporary writers like Amarnath and Sohan Lai, admired his administration of 
Justice. Waheeduddin, basing his view on his own family archives writes,
Like all Oriental monarchs Ranjit Singh w as in the habit o f  receiving petitions and 
listening to com plaints in the course o f  passing through the streets. The general method  
w as for the petitioner to lie down in the path o f  the royal procession  or shout for the 
Maharaja’s protection from am idst the crowd. He w ould decide som e matters on the spot 
and pass others down to one or other o f  the officers accom panying him. So sharp w as his 
m em ory and so  keen his interest in seein g  justice done that he often enquired about the 
cases subsequently and looked into them  after they had been decided by the low er  
authorities. There w ere not a few  occasion s w hen the personal know ledge he had gained  
helped him in confirm ing or altering the decisions o f  his o fficers.56
33 HT Prinsep supports the argument o f Thornton. Please see: Henry Thoby Prinsep, Origin o f the Sikh 
Power in the Punjab and Political Life o f  Muha-raia Runieet Singh with an account o f the present 
condition, religion, laws and customs o f  the Sikhs (Patiala: Languages Department, 1970) 144.
54 Prinsep 109-11, 139.
35 John Malcolm, Sketch o f  the Sikhs: Their origin, customs and manners. (Delhi: Asian Educational 
Services, 1986) 127.
36 Waheeduddin 34, 35.
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Contrary to the views expressed by some other British authors, Swinson, reflecting about 
the law and order during this time writes that there was no written law whatsoever. Still, 
the regime was stable, and though Ranjit Singh was old and tottered on his feet, and 
drank regularly to excess no one dared oppose him.57 It appears that there were two levels 
of functionaries; a) Military and b) Fiscal. To this rule an exception was at the city of 
Lahore, where an officer of Justice styled Adalti was stationed. However there was no 
such functionary at the commercial capital of Amritsar. And there was no special minister 
of justice. Detached military commanders carried out administration of Justice, wherever 
they were put in command. Ranjit Singh made tours through his dominions, he would 
listen to complaints and would take immediate actions against his own officers if found 
guilty. The unwritten penal code of the state contained but two penalties; fine and 
mutilation. There was scarcely any crime from theft to murder for which immunity might 
not be purchased by the payment of a fine."
Important primary evidence suggests that the ruler of Lahore considered justice as an 
important pillar of his state. The two widely quoted farmans in the Fakirkhana collection 
clearly describes the dispensation of Justice in Ranjit Singh’s rule. According to the 
farmans,
N o  person in the city  could practice high handedness, i f  H is H ighness h im self should  
issue an inappropriate order against any resident o f  Lahore, it should be clearly brought 
to  the notice o f  His H ighness so that it m ay be am ended. The Protector o f  Bravery, 
M alw a Singh, should alw ays be advised to dispense ju stice  in accordance with the 
legitim ate right and w ithout the slightest oppression. Furthermore, he should be advised
57 Arthur Swinson, North West Frontier: People and Events, 1839-1947 (London: Hutchinson, 1967) 29.
58 Jows 10.
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to pass orders in consultation with the Punches  and the Judges o f  the city and in 
accordance with the sh astras  and the Quran, as pertinent to the faith o f  the parties; for 
such is our p lea su re ...59
The essence of these farmans can be corroborated by the fact stated in Surfs third 
volume which begins by stating that at the time of Ranjit Singh taking over as the chief in 
1790, ‘ ...after tyranny a king emerges. That king has the trust of the Lord and is a 
dispenser of justice’.60 Suri considers orders given by Ranjit Singh as auspicious as the 
his family, according to him was blessed by the Gurus.61 He adds that it was stressed in 
the several decrees issued to the judicial officers that all cases should be decided on true 
premises with a voice of conscious and to show kindness to the poor.62 Amarnath too 
substantiates this point and mentions that, ‘in view of the worldly reality he always 
remembered that the state is like a calling of a shepherd and that it is obligatory for rulers 
to be vigilant so that every living being may live in the cradle of peace, that the people of 
the world may reside in happiness under the shadow of kindness of a just sovereign and 
that the aggrieved may dwell merrily under the benevolent shield of a compassionate 
king...’.6'5 Though, whether Malwa Singh was the chief justice or not remains obscure, 
and no other source mentions of him as chief justice, it can however be suggested that 
Ranjit Singh positioned Sikhs at the highest echelons of his judicial system. Thus by
59 Waheeduddin 31-32.
60 Suri Vol. II, Trans. V S Suri, GNDU, Amritsar, 2002, 1.
61 Suri, Vol. 113.
62 Amarjit Singh, “Judicial administration o f Maharaja Ranjit Singh”, The Paniab Past and Present. October 
1968 (Patiala: Punjabi University) 344; Also see: Herbert Leonard Offley Garrett and G L Chopra, Events 
at the Court o f  Rani it Singh. 1810-1817 (Patiala: Languages Department, 1970) 255.
63 Amarnath 16.
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keeping the Mughal system intact, it seems he would have got legitimacy to govern, but 
by changing its composition of those who constituted judiciary significantly, he brought 
about a change in hegemony from Muslim elites to the non Muslim elites.
In addition, some of the English sources written by travellers and British officials have 
praised Ranjit Singh’s judicial system. For instance, Baron Charles Hugel who visited the 
Panjab during Ranjit Singh’s reign writes in this connection: "Never perhaps was so large 
an empire founded by one man with so little criminality; when we consider the country 
and the uncivilized people with whom he had to deal, his mild government must be 
regarded with feelings o f astonishment.64 W G Osborne, another foreign visitor to the 
Panjab at that time, writes: “he rules with a rod of iron, but injustice to him it must be 
stated that except in actual open warfare he has never been known to take life though his 
own has been attempted more than once and his reign will be found free from any 
striking acts of cruelty and oppression than those of many more civilized monarchs.63
It appears that Ranjit Singh recognised the customary laws; thus by safeguarding the 
religious rights of the Muslims along with their traditional customs, he strengthened his 
position among his Muslim subjects who had had tribal lineages.66 According to Rattigan,
64 Hugel 382.
fo W G  Osborne, The Court and Camp of Ranjit Singh, with an introductory Sketch o f the Origin and Rise 
o f Sikh State (London: Henry Colburn, 1840) 36.
66 Ranjit Singh had the intention o f standardising these tribal customs, with advice from the elders o f  the 
community. He established a small committee under the chairmanship o f  Bahadur Singh Hindustani. 
Munshi Sohan Lai was associated with the committee as a head clerk. Please refer: Khushwant Singh,
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the bulk of the population was governed by the customary laws. Ail the tribal groups, 
which between themselves constituted the major part of the people subject to the Khalsa 
rule, were firmly attached to their respective customs. No doubt they had religious 
affiliations as well but in their social and legal matters their outlook was tribal rather than 
religious.67 The best example, which illustrates this point, is when Syed Ahmad of Rae 
Bareilly tried to force certain strict Shariat laws upon the tribal regions, the tribal 
community opposed it to the extent that they killed those executing the harsh orders. 
Generally, these courts, which dealt with the customary laws, were invariably composed 
of the elders of the communities under a system known as Panchayat,68 Hence, this 
seems to have encouraged the village elders to be in support of Ranjit Singh’s policies, as 
there was 110 severe crisis calling for his solemn attention.69 The importance given to the 
customary laws and the Panchayats in the administering of justice was moving away
History o f  the Sikhs (1469-1849). Vol. 1, (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) 271; Also see: 
Khushwant Singh, Ranjit Singh. Maharaja o f the Paniab. 1780-1839. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962) 161.
67 William Henry Rattigan, A Digest o f  Civil Law for the Paniab: chiefly based on the customary laws as at 
present judicially ascertained (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1929).
68 Murray in the Appendix in Prinsep’s work describes the role o f Panchayats as an arbitrator. Please see; 
Prinsep 160; Also see: Septimus Smet Thorburn, Musalmans and Moneylenders in the Pan jab (Edinburgh: 
William Blackwood, 1886) 166.
69 Panchay>at refers to a South Asian political system where the council o f  elected members takes decisions 
on issues key to a village's social, cultural and economic life: thus, a panchayat is a village's body o f  elected 
representatives. The council leader is named sarpanch in Hindi. Traditionally, these assemblies settled 
disputes between individuals and villages. This practice was continued by the British who formed a body o f  
panchas under the direction o f the British government. Please see: Henry Montgomery Lawrence, Political 
diaries o f the Agent to the Governor-General. North-West Frontier, and Resident at Lahore, from 1st 
January 1847 to 4th March 1848. Series: Punjab Government Records, Vol. 3, (Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 
1909); According to John Malcolm, ‘...this court has a high character o f justice’, John Malcolm 127-128; 
Also see: Thorburn, who calls Panchayat as, ‘The accepted exponents and enforcers o f  public opinion or an 
institution which had the sanction o f prescription and had always given satisfaction to the people’, 
Thorburn 166; For more on Panchayats and Village Justice, see: India. Foreign Department. General Report 
upon the Administration o f  the Paniab Proper for the years 1849-50 and 1850-51. (Lahore: The Chronicle 
Press, 1854) 8-10.
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from the Mughal system where the importance was given to the Adctltis and the Shariat 
law. Decisions upon all the other issues, such as land and payment of revenues, were 
taken by courts established by kardars and nazims and finally by Ranjit Singh himself, 
but only if his intervention was ever called for. If it was required, special courts were set 
up which were presided over by Adaltis and Qazis.70 Evidence suggests that by 
strengthening the judicial system at the village level, not only did Ranjit Singh build trust 
but also avoided intricacies of the legal procedures.
Another judicial policy adopted by Ranjit Singh was the policy of co-existence of the non 
Muslims with the Muslim qazis and adaltis. For example, Wisakha Singh, a Sikh, was 
given the charge of justice of the Jammu region in 181571 and later was made in charge of 
administering justice in Kashmir as well.72 He was warned by Ranjit Singh that he must 
administer strict justice in accordance with the principles of religion and the quality of the 
deed, so that no poor person should suffer unnecessarily.73 In another instance, 
administration of Justice was given to Gurmukh Singh for the region of Khangarh and 
Muradabad.74 Suri also mentions that Ranjit Singh made Bahadur Singh Hindustani a
70 Suri Daftar II 228, 271, 306, 357, 361, 365; Garrett and Chopra 93, 95, 143, 157, 176, 188, 252, 253, 
255 ,271 ,275 .
71 Suri Vol. II 179.
72 Suri Vol. II 347.
73 Events at the court o f Ranjit Singh, 1810-1817: translated from the papers in the Alienation Office. 
Poona. Eds. Herbert Leonard Offley Garrett and Gulshan Lai Chopra, (Lahore: Government Press, 1935, 
Patiala: Language Department, 1970) 255; Also refer: 188, 252, 271.
74 Suri Vol. II 321.
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Judge.75 Some more names of the non Muslims such as Sham Das Adaltia, Khushal Mai 
Adaltia and Sujan Rae were in charge of administering justice. Sujan Rae was the 
Darogha i Adalat, who was ordered to administer justice and always should consider 
religious honesty as of foremost importance.76 The mention of Malwa Singh, a Sikh, in 
the farman in Fakir collection clearly demonstrates that he had to work in collaboration 
with the panches and the Judges of the city.77 It also depicts concern for the village 
community. According to Henry Durand, when he visited Avitabile, the Nazim of 
Peshawar, he had been performing judicial functions. He writes, “I called upon Avitabile 
and found him employed in giving decisions with his judges around him. Two Qazis, two 
Hindus and two Sikhs formed his conclave”.78 General Ventura, the French general of 
Ranjit Singh held the responsibilities of a Qazi along with military and administrative 
functions.79
A great deal of contemporary evidence suggests that Ranjit Singh punished those non-
Muslim qazis and adaltis who exceeded their limit of jurisdiction. For instance, in 1816,
* * 80Baisakha Singh was warned for being cruel in administering justice. In another
75 Suri Vol. II 437.
76 Events at the Court 93. 157, 176,275.
77 Waheeduddin 42.
78 Charles Grey and Herbert Leonard Offley Garrett, European Adventurers o f  North India. 1785-1849. 
(Lahore: Printed by the Superintendent, Government Printing, Punjab, 1929) 137.
79 Fauja Singh, Some Aspects o f  State and Society under Ranjit Singh (New Delhi: Master Publishers, 
1982)152.
80 Events at the Court 252.
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instance Lala Khushab Ram was dismissed from the position of judge and in 1830, Seel 
Singh Adalti was removed from his office.81 In 1828, Bahadur Singh Adalti was 
dismissed.82 Suri mentions that Ranjit Singh punished Bhai Ram Singh after it was 
realised that he had sent a false report about Agar Khan of Rajauri.83 Even Generals like
* • • R i l  •Hari Singh Nalwa were punished for not administering justice properly. The mention of 
administering justice with religious honesty seems to suggest the intent of Ranjit Singh 
towards his Muslim subjects especially when the justice was being administered by a non 
Muslim. This intent is vindicated by an event which describes justice to have been 
considered over and above state income.
Sukh D ia l, the agent o f  Rama N and Sahu w as told that the work o f  administration o f  
justice, the charge o f  the seal o f  ‘nnm shigirF  and other services connected with them  
have been entrusted to him by the N ob le  Sarkar, against 1.3 m illion ,83 but that he m ust 
adm inister ju stice  with m ercy and with religious honesty. Folding his hands he replied  
that on the basis o f  the contract ju stice  according to religious honesty it was a bit difficult 
to adm inister, because one had to keep an eye on procuring m oney both by m eans lawful 
as w ell as illegitim ate. The N ob le  Sarkar said that out o f  regard for him he postponed the 
granting o f  this contract for one year and w ould now  watch with what cleverness he 
w ould  discharge his task.86
It can be suggested that the primary concern of Ranjit Singh was fairness in 
administration of justice towards his subjects. There are similarities with the Mughal 
system. For instance, in matters of punishments, like Shahjahan, he did not regard nobles
81 Suri Vol. II 169, 399.
82 Suri Vol. II 365, 447.
83 Suri Vol. II 168-169.
84 Suri Vol. I I466.
83 In Rupees
86 Events at the Court 95.
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as different from his ordinary subjects. In Ranjit Singh’s scenario the nobility was 
primarily composed of the non Muslims and his subjects were mostly Muslims. Similarly 
it appears that on the lines of Akbar, Ranjit Singh was aware of the fact that to look 
towards sovereigns (farman dahan) is considered to be the worship of God; and for 
sovereigns, in return, the dispensing of justice and administering the world, is the real 
mode of worship.88 In addition to aspects which Ranjit Singh inherited from the Mughal 
system of justice, the importance given to customary laws and participation of people 
from the grassroots through the medium of Panchayats significantly improved the 
administration of Justice in Panjab.89 The process of administering justice in Panjab 
involved the vast majority of Muslims in the system of Justice provided by the state 
controlled by non Muslim elites, thus making it unique for its time. This aspect gave 
permanence to the institution of justice, thus providing employment to many Muslim 
jurists which further gave legitimacy to Ranjit Singh to govern over Muslim subjects. It 
can also be suggested that by including the non Muslims in the process of dispensing 
justice, Ranjit Singh made an effort much before the British to separate the institution of 
justice from the sway of religious identities, thus making the state machinery supreme, 
although not ignoring religious and customary laws. Most importantly, this endeavour 
made the institution of justice less dependent on Muslim jurists, thus bringing about a 
paradigm shift from the Muslim hegemony to the non Muslim hegemony in the process 
of judicial matters.
87 Muhammad Athar Ali, Mughal India: Studies in Polity. Ideas. Society and Culture (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 65.
88 Ain i Akbari, Ed. Heinrich Ferdinand Blochmann, (Calcutta: Asiatic Society o f  Bengal, 1869-77) Vol. 3, 
220, 243; as quoted by Athar Ali 161-162.
89 Fauja Singh 169.
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5.3 Soldiers of the Lahore government
The army being the strongest agency of state formation, the recruitment process in it was 
crucial for engagement with the majority Muslim population. It appears that an 
overwhelming majority of the soldiery was drawn from amongst the Sikhs who were not 
mercenaries but who on the contrary regarded themselves as co-sharers in the glory 
which was symbolised by the establishment of Sikh rule at Lahore, so that the morale of 
the army was tremendously high. In the words of Lord Hardinge, every village had some 
relations in the Sikh ranks.90 Foreign Secret proceedings claim that in the regular 
infantry, the Sikhs constituted fifty two out of sixty two battalions in 1845, which means 
about forty five out of fifty four thousand men.91 The same was the case in the regular 
cavalry. In the irregular cavalry their strength was 9, 766 out of 10,799 under Ranjit
O')
Singh. In the jagirdari contingent also they formed a majority. The Sikhs were mostly 
Jats9j who came from the central regions of the Panjab called Majha and Doaba. Every 
Jat village sent recruits for the army, who again remitted their savings to their homes. 
Many a highly taxed village paid half its revenue from its military earnings.94 The cis 
Sutlej states of the Malwa region were under British protection but this fact did not stand 
in the way of the Malwa Sikhs entering into the service of the Lahore government. On the
90 Lord Hardinge’s comments on H Lawrence report referred to under footnote 69.
91 Foreign/Secret Proceedings. 26 December 1846 —No. 1027; John Lawrence to Curie, 24 August 1846.
92 Foreign/Secret Proceedings. 26 December 1846 -  No. 1027; John Lawrence to Curie, 24 August 1846.
93 Among the Majha Jats, the Sandhus occupying 159 estates in all respects, rank first. It was from this 
caste, that most o f  Ranjit Singh’s military leaders were drawn. Please see: Punjab Government. Gazetteer 
o f the Lahore District (1893-941 101.
94 Jows 11.
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eve of the first Sikh war 1845- 46, ten to fifteen thousand people from the cis Sutlej 
region were serving in the Lahore ranks.95
Ranjit Singh engaged Muslims too, who were an important part of his army. Taken 
together in the irregular cavalry there were 1029 Muslims out of 10, 799, approximately 
9.5 %, under Ranjit Singh. In the artillery they numbered more than 60 % of the total 
strength but in the regular infantry they formed only a minority. In the jagirdari forces 
and garrisons their number was even less. The same was the case in the regular cavalry. 
All the same, the Muslims held respectable positions in the Lahore armed forces. Some of 
them such as Ghause Khan, Mazhar Ali, Sultan Mohammed,96 Illahi Baksh and Amir 
Khan occupied key positions of colonels in the state military apparatus. They 
commanded more than half of the batteries of the artillery, top khan a.91 This was probably 
the Muslims of Lahore were always involved in artillery especially during the time of the 
Mughal rule.
Muslim soldiers could be broadly divided into Panjabi Muslims, Afghan tribes and 
Purbia Muslims.98 The first regular Muslim battalions of Ranjit Singh were composed of
9:1 HM Lawrence to Governor General -  Paniab Government Records press lists. Vol. 9, Letter 214.
96 There are three instances where there is a mention o f  General Sultan Mohammed in: JS Grewal & Indu 
Banga, Civil and Military Affairs o f Maharaja Ranjit Singh (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1987) 
Order numbers 390, 400 ,432 , 187,189 and 195.
97 Shahamat Ali, The Sikhs and the Afghans (London: John Murray, 1847, Patiala: Language Department, 
1970) 6; Also see: Foreign Secret Consulation. 27 April, 1844, No. 17.
98 Purbia Muslims are Muslims from Eastern India. It is difficult to say why these Purbias joined Ranjit 
Singh’s forces, but it appears it was for better prospects.
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Najibs and the inhabitants of Saharanpur and its vicinity." Later, one more Najib 
battalion100 was raised. Besides there were several Purbia Muslim officers like Sheikh 
Basawan, Aziz Khan, Bakhtawar Khan and Ibadullah, who were recruited. The artillery 
personnel were drawn from this class.101
1 (PAs regards Panjabi Muslims, who were known as Jagirdari Fanj\ ~ the most prominent 
among them were the Afghans of Kasur and Multan and the Muslims of Jhang and other 
districts situated between the river Indus and the Chenab. They were mainly employed in 
the cavalry and both regular and irregular infantry. They were also found in jagirdari 
contingents of Muslim fief holders like Qutubuddin of Kasur, Sheikh Ghulam 
Mohiuddin, Sheikh Imamuddin, and the Fakir brothers. Some of the Hindu chiefs such as 
Diwan Sawan Mai and Diwan Lakhi Mai had in their contingents, a large number of 
Muslim raj puts .l0j
99 Foreign Miscellaneous Proceedings, Vol. 332, m 386.
100 The Najib battalion was composed o f  Muslims from the Saharanpur belt.
101 Foreign Secret Consultation. 27 April 1844, No. 17.
102 Jagirs were given for the purpose o f securing military service. Almost half o f  the ja g ir  was commonly 
assumed to be personal and the other half was utilized for the maintenance o f the troops. If a certain 
Jagirdar did not supply the fixed quota o f troops for a long time, corresponding payment could be realised 
from him. Please see: Suri, Daftar II 381; Also, it was expected o f  the Jagirdars to supply temporary levies 
in emergencies. The grantees signed a Qabuliyat (deed o f acceptance) before taking over the possession o f  
a jag ir , please see: Akhbarat e Ranjit Singh. (MS) (1825), National Archives o f  India, 368.
103 Foreign/Secret Consultation. 27 April 1844, no. 17.
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The Afghans from across the Indus were much valued for their fighting qualities and 
were eagerly sought after by the Sikh rulers. For instance in 1836, Kanwar Nau Nihal 
Singh and Raja Suchet Singh were ordered by Ranjit Singh “to engage all sowars and 
footmen in the service of Painda Khan of Dera Bannu and Sher Mohammed Khan of 
Dera Ismail Khan who came to them for service.104 Similarly from time to time hundreds 
of men were entertained on the recommendations of the Afghan chiefs like Pir 
Mohammed Khan, Sultan Mohammed Khan and Shah Nawaz Khan.105 Also, contingents 
of Afghan soldiers were maintained for the Lahore government by various Barakzai 
sardars and other Afghan feudatories like Gul Mohammed Khan of Tank.106 In Multan, 
when Multan fell to Ranjit Singh’s forces, the Pathans were encouraged to join the army. 
Sawan Mai maintained eight regiments of Pathan soldiers and two of Sikhs to preserve 
law and order.107
It appears another assignment, which led many Muslims to gain employment, was 
through the gun manufacturing industry.108 Hence, soon after the taking over of Lahore, 
Ranjit Singh adopted a policy of revitalising the Lahore gun industry, which was 
controlled by Muslim experts. The start was made with the establishment of a workshop
104 Foreign/Political Consultation. 15 August 1836, No. 17-Lahore Intelligence, 2-8 July 1836.
10:> Foreign/Political Consultation. 15 August 1836, No. 17- Lahore Intelligence, 2-8 July 1836.
106 Foreign/Secret Consultation, 2 Nov. 1840, No. 9 1.
107 Maclagan 130.
108 Fauja Singh, Military System o f the Sikhs during the period 1799-1849. (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 
1964)32-34.
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in the Idgah in Lahore soon after the conquest of the city. This was followed at short 
intervals by two more workshops in the city of Lahore. They were set up in the fort (Oila 
Mubarik) and the Taksali gate area respectively. The Idgah karkhanci was consigned to 
the custody of General Court after he had joined Ranjit Singh’s service. Mirza Afzal 
Khan worked as his chief assistant.109 The gun industry expanded with the borders of 
Ranjit Singh’s rule. For instance, outside Lahore the places where similar karkhanas were 
established were Shahdara, Peshawar, Nakodar, and Sheikliupura.110 The workshop at 
Nakodar was known as kavkhana Khalifa Nuruddin as it worked directly under his 
supervision. A deputy named Daroga Kaide Khan assisted the Khalifa. The supreme 
control of all the state karkhanas was vested in Fakir Nuruddin.111 In another instance, 
Tej Singh was ordered to call for ten guns from the artillery of Shaikh Illahi Baksh at 
Lahore for the royal camp at Amritsar, with gunners, and also to get gun-powder, camion 
balls and grapeshot from Khalifa Nuruddin, as evident from the order given to Tej Singh 
by Ranjit Singh,
Call ten guns from  the artillery unit o f  Shaikh Illahi Bakhsh at Lahore to be attached to 
the royal camp. The rem aining four guns should be left behind under the charge o f  one 
Jamadar and four soldiers. . . .Y o u  should also arrange to get 100 m aunds  o f  gun powder 
and 5000  shots from the stores o f  K halifa Nuruddin at Lahore. A n order has been issued  
to him in this con n ection .112
109 Foreign/Secret Programme. 23 March 1844, No. 48.
110 For details, please see: Prem Singh Hoti Mardan, Panjab da Samaiik Itihas. Ed. Fauja Singh, (Patiala: 
Punjabi University, 1979) 54-57.
111 Fauja Singh, Military System 241-242.
112 JS Grewal & Indu Banga, Order nos. 366, 181-182.
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It is not insignificant that he granted stipends to his mislris (masons) to go to British 
workshops and acquire knowledge of advanced technology of arms manufacturing. One 
such example is of Mian Qadir Baksh who was sent to Ludhiana for this purpose. On his
I i  -j
return he wrote a book on gunnery in Persian Miftah ul Qila. Non- Muslims were 
encouraged by Ranjit Singh to work along with the Muslim experts in the gun industry. 
For instance, the workshop in Shahdara was called karkhana Suba Singh and was under 
the management of darogha Jawahar Mai. Much of the improvement in the quality of 
karkhanas and their production was due to Lehna Singh Majithia who had an inborn 
talent for mechanical arts.114 For a brief period Dr Martin Honigberger was put in charge 
of gunpowder and shot factories at Lahore.113 Next to Lahore the chief manufacturing 
towns were Amritsar, Multan, Shujabad and Leia.116
It can be suggested that among the Muslims, the number of Panjabi Muslim soldiers 
associated with the jagirdari fau j reduced, thus having a significant effect on the Panjabi 
Muslim elites. However, it seems that the number of Panjabi Muslims which emerged 
under the rule of the Ranjit Singh or earlier under the Sikh misls, increased significantly 
with time. This demonstrates a pattern where Ranjit Singh began recruiting skilled 
Muslims in specific areas of expertise such as the artillery or recruited Muslims from
113 Ska Ram Kohli, The Organisation o f the Khalsa Army. Maharaja Ranjit Singh: First Death Centenery 
Memorial, Eds. Teja Singh and Ganda Singh (Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1939) 72.
114 Alexander Burnes, Travels into Bokhara containing the Narrative o f  the Voyage on the Indus from the 
Sea to Lahore. Vol. II (London: John Murray, 1834) 14.
U:> Grey and Garett 235.
116 Henry Steinbach. The Puniaub: Being a Brief Account o f the Country o f  the Sikhs. (Patiala: Language 
Department, 1970) 50.
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areas far off, the Najibs and the Purbia Muslims, which probably would have acted as a 
counter balance to the Panjabi Muslims loyalties towards Panjabi Muslim chiefs. As 
suggested this process led to the emergence of new Muslim military elites which had 
their loyalties clearly marked towards non Muslim political elites of Panjab, It seems that 
the recruitment process of Muslims symbolised the fairness in Ranjit Singh’s sensibilities 
towards his most important part of state polity, the military recruitment. Also, by giving 
employment, he was able to legitimise his rule and further establish non Muslim 
hegemony in Panjab. It is also noteworthy that towards the end of his rule, with the rise 
of the British, an absolutely new adversary appeared at his state’s border. This adversary 
had no intent to base its ideological rhetoric on the basis of Islam, hence offered a new set 
of challenges to both Ranjit Singh and then the population of Panjab under his 
jurisdiction.
5.3.1 —Non conflicting tactics: Ruling beyond Indus
In this section it is argued that Ranjit Singh avoided direct engagement of his troops led 
by Sikh and Hindu army officials with the hostile Muslim forces beyond the river Indus, 
in the process of establishing non-Muslim hegemony in the region. To do so, he deployed 
European military officers who not only established European style disciplined army 
contingents, but ruled hostile Muslim areas along with Muslim soldiers from the region. 
For example, Avitabile,117 an Italian general, was made the Governor of Peshawar in
117 General Paolo di Avitabile was born on October 25, 1791 at Agerola, Italy. He served as artillery 
Sergeant-Major in the regular army o f the king o f Naples from which he resigned in 1817. During the next 
few years, he was in the employment o f  Mohammed Ali Mirza, the governor o f  Rinnan Shah in Persia. 
Later, he worked as an administrator o f  the Kurdish districts. In 1826, he got military service at Lahore
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1838, after the annexation of the city, which he governed until 1842.118 Lafont claims that 
six hundred Sikhs were assassinated during the first year of Avitabile's rule. Also, Ranjit 
Singh had observed that after the battle of Jamrud, in the year 1837, there were not many 
non Muslim leaders, who wanted to go to that part of the country.119 The tribes at the 
border had to be controlled. The tribes were not so considerate towards the non-Muslims, 
especially the Hindus and the Sikhs. It seems that the French officers were not considered 
so much as Kafirs and were more trusted than the Hindus and the Sikhs. Also, the French 
officers had since a long time established their own connections in Kabul, particularly
with Jabbar Khan of the Qizilbash community. Jean Marie Lafont in his work French
Administrators o f  Maharaja Ranjit Singh, has thus argued,
...th at in 1822, Ranjit Singh had com pleted his main conquests: Multan, Mankera, Attock
and Peshawar (though not annexed then) and Kashmir and he felt that to conquer is
som ething, but to keep and administrate -  lets say to integrate -  a conquered territory is
quite another task; requiring m ilitary units very different from the host o f  irregular
cavalry w hich until that tim e had form ed the bulk o f  the Lahore army. B esid es that, the
kingdom  towards the North W est and the South was bordering purely M oham edan states
(Sindh and A fghanistan) o f  m uch bigger size and historical coh esion  than the petty
M oslem  principalities had been  subjected to until then. To attack them w as to risk a
general upheaval o f  the M oslem  subjects o f  the state, and a p ossib le defection  o f  the
M oslem  subjects o f  the state, and a possib le defection  o f  the M oslem  contingents o f  the
army, in case o f  a setback, particularly i f  a Jehad w as proclaim ed by the U lem a. A
theoretical solution to such a problem  w as the creation o f  strongly d isciplined  units under
the com m and o f  officers w ho, being neither Sikhs nor M oslem s nor Hindus, w ould  only
depend on the head o f  the state and w ould accept no other interference in the execution  o f
120
their orders. But w here to find such officers?
where he rose to become a General. He was appointed as the governor o f Wazirabad and Peshawar. Please 
refer: Badhera 250; Also see: Suri, Vol. Ill 300; Amarnath 242; Devinder Kumar Verma, 'Foreigners in the 
Court o f  Maharaja Ranjit Singh,’ The Paniab Past and Present. Vol XIV-II, October 1980, (Patiala: Panjabi 
University) 250-252.
118 Suri, Vol. V 116.
119 Jean Marie Lafont, French Administrators o f  Maharaja Ranjit Singh (Delhi: National Book Shop, 1988) 
138; Hugel 79.
120 Jean Marie Lafont, French Administrators 10-11.
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Hence, it may be believed that these European officers who were non Hindu and non 
Sikh to govern the Muslim dominant region emerged as part of a plan of Ranjit Singh to 
engage non Muslims.121 These developments clearly demonstrate the undercurrents of 
discontent and dissent which engulfed the non Muslim elites in the region beyond Indus. 
The involvement of Europeans, who were Christians, at the highest echelons of society, 
in the state formation process by Ranjit Singh expanded the group constituting the non 
Muslim elites. Perhaps, it can be suggested, that the religious significance of Europeans 
being Christians, and thus being historically and theologically closer to the Islamic 
historical and theological context would have had some impact, on the religious 
environment, thus having its implications politically in the region. There is however, no 
evidence available from the primary sources to prove this.
5.4 Agrarian Policy and the Muslim subjects
According to the 1855 census report of the Panjab territories the proportion of 
agriculturists to total population was 56%. The corresponding percentage in the north 
western provinces was 64%. The proportions in both cases however would have been 
greater than that actually shown. But it can be said that more than half the population 
would certainly have been agricultural. It is probable that three fourths subsisted on 
agriculture, more so had the returns been strictly rendered according to the prescribed
121 It seems there was dissent among the high ranking Muslim chiefs. According to the News dated August 
9th, 1813, Ghause Khan, the Darogha o f  Topkhana, an old loyalist, had disobeyed orders during the war. 
Chaudhary Qadir Baksh and Naurang Singh complained to Ranjit Singh. Please refer: Garett and Chopra 
90.
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definition, namely that all persons deriving any part of their subsistence from the land 
population were to be returned as agriculturists. In several districts the percentage was 
lowest. Lahore (42.95 percentage of agriculture 011 total population), Amritsar (42.13%), 
Peshawar (48.0%), were cities with a large non agricultural population. Again in the cis 
and trans Sutlej states and the Lahore division, about half the Hindus and half the 
Muslims were agriculturists; but in the Jhelum, Multan, Leia and Peshawar divisions 
where the Muslims dominated, there the Muslims were for the most part agriculturalists 
and the Hindus for the most part were non agriculturalists. This may appear strange but it 
was nevertheless in accordance with fact, for in those divisions the men of the soil were 
Muslims and the Hindus who frequented those localities were generally traders. The 
Muslims farmers accepted the services of Hindus as bankers and accountants but would 
not allow them to hold land.122 It seems that this fact that the Muslims owned the land 12jl 
was kept in mind by Ranjit Singh while formulating his administrative and agricultural 
policy. It will be argued in this section that by formulating this anti landlord-tiller 
friendly policy, Ranjit Singh gained support among the largest beneficiaries of this 
policy- the majority Muslims who were engaged in agriculture. J. M. Douie elaborating
122 Report on the Census taken 011 the 1st January 1855 o f  the population o f the Paniab Territories. 
(Calcutta: 1856)22-23.
123 For instance, important tribes and castes o f  the Lahore district were Jats, Arains, Rajputs, Khokhars, 
Dogras, Kambohs, Kharals, Gujars, Mahtams, Labanas, Sheikhs, Koreshis, Moghals and Sayyids. The 
majority o f these groups were Muslims and were into the practice o f  agriculture. Please see: Punjab 
Government. Gazetteer o f the Lahore District 0  893-94). 100-108; Similarly in the Peshawar district, the 
landowning classes and the village menials were entirely Muslims; the Hindus and the Sikhs being 
confined to the mercantile classes. Please refer: Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f  the Peshawar District 
11897-98) 110. In Multan, there were practically no indigenous Jat and Rajput Hindus, as found in the 
region o f  Lahore; and the Hindus were almost entirely limited to the non agricultural castes, such as the 
Brahmans, Aroras and the Bhatias. Please refer: Maclagan 115. The Jats, Arains, Rajputs were agricultural 
tribes in the Sialkot district. Please refer: Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f the Sialkot District (1920). 
(Lahore: Government Printing, 1921) 38.
this point writes that in a good many cases the superior owners were the descendants of 
persons who once exercised political sway, or enjoyed an ownership over the land, from 
which they were ousted during the dominion of the Sikhs, though they managed to collect 
at harvest with greater or lesser regularity some small proprietary fee such as a ser in 
every maimd of the produce from the persons in actual possession of the land,124
Also, evidence which corroborates this point well is an instruction given to the kardar by 
Ranjit Singh as mentioned in the Muzaffargarh Settlement Report of 1882;
Treat the subjects w ell. W ork in extending cultivation. C ollect the revenue with
125acuteness. Every harvest and every year let cultivation and revenue increase.
5.4.1 -  Engaging with the Cultivator
It appears from contemporary evidence that Ranjit Singh’s policy of engaging with the 
majority Muslims engaged in agriculture revolved around developing direct links with 
the Muslim farmers, thus empowering large number of farmers and making few landlords 
and intermediaries obsolete. This seems to have brought about a support from the large 
masses of Muslim farmers who were earlier working for Muslim zamindars. According 
to Baden Powell, “it levelled down the differences and compelled an equality of the
124 James McCrone Douie, The Paniab Settlement Manual. Lahore, 1891, 56-57, 68.
l2:> Ram Das, Muzaffargarh 52,
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landlord and the subordinate”.126 The cultivators gradually acquired the rights of those
127whose lands they had been originally content to cultivate.
Indu Banga argues that the bulk of land in the Panjab during Ranjit Singh’s reign was 
held by small proprietors who cultivated their lands in whole or in parts. In Lahore, for 
instance, over 2.7 million acres of land was cultivated by the proprietors themselves 
while the land given to the tenants amounted to over 300,000 acres only. In Jalandhar, 
over sixty six thousand proprietors held, on the average, only twelve acres of land or a 
little more. In Rawalpindi, the peasant proprietors paid over 600,000 of rupees as revenue 
out of the total of over seven hundred thousand.128 In the extreme south western districts 
like Multan and Muzaffargarh where there were big landlords before the Sikh rule, 
revenue settlements were made not with these landlords but with the cultivators working 
on their lands. All that they were required to do was to pay a small fee of malikana 
(proprietary allowance) to the landlords. Whilst Diwan Sawan Mai, the non Muslim 
governor of Multan, upheld the right of the grassroot level owners of the soil, he checked 
and regulated their demands upon the real cultivators and this gave rise to, or placed on a 
firm footing the numerous and important class of chukdars (owners of wells who mostly 
carried on cultivation by means of wells).Under Sawan Mai’s administration, they first 
obtained the sanction of the government to dig a well in any uncultivated portion of land,
126 Baden Henry Baden-Povvell, The Land Systems o f British India: being a manual o f  the land-tenures and 
o f the systems o f  land-revenue administration prevalent in the several provinces. Vol. II (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1892) 623.
!27 India. Foreign Department. General Report upon the Administration o f  the Paniab Proper for the years 
1849-1850 and 1850-51 101.
128 Banga 174.
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settling at the same time the rate at which they were to be assessed and agreeing to pay a 
small fee to the real owners of the land {IIaq i zamindavi or lick). Beyond a payment of 
this fee the cultivator became free of the zamindar, even if he left the land uncultivated. 
The chukdars came to be known as Adna Malik while the superior owners were called 
Ala Malik.
It appears that in some of the extreme central districts (for example Gujrat) where warlike 
Muslim clans commanded great influence and occasionally created difficulties for the 
Sikhs, their proprietary rights were reduced by settling most of their lands in favour of the 
actual tillers of the soil. Thus the waris (heir), descendants from the original founder of 
the village and the ordinary cultivator whose father or grandfather had settled there were 
often placed 011 a common level. No malikana was charged from the cultivator and 
revenue was levied 011 both the waris and the tiller alike on the basis of the land they 
cultivated. Under these circumstances many of the traditional land owning classes 
including the Gakhars were practically reduced to the status of mere tillers of the soil.129 
Similarly in Jhelum, the waris classes were practically ousted and most of their lands 
were settled in favour of the actual cultivators. In a great many cases the landowners of
L 30old were “compelled to become tenants under their foreign ploughmen.”
129 Hector Mackenzie, Settlement report o f Guirat (Punjab). (Lahore: 1874) as quoted in: Douie, Paniab 
Settlement Manual 56.
130 Settlement Reports o f  Cracfort and E L Brandreth o f Rawalpindi and Jhelum districts as quoted in: 
Lepel Griffin, Ranjit Singh. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905) 148.
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In Hazara also a similar pattern could be observed. The majority of the agricultural class 
was composed of the Muslims.1 jl The rights of the waris survived only in villages where 
the Sikhs gave jagirs or in parts of the country where it did not suit the Sikhs to interfere 
directly; otherwise they were placed on a common level with the actual cultivators. It 
m ust, however, be remembered that the wilder tracts along the western bank of the Indus 
remained practically impervious to the influence of the big economic changes, which 
marked the upper and lower parts of the Chaj and the Sind Sagar Doabs. This was largely 
due to the dominant position of the martial classes in this part of the Panjab. The Sikhs 
allowed them to collect revenue through their tribal chiefs (Maliks) on their behalf.
5.4.2 — Revenue collections: Peasant Proprietors and Tenants
It appears that in the process of revenue collection, little distinction was made between 
peasant proprietors and tenants. According to Indu Banga, the number of tenants in the 
Panjab is said to be nearly half the number of the proprietors. In terms of acreage the
* 13?tenants are estimated to have under them about 25% of the total area under cultivation.
In his dealings with the tenants, Ranjit Singh treated them essentially like proprietors 
allowing them generally to share in the payment of revenue. Thus, as suggested by Baden 
Powell, practically every landlord was treated as equal.133 Also it seems that the tenants
131 Important Muslim tribes were, Utmanzais, Sulemanis, Turins, Tanaolis, A wans, and Gujars, Please see: 
Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f  the Hazara District 0883 -8 4 1  (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press) 
66-67 and 74-75.
132 Banga 179. Also see, for revenue collection in regional context, ‘Sialkot Revenue’, Punjab Government, 
Gazetteer o f the Sialkot District 0 9 2 0 )  21.
133 Baden-Powell, Land Systems. Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon, 1892) 635.
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had all the privileges as did the proprietor. For instance, like the proprietors the tenants 
were not disturbed by administration in the occupation of their lands so long as they 
regularly paid their revenue to the state. They enjoyed the right to use the wood of the 
trees on their lands for their own use. Similarly their tenure was inheritable but they had 
no right to transfer it to anybody else. The payment of revenue in the case of both the 
proprietor and the tenant was also fixed 011 the same basis. The tenant like the proprietor 
paid it directly to the state and not to his landlord for onward transmission to the 
government. The landlord was entitled to his malikana fee but this too was often 
collected through the government machinery lest the landlord oppress the tenant. The 
rates of malikana124 varied from place to place, depending upon the relative strength of 
the two parties concerned. These rates were from 10% to 15 % of revenue in Gurdaspur, 
from 5% to 10% in Kohat; 6.25% in Gujranwala, and 5% of the gross produce in 
Multan.135
It appears that the position of the tenants vis-a-vis the proprietor varied from district to 
district under Ranjit Singh’s policy, depending upon the hostilities from the local 
cultivators. For instance, in the extreme north western districts like Rawalpindi and 
Attock, the landlords had a greater degree of control over their tenants, while in the south 
western districts where cultivation was insecure and the land abundant the tenants held
134 It may be remembered however that the connotation o f  malikana under the British and under the Sikhs 
was not the same. Under the British, it meant absolute proprietory right which was not there under the 
Sikhs, or for that matter in the pre British period in India.
13:> General Report upon the Administration o f  the Paniab proper 11849-5 IT Lahore: The Chronicle Press, 
1854.
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their lands as long as they paid the state revenues regularly. In the submontane and 
central districts they paid some dues to their landlords, while in the eastern districts they 
could often evade the same owing to their kinship ties with the village proprietors.
Ranjit Singh gave special instructions to his elites who were in charge of revenue 
collection, not to be harsh to the cultivators. For instance, Suri mentions that in 1832 Raja 
Gulab Singh was ordered to realize revenue from Chandiot and zamindars of Kharral 
tribe keeping in view the prosperity of the people.136 In the same year Lala Shiv Dayal, 
son of Diwan Moti Ram, was asked to collect revenue from his area without causing any 
damage to the prosperity of the country, or any harm to the zamindars}*1 Similar orders 
were issued to Misr Rup Lai of Bist Jalandhar in 1833, to Dewan Sawan Mai in 1834 and 
to Mehan Singh of Kashmir in 1834. In 1838, a general proclamation was issued and its 
copies were circulated to Raja Gulab Singh and Suchet Singh, Misr Beli Ram, Rup Lai 
and Ram Kishan, Sardars Lehna Singh Majithia and Mehan Singh Colonel, Bhais Mahan 
Singh, Dal Singh, and Surjan Singh and Diwan Sawan Mai urging upon them to look 
after the subjects and to realize revenue from them according to the condition of the 
country and especially to take care of the zamindars in every matter and to show no
136 ‘...an emphatic order was issued to Raja Gulab Singh by the Maharaja to collect large sums o f  autumn 
crop from the kardars o f Pind Dadan Khan, the town o f Miani, Jalap and the salt market...’ Please refer: 
Suri, Daftar III, Part II, Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) 204.
137 Suri Vol. Ill (Part I-III) 205.
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tyranny or oppression to any one of them and to actively safeguard the interests of the 
people.138
Most striking evidence is available about the flexibility of his revenue system which 
effectively provided for total or partial reduction of the land tax139 in times of difficulty. 
Munshi Sohan Lai mentions that whenever the cultivators were hard pressed to pay their 
share of revenue due to the failure or destruction of their crops, the government came to 
their rescue by grant of full or proportionate exemption from the payment of land 
revenue. The Maharaja would protect the farmers against rack renting by the ijaradars 
(revenue farmers, Ijara means farming of revenue. In the Mughal period Ijara or farming 
system was prevalent) and dealt with their grievances on a top priority basis. There are 
many examples of this policy in practice. For instance, when an earthquake caused heavy 
damage to the crops in Kashmir, the land revenue was remitted 011 receipt of Diwan Kirpa 
Ram’s report.140 Relief in revenue was granted to the zamindars of Mankera 011 account
138 Suri, Daftar III, Part IV, Trails. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002)148-149; Sita Ram Kohli, ‘Land 
Revenue Administration’, Journal o f the Historical Society, Vol. VII, No. 2 (1919), 74-90. Also see for 
exact copies o f  the two pai’wanas containing such expressions: Hoti 130-131; Also see: Jows 81.
139 According to the General Report upon the Administration o f the Paniab proper (1849-5 D , the Sikhs 
looked after the security and development o f  the revenue and consequently the industrious and more frugal 
gradually took over the rights o f those whose land they had originally been content to cultivate. Under the 
Sikh system o f taxation, the revenue absorbed the larger portion o f the rent. The profits or rent o f  the 
proprietor varied in every holding. It was sometimes a trifling percentage in grain and money. For more 
details, please refer: General Report upon the Administration o f the Paniab proper (1849-50 and 1850-51). 
101; According to the report, taxation could not be called uneven as such a multiform system of taxation 
did not harass the people. Please see: General Report upon the Administration o f the Paniab proper (1849- 
50 and 1850-511 103-104.
140 Suri Vol. II, Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) 428.
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of damage to crops.141 The Maharaja then sent thousands of asses laden with wheat and 
made arrangements for the distribution of grain from mosques and temples by way of 
famine relief.542 The gazetteers provide corroborative evidence into the functioning of 
administrative policies and its implications. For instance, in 1830 Ranjit Singh hearing of 
too harsh exactions of his officials and of the unsatisfactory state of affairs sent General 
Ventura to assess some tracts in Attock and Rawalpindi districts. It seems that Ventura’s 
assessments were fair but following a period of much depression and over-taxation they 
could be realised from the farmers with difficulty. Taking personal interest in the matter, 
Ranjit Singh summoned the heads of tribes and villages to Lahore. It appears that he 
fixed comparatively light assessments and sent them back to their homes, assuring them 
that what they had suffered was not at his hands but was the work of his officials. He 
conferred on them still greater benefit than even light assessments for he sent Bhai Dal 
Singh to realise the remittances from them, who was a man of known integrity of 
character and amiable temper.l4j
Ranjit Singh punished non Muslim elites, and favoured the Muslim cultivators if he 
discovered discrepancies in implementation of his policies. For instance, in 1833, 
Jamadar Khushal Singh used much severity in collecting revenue in Kashmir. He was
1,11 Suri, Vol. II Trans. V S Sun, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) 495,496.
142 Narendra Krishna Sinha, Ranjit Singh 3rd ed. (Calcutta: A Mukherjee & Co. Ltd., 1975) 146. Also see: 
Amarnath, 224.
143 See Paniab District Gazetteers, Vol. XXIX -  A (1907), Punjab Government, Gazetteer o f  the Attock 
District (1883-84) 232 and Vol. XXVIII -  A(1907), Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f  the Rawalpindi 
District (1893-94). Revised ed. (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1895) 203.
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chided for that144 According to Diwan Amarnath, he was told that there would have been 
no dereliction of duty if he had not gone to collect due revenue.
5.4.3 — The Cultivator: Instructions to the Army
It appears that strict guidelines were given to the Army to be careful not to destroy crops 
while marching. For example in 1831, Sultan Mahmud, Sheo Prasad, Mazhar Ali and 
Jawahar Mai were ordered that while marching with the topkhanci and gharnal from 
Adinanagar to Lahore they should cause no inconvenience or discomfort to the people on 
the way and should not destroy their pastures and farms.14:5 Again in 1831, while he was 
returning from Ropar to Amritsar, Ranjit Singh ordered the platoons with him to set up 
guards upon the neighbouring farms when encamped so that none of the royal troops 
should indulge in destroying crops.146 While ordering Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh with his 
army to Peshawar he was directed on or about March 30, 1839, to be careful about the 
cultivation of the villages on the way.147 As a matter of fact, such instructions formed part 
of his standing orders to his troops and army commandants, even so the matter was 
considered so important that they were repeated every time a troop movement was 
ordered. And those who violated his orders were severely punished, whatever be their
status. For instance in 1832 when Warris, Nazim and some other panchas of Sharakpur
144 Suri, Vol. Ill, Part II Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002)225,226.
145 Suri, Daftar III, Part I, Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) 53, 54.
146 Suri, Vol. Ill, Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) 131, 106.
147 Ganda Singh 6.
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reported to the Maharaja the devastation of their country by the troops of some chiefs of 
Raja Dhian Singh, he was chided and plainly told that when his orders clearly enjoined 
that no waste of crops should take place why had his orders been violated?148 At another 
time Prince Kharak Singh was fined rupees ten thousand for a complaint that his troops 
had caused damage to crops.149 However the fine was not realised because on 
investigation of the complaint the Maharaja at once ordered the forfeiture of the horses, 
mules, and camels of the army commandants responsible for it. Proper compensation was 
paid to those who suffered losses. For instance, in 1835, a remission of rupees 5000 was 
allowed in land revenue in the case of Rohtas for the continuance of Ranjit Singh’s camp 
there and rupees fifteen thousand in the case of the farmers of Gujrat for the passage of
• 1 SO *troops through their lands. In another instance in 1839, when the villages of Kukran 
complained to the Maharaja about the loss of their cultivation by the encampment of Misr 
Sukhraj’s regiments, they were promised remission of half of their land revenue.151
5.4.3(a) Sahukars, Loans and Interest Rates
Another area where the government intervened towards the larger benefit of the 
cultivators, and as mentioned earlier Muslims were the major benefactors, was the 
fixation of interest by the Sahukars (money lenders), by the government. It is also 
important to mention again that the Sahukars were mainly non Muslims, largely from
148 Ganda Singh 476.
149 Sun, Vol. Ill, Part II, 348.
lj0 Foreign Political Programme. 7th August 1837, No. 57.
131 Ganda Singh 6.
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Arora Khatri backgrounds. The Hazara settlement report mentions the sahukars were not 
allowed to charge exorbitant rates of interests on their loans. By a general consensus the 
principal of damdupal set the utmost limit. According to it the maximum interest a 
sahukar could charge on his money could not exceed the amount of his principal. The 
common rate of interest was one percent per mensum.152 The kardar of the area had 
instructions to intervene in case the sahukar tried charging higher interest rates.13J For 
instance the order for sahtikars was;
N o sahukar w as allow ed  to se ize  oxen , toorhi etc from  the zam indars. The first part 
though pertaining to a sp ecific  case is also significant in so  far as it m akes the settlem ent 
subject to the overall consideration o f  the general w elfare o f  the people. The 
m oneylenders too on their part behaved w ell and w ere held in high respect, unlike the 
m oneylenders o f  the British days later on. Therefore the governm ent as w ell as the 
v illage  panchayats helped him in the repayment o f  their loans in case such help was 
legitim ately  required. T he sahukar in the tim e o f  Ranjit Singh w as considered to be a 
hum ble accountant and a servant o f  the dom inant class-the agricultural com m un ity .154
Those farmers who required loans were given taccavi loans. That is those who possessed 
capital and enterprise were encouraged to sink wells, dig canals, and cultivate the lands of 
the nominal owners.133 These farmers were also allowed hereditary and transferable
132 EG Wace, Report o f  the Land Revenue Settlement o f  the Hazara district o f  the Punjab (1868-1874). 
(Lahore: Central Jail Press, 1876), 85.
133 Malcolm Lyall Darling, The Paniab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (London: Oxford University Press, 
1928) 202.
154 Thorburn, Musalnians and Moneylenders, (Edinburgh, 1886) 37-38.
133 Edward O’Brien, Report o f  the land revenue settlement o f  the Muzaffargarh district o f  the Punjab 1873- 
1880 (Lahore: Central Jail Press, 1882) 92.
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rights in the new means of irrigation developed by them as well as in the lands irrigated 
from them.156
5.4.4 — The Policy o f  Extensive Cultivation: Role o f  the Chukdars
It appears that the policy of extensive cultivation was widely followed all over the 
kingdom, giving rights to cultivate to the chukdars, well digger. Inspired and encouraged 
by Ranjit Singh, this policy attained its success in the snba of Multan under the 
management of Diwan Sawan Mai. In Multan the Hindus were entirely confined to non 
agricultural class, hence the main benefactors of the policy were Muslims.157 The Diwan 
was in the habit of granting patents to individuals to sink wells. These people paid trifling 
head rent to the proprietor. The well belonged to the patentee as also the use of his land, 
for without irrigation, cultivation was not possible. The holders of these wells were 
known as chukdars}** This policy not only developed waste land into prosperous 
agricultural land but also most importantly created opportunities to own land for those 
who previously did not possess any.159 In 1836, the Diwan was honoured by Ranjit Singh 
for his good name and for the prosperity of his country. The Diwan succeeded in bringing 
vast tracts of waste land under cultivation. He was aware that there were plenty of such 
waste lands under his jurisdiction. There were, however, also people who owned no lands
136 D G Barkley, Character o f Land Tenures. Report on the Administration o f Paniab 11872-1873) 14-15.
137 Maclagan 115.
138 India. Foreign Department. General Report upon the Administration o f the Paniab Proper for the years 
1849-50 and 1850-51, (Lahore: The Chronicle Press, 1854) 103-104; Also see: Maclagan 170.
159 Suri, Vol III, Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) part II 346, 352, 372; Part III 377,378; Part IV 
119.
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but were willing to settle down and work as cultivators provided they were furnished with 
necessary status and facilities. The Diwan decided to support them and assured them that 
if they developed any lands they would not be ousted from them, rather they would be 
recognised as virtual owners of those lands (adna malik) while the real owners (ala 
malik) would be nominal owners.160
The chukdars or the well diggers were given liberal loans to sink wells. Many canals 
were taken out from the rivers Chenab and Sutlej161 and the old ones were repaired. 
Wherever, with the help of improved means of irrigation or even otherwise, they were 
able to bring new lands under the plough they were granted considerable concessions in 
revenue assessment rates. The prosperity brought by Sawan Mai attracted the notice of 
some high contemporary British officials like Captain Wade and Mackeson who 
happened to pass a number of times through the territories of the suba of Multan during 
the governorship of the Diwan. Some of the observations are captured in Sohan Lai’s 
chronicle.162 Ranjit Singh is mentioned here as telling Ventura that Mr Mackeson had 
informed him that the country under the control of Diwan Sawan Mai was very 
prosperous and that the Diwan was incomparable in the control and administration of his 
own estate. Griffin who wrote a biography of Ranjit Singh also admired the Diwan’s
160 Muzaffargarh Settlement Reports. 1850. Public Sections, Vol. I 14.
161 For a detailed account o f  these canals, see: Hoti 18-20.
162 For instance, see: Suri, Daftar III, Part II Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002)351.
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work by saying “I-Ie turned what was a desert into a rich cultivated plain. i6j Douic’s 
observation in this respect is even more significant. He says that in Multan, Diwan Sawan 
Mai did much to restore the prosperity of a country which had been desolated by a 
century of anarchy.164
It appears that it was unusual in the time of Ranjit Singh for people from the Panjab to 
migrate to the British dominions. Burnes has observed that “People were not at all over 
anxious to migrate to British territories”.165 Ranjit Singh showed concern and would 
question the officers in charge about reasons for people leaving if at all. For instance, 
even Misr Rup Lai of Jalandhar, who otherwise had the reputation of a considerate and 
efficient administrator, was reprimanded in 1835 when it was brought to the attention of 
the Maharaja that some people from the Bist Jalandhar Doab had become fugitives and 
had run away to the other side of the Sutlej.166
5.4.5 ~ Zamindars, Kardars and Nazims
It appears that Ranjit Singh defended those zamindars who, accepted his authority and 
recognised his policy. For instance, on 7th February 1816, a group of zamindars waited 
upon Ranjit Singh to enquire about his health and in the meeting he assured them of his
163 LepeL Griffin, The Paniab Chiefs; historical and biographical notices o f  the principal families in the 
Lahore and Rawalpindi divisions o f the Paniab. Ed. Charles Francis Massy. 2 vols. (Lahore: Civil and 
Military Gazette Press, 1890) 151.
164 Douie 20.
163 Burnes, Vol. I 96.
166 Suri, Dafter III, Part II Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002)325.
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patronage to them. The zamindars of the neighbourhood of the fort of Attock, presenting 
one horse as nazar, asked for honour and patronage to be shown to them. The noble 
sarkar bestowed upon each a robe of honour and gave them assurances. In the same way 
in 1837, when the zamindars of Rohjhan, Kan and some other places came to meet him 
he granted them valuable robes of honour and some pairs of gold bangles and thereby 
tried to win them over.
Ranjit Singh punished the kardar of any neglected village. For instance, on the 9lh of July 
1816, some of the zamindars of Chosa and Chatarpur met Ranjit Singh to complain to 
him against the tyranny practised by a kardar of Kanwar Kharak Singh. The sarkar 
assured them that cruel practice by the kardar would be stopped. Sohan Lai in his book 
also gives several examples of this type. For instance, when in 1831, Kanwar Sher Singh 
treated the zamindars of Deva Vatala with great cruelty Ranjit Singh disapproved of the 
action.167 The account given here refers to Ranjit Singh’s strong reaction when he saw the 
village of Ghar in a deserted condition in the course of his tour through the country.168 
The activities of the nazims, kardars and thanedars were closely watched, and if any 
discrepancies were discovered, they were summoned. There are many instances of such
167 Suri, Daftar III, Trans. V S Suri, 30, 350.
168 Suri, Daftar III, Part II 212.
248
kind mentioned in the Umdat ut Tawarikh.169 According to Ganesh Das Wadehra, it was
170a general routine to summon the kardars to court to render accounts.
171The peasants were asked to settle on the land, for instance in Gujranwala and Gujrat.
At some places part of the revenues were offered by way of inducement to those who 
increased production by extending cultivation to waste lands. Suri describes the case of a 
village- Tajpur- which was half deserted. Ranjit Singh told Mian Elahi Baksh that it must 
be improved and populated well and added that half of the revenue due to the sarkar from 
that place would be paid to him and the other would be given to him for improvement of 
the village.172
In the territories such as the suba o f Multan, Kashmir or districts such as Dera Ismail 
Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, control over the local administration was exercised through 
the office of the chief authority, the Nazim. Furthermore, by virtue of their being situated 
far away from the centre, Lahore, the officers in charge of these areas were usually 
allowed a greater degree of prudence in their day-to-day management. However, it 
appears that Ranjit Singh closely watched the working of his nazims and did not allow
169 Suri, Vol III, part I Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002)68,69.
170 Badhera 321.
171 Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f the Gujranwala District (1893-94). (Lahore: Civil and Military 
Gazette Press, 1895) 11, DSP Davies. Gazetteer o f  the Gujrat District (1892-93) (Punjab Government) 101- 
102.
172 Suri, Daftar III, Part V Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002)389.
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them to exploit the powers. He did so by keeping a close watch over the nazims through 
his efficient and well organised system of espionage.173 He had some methods to get 
information about the happenings in different parts of the country. It was a regular habit 
with him to make enquiries about his administration in Kashmir, Peshawar and Multan 
from foreigners who met him after passing through these areas. Sohan Lai mentions 
many such instances.174 He made enquiries from Burnes and Vigne about Kashmir in 
1836 and from Court about Peshawar in 1836 and again in 1838. Another important point 
to be remembered is that the thanedcirs of all the forts along the Grand Trunk road from 
Phillaur to Peshawar, such as Jalandhar and Amritsar, reported to him.
He took adequate actions if he discovered that his nazim was not performing according to 
his state policy. For instance, before Diwan Sawan Mai was appointed the nazim of 
Multan in 1821, a number of governors such as Sham Singh Pachauri and Hazari Badan 
Singh175 were appointed but were removed soon after because they failed to provide good 
administration. In another instance, a number of governors were appointed in Kashmir 
because the Maharaja was not happy with them. Diwan Moti Ram, Hari Singh Nalwa, 
Diwan Kirpa Ram and Kanwar Sher Singh ruled for short intervals only. In 1831 the 
Maharaja, in his conversation with Captain Wade, referred to the names of his chiefs who
173 See, for example, how a clerk appointed to attend on Avitabile reported to the Maharaja in 1838 that 
Avitabile was embezzling funds. Suri, Daftar III, Part IV 543.
174 Suri, Daftar III, Part II Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) 353, 362.
175 Suri, Daftar II, Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) 328, 390,391.
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had brought ruin to Kashmir.176 Diwan Moti Ram and Kirpa Ram were once severely 
penalized.177 In 1833 when Kanwar Slier Singh was the nazim of Kashmir, Bhai 
Gurmukh Singh and Jamadar Khushal Singh were specially sent there to deal with the 
kardars, qammgos and other officials of Kashmir who were not paying the arrears of 
revenues to the Kanwar. They proved too harsh, and their high — handedness and 
devastation plunged Kashmir into a terrible famine.178 They were severely reprimanded 
by the Maharaja for their atrocities. In 1834 when Col. Mehan Singh was the governor of 
the sub a, Mullah Farash and Sukh Lai were appointed to investigate the conditions of 
Kashmir.179 In 1838, the jagirs of the same Col. Mehan Singh were confiscated on 
account of a serious default on his part.180 As regards Peshawar, Avitabile, its governor 
since Hari Singh Nalwa’s death in 1837, was asked to reimburse the people who had 
suffered at his hands on account of his wrong decision.181
It can be suggested that agrarian policy formulated by Ranjit Singh was in favour of 
fanners, and the main beneficiaries of this policies were the Muslims, as they had large 
land holdings. This would have surely had an influence on the Muslims population in
176 Suri Vol. Ill, Part II Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) 230.
177 Suri Vol. Ill, Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) Part I 13, 14; Amarnath, Chapters XXIII & 
XXIX, 131, 165.
S7S Suri Vol. Ill, Part II Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) 215; Also see: Amarnath, Chapter 
XXXVIII 226.
179 Suri Vol. Ill, Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) Part II 277,278.
180 Suri Vol. Ill Part IV Trans. V S Suri, (Amritsar: GNDU, 2002) 504; According to Sohan Lai, p 80 the 
Maharaja, on learning from a reliable source in his court that the Nazim was indulging in corruption, was 
displeased.
185 Suri Part V 116 Trans. V S Suri 643.
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favour of Ranjit Singh and would have led to the legitimising rule of Ranjit Singh over 
Muslims agrarian community.
5.5 State Formation: The New Governing Muslim Elites
Did the new elite formation with regards to Muslims take place under Ranjit Singh? This 
section will examine the fluctuating place of Muslims in the elites of the Panjab over the 
period 1799-1839. It appears that in the process of state formation and to gain legitimacy 
to rule his Muslim subjects, Ranjit Singh needed certain Muslims to help him govern the 
state.182 Fakir Syed Waheeduddin claims, based on material preserved in his family 
archives, that there were many Muslim officers in the higher and middle echelons of 
society serving Ranjit Singh. According to him there were two ministers, one governor, 
and several district officers in the civil administration. There were forty one high ranking 
Muslim officers in the army, two of them generals, several of them colonels, and ninety 
two Muslims who were senior officers in the police, the judiciary, the legal department 
and the supply and stores departments.183 It is argued that such men were engaged either 
because they were respected by the Muslim community or had served with loyalty under 
the Sikh misl chiefs earlier. This will be elaborated in this section by examples of new 
governing Muslim elites who rose in civil and military services. Thus, while on the one 
hand, the old Muslim elites, such as the Tiwanas, Sials, Awans, Nawab of Multan and 
Nawab of Kasur lost their power and accepted jagirs in Panjab, yet on the other, as will
182 These Muslim elites were Ranjit Singh’s ‘Governing Elites’. Please refer Introduction for more details 
on ‘Governing Elites’.
183 Waheeduddin 36,
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be argued in this section, the new Muslim elites not only gained power but also proved 
their loyalty towards Ranjit Singh's kingdom.
In the process of the formation of ruling elites of the centre -  the city of Lahore, Fakir 
Azizuddin’s own family stands out distinctly.184 It appears that it was the honour and 
reverence associated with the family, which could have been an important reason of their 
enrolment in the court services. As mentioned by Lepel Griffin, in his famous work on 
Panjab Chiefs, Azizuddin belonged to the family of Ghulam Mohiuddin, was educated in 
Lahore under the guidance of the reputed Abdullah Ansari. He became a follower of 
Faqir Imanat Shah Qadri and gave himself the title of ‘Faqirh He hailed from a family 
that traced its genealogy to Jalauddin, a native of Arabia, who at the close of the seventh 
century of the Mohammedan era, came to serve at the court of Halaku Khan of Bukhara. 
He had also served as a priest at Mecca, Medina and at the shrine at Najif Sharif. Lepel 
Griffin adds that this account of the family claiming descent from Bukhari Sayyids is 
possibly true. There are however many who assert that it was only when Fakir Azizuddin 
became rich and powerful that he discovered himself to be a Sayyid and an amusing story 
is told of the maimer in which the genealogy was manufactured and promulgated.18i Fakir 
Azizuddin, the eldest son of Ghulam Mohiuddin, was a pupil of Lala Hakim Rai, the 
chief physician of Lahore. Soon after the taking over of Lahore in 1799 Hakim Rai
iS4 Punjab Government. Gazetteer o f  the Lahore District (1893-94) 119.
1S:> Certain it is that until the time o f Maharaja Sher Singh, the Fakirs styled themselves, and were styled in
all official documents as “Ansaris”. After 1840, they styled themselves as “Bukharis”. Lepel Griffin and
Charles Francis Massy, Chiefs and Families o f  Note in the Paniab. (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette
Press, 1909-1910) Vol. I, 294-295. For a detailed account on the Fakir family, see the Chapter ‘The Fakir
Family’ in Waheeduddin 39-47.
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placed the young Fakir in the attendance of Ranjit Singh, who was suffering from a 
severe infection of the eyes. The skill and attention of the young doctor won a grant of 
villages of Baddu and Sharakpur. Also, Ranjit Singh then employed him as his personal 
physician.186
There are many instances given in contemporary sources, which indicate that Azizuddin 
performed duties beyond what his profession as a physician demanded of him. Ranjit 
Singh used to seek his advice both for external diplomatic engagements, and for military 
and internal affairs. The most important example seems to be in the year 1808, when 
Charles Metcalfe was sent to Lahore to draw up a treaty between the British and the 
Lahore court, which was later ratified in 1809. Ranjit Singh took the advice of Fakir 
Azizuddin and opted for the historic treaty instead of aggression as was being advised by 
his other chiefs. In April 1831, Azizuddin, along with Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa and 
Diwan Moti Ram, was sent to Shimla on a complimentary visit to Lord William 
Bentinck, the then Governor General of the British in India. The envoys were received 
with great honour and arrangements were made for a meeting between the Maharaja and 
the Governor General, which took place at Ropar, in October 1831.
In May 1835, Ranjit Singh was present in the Peshawar valley, when Amir Dost 
Mohammed Khan with a large army arrived from Kabul with the intention of recovering 
Peshawar from the Sikhs. Azizuddin was sent as the principle envoy to the Afghan camp
186 Griffin and Massy 294-295.
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and contrived to delude the Amir so completely that the Afghan army was almost 
surrounded by the Sikhs during the progress of the negotiations, and had to retire to 
Kabul with all speed. The Maharaja was so pleased with Azizuddin that on his return to 
the camp, a general salute was ordered in his honour. Lepel Griffin claims that in 
November 1838, when the British forces were assembled for the Kabul campaign, the 
Maharaja visited Lord Auckland, the then Governor General, at Firozpur. Shortly 
afterwards Lord Auckland paid the Maharaja a return visit at Lahore and Amritsar and on 
both these occasions, the Fakir was assigned to look after the arrangements.
Apart from diplomatic engagements, Azizuddin was sent along with military expeditions, 
such as the annexation of the Gujarat country of Sahib Singh Bhangi, to resolve 
administrative matters. In 1813, when Jahan Dad Khan had given up Attock to the 
Maharaja, Fakir was sent with Diwan Din Das Sukhdayal and Sardar Mohta Singh to 
reinforce the garrison and to settle matters related with the district. He accompanied the 
expedition against Kangra and in 1826, was sent to take over the fort of Phillaur from 
Diwan Kirpa Ram. Shortly before this, he had assumed the charge of Kapurthala, 
Jandiala, Hoshiarpur and the trans Sutlej estates. On the 27th of June 1839, Ranjit Singh 
died. Azizuddin remained by him till the last, administering the medicine with his own 
hand, and telling him news from various quarters, which the Maharaja was anxious to 
hear.188
187 Griffin and Massy 296-297; Also see: Sinha 98-99.
188 Bhagat Singh 440.
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The influence of Azizuddin in the Lahore court perhaps encouraged Ranjit Singh to give 
employment to his two brothers Nuruddin and Imamuddin. Nuruddin entered the service 
in 1810, and was employed in the civil administration of Gujrat, Jalandhar, Sialkot, 
Daska and Wazirabad in succession. He was in charge of the arsenal of the Lahore fort 
and of the garrison stationed there. One key of the treasury was kept in his charge, two 
others being entrusted to Misar Beli Ram and Sardar Hukam Singh respectively. At one 
time, he was appointed as the incharge of Ranjit Singh’s charitable trust for the poor. For
189several years he controlled the Gulabkhana (laboratories) at Lahore. In 1810, he was 
asked to superintend the district of Dhanni. In 1812, Jalandhar was placed under him and 
in 1813 -  Sialkot, Daska, Halowal and Wazirabad. In 1818, he was summoned to Lahore 
and was made in charge of the arsenal at the fort of the royal gardens and palaces. In 
1826, he was asked to expand the power of Ranjit Singh around Pind Dadan Khan. In 
1831, he proceeded to Sayeedpur and Makahad to assist Raja Gulab Singh in his 
administration of that part of the country.190 One of the most important duties as 
Apothecary-General was to supervise the Maharaja’s food. After the food was cooked 
and tasted, Fakir Nuruddin put it into a special container having locks and then put his 
personal seal on the container.191
189 Sir Henry Lawrence calls him the “Apothecary General” and again as the “Commissary General and 
Head of Store Keeping”. See Henry Montgomery Lawrence, Adventures o f  an Officer in the Puniaub, Vol. 
II (London: Henry Colburn, 1846) 234.
190 Griffin and Massy 303.
191 Waheeduddin 44-45.
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Fakir Imamuddin, the youngest brother, was not a figure about the court but held
important administrative and military positions.192 He controlled the fort of Gobindgarh,
which controlled the greater part of Lahore. This responsible post did not keep him away
from the capital, and he was not employed on active service. Like his brothers, he also
acted sometimes as a channel of communications between British visitors and Ranjit
1 01Singh and in 1827, was deputed on a complimentary mission to Shimla.
Fakir family was an exceptionally well placed Muslim family in Ranjit Singh's court. 
They had an influence in nearly all aspects of the governance. However, it cannot be 
ignored that their historical background, in addition to their involvement and active 
participation in the day to day working of the government, also enabled Ranjit Singh to 
establish his legitimacy symbolically among the Muslims.
After closely examining the primary sources, it appears that most of the Muslims who 
rose to power in the Lahore government belonged to families who had been trustworthy 
to the Sikh elites. For example, Sheikh Ghulam Mohiuddin’s father, Shaikh Ujala of the 
Kalal tribe, was a munshi in the service of Sardar Bhup Singh of Hoshiarpur. Diwan Moti 
Ram, son of General Mohkam Chand,194 placed him in attendance on his second son, 
Shivdayal. He held many portfolios, especially the diplomatic and civil affairs ones. For
192 Waheeduddin 45.
193 Gulshan Lai Chopra, The Panjab as a Sovereign State 0799-1839'). (Lahore: Uttar Chand Kapur and 
Sons, 1928. Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, 1960) 1 7 8 -  179,
194 General Mohkam Chand was a reputed General o f  Ranjit Singh.
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instance in 1823, when Mohammed Azim Khan of Kabul had marched to Peshawar to 
attack the Sikhs, Ranjit Singh wished to persuade the Afghans to retire without fighting. 
Kirpa Ram195 sent Ghulam Mohiuddin to carry on the negotiations, who accordingly 
bought over the ‘pir5, the spiritual adviser of Mohammed Azim Khan. The pir persuaded 
the Sardar to retire, resulting in the Afghan army hastily breaking up, and retired in 
confusion from Minchini and Jalalabad. Ranjit Singh took possession of Peshawar, and 
after dividing the territory between two Afghan brothers Mohammed Yar Khan and Dost 
Mohammed Khan,196 returned to Lahore. Before leaving, yet again he sent Ghulam 
Mohiuddin on a mission to Mohammed Azim Khan to inform him about the capture of 
Peshawar. In 1827, he was given an important assignment to assist Kirpa Ram in the 
administration of Kashmir, where the latter had been appointed as the Governor.197 Again, 
in 1831, he was asked to proceed to Kashmir as a lieutenant of Prince Sher Singh who 
had been nominated to succeed Kirpa Ram, Since the prince knew little about managing 
the civil affairs, the Shaikh acquired powers beyond his duty. He oppressed the people of 
Kashmir, and in 1832, the place was struck by famine. The Shaikh was recalled to Lahore 
and fined. Ghulam Mohiuddin remained out of employment for a while before Bhai Ram 
Singh wished to have a knowledgeable person to assist Prince Nau Nihal Singh with 
sufficient ability to counteract the influence of his enemy. Diwan Hakim Rai placed him 
in the service of the Prince, where he excelled rapidly and became his chief fiscal
193 Kirpa Rain was the grandson o f the illustrious General Mohkam Chand.
196 They were the Barakzai chiefs.
197 Mofti Aliuddin, Ebratnameh, Ed. Mohammed Baqir. Vol. 1 (1854. Lahore: The Punjabi Adabi 
Academy, 1961)496-497.
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Minister. In 1839, he took charge as the governor of the Jalandhar Doab, thus rising to the 
highest level in administration.198
Another family which served the Lahore government had its service rooted in the 
Sukarchakia Misl, the misl to which Ranjit Singh belonged. According to Ikram Ali 
Malik, a historian of Panjab, there is not much to be discovered about this family before 
Ghosi Khan. It seems that Maha Singh Sukarchakia, the father of Ranjit Singh enrolled 
Ghosi Khan as an artillery officer in his army in the latter half of the eighteenth century. 
He continued to serve the Sukarchakia misl under Ranjit Singh. He knew the art of 
casting guns and was skilful in his profession. He was rewarded with a Jagir worth 
rupees five thousand, at Wan and Bherowali, in lieu of his services. His son Sultan 
Mahmud Khan continued to serve Ranjit Singh and accompanied him in his expeditions 
against Multan and Kashmir. In the Tirah campaign in Kangra, he distinguished himself, 
which led to him being made a general by Ranjit Singh in command of twenty five 
guns.199 Many former Persian elites also joined in the ranks of Ranjit Singh’s army in the 
artillery. Imam Shah, whose fore fathers served Nadir Shah, met Sardar Jodh Singh who 
instated him as the Jamadar of the artillery. The very next year Imam Shah entered the 
army of Ranjit Singh and fought in many battles as Colonel of Artillery. He served 
throughout the reign of Ranjit Singh and his successors.200 Though the mention of Illahi 
Baksh often comes in the sources, it has been difficult to find information about him
198 Griffin and Massy, Vol. I 316-317.
199 Ikram Ali Malik, The History o f the Paniab (1799-19471 (Panjab: Language Department, 1970) 113.
200 Griffin and Massy Vol. I 395.
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beyond his military campaigns. He was an officer in Ranjit Singh’s army who 
commanded the special artillery wing of fauj-i-khas and a portion of the artillery corps 
named Derah-i-Illahi Baksh. General Illahi Baksh’s topkhana played an important part in 
the fall of Multan in the year 1818. He was the leading figure in the artillery unit of 
Ranjit Singh’s army.
Similarly, Mirza Ghulam Murtaza’s family came from Samarkand in 1530. His family 
was given estates near Kadian, which they lost to Ata Mohammed, the Afghan. 
Consequently, his family retired to Begowal, where under the protection of Sardar Fateh 
Singh Ahluwalia, they lived peacefully for 12 years. Ranjit Singh invited Ghulam 
Murtaza to return back to Kadian and restored to him a large portion of his estate. He 
then, with his brothers, entered the Lahore army and performed efficient service on the 
Kashmir frontier and at other places.
The number of Muslim’s inter governing elites, as claimed by Fakir Waheeduddin, 
demonstrates a significant proportion of Muslims in the middle level posts. Most of those 
who were engaged at higher echelons were from the Fakir family or were those Muslims 
who were associated with the artillery or gun manufacturing departments of the army, as 
has been demonstrated in this section. In comparison to the rise of the non Muslim elites 
at the higher echelons of Panjab’s polity it can be suggested that their number was not 
considerable. For instance, within a short span of time the rise of the Hindu family of 
Dogra brothers from Jammu region, Dhian Singh, Gulab Singh, Suchet Singh, and son of 
Dhian Singh, Hira Singh, was noteworthy, especially in the context of rise of any other
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new Muslim elite.201 Similarly, Diwan Mohkam Chand and his son, Diwan Moti Ram 
gained politically in the Panjab. Diwan Mohkam Chand as an army commander remained 
very close to Ranjit Singh, participating in all the major expeditions,202 and his son 
Diwan Moti Ram worked as the Governor of Jalandhar Doab and later was appointed the 
first Governor of Kashmir as well. Both sons of Moti Ram, Ram Dyal and Kirpa Ram so 
served Ranjit Singh in important expeditions. The families of Kliushal Singh, Diwan 
Ganga Ram, Misr Diwan Chand, Misars Rup Lai and Beli Ram and Sawan Mai, all of 
them, rose significantly to the top echelons of Panjab’s elites. The other group was of the 
Firangees (foreigners) who began working for Ranjit Singh. Alexander Gardner claims 
that there were forty two of them, of which there were fourteen French, four Italians, two 
Americans, two Spanish, six English, two Greeks, one German, one Austrian, two 
Russians and five Anglo Indians. Out of them there were six Generals namely General 
Ventura, General Allard, General Avitabile, General Court, General Harlan, General Van 
Cortlandt, thus suggesting the quick rise of these men to the highest echelons of the Army 
as compared to the Muslims in the army. General Avitabile served as the civil and 
military governor of Peshawar for five years from 1838 to 1842 and General Ventura 
served as the Governor of Derajat. The Sikh elites such as Desa Singh Majithia and his 
son Lehna Singh Majithia gained along with the state formation process by Ranjit Singh. 
Desa Singh Majithia was made the governor of the hill states of Kangra, Chamba, 
Nurpur, Kotla, Shahpur, Jasrota, Basoli, Mankot, Jaswan, Guler, Mandi, Suket and Kulu.
201 Dhian Singh was given the title o f ‘Raja’ in the year 1811 by Ranjit Singh. In the year 1822, Ranjit 
Singh gave the title o f ‘Raja’ to Gulab Singh and Suchet Singh as well. In the same year, Dhian Singh was 
made the Raja o f Bhimber. In the year 1828, he became the first minister with a title o f  Raja-i-Rajgan, 
Hindpat Raja Bahadur. Please refer: Amarnath 152, 184.
202 Ahmad Shah Batalia, Zikr-Guruan wa Ibtida-i-Singhan wa Mazhab-i-eshan, p mm 34.
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Lehna Singh Majithia continued with the policies of his father and was honoured with 
IJjjal Didar, Nirmal Bndh, and Sardar-i-ba-Waqar in May 1837. Similarly Sandhanwalia 
chiefs and the Attariwala family were bestowed with many honours and titles. Hari Singh 
Nalwa rose from a humble position in Ranjit Singh’s army to become a General and also 
held the position of Governor of Kashmir and Hazara,
5.6 Conclusion
Thus, a short glimpse of the rise of the non Muslims to the highest echelons of the Panjab 
elites in comparison to the Muslims, suggest that Ranjit Singh’s strategy was to try to 
incorporate skilled and loyalist Muslims in the system of governance, which would have 
enabled him to establish his legitimate domination in the Panjab. However, it can be 
suggested that there are few instances of a Muslim being given an independent charge 
and they were usually asked to serve under non Muslim elites, thus not only establishing 
but enforcing the non Muslim hegemony in Panjab.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This study has attempted to probe the historical process by which the Sikhs, the Hindus 
and the Christians constituting the non Muslim group significantly displaced the Muslim 
elites from power and began governing Panjab in the nineteenth century. The thesis has 
endeavoured to trace the trajectory of this change since the fifteenth century in the region 
of Panjab and has tried to analyze the various reasons which led to this hegemonic 
transformation. The thesis has tried to show how the political and social fabric of Panjab 
which had been occupied by the religious spaces of two distinct and important 
communities- the Muslims and the Hindus, saw the emergence of a third space of the 
Sikhs almost simultaneously with the rise of the Mughal rule. It has been argued here 
how the ideology of Sikhism, with a large number of followers from the Jat and the 
Kliatri caste groups, became a significant ingredient for the power struggle in Panjab. 
This had major implications for defining the new elites who would govern in the Post- 
Mughal eighteenth century Panjab. This work has further postulated that the issues of 
language, caste and religious identities came to be debated with the rise of the Sikhs 
which led to the establishment of the non Muslim hegemony.
The thesis has demonstrated that the Muslim elites had varied positions towards the Sikh 
leadership, as it was seen both as a threat as well as a force to align with. For example, 
while the Sufi order of the Chistis built a strong bond of closeness with the Sikh masters;
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another Sufi order, the Naqshbandis, followed a policy of antagonism towards the Sikh 
leadership. It has also been argued that the coming of agricultural communities such as 
the Jats, into the fold of Sikhism, increased not only the social base but also the political 
base of the new ideology in the Panjab. What was significant about the rise of the Sikhs 
was that with the codification of the language of the land i.e. Panjabi, the establishment 
of new cities and towns by the Sikh masters, the establishment of the Hannandir, the 
compilation of the Granth, and the encouragement of the Sikhs to do trade, the Sikh 
ideology allowed the new followers to break away from the Muslim political, economic 
and religious hegemony and provided a new context for existence. It has been 
demonstrated in the work that this augmentation of the new ideology exerted political 
pressure on the political elites of Panjab under the Mughals who were primarily Muslims.
The thesis has dealt with the contentious issue of conversion from one faith to the other 
and its ramifications on both religion and politics in Panjab. On one hand, this issue was 
the result of the progressive policies propagated by the Sikh Gurus, which gave 
expression and direction to those who intended to follow a path which was based neither 
on Hindu ideology, nor on the Muslim ideology. On the other hand, the new ideology 
provided a chance to the suppressed classes to assert themselves away from the 
oppression of the Muslim elites in Panjab. It has been shown in the thesis that the Sikh 
leadership set examples which brought a social change in Panjab’s society whereby being 
a Sikh began to be associated with honour and respect. The two instances of conversion 
which immensely influenced the trajectory of social change in Panjab were the killing of 
the ninth master, Guru Tegh Bahadur, and the other being the internal conversion, that is,
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within the wider Sikh community into the new form of the Khalsa, by the tenth master 
Guru Gobind Singh.
The main concern of the thesis has been to show how the non Muslims regrouped and 
established their hegemony in the Post-Mughal Panjab. The breakdown of the Muslim 
elite structure due to the weak Mughal centre, and the attacks by the Persian ruler Nadir 
Shah, the Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali and the Sikhs led to the failure of the Mughal 
domination in the Panjab. For the first time after many centuries of Muslim rule, Banda 
Singh was able to establish his hegemony by giving full religious liberty to the Muslims. 
The thesis demonstrates that by developing various social structures such as the 
Gurmatta, the Sarbat Khalsa and especially the institution of Rakhi, the foundation for 
the non Muslim hegemony was laid in Panjab by the Sikhs.
The thesis claims that Jehad was an instrument which was used by the Muslim elites to 
address the issue of loss of their power, as early as the beginning of the eighteenth 
century in Panjab. Furthermore, this work shows that the functioning of the Muslim elites 
comprising of political elites, the Mullahs and the Zamindars had two fold ramifications 
in the Panjab. On one hand, in the Post-Aurangzeb Mughal scenario it brought the 
Muslim religious consciousness back as the dominant policy, 011 the other hand it 
broadened the divide between the Muslims and the non Muslims, thus strengthening of 
the boundaries between the two groups. Both these blocks now had a leadership base, 
with clear intentions of establishing their hegemony in Panjab. There were always 
exceptions among Muslims and non Muslims, but none being the dominant voice of the
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group they were part of. The thesis reasons that after many years of rule by the Muslim 
rulers, the insecurity emerged within the Muslim ruling elites which began showing 
dissemination in the form of Jehad. For the Muslims of Panjab, whether it was under the 
leadership of the Governor of Sarhind or that of Shah Wali Ullah, it seems the idea of 
Jehad came as a result of a position of weakness than as a position of strength, as if it was 
a last effort to keep control of the political command of the region. It has also been shown 
that after a series of Jehads against the Sikhs, the political change took place in Panjab 
with the recognition of Sikhs as having a stake in the territorial authority of the region.
The thesis demonstrates that the Sikhs were recognised by the Muslim elites because of 
the intermittent adoption of the policy of appeasement towards the Sikh leadership; the 
conferment of the title of ‘Nawabship’ to Kapur Singh, and the enrolment of Sikhs in the 
army by Mir Mannu and Adina Beg being a few important examples which have been 
discussed in this work. In addition, it has been postulated that the Sikh leadership used 
this policy in their own favour to regroup and reorganise their resources, which further 
implied their intention to expand their territorial control over the Panjab.
Under Ahmed Shah Abdali, the Afghan interest in the region of Panjab increased as their 
power stabilized in Kabul and similarly decreased as instability overrode their existence 
in the capital of Afghanistan, as examined in the thesis. The repetitive attacks on Panjab 
by Afghans had its ramifications in favour of the non Muslims. For example, it further 
weakened the already fractured structure of the Mughal power in Panjab and brought 
about the emergence of a new force, from which the Muslim elites of Panjab began
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legitimizing their existence. Significantly for the Sikhs and the non Muslims at large, the 
Afghans brought catastrophic situations such as the mass killings and total destruction of 
the religious places in the beginning of their conquests. But later they also recognized the 
strength and the skill of the Sikhs to rule the territories in Panjab, thus giving them 
legitimacy to govern in Panjab. This, as has been demonstrated in the thesis, brought the 
Sikhs in the dominant position with regards to the Muslim elites of Panjab.
Lahore was seen as the centre of Panjab. It has been argued in this work that the takeover 
of the city by the Sikhs in 1764 under the leadership of Jassa Singh Ahluwalia from the 
Afghan Muslim elites along with most of the territories from Indus to Chenab, his 
proclamation as Sultan i Qaum and with the striking of a coin- all put together meant the 
emergence of a state in control of the Sikhs in the Muslim majority Panjab. However, as 
has been demonstrated in the fourth chapter, the political understanding of the new state, 
in the region of Lahore, emerged among the Sikhs with the rise of Ranjit Singh, who 
understood the importance of gaining legitimacy from the Muslim elites before the 
takeover of the city. It has been established in this work that for Ranjit Singh, legitimacy 
from the Sikh, Hindu and Muslim groups was crucial in his state formation process. For 
the Muslim elites Ranjit Singh was their last choice after the Nawab of Kasur. Also, it has 
been claimed that soon after his takeover of Lahore, he evaded aggression towards the 
Muslim principalities until he established himself firmly as the ruler of the seat of 
Lahore. The thesis has examined the process of subjugation of the cities of Multan, 
Kashmir and Peshawar. There was a change in control of these cities from Muslims to the 
non Muslims which was brought about by Ranjit Singh soon after the conquests. Also, as
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the territorial expansion took place beyond Lahore, Khatri Hindus such as Sawan Mai 
and Kirpa Ram and Europeans such as Jean Ventura, a Christian, were given important 
positions as Governors of Multan, Kashmir and Peshawar respectively. It has been shown 
in the thesis that during the process of subjugation of Panjabi Muslim chiefs, such as the 
Awans, Tiwanas and the Sials, the non Muslim leadership controlled the expeditions as 
also the post conquest administrative policies. Only in case of Peshawar, Ranjit Singh 
had to delay positioning non Muslims in control until 1834. Additionally, the thesis states 
that the delay in doing so was due to the Jehad against the Lahore court in 1831 under the 
leadership of Syed Ahmad Bareilly, which he wanted to suppress first. The discussion 
about the Jehad by Syed Ahmad Bareilly has brought to light various factors which led to 
its rise and fall, especially when the Muslim sources mentioning the Jehad have been 
examined together with the Sikh sources. The religious uprising and the strict Islamic 
doctrines as placed by Syed Ahmad Bareilly, as has been suggested in the work, perhaps 
gave a glimpse to the various Muslim groups in the region beyond Indus and the Panjab, 
as to what could follow if the Syed were to come to power. In addition, the inter-rivalries 
between various Muslim groups contributed in favour of Ranjit Singh and his men, not 
allowing them to unite under the common factor of their religion, Islam. The inter­
rivalries between the Awans, Tiwanas and the Sials, between the Yusufzais and 
Barakzais, the inter-rivalries between the Sadozais, Badozais, Laghari, Ghorcharni, Lund 
and the Khosas have been elaborated to discuss the crucial role played by them towards 
the establishment of the non Muslim hegemony in Panjab and beyond the river Indus.
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To sustain his rule, Ranjit Singh required legitimacy from the Muslims to govern. He 
built his positive image among the Muslims of Panjab while expanding his state towards 
other Muslim principalities. However, it has been argued that his policies in no way are 
to be considered to be an attempt to provide equality and even though the gestures were 
imposing they were in no manner attempting to have parity with the subject people. Once 
the political hierarchy of non Muslim ruling elites was established and was above 
question, Ranjit Singh was generous in making concessions towards the subjugated 
people. The Sikhs adapted to their cultural surroundings, they connected and fused 
different cultural traits but they did not dissolve their existing identities. Rather, they 
strengthened it by invigorating their religious institutions such as the Gurudwaras on one 
hand and their cities such as Amritsar and Haripur 011 the other. It has been shown that 
the change in the political control at the top level of state polity was followed by the 
adoption of policies that demonstrated concern and a cautious approach by Ranjit Singh 
towards Muslim subjects in the state formation process. He made sincere efforts to 
associate himself with Muslim leaders and shrines and built his image as an ally of their 
policies. The state patronages existing before his take over were continued during his 
rule. Also, he took special interest in the religious occasions of the groups such as the 
Shias and the Ismailis. These steps perhaps enabled him to develop relationship through 
these shrines thus empowering his legitimate domination over his Muslim subjects. Also, 
it has been suggested that by keeping important Islamic relics o f the Prophet in the royal 
treasury, he was not only able to build his image as guardian but also uphold his 
hegemony over the Muslim religious leadership. Likewise, his intervention in the 
discrepancies found in the accounts of mosques also suggests that he did seem to keep the
269
functionaries of mosques under his observation if not under complete control. Religious 
policy of the Lahore government had positive results towards the state formation process. 
By supporting the status of the Muslim religious institutions in his state, he received their 
support in every aspect of running of the state. Sufi shrines continued to be the centre of 
public life in villages and towns of Panjab and these shrines participated in the state 
organized festivities such as those organized during Id festivities or Diwali festivities. 
The proactive policy of state to celebrate the festivals influenced and strengthened the 
relationship between the different faith groups and associated every one with the spirit of 
being part of the state of Panjab. This led to the emergence and spread of mixed 
communities in Panjab with ideals of tolerance towards each other’s religion. The system 
of justice was given importance by Ranjit Singh at the beginning of the state formation 
process itself. He revived the system of Oazis and Adaltis as followed during the time of 
the Mughals, however, it is interesting to note that though he as a monarch was the 
highest court of appeal, the thesis claims that he suggested through his farmans that he 
too was governed by the law. By adopting the policy of co-existence, he encouraged non 
Muslims to work along with the Muslim Oazis in dispensing justice, thus elevating the 
position of non Muslims in the state Judiciary. It has been postulated in the work that he 
was strict with those non Muslims who did not perform their duties correctly and was 
involved in the administration of Justice which assisted him to establish legitimate 
domination over Muslim subjects.
This work has claimed that the policies of the Lahore court towards the Muslim soldiers 
seem to indicate earmarking of certain areas in the forces where Muslims were
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encouraged to join. One such area was the gun manufacturing industry. The revival of 
this industry was crucial, as many Muslim families were earlier involved in the 
manufacture of guns in Lahore. Jagirdari forces too were composed of Muslims, 
especially from Panjab. It has been claimed in the work that Ranjit Singh encouraged the 
recruitment of the Muslim Purbia soldiers and Najib Muslims, probably because they 
were trained on the European lines by the British. Also, recruitment in the army was seen 
as an important tool to engage with the Muslim population, as suggested by the steps 
taken to recruit Pathans in the Lahore army by Sawan Mai after the fall of Multan.
The agrarian policy adopted by Ranjit Singh was cautiously formulated and driven in 
favour of the farmers, and the major beneficiaries of this policy were the Muslims. 
During revenue collection, special instructions were given to the revenue collector to be 
kind to the tiller, especially towards those who were affected by emergencies such as 
famine. The Lahore army marching through the villages was also given special 
instructions not to destroy the crops. It has been claimed that an important area where the 
state intervened in favour of the farmer was in matters of loans. Ranjit Singh kept a check 
on the money lenders as well, thus attempting to create a balance between the non 
Muslim money lenders and the Muslim landlords. This had a progressive influence 011 the 
tillers as it encouraged them to take risks on one hand and on the other protected them 
from exploitation. This work also states that those who did not possess land to till were 
encouraged to dig wells and own land rights. This policy, as the thesis has demonstrated, 
was very popular, especially in Multan. The policy also targeted the lower ebb of Muslim 
society, hence helping them rise from poverty. The policy of chastising those kardars
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who did not adhere to the policies of the state was severe. By asking various travellers, 
officers and also by travelling himself, Ranjit Singh kept a check on the running of his 
state, especially about the work of his kardars and mukaddams, Even the highest serving 
officials such as Kirpa Ram and Hari Singh Nalwa were punished for negligence towards 
their duty.
The work claims that Ranjit Singh created significant and striking reference points for his 
Muslim subjects in the state in the form of new Muslim governing elites. These men, 
such as the Fakir brothers, were from respectable families and commanded respect from 
the Muslims. They were involved in every aspect of governance of the state, such as the 
army, the royal treasury, diplomatic engagements and medical facilities of the state. The 
thesis has argued that by engaging these men, on one hand Ranjit Singh was successful in 
legitimizing his rule and on the other was able to sustain it among the larger Muslim 
population at the time of call for Jehads against his state. He was able to use the Muslim 
elites to his advantage during negotiations as mediators. It has also been suggested that 
by adopting skilled and loyalist Muslim elites, he was able to pass a message to his 
adversaries not to divide his state on communal lines.
The work of Haijot Oberoi has argued that the Sikh tradition did not focus on 
establishing a ‘distinct religion’, especially in the context of ‘early Sikh period’.1 His 
research stresses on the analysis of distinction between the Hindu and the Sikh
1 Harjot Oberoi, The Construction o f  religious Boundaries: Culture. Identity and diversity in the Sikh 
Tradition. (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1994).
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communities, though there is some mention of distinctions from the Muslim community. 
Whereas this research has argued that whenever a political or a social situation arose at 
any juncture of history, the Sikh leadership portrayed its thoughts and ideas as a distinct 
perspective both from the Hindus and the Muslims. Throughout the course of history and 
in the later period as well, the house of the Gums did not seek legitimacy to exist from 
the Muslim leadership. What is missed out in his research is the understanding of 
religious tradition in the context of ‘centre and periphery’ perspective, where an 
individual existed in the society and participated in the ‘peripheral’ popular culture of the 
region concerned, and still had an understanding about his/her own ‘central’ core 
religious ideals. It is important to grasp that the Sikhs lived, worked and did business as a 
minority among the majority population whose traditional influences had a region wide 
context. For instance, the Chistis in the Western Panjab, the Qadiris in the cities, Gugga 
Pir in the central Panjab, and Sakhi Sarwar in the Western Panjab, attracted the Sikhs 
from those areas. Hence, the association of the Sildis with these shrines, which has been 
termed as “An Enchanted Universe”2 by Harjot, was region specific, while their 
association with the ideals of Sikhism transcended these regional contexts and bound the 
Sikhs with the central institutions, as discussed in this work. These linkages, which acted 
as the central force, brought the Sikhs together from far and near, especially when the 
issues concerning politics and religion took dominance. The future research can 
endeavour to examine these region wide associations of the Sikhs in more detail. During 
Ranjit Singh’s reign, the Sikh elites’ participation in the Muslim festivities, or their visits 
to the Sufi shrines was not becoming part of the culture of the other but was a means to
2 Oberoi, 139-203.
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engage with the majority Muslims who were governed by the majority non-Muslim 
elites.
The formation of the Khalsa has been called a “dramatic change”3 by Haijot Oberoi and 
it has been considered by him as a push towards the creation of a “separate religious 
culture”. This research has suggested that by forming the Khalsa and by then becoming a 
Khalsa himself, Guru Gobind Singh provided identity markers (the Five K’s) to those 
who will become the centre of the Sikh faith. It has been demonstrated that those who 
adhered to the principles of the Khalsa doctrine led the community to become the 
dominant group. The symbology of the Khalsa identity became the reason on which the 
allegiance or disloyalty towards the Sikhs was based among the Mughals or the Afghan 
elites. It may also be suggested that the emergence of the Singh Sabha ethos or the Tat 
Khalsa had direct linkage with this principle, in that it was an expansion of this dominant 
group. Thus, it may have led to the assertion of the Khalsa ideals to become the central 
ethos for those who wanted to be at the control of the social and political affairs of the 
Sikh community. This spearheading of Khalsa ethos may have marginalised other ideals, 
which Haijot Oberoi has referred to as ‘Sanatan traditions', leading to redefining of the 
idea of being a ‘Sikh’ in the nineteenth century Panjab. It may also have expanded the 
Khalsa territoriality among the Sikhs, and thus having its direct influence on the politics 
of the times which was moving towards a population centric approach and riding on the 
vehicle of censuses taken by the British then. The shades o f these dynamics can also be
3 Harjot Oberoi, The Construction o f  religious Boundaries: Culture. Identity and diversity in the Sikh 
Tradition. (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1994) 24.
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observed until today in the current political scenario, when the formation of the Khalsa’s 
300 years was celebrated on a grand scale never witnessed before at Anandpur City in 
Panjab by the government of Panjab in the year 1999.
The creation of the state under Ranjit Singh, Sarkar e Khalsa, created a non Muslim 
hegemony, where the Sikhs and the high caste Hindus such as Khatris, and to a lesser 
extent Christians gained supremacy over a Muslim majority in Panjab. This was 
significant because it established a trend where non Muslims were part of the ruling class. 
In this way, the developments in Punjab are important because they signify an end to the 
Muslim domination over much of northern India. However, the significance lies in the 
fact that the ruling class was composed of the Sikhs and the Hindus. In terms of temporal 
authority, the Sarkar e Khalsa had important ramifications. Although Mughal institutions 
were maintained nominally such as the judiciary and the agrarian system, the 
symbological connotations attached to them were subverted by Ranjit Singh’s policies. 
For example, Qazi and Adaltis, the judiciary functionaries who traditionally had been 
Muslims began having Sikhs in those positions as well. The army was primarily 
composed of Sikhs and the Sikhs’ religion was instrumental in giving an identity to the 
army which would have ramifications in its military functionings. This is not to say that 
the Panjab became a Sikh theocracy, far from it; what this thesis shows is that the Sarkar 
e Khalsa created a space where disparate social groups ranging from Khatris to Shias 
experienced a significant level of social mobilization. Sikhism, apart from being a 
religion, also served as a framework which could be used by Ranjit Singh to create his 
distinct political identity in relation to the Mughal predecessors in Punjab. It created
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legitimacy for Ranjit Singh to rule the region west of Sutlej on his own terms. And the 
symbologies attached to his rule were a clear reflection of this. The Sarkar e Khalsa was 
not about regional nationalism as we will understand it in the modernistic sense, rather it 
was about assertion; assertion of identity and assertion of autonomy, which gradually had 
become politicized from the very founding days of Sikhism. On the whole, it was not a 
simplistic reaction to the Mughal rule. It was also not simply an appropriation of the 
State’s apparatus for one’s gain. From our vantage point it can be said that it was an 
attempt to create a new juncture in the political history of North West India.
The importance of not fetishisising the regional nationalism, and in this context 
‘Panjabiyaf, the Sarkar e Khalsa represents certain trends which can be applied outside 
Punjab. First at the basic level, it conveys to us the violence and chaos that is associated 
with the very process of state formation and it shows us that continuity and change are 
not two factors on opposing poles, but rather have a dialogue with each other. Continuity 
did occur as has already been mentioned in terms of the maintenance of certain 
administrative practises and institutions. However, the point to consider is that the state 
formation has a very strong temporal quality as well. The makeup of the state goes 
beyond its institution and it seeks a movement forward from a previous set up. While 
Ranjit Singh’s policy fell into a category of accommodation in the sense that it did 
incorporate a wide variety of groups, there was a significant attempted break, as previous 
Mughal elites as well as Punjabi Muslim tribal leaders who were entrenched in the 
countryside were marginalised often through violent means and sometimes through 
coercive diplomacy. Hence at the very least this meant a break with sentiments,
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procedures and norms of governance associated with the traditional elites within Panjab 
before Ranjit Singh. Sikhism is important not because it was a religion that propagated 
domination over non Sikhs but because in the political context of that time it created a 
framework for these changes to occur. This was because of various factors. For one, 
Sikhism incorporated the communities such as the Jats and the Khatris who, even when 
not a part of the governing elites were participants in northwest India’s military and 
political landscape. Sikhism allowed groups such as these and eventually ambitious 
individuals such as Ranjit Singh to realize their military and political aspirations, apart 
from giving them their religious identity. At the same time it should be stressed that the 
religious context in which Sikhism operated was still very real. But we are talking of a 
context in time and space where the boundary between the religious and the profane was 
not seen in rigid terms. That is why Ranjit Singh could use the Sikh terms such as the 
Sarkar e Khalsa while simultaneously maintaining multi-religious non Muslim elite. The 
Sarkar e Khalsa created a break from the Mughal past by politicizing the identities of the 
groups such as the Jats and the Khatris which paved the way for a non Muslim identity to 
emerge in Punjab as something very distinctive, both culturally and politically. Its legacy 
was to be felt more than a century after the Sarkar e Khalsa decline when partition 
occurred. It implanted in the minds of the Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims a certain ‘genetic 
memory’, that is, the feelings and ideas inherited from our ancestors as part of a 
collective subconscious, which shaped certain Punjabi consciousness. Due to the political 
necessities within which the Sarkar e Khalsa operated, religious identities which had 
been fluid began to be crystallized. The British administration in Panjab, through 
recruitment policies as well as by introducing the system of the census, further
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augmented the crystallisation of these identities, which was started during the time of the 
Sarkar e Khalsa. Hence, the Sarkar e Khalsa was in essence a ‘modern’ state, for it 
reconfigured the culture of the region, by way of using the State apparatus. The 
romanticisation of Ranjit Singh’s rule with Punjabi identity is therefore historically ironic 
because there is little about his rule that is traditional; rather his rule represents a cautious 
radical break from the past. This cautious break from the past was not only restricted to 
the Panjab, as has been noted, but Ranjit Singh also patronized the Hindu religious sites 
in Jawalamukhi and other holy cities in order to establish his image as a righteous and 
legitimate ruler. This itself would have political ramifications over the Mughal authority 
outside the Panjab. From the Muslim side, the reaction to Ranjit Singh’s rule was not 
simply religious, despite certain appearances, as has been already explained. Jehad, when 
it was declared, was intrinsically tied to the political concerns of tribal leaders, and 
dynasts that had their own aspirations, Sarkar e Khalsa threatened the parochial interest 
of the well entrenched Muslim elites that operated at the time of the Mughals or perhaps 
even before. Punjabi Muslim identity was itself too fragmented in terms of class, caste 
and aspirations, to provide a concerted ideological counter to the Sarkar e Khalsa. 
Rather, under the Sarkar e Khalsa, various factions within the Punjabi Muslim elites 
accentuated their rivalry with each other; which, as noted, resulted in the rise of the 
families such as the Fakirs. Even though the ruling elite were primarily non Muslim, this 
did not imply that the Muslims of Punjab felt oppressed as a collective whole. Rather, 
what happened was that the political and military networks of a profane nature were 
significantly disrupted which again can be used as an argument that the Sarkar e Khalsa 
at various levels represented a break with the past.
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This is important also in the sense that it does not reduce the Sikh identity to something 
that is reactionary in relation to Muslims and Hindus. It has to be stressed that the 
crystallisation that has been mentioned was not a reactionary process, but a process in a 
way that represented a linear moment in historical terms. Partition, despite its tragic 
characteristics, was the culmination of this linear moment. A movement which may have 
had repressive elements in it but which was also a part and parcel of a political 
dynamism, when it came to the process of state formation in north India.
Of course another point that has to be made is that the Sarkar e Khalsa can be made to be 
a showcase for certain wider dynamics in Indian history. For one, it puts into question the 
Mughal versus post Mughal viewpoint that has dominated much of Indian historiography. 
It counters the notion that the decline of the Mughals heralded a ‘decline’ in the Indian 
political scenery. Christopher Bayly for instance has conveyed the complex mechanics 
that were at work when it came to the Mughals being undermined. The very dynamics 
that may have benefitted the Mughal Empire also undermined it. Such as, the dynamics 
of the Indian military labour market, the highly volatile nature of the north Indian country 
side - a factor that has existed for centuries, as well as armed pastoral and agrarian groups 
constantly mobilizing themselves through the state or without the state. It was the same 
dynamism that allowed the British to use the Indian resources to conquer India in terms 
of monetary power and military manpower. If one was to really look for continuity in the 
context of the Ranjit Singh kingdom or the Maratha domain, looking at the institutions 
will only give one a superficial picture. Rather continuity or lack of it should be searched
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for at a more grassroots' level, which does not mean that it has to be a subaltern 
approach, instead it may be a parochial approach. For the establishment of the Sarkar e 
Khalsa was very much rooted in the dynamics of the North West country side that was 
truly a creation of the volatility of that area, a volatility that the Mughals presided over 
without really suppressing it. This of course is an area of Indian history which has to be 
studied in depth. But as the works of scholars like Dirk Kolff show — even powerful state 
machinery, such as the Mughals commanded, never had a monopoly over the north 
Indian military market because large numbers of military men could be at the service of 
local landowners and magnates.4 Even when it came to the mansabdari system, local 
linkages were highly important in the local Mughal military recruitment practices as in 
the case of the Rajputs. These local linkages therefore were highly important in 
maintaining a state, and thus in certain instances could be crucial in creating a state in the 
context of a new conceptual framework. Therefore the Sarkar e Khalsa had its roots in 
the social and political history of the semi nomadic pastoral tribes such as the Jats, the 
Bhattis and the Gakhars. Interaction of the Mughal government with these groups before 
the establishment of the Sarkar e Khalsa often acted as the catalyst for the formation of 
the state. It was the British administrative system and its promotion of the irrigation 
system that took away the space for these changes to occur. As a result the Sarkar e 
Khalsa is also significant since at least in chronological terms it acts as a bridge during 
the times when major social transformations took place. Hence, the significance of 
Sarkar e Khalsa because of its chronological location cannot be underplayed. This also 
means that the distinctions often made between the British rule and the history of India
4 Dirk H A Kolff, Naukar. Sepoys and Rajputs: The Ethnohistorv o f the Military Labour Market o f  
Hindustan. 1450-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) Introduction.
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before the arrival of the British have to be examined in a less simplistic manner in the 
Punjab and the other regions of the Indian subcontinent.
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GLOSSARY
Adalti:
Akhbarat:
Amil:
Bakhshi:
Bcmi:
Banjara:
Baraka:
Basant:
Bigha:
Brahmin:
Chaudhari:
Chukdar:
Daftar:
Dal Khalsa:
Official of the judicial department 
Newspaper
An Amil is in-charge of an administrative unit. His primary 
task is to serve as prayer leader at the local masjid, and to 
appoint a surrogate namaz imam when he is out of town. An 
amil may have jurisdiction over a particular city and its 
outlying suburbs or over mohallas.
A caste found among both Hindu and Muslim Panjabis as well 
as Kashmiris
Verses from the Holy book of the Sikhs, Guru Granth 
Nomadic tribe of India 
The spiritual territory of the sufi pir 
Spring season
A unit of measurement of land
A caste group mainly involved in policy formulations and the 
studying and teaching of sacred scriptures
Government official
Owners of wells who mostly carried on cultivation by means 
of wells
Office book or office department
Dal Khalsa is the term used to describe the militia, which 
came into being during the turbulent period of the eighteenth 
century and became a formidable force of the Sikhs in the
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Daroga:
Darshart: 
Dastakhat e Khas: 
Dasvandh:
Dharamshala: 
Dharmarth: 
Diwar):
Doab:
Faqir:
Farman:
Far man dahan:
Faiwa:
Faujdar:
Firangee:
northwestern India.
Inspector
Visual sight of a monarch or idol of god or goddess 
Royal signature
Literally means a tenth part and refers to the act of donating 
ten percent of ones harvest, both financial and in the form of 
time and service such as seva (selfless service) to the 
Gurdwara and anywhere else
Place to rest, primarily created for a religious purpose 
Religious grant
Middle Eastern title used in various languages for high 
officials, especially of cabinet rank, or as a rank of nobility in 
South Asia
Means "two waters" or "two rivers" in Persian. Used in India 
and Pakistan for a "tongue" or tract of land lying between two 
confluent rivers
A Sufi, especially one who performs feats of endurance or 
apparent magic.
Order
Equivalence of looking towards sovereigns to the worship of 
God
A considered opinion in Islam made by a mufti, a scholar 
capable of issuing judgments on Sharia (Islamic law)
A title awarded by Muslim rulers to people who had the 
responsibility of protecting some territory
Foreigner
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Gaddi:
Gaddi Nashin: 
Ghazi: 
Gurmukhi:
Gurudwara:
Haveli:
Hnkamnama:
Ijaradar:
Jagir
Jagirdar:
Jehad:
Jogi:
Jitbba:
Julaha:
Kacha
Kafir:
Seat
Heir apparent 
Islamic religious warrior
The most common script used for writing the Punjabi 
language. 'Gurmukhi1 literally means from the mouth of the 
Guru. Gurmukhi has some similarities to older Indian scripts 
of the times, but its thirty five characters and vowel modifiers 
were standardized by Guru Angad.
Sikh religious place
A big residence
Set of orders
A revenue farmer. Ijara means farming of revenue. In the 
Mughal period Ijara or farming system was prevalent.
A medieval system of assigning land and its rent as annuity to 
state functionaries. Jagir is a Persian term meaning land 
assigned.
Official holding jagir(s)
A religious call to war for the followers of Islam
A term for a male practitioner of various forms of the path of 
Yoga
An Indian dress for men, a piece of clothing for the trunk of 
the body.
A category of Harijans 
Specially designed underwear
An Arabic word literally meaning "ingrate". In the Islamic 
doctrinal sense the term refers to a person who does not
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Kangha
Kara
Karah Parshad 
Kardar:
Kesh
Khalsa:
Khanqa:
Khatri:
Khillat:
Khulasa Sikhs
Kirpan:
Kotwal:
Kumidan i 
Topkhana:
Lakhi:
Langar:
recognize Allah or the prophethood of Muhammad (i.e., any 
non-Muslim) or who hides, denies, or covers the truth. It is 
usually translated into English as "infidel" or "unbeliever."
Wooden comb
Iron bracelet
A soft, sweetened food made of flour or semolina and ghee
Administrator
Uncut hair
Pure, refers to the collective body of all baptized Sikhs
A building designed specifically for gatherings of a Sufi 
brotherhood, and is a place for spiritual retreat and character 
reformation. In the past, and to a lesser extent nowadays, they 
often served as hospices for Sufi travelers and Islamic 
students.
A caste group in Panjab which were mainly involved in 
military and some in trade
Robe of honour
Sahajdhari or slow adopting Sikhs
Strapped sword
Inspector
The commandant of gunnery 
Millionaires, One lakh = 100,000
Is the term used in the Sikh religion for the free, vegetarian- 
only food served in a Gurudwara and eaten by everyone sitting 
as equals
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Madad i Mash: 
Mahal: 
Malikana: 
Mansabdari:
Masjid:
Maulvi:
Maulvizada:
Mela:
Misldar:
Misls:
Mistri:
Mohalla:
Mujahideen:
Mukaddam:
Nambardar:
Nanakshahi:
Nanrooz:
Nawab:
Nazar:
Nazrana:
Royal grant
Used to refer to the wife of the respective Gurus 
Proprietary allowance
The generic term for the military -type grading of all imperial 
officials of the Mughal empire.
Mosque
Religious representative of Islam in Masjid
Son of a Maulvi
Fair
Leader of the Sikh fighting clans
Equals, Sikh bands
Mason
Neighbourhood
Mujahideen literally means "strugglers" and is a term used for 
Muslims fighting in a war or involved in any other struggle.
Government official
Government official
Calendar used by the Sikhs.
The official New Year for Zoroastrians worldwide. It falls 
each year on the Spring Equinox -  March 21
Was originally the subedar (provincial governor) or viceroy of 
a subah (province) or region of the Mughal empire, but 
became a high title for Muslim nobles.
A kind of gift
Royal gift
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Nihang: 
Panch:
Panchayat:
Pandit:
Panth:
Pargana:
Parwana:
Patvari:
Peer:
Peerzada:
Piri-Muridi:
Purdah:
An armed Sikh order
Each of the five wise and respected elders chosen and 
accepted by the village community to form a Panchayat.
Panchayat refers to a South Asian political system where the 
council of elected members takes decisions 011 issues key to a 
village's social, cultural and economic life: thus, a panchayat 
is a village's body of elected representatives. The council 
leader is named sarpanch in Hindi. Traditionally, these 
assemblies settled disputes between individuals and villages.
A Pandit or Pundit is a scholar, a teacher, particularly one 
skilled in Sanskrit and Hindu law, religion, music 01* 
philosophy. In the original usage of the word, a pundit is a 
Hindu, almost always a Brahmin, who has memorized a 
substantial portion of the Vedas, along with the corresponding 
rhythms and melodies for chanting or singing them.
The term used for several religious traditions in India. A panth 
is founded by a Guru or an Acharya, and is often led by 
scholars or senior practitioners of the tradition.
A former administrative unit of the Indian Subcontinent, used 
primarily, but not exclusively, by the Muslim kingdoms
Message
A land official working for the government 
Sufi religious leader 
Follower of peer(s)
A special relationship between the pir, spiritual leader and his 
disciple
Purdah or Pardaa (literally meaning "curtain") is the practice 
of preventing men from seeing women. This takes two forms:
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Qabuliyat
Qctnimgo:
Qcttalgarhi:
Qazi;
Qila Mubarak: 
Qiladar:
Raja:
Rajput:
Rakhi:
Sadhu:
Sahibzada:
Sahukar:
Sardar:
Sant Sipahi:
physical segregation of the sexes, and the requirement for 
women to cover their bodies and conceal their form. Purdah 
exists in various forms in the Islamic world and among Hindu 
women in parts of India.
deed of acceptance
Means "an expounder of law". This designation was used in 
the Punjab and other provinces of India and Pakistan for 
hereditary registrar of landed property in a subdivision of a 
district. In Mughal times the most of these offices were held 
by Khatris.
Small fortress where killing took place
A judicial functionary for the adjudication o f cases concerning 
Muslim law
Auspicious fort
Person in charge of the fort
King
A Hindu Kshatriya caste 
Protection
A common term for an ascetic or practitioner of yoga (yogi) 
who has given up pursuit of the first three Hindu goals of life: 
kama (enjoyment), artha (practical objectives) and even 
dharma (duty).
Child
Money lender 
Leader
A baptised Sikh, better known as a Khalsa Sikh, is a "Sant- 
Sipahi" - a Saint-Soldier: A saint first and then a soldier. So to
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Sarkar:
Sarpanch:
Sharia:
Shastra:
Smriti:
Sowar: 
Sabedar: 
SufedKoh: 
Sutra or Satta:
satisfy this term, one must first become a saint and then a 
Soldier. As a saint one must have total control over ones 
internal vices and be able to constantly be immersed in five 
virtues as clarified in the Guru Granth Sahib. Only then can a 
Sikh become a soldier
Government
A sarpanch is a democratically elected head of a Panchayat. 
He, together with other elected Panches, constitute the 
Panchayat.The Sarpanch is the focal point of contact between 
government officers and the village community
It is the body of Islamic law. The term means "way" or "path"; 
it is the legal framework within which the public and some 
private aspects of life are regulated for those living in a legal 
system based on Muslim principles of jurisprudence.
Shastra (or Sastra) is a Sanskrit word used (to be pronounced 
[shaastra]) to denote education/knowledge in a general sense. 
The word is generally used as a suffix in the context of 
technical or specialised knowledge in a defined area of 
practice. E.g. Vaastu Shastra, Artha Shastra. In essence, the 
shaastra is the knowledge which is based on principles that are 
timeless. Also, it is applicable to all and not meant for a 
certain group of people.
Shastra is also a by-word used when referring to a scripture 
Refers to a specific body of Hindu religious scripture 
Horse rider 
Viceroy
The white mountains
Literally means a rope or thread that holds things together, and
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Tazia:
Tazkirah:
Tehsildar:
Thaaedar:
Toshakhana:
Tumcindar:
Ulema:
Ushr:
Vakil:
War is: 
Wilayat: 
Zamindar: 
Zamindari:
more metaphorically refers to an aphorism (or line, rule, 
formula), or a collection of such aphorisms in the form of a 
manual.
The replica of the tomb of Imam Hossain, grandson of Hazrat 
Mohammed and the martyr in the War of Karbala. The 
meaning of the word is 'to mourn' or to 'show condolence'.
A biographical memoir
Government official in charge of an administrative unit 
Police inspector 
Royal treasury 
Government official
The people of Islamic Knowledge; refers to the educated class 
of Muslim legal scholars engaged in the several fields of 
Islamic studies.
Islamic tax. Ushr taxes are used to provide social welfare 
funds.
Diplomat
Heir
An administrative division, usually translated as "province."
Landholders
System of landholdings
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